Xen Project

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 Basics 13/13

  • Identification

    Xen Project is a Linux Foundation Collaborative Project that develops the Xen Hypervisor and related virtualization technologies. The Xen Hypervisor is a leading virtualization platform that is powering some of the largest clouds in production today, such as Amazon Web Services, Rackspace Public Cloud, Alibaba Cloud (Aliyun) and many hosting services. It also fosters the creation of lightweight Unikernel systems with the Mirage OS incubator project, as well as many independent efforts which use our hypervisor as a base for their work.

    What programming language(s) are used to implement the project?
  • Basic project website content


    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]

    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]

    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]
  • FLOSS license

    What license(s) is the project released under?



    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]

    Mostly GPLv2 with some files being released under more permissive licenses to allow interaction with other open source projects. Some sub-projects use MIT or BSD style licenses. The GPL-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]

    The GPL-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]
  • Documentation


    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]


    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]
  • Other


    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]

    Given only https: URLs.



    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]

    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]

    Besides in-tree documentation as highlighted earlier, the project has an entire website and wiki dedicated to documentation. See https://wiki.xenproject.org/ and https://www.xenproject.org/



    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]


(Advanced) What other users have additional rights to edit this badge entry? Currently: []



  • Public version-controlled source repository


    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]

    Repositories are at https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/ Some sub-projects such as XAPI and MirageOS use github exclusively: see https://xenproject.org/developers/teams.html for mor einformation



    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    Uses git/github to track



    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]

    Interim versions are put on git, not just final versions.



    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]

    Uses git.


  • Unique version numbering


    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]

    The primary single user uses git commit records (and signed release tags) to identify releases.



    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]


    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

  • Release notes


    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]

    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]

    We do this explicitly for point releases (e.g. https://xenproject.org/downloads/xen-archives/xen-46-series/xen-461.html). However, we do not explicitly list fixed vulnerabilities for major releases which by default contain fixes for all known vulnerabilities as listed in https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/ up to the release date, unless there has been an oversight (note that this has not happened yet), in which case this would be stated in release notes.


  • Bug-reporting process


    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    The vast majority of bug reports are acknowledged.



    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]

    It is up to contributors to submit enhancement requests: the Xen Project developers almost never accept "enhancement requests" on their own, unless these are very popular requests from https://xenorg.uservoice.com/forums/172169-xen-development. However the vast majority of enhancement requests by contributors, are merged within the required time period (see https://xen.biterg.io:443/goto/edb2f27b8c1cf85113ab55a58e218a13)



    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]

    Reports and responses are handled as described in https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Reporting_Bugs_against_Xen_Project https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Reporting_Bugs_against_Xen_Project]. Many reports are initially handled via mailing lists, which are searchable via http://xen.markmail.org/ (subject:BUG). The bug tracker is also used (and is searchable); it is described at https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Bug_Management_Interface


  • Vulnerability report process


    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]

    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]

    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]

    The project's security team typically responds within one working day.


  • Working build system


    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]

    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]


    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

  • Automated test suite


    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]

    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]

    See the README files in the relevant repositories, as well as https://xenbits.xen.org/docs/xtf/



    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    The OSSTEST suite and the Test Farm which executes OSSTEST tests all official git code branches. However, the test coverage of OSSTEST does not cover all input fields and functionality. Several vendors (e.g. Citrix, Oracle & SUSE) have their own extensive test suites (including test infrastructure), which are executed on release candidates. These suites have an extremely high degree of coverage. It would not be possible for the project to run these suites and operate the infrastructure due to the Hardware that would be required.



    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    OSSTEST and the projects Test Farm implements continuous integration. In addition we do random build testing for different compilers (various gcc and clang versions) via Travis


  • New functionality testing


    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]

    We do not currently do this for all new features: only for supported new features. For new features in preview or experimental state we do not require automated tests. In addition, testing of new drivers and hardware features can be challenging due to hardware availability. To help address this issue, we developed a new test framework called XTF creating microkernel-based tests, and a suite of tests built using the framework. XTF is currently being integrated into OSSTEST, the project's CI / continuous integration / automated push gate system. Experimental and preview features are excluded.



