hwlocality

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These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

        

 Basics 11/13 ●

  • Identification

    Rust bindings to Open MPI Portable Hardware Locality "hwloc" library, covering version 2.0 and above.

    What programming language(s) are used to implement the project?

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]

    Top of https://github.com/HadrienG2/hwlocality/blob/master/README.md.


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    Facilities are available, but not fully described in README/CONTRIBUTING yet.


    Not enough for a badge.

    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]

    Facilities are available, but not described in README/CONTRIBUTING yet.


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    Facilities are available, but not described in README/CONTRIBUTING yet.


  • FLOSS license

    What license(s) is the project released under?


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]

    The MIT license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]

    The MIT license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]

    https://github.com/HadrienG2/hwlocality/blob/master/LICENSE


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]

    https://github.com/HadrienG2/hwlocality/blob/master/README.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]

    Reference documentation is available at https://docs.rs/hwlocality/.


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]

    Given only https: URLs.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]

    GitHub supports discussions on issues and pull requests.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]

    English is the standard language for documentation, bug reports, PRs, etc.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]

    As evidenced by main branch commits, dependency updates, and low issue response time.



(Advanced) What other users have additional rights to edit this badge entry? Currently: []



  • Public version-controlled source repository


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]

    Repository on GitHub, which provides public git repositories with URLs.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made.


    Enough for a badge!

    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]

    Online repository includes the full git history.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • Unique version numbering


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]

    Enforced by crates.io, with mirroring git tags at https://github.com/HadrienG2/hwlocality/tags.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]

    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

    https://github.com/HadrienG2/hwlocality/tags


  • Release notes


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]

    Planned after v1.


    Enough for a badge!

    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]

    No publicly known vulnerability.


  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    https://github.com/HadrienG2/hwlocality/issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    https://github.com/HadrienG2/hwlocality/issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    Typical response time is within a couple of days.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]

    Maintainer has promptly responded to 100% of issues not recorded by himself at the time of writing.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]

    https://github.com/HadrienG2/hwlocality/issues


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]

    https://github.com/HadrienG2/hwlocality/blob/master/SECURITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]

    https://github.com/HadrienG2/hwlocality/security/advisories/new


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]

    No vulnerabilities reported in the last 6 months.


  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]

    Uses cargo, the standard build system for Rust projects.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]

    Uses cargo, the standard build system for Rust projects.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    Cargo is FLOSS, all build dependencies and the underlying hwloc C library are FLOSS too.


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]

    Automatically run by CI, can be run locally using "cargo test".


    Enough for a badge!

    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]

    Via "cargo test".


    Barely enough for a badge.

    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    Work towards this is ongoing, as evidenced by the growing test coverage.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    Done via GitHub actions.


  • New functionality testing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]

    Enforced via unit test coverage monitoring in CI.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]

    Unit test coveraged is published for everyone to see on codecov.io.


    Barely enough for a badge.

    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]

    Will be adressed as part of the upcoming "contribution guide" work.


  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]

    Aggressive rustc+clippy warnings that go beyond the standard configuration are enabled. Warnings are treated as errors by CI, and all warnings which can safely be treated as errors locally without a risk of breaking the build on compiler updates are also treated as errors locally.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]

    CI treats warnings as errors, and is kept green on the master branch.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]

    CI treats warnings as errors, and is kept green on the master branch.


  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]

    This project does not manage user privileges and limitations directly, so the only known area of caution is that it could be used in the implementation of privileged binaries. This is acknowledged by...

    • Keeping design & implementation simple (this includes only adding dependencies to the extent that they significantly simplify the part of the code that I maintain)
    • Exposing an easy-to-use and safe API with good input validation (including those hwloc should validate already, as a form of defense-in-depth)
    • Avoiding unnecessary use of unsafe code
    • Honoring Rust's invariants in the unsafe code that must exist

    Enough for a badge!

    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]

    Main developer has significant experience writing C and unsafe Rust code. All unsafe code has been carefully reviewed and annotated with SAFETY comments clarifying type invariants and how unsafe preconditions are met, which should ease third party review. Special attention has been paid to null pointers, out-of-bounds accesses, use after free, inadequate input validation, and violations of Rust's reference aliasing rules as these are common vulnerabilities in unsafe Rust code.


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]

    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    Enough for a badge!

    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]

    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]

    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]

    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]

    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]

    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]

    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]

  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]

    The main distribution mechanism is https://crates.io/, which uses MITM-resilient protocols.


    Enough for a badge!

    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]

    The main distribution mechanism is https://crates.io/, which does not do this.


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    Enough for a badge!

    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]

    No known vulnerability at the time of writing.


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    No known vulnerability at the time of writing, plan to address them ASAP if they come up.


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]

    No credentials needed at present time, so this is easy. But to avoid future incidents when more CI features that require secrets (e.g. codecov.io) are added, GitHub's secret scanning feature is also enabled, with push prevention.


  • Static code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]

    Clippy is the main third-party static analyzer used here. In addition, GitHub's features for detecting secrets and vulnerable dependencies are enabled. Formal verification and model checking tools (kani, prusti...) have also been considered, but they have very draconian restrictions (e.g. no loops) that seem to make them unfit for application to a relatively complex C API binding.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]

    See github scanning discussed above + with the current hardened settings clippy enforces a number of coding style rules that make mistakes in unsafe code stand out more. Would be interested in having more security-focused analyzers, but have not found any that supports Rust and is available under financial conditions suitable for an open source project.


    Enough for a badge!

    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]

    No vulnerability found at this point in time.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    It is run in CI along with all other forms of testing.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]

    CI includes cargo-careful + AdressSanitizer + LeakSanitizer dynamic analysis, with random testing via quickcheck used to optimize code coverage and "test the unexpected". Code coverage is measured via cargo-tarpaulin and published on codecov.io. Other tools which were considered but not adopted include...

    • Miri is perhaps the most well-known and feature-complete Rust UB checker, but alas it requires complete knowledge of program actions and thus does not work for C library bindings
    • Valgrind's memcheck works, but does not seem to bring extra benefits on top of ASAN + LeakCheck and executes slower
    • MSAN requires every library to be built in a special mode, which is impractical when system dependencies like libc come into play
    • The bindings do not feature any explicit concurrent code (they only interacts with concurrency mechanisms indirectly via hwloc, forwarding associated user requests unmodified), so concurrency checkers do not seem necessary

    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]

    See answer to [dynamic_analysis].


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]

    Most testing is performed on debug builds, which have all assertions enabled. cargo-careful is used to additionally enable Rust standard library assertions.


    Enough for a badge!

    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]

    No vulnerability found.



This data is available under the Creative Commons Attribution version 3.0 or later license (CC-BY-3.0+). All are free to share and adapt the data, but must give appropriate credit. Please credit Hadrien G. and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Hadrien G..
Entry created on 2023-09-28 08:44:43 UTC, last updated on 2023-12-27 07:22:47 UTC.

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