BadgeApp

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
If this is your project, please show your baseline badge status on your project page! The baseline badge status looks like this: Baseline badge level for project 1 is baseline-3 Here is how to embed the baseline badge:
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These are the Baseline Level 3 criteria. These criteria are from baseline version v2025.10.10 with updated criteria text from version v2026.02.19. Criteria that are new in version v2026.02.19 are labeled "future" and will begin to be enforced starting 2026-06-01. Please provide answers to the "future" criteria before that date.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    BadgeApp is the web application that allows developers to provide information about their project and (hopefully) get an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) Best Practices badge. This project was originally known as the Core Infrastructure Initiative (CII) best practices badge project.

    The Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) is managed by The Linux Foundation. The OpenSSF Best Practices badge online application (aka the BadgeApp) enables developers to quickly determine whether they are following best practices and to receive a badge they can display on GitHub and other locations. The application and its criteria are an open source project to which developers can contribute.

    You can see the program running, and use it to try to get a badge, by visiting: https://bestpractices.coreinfrastructure.org/

    The BadgeApp is written in Ruby on Rails and Javascript.

    See the development site on GitHub for more about how we secure this application.

    Note that the BadgeApp gets its own badge!

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

    We hope to see many other projects get their badge. Please start!

    Note that this badge entry is released under at least the Creative Commons Attribution version 3.0 or later license (CC-BY-3.0+).

 Controls 21/21 ●

  • Controls


    Enough for a badge!

    When a job is assigned permissions in a CI/CD pipeline, the source code or configuration MUST only assign the minimum privileges necessary for the corresponding activity. [OSPS-AC-04.02]
    Configure the project's CI/CD pipelines to assign the lowest available permissions to users and services by default, elevating permissions only when necessary for specific tasks. In some version control systems, this may be possible at the organizational or repository level. If not, set permissions at the top level of the pipeline.

    The only job assigned special permissions is the special deployment task. All others only have the privileges necessary to download the code, install tools locally in that container, and run the tools to determine and report analysis results.


    Enough for a badge!

    (Future criterion) CI/CD pipelines which accept trusted collaborator input MUST sanitize and validate that input prior to use in the pipeline. [OSPS-BR-01.04]
    CI/CD pipelines should sanitize (quote, escape or exit on expected values) all collaborator inputs on explicit workflow executions. While collaborators are generally trusted, manual inputs to a workflow cannot be reviewed and could be abused by an account takeover or insider threat.

    None of the three CI/CD workflows (.github/workflows/main.yml, codespell.yml, scorecard.yml) define any workflow_dispatch inputs or other explicit collaborator-triggered input parameters. All workflows trigger only on automated events (push, pull_request, schedule, branch_protection_rule).

    Since there are no manual workflow inputs to sanitize, the criterion is vacuously satisfied — there is no attack surface of this type to protect.

    Supporting evidence:

    • grep for workflow_dispatch across all workflow files returns zero matches.
    • The existing input validation (OSPS-BR-01.02's script/validate_branch_name) handles environment-provided values like GITHUB_REF_NAME, which is a different concern (automated trigger context, not collaborator-supplied input).

    Conclusion: The project meets OSPS-BR-01.04 because it has no pipelines that
    accept trusted-collaborator input (no workflow_dispatch with inputs, no
    manual triggers with parameters). If such inputs are added in the future,
    they would need to be validated before use.


    Enough for a badge!

    When an official release is created, all assets within that release MUST be clearly associated with the release identifier or another unique identifier for the asset. [OSPS-BR-02.02]
    Assign a unique version identifier to each software asset produced by the project, following a consistent naming convention or numbering scheme. Examples include SemVer, CalVer, or git commit id.

    The primary single user uses git commit records to identify releases. [version_unique]


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST define a policy for managing secrets and credentials used by the project. The policy should include guidelines for storing, accessing, and rotating secrets and credentials. [OSPS-BR-07.02]
    Document how secrets and credentials are managed and used within the project. This should include details on how secrets are stored (e.g., using a secrets management tool), how access is controlled, and how secrets are rotated or updated. Ensure that sensitive information is not hard-coded in the source code or stored in version control systems.

