CAIRIS

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 1411 is passing Here is how to embed it:

These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

        

 Basics 13/13

  • Identification

    Computer Aided Integration of Requirements and Information Security

    What programming language(s) are used to implement the project?
  • Basic project website content


    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]

    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]

    Non-trivial contribution file in repository: https://github.com/failys/cairis/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md.



    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]
  • FLOSS license

    What license(s) is the project released under?



    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]

    The Apache-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]

    The Apache-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]

    Non-trivial license location file in repository: https://github.com/failys/cairis/blob/master/LICENSE.


  • Documentation


    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]

    Some documentation basics file contents found.



    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]
  • Other


    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]

    The project GitHub site supports HTTPS: https://github.com/failys/cairis. The project documentation supports HTTPS: https://cairis.readthedocs.io



    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]

    GitHub supports discussions on issues and pull requests.



    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]

    https://cairis.readthedocs.io. Documentation source files can be found here: https://github.com/failys/cairis/tree/master/docs .



    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]


(Advanced) What other users have additional rights to edit this badge entry? Currently: []



  • Public version-controlled source repository


    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]

    Repository on GitHub, which provides public git repositories with URLs.



    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made.



    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]

    Repository ids are used for interim versioning between major/minor/incremental releases.



    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • Unique version numbering


    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]

    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]


    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]
  • Release notes


    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]

    A bullet summary of the main features in each release is given, e.g. https://github.com/failys/cairis/releases/tag/1.4.0 We could do a better job with this summary though...



    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]

    No publicly known vulnerabilities.


  • Bug-reporting process


    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    The majority of issues reported are acknowledged within hours, and fixed within 72 hours.



    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]

    The majority of enhancement requests are responded to (although not necessarily prioritised for implementation) within 24 - 48 hours.



    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]

    All open/closed issues are available at https://github.com/failys/cairis/issues


  • Vulnerability report process


    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]

    Vulnerabilities should be reported just like any other bugs; these should be reported in line with our contribution guidelines: https://github.com/failys/cairis/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md



    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]

    We haven't received any vulnerabilities yet, but this is something we will consider.



    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]

    No vulnerabilities reported yet.


  • Working build system


    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]

    A docker container is automatically generated after each push to the master branch: https://hub.docker.com/r/shamalfaily/cairis/



    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]

    Docker file available here to illustrate packages / tools used: https://github.com/failys/cairis/blob/master/docker/Dockerfile



    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    Docker file available here to illustrate packages / tools used: https://github.com/failys/cairis/blob/master/docker/Dockerfile


  • Automated test suite


    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]

    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]

    Tests run by simply running py.test as standard



    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    The automated tests cover > 90% of server side functionality, but a testing strategy for front-end testing is still under development.



    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    CI support via Travis.CI: https://travis-ci.org/failys/cairis


  • New functionality testing


    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]

    Any new functionality should be complemented with new or revised test cases. This is mandated in the contribution guidelines.



    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]

    Commits that address issues / projects are referenced, e.g. https://github.com/failys/cairis/issues/107



    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]

    Any new functionality should be complemented with new or revised test cases. This is mandated in the contribution guidelines.


  • Warning flags


    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]

    No compiled languages are used by CAIRIS. 'use strict' is set on all JavaScript modules.



    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]

    No compiled languages are used by CAIRIS. 'use strict' is set on all JavaScript modules.



    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]

    It is our policy to address warnings when they are flagged during automated testing. We are proactive in findings these when they arise due to incompatibility issues, and run our automated tests on both Python 2 and Python 3.


  • Secure development knowledge


    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]

    The primary maintainer has a PhD in Computer Science cogent to computer security, and lectures / carries out research in Security by Design: http://staffprofiles.bournemouth.ac.uk/display/sfaily



    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]

    The primary maintainer has a PhD in Computer Science cogent to computer security, and lectures / carries out research in Security by Design: http://staffprofiles.bournemouth.ac.uk/display/sfaily


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]

    CAIRIS relies on flask security for supporting processes and data for authentication, including cryptography. CAIRIS doesn't currently employ cryptography at rest or in transit in any other context, but this is currently under review.



    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    CAIRIS relies on flask security for supporting processes and data for authentication, including cryptography. CAIRIS doesn't currently employ cryptography at rest or in transit in any other context, but this is currently under review.



    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]

    CAIRIS uses flask_security, which uses FLOSS libraries only.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]

    CAIRIS relies on flask security for supporting processes and data for authentication, including cryptography. CAIRIS doesn't currently employ cryptography at rest or in transit in any other context, but this is currently under review.



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]

    CAIRIS relies on flask security for supporting processes and data for authentication, including cryptography. CAIRIS doesn't currently employ cryptography at rest or in transit in any other context, but this is currently under review.



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]

    CAIRIS relies on flask security for supporting processes and data for authentication, including cryptography. CAIRIS doesn't currently employ cryptography at rest or in transit in any other context, but this is currently under review.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]

    CAIRIS relies on flask security for supporting processes and data for authentication, including protection against CSRF attacks. CAIRIS doesn't currently employ cryptography at rest or in transit in any other context, but this is currently under review.



    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]

    CAIRIS user account passwords are hashed and salted when first used.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]

    We follow practices prescribed by flask security when initialising flask security components.


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]

    MITMs can be addressed in a number of ways. If CAIRIS is hosted on a domain where only https traffic is allowed then traffic to/from the CAIRIS is sent over http. Alternatively, mod_wsgi-express to run over TLS, but configuration of mod_wsgi-express is not within the scope of CAIRIS.



    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]

    No hashes are retrieved over the network.


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]

    No publicly known CAIRIS vulnerabilities have been reported.



    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    No publicly known CAIRIS vulnerabilities have been reported.


  • Other security issues


    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]

    Neither the CAIRIS repository nor CAIRIS itself manages private data.


  • Static code analysis


    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]

    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]

    Our use of code analysis tools are limited to coverage testing tools. We will review rules and alternative approaches when time and resources allow.



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]

    Our use of code analysis tools are limited to coverage testing tools. We will review rules and alternative approaches when time and resources allow.



    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    Source code analysis takes place as part of automated testing after each push to the master branch.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]

    Our use of code analysis tools are limited to coverage testing tools. We will review rules and alternative approaches when time and resources allow.



    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]

    We do not currently use any tools developed in a memory-unsafe language to the best of our knowledge.



    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]

    code assertions are included in test cases.



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]

    Our use of code analysis tools are limited to coverage testing tools. We will review rules and alternative approaches when time and resources allow.



This data is available under the Creative Commons Attribution version 3.0 or later license (CC-BY-3.0+). All are free to share and adapt the data, but must give appropriate credit. Please credit Shamal Faily and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Shamal Faily.
Entry created on 2017-11-23 14:00:02 UTC, last updated on 2019-07-29 13:04:32 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2017-11-24 08:10:25 UTC.

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