    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]

    The project has a graded approach for features are supported ranging from preview, experimental, supported to deprecated. For features to be marked as supported, tests in the project's CI infrastructure are required or contributors are required to run 3rd party tests in their own 3rd party CI loops and demonstrate positive test results on a releases release candidate.



    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]

    We do not yet have a documented policy. A formal policy was discussed (but not yet agreed) that requires all supported features to be automatically tested by OSSTEST, XTF, a 3rd party test system or manually with test reports sent in for RCs. We have not yet fully formalised and documented this policy, as some areas such as 3rd party and manual test reports cannot currently be automatically submitted and checked without manual intervention. However, there are logistical challenges to enforcing and correctly documenting such a policy, which have not yet been fully resolved.


  • Warning flags


    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]

    We compile with -Wall -Wextra, and use Coverity



    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]

    We compile with -Werror, so warnings cannot be ignored.



    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]

    We compile with -Wall -Wextra to turn on as many warnings as possible


  • Secure development knowledge


    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]

    The project has a dedicated security team that has a track record of designing secure software



    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]

    The project has a dedicated security team that has a track record of fixing reported vulnerabilities


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]

    We don't provide cryptographic libraries or facilities. The Xen hypervisor itself doesn't do any cryptography.



    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    We don't provide cryptographic libraries or facilities. The Xen hypervisor itself doesn't do any cryptography.



    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]

    We don't provide cryptographic libraries or facilities. The Xen hypervisor itself doesn't do any cryptography.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]

    We don't provide cryptographic libraries or facilities. The Xen hypervisor itself doesn't do any cryptography.



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]

    We don't provide cryptographic libraries or facilities. The Xen hypervisor itself doesn't do any cryptography.



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]

    We don't provide cryptographic libraries or facilities. The Xen hypervisor itself doesn't do any cryptography.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]

    We don't provide cryptographic libraries or facilities. The Xen hypervisor itself doesn't do any cryptography.



    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]

    We don't provide cryptographic libraries or facilities. The Xen hypervisor itself doesn't do any cryptography.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]

    We don't provide cryptographic libraries or facilities. The Xen hypervisor itself doesn't do any cryptography.


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]


    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]

    We provided PGP-signed tarballs and PGP-signed git tags, so that the recipient can verify that they are getting the right bits.


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]

    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    See https://xenproject.org/security-policy.html under "Embargo and disclosure schedule"


  • Other security issues


    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]

    Private credentials are stored securely or in private repositories


  • Static code analysis


    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]

    The project uses Coverity Scan.



    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]


    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]

    These are reported to the security team, which handles the issues. See https://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html



    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    Coverity Scan is run daily


  • Dynamic code analysis


    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]

    The project runs American Fuzzy Lop over some portions of the codebase as part of its test infrastructure. This capability is being extended to cover more components. In addition tests which verify whether discovered, disclosed and fixed vulnerabilities are present in releases and master are run as part of the project's test infrastructure.

    In addition, 3rd party test infrastructure which has extensive fuzzing capability (such as Citrix' XenRT) are run on RCs (but also at regular intervals between releases) as part of the projects release process and issues are reported to the Xen Security team.



    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]

    Vendors such as Citrix, Oracle and SUSE, run their own test suites which for example in the case of Citrix who runs XenRT includes fuzzing functionality on XEN PROJECT release candidates. The project also runs AFL on portions of the code base as part of its test infrastructure.



    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]

    The Xen Project code base has a large number of run-time assertions in DEBUG builds. The test infrastructure tests against both RELEASE and DEBUG builds.



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]

    These are handled in the same way as we handle vulnerabilities. See https://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html



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Entry created on 2016-09-13 12:41:15 UTC, last updated on 2017-04-07 12:28:15 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2017-04-07 12:27:27 UTC.

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