    See docs/secrets-policy.md for the policy and processes for managing secret/credentials, including rotating them.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the integrity and authenticity of the release assets. [OSPS-DO-03.01]
    Instructions in the project should contain information about the technology used, the commands to run, and the expected output. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    Releases are not intended for widespread use in many different sites, so this is N/A. [signed_releases]


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the expected identity of the person or process authoring the software release. [OSPS-DO-03.02]
    The expected identity may be in the form of key IDs used to sign, issuer and identity from a sigstore certificate, or other similar forms. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    Releases are not intended for widespread use in many different sites, so this is N/A. [signed_releases]


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include a descriptive statement about the scope and duration of support for each release. [OSPS-DO-04.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for the project's released software assets, the project should have a SUPPORT.md file, a "Support" section in SECURITY.md, or other documentation explaining the support lifecycle, including the expected duration of support for each release, the types of support provided (e.g., bug fixes, security updates), and any relevant policies or procedures for obtaining support.

    Our releases are intended for use in a single website that we maintain, and the support ends when we update the production branch.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST provide a descriptive statement when releases or versions will no longer receive security updates. [OSPS-DO-05.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for security fixes, the project should have a SUPPORT.md or other documentation explaining the project's policy for security updates.

    As the intended use is a single website, we simply stop updating all previous versions, and only support the current version.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST have a policy that code collaborators are reviewed prior to granting escalated permissions to sensitive resources. [OSPS-GV-04.01]
    Publish an enforceable policy in the project documentation that requires code collaborators to be reviewed and approved before being granted escalated permissions to sensitive resources, such as merge approval or access to secrets. It is recommended that vetting includes establishing a justifiable lineage of identity such as confirming the contributor's association with a known trusted organization.

    See docs/governance.md especially our "Escalated permissions policy". This updated policy was approved by the Best Practices Badge TSC in 2026.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, all compiled released software assets MUST be delivered with a software bill of materials. [OSPS-QA-02.02]
    It is recommended to auto-generate SBOMs at build time using a tool that has been vetted for accuracy. This enables users to ingest this data in a standardized approach alongside other projects in their environment.

    See docs/sbom.md. Every time we push to the staging or production branch, as part of the build process we generate an SPDX SBOM and record it. We provide a script scripts/get-sbom to make it easy to acquire the SBOM information given a commit ID. Commits to production are the closest thing we have to a "release". We also document the REST API for retrieving a SPDX SBOM of the current main branch, though that isn't really a release.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release comprising multiple source code repositories, all subprojects MUST enforce security requirements that are as strict or stricter than the primary codebase. [OSPS-QA-04.02]
    Any additional subproject code repositories produced by the project and compiled into a release must enforce security requirements as applicable to the status and intent of the respective codebase. In addition to following the corresponding OSPS Baseline requirements, this may include requiring a security review, ensuring that it is free of vulnerabilities, and ensuring that it is free of known security issues.

    We don't use multiple source code repositories for the project.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, project's documentation MUST clearly document when and how tests are run. [OSPS-QA-06.02]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains how to run the tests locally and how to run the tests in the CI/CD pipeline. The documentation should explain what the tests are testing and how to interpret the results.

    Yes, it includes a test suite based on minitest (the test framework that comes with Rails). [test]


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project's documentation MUST include a policy that all major changes to the software produced by the project should add or update tests of the functionality in an automated test suite. [OSPS-QA-06.03]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains the policy for adding or updating tests. The policy should explain what constitutes a major change and what tests should be added or updated.

    Yes, this is a documented policy in CONTRIBUTING.md which says:

    When adding or changing functionality, please include new tests for them as part of your contribution. [test_policy_mandated]


    Enough for a badge!

    When a commit is made to the primary branch, the project's version control system MUST require at least one non-author human approval of the changes before merging. [OSPS-QA-07.01]
    Configure the project's version control system to require at least one non-author human approval of changes before merging into the release or primary branch. This can be achieved by requiring a pull request to be reviewed and approved by at least one other collaborator before it can be merged.

    We have a policy in CONTRIBUTING.md that modifications other than low-risk modifications be reviewed by someone else, and a stated goal of having at least 50% of all proposed modifications to be reviewed. [two_person_review]


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project MUST perform a threat modeling and attack surface analysis to understand and protect against attacks on critical code paths, functions, and interactions within the system. [OSPS-SA-03.02]
    Threat modeling is an activity where the project looks at the codebase, associated processes and infrastructure, interfaces, key components and "thinks like a hacker" and brainstorms how the system be be broken or compromised. Each identified threat is listed out so the project can then think about how to proactively avoid or close off any gaps/vulnerabilities that could arise. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    The security requirements and assurance case are documented in docs/security.md. [assurance_case]


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, any vulnerabilities in the software components not affecting the project MUST be accounted for in a VEX document, augmenting the vulnerability report with non-exploitability details. [OSPS-VM-04.02]
    Establish a VEX feed communicating the exploitability status of known vulnerabilities, including assessment details or any mitigations in place preventing vulnerable code from being executed.

    We don't have any known vulnerabilities in components we use. When a dependency has a vulnerability, we generally simply update it to a not-vulnerable version, even if we believe it won't affect us, because that's a stronger defense than a possibly-flawed analysis.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. [OSPS-VM-05.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    External dependency checking is performed in two ways:

    • bundle_audit. This checks all gems for known vulnerabilities. This is run on every execution of the "rake" local check task and on every run of the continuous integration task on CircleCI.
    • Gemnasium. This also checks gems for known vulnerabilities, and puts the current status on a badge that is displayed on the front page of the project home page.

    For the few external dependencies that aren't managed as gems (e.g., PostgreSQL) the system package managers and/or the deployment system's managers are used to maintain them & periodically check them. [dependency_monitoring]


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include a policy to address SCA violations prior to any release. [OSPS-VM-05.02]
    Document a policy in the project to address applicable Software Composition Analysis results before any release, and add status checks that verify compliance with that policy prior to release.

    External dependency checking is performed in two ways:

    • bundle_audit. This checks all gems for known vulnerabilities. This is run on every execution of the "rake" local check task and on every run of the continuous integration task on CircleCI.
    • Gemnasium. This also checks gems for known vulnerabilities, and puts the current status on a badge that is displayed on the front page of the project home page.

    For the few external dependencies that aren't managed as gems (e.g., PostgreSQL) the system package managers and/or the deployment system's managers are used to maintain them & periodically check them. [dependency_monitoring]


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, all changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for malicious dependencies and known vulnerabilities in dependencies, then blocked in the event of violations, except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-05.03]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Software Composition Analysis tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    External dependency checking is performed in two ways:

    • bundle_audit. This checks all gems for known vulnerabilities. This is run on every execution of the "rake" local check task and on every run of the continuous integration task on CircleCI.
    • Gemnasium. This also checks gems for known vulnerabilities, and puts the current status on a badge that is displayed on the front page of the project home page.

    For the few external dependencies that aren't managed as gems (e.g., PostgreSQL) the system package managers and/or the deployment system's managers are used to maintain them & periodically check them. [dependency_monitoring]


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SAST findings. [OSPS-VM-06.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of Static Application Security Testing (SAST) findings. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    This is vacuously true, since we've had no reports of vulnerabilities that apply to a deployed system. [static_analysis_fixed]


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, all changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for security weaknesses and blocked in the event of violations except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-06.02]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    As noted in https://github.com/linuxfoundation/cii-best-practices-badge/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md, Brakeman, Rubocop, and rails_best_practices are used to analyze the Ruby code. Brakeman is specifically designed to analyze Ruby on Rails code. The Javascript client-side code is analyzed with ESLint, using over 100 rules.

    These analysis tools are used as part of the default 'rake' process used in local development, as well as the "pronto" process run on the continuous integration server running on CircleCI. [static_analysis]



This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit David A. Wheeler and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: David A. Wheeler.
Entry created on 2015-10-23 22:02:10 UTC, last updated on 2026-04-03 22:31:58 UTC. Last lost passing badge on 2023-09-19 06:10:11 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2023-09-19 06:10:30 UTC.