Shapin

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Baseline Level 3 criteria. These criteria are from baseline version v2025.10.10 with updated criteria text from version v2026.02.19. Criteria that are new in version v2026.02.19 are labeled "future" and will begin to be enforced starting 2026-06-01. Please provide answers to the "future" criteria before that date.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Pin floating tags in CI workflow files to immutable SHAs, making your pipelines reproducible and immune to tag mutation attacks.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

 Controls 21/21 ●

  • Controls


    Enough for a badge!

    When a job is assigned permissions in a CI/CD pipeline, the source code or configuration MUST only assign the minimum privileges necessary for the corresponding activity. [OSPS-AC-04.02]
    Configure the project's CI/CD pipelines to assign the lowest available permissions to users and services by default, elevating permissions only when necessary for specific tasks. In some version control systems, this may be possible at the organizational or repository level. If not, set permissions at the top level of the pipeline.

    Every job in ci.yml and release.yml declares only the minimum permissions required for its specific activity:

    test: contents: read only
    codeql: contents: read + security-events: write (SARIF upload)
    gosec: contents: read + security-events: write (SARIF upload)
    grype: contents: read + security-events: write (SARIF upload)
    dco: contents: read only
    release: contents: write + id-token: write + attestations: write (no packages: write — that is scoped exclusively to the docker job)
    docker: contents: read + packages: write + id-token: write
    A top-level permissions: read-all default ensures any job without an explicit block cannot silently inherit broad permissions.


    Enough for a badge!

    (Future criterion) CI/CD pipelines which accept trusted collaborator input MUST sanitize and validate that input prior to use in the pipeline. [OSPS-BR-01.04]
    CI/CD pipelines should sanitize (quote, escape or exit on expected values) all collaborator inputs on explicit workflow executions. While collaborators are generally trusted, manual inputs to a workflow cannot be reviewed and could be abused by an account takeover or insider threat.

    None of the CI/CD pipelines accept manual workflow_dispatch inputs — all workflows are triggered exclusively by push (tags or main) and pull_request events. There are no ${{ inputs.* }} expressions used anywhere in the pipeline. Consequently there is no collaborator-supplied input that could be injected into shell commands or pipeline logic.


    Enough for a badge!

    When an official release is created, all assets within that release MUST be clearly associated with the release identifier or another unique identifier for the asset. [OSPS-BR-02.02]
    Assign a unique version identifier to each software asset produced by the project, following a consistent naming convention or numbering scheme. Examples include SemVer, CalVer, or git commit id.

    All release assets include the semantic version identifier in their filename (e.g. shapin-v1.2.0-linux-amd64, shapin-v1.2.0-darwin-arm64). The version is also embedded in the binary at build time via -X main.Version. Assets are grouped under the corresponding GitHub Release tag (e.g. v1.2.0), and a checksums.txt SHA-256 manifest ties all assets to the release.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST define a policy for managing secrets and credentials used by the project. The policy should include guidelines for storing, accessing, and rotating secrets and credentials. [OSPS-BR-07.02]
    Document how secrets and credentials are managed and used within the project. This should include details on how secrets are stored (e.g., using a secrets management tool), how access is controlled, and how secrets are rotated or updated. Ensure that sensitive information is not hard-coded in the source code or stored in version control systems.

    Documented in SECURITY.md. Shapin does not manage secrets — it accepts tokens as ephemeral runtime inputs only. The policy clarifies that the project repository contains no committed secrets, the CI/CD pipeline uses only the ephemeral GitHub-provisioned GITHUB_TOKEN with per-job minimum permissions, and users are responsible for secure handling of any tokens they pass to the tool.

    https://github.com/Kirskov/Shapin/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the integrity and authenticity of the release assets. [OSPS-DO-03.01]
    Instructions in the project should contain information about the technology used, the commands to run, and the expected output. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    README.md includes a "Verify release integrity" section under Installation documenting three independent verification methods with exact commands and expected output: (1) SHA-256 checksum verification via checksums.txt, (2) cosign bundle signature verification with the expected certificate identity and OIDC issuer, (3) SLSA provenance attestation via gh attestation verify. This is in the README, separate from the release workflow in .github/workflows/release.yml.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the expected identity of the person or process authoring the software release. [OSPS-DO-03.02]
    The expected identity may be in the form of key IDs used to sign, issuer and identity from a sigstore certificate, or other similar forms. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    The "Verify release integrity" section in README.md documents the expected signer identity for both binary and Docker image verification:

    Certificate identity: https://github.com/Kirskov/Shapin/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/vX.Y.Z
    OIDC issuer: https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
    These identify the exact GitHub Actions workflow and tag that must have produced the signature, preventing acceptance of signatures from any other identity. This is stored in the README, separate from the release workflow.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include a descriptive statement about the scope and duration of support for each release. [OSPS-DO-04.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for the project's released software assets, the project should have a SUPPORT.md file, a "Support" section in SECURITY.md, or other documentation explaining the support lifecycle, including the expected duration of support for each release, the types of support provided (e.g., bug fixes, security updates), and any relevant policies or procedures for obtaining support.

    The README.md includes a Support section documenting that only the latest release receives security and bug fixes, no backports are made to older releases, and there is no LTS program. Links to GitHub Issues for bug reports and SECURITY.md for vulnerability disclosure are included.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST provide a descriptive statement when releases or versions will no longer receive security updates. [OSPS-DO-05.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for security fixes, the project should have a SUPPORT.md or other documentation explaining the project's policy for security updates.

    The Support section in README.md explicitly states: "A release stops receiving security updates as soon as a newer version is published." This makes the end-of-support trigger unambiguous — only the latest release is ever supported for security fixes.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST have a policy that code collaborators are reviewed prior to granting escalated permissions to sensitive resources. [OSPS-GV-04.01]
    Publish an enforceable policy in the project documentation that requires code collaborators to be reviewed and approved before being granted escalated permissions to sensitive resources, such as merge approval or access to secrets. It is recommended that vetting includes establishing a justifiable lineage of identity such as confirming the contributor's association with a known trusted organization.

    MAINTAINERS.md documents that this is a single-maintainer project and that no collaborator will receive escalated permissions (write access, merge approval, secrets access) without explicit review and approval by the maintainer, including a demonstrated contribution history and verified identity.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, all compiled released software assets MUST be delivered with a software bill of materials. [OSPS-QA-02.02]
    It is recommended to auto-generate SBOMs at build time using a tool that has been vetted for accuracy. This enables users to ingest this data in a standardized approach alongside other projects in their environment.

    An SBOM in SPDX-JSON format (sbom.spdx.json) is auto-generated by Syft (anchore/sbom-action) at release time and published as a release asset alongside the binaries. It is included in checksums.txt and signed with cosign.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release comprising multiple source code repositories, all subprojects MUST enforce security requirements that are as strict or stricter than the primary codebase. [OSPS-QA-04.02]
    Any additional subproject code repositories produced by the project and compiled into a release must enforce security requirements as applicable to the status and intent of the respective codebase. In addition to following the corresponding OSPS Baseline requirements, this may include requiring a security review, ensuring that it is free of vulnerabilities, and ensuring that it is free of known security issues.

    Shapin is a single-repository project. There are no subprojects or additional source code repositories compiled into the release. This criterion does not apply.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, project's documentation MUST clearly document when and how tests are run. [OSPS-QA-06.02]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains how to run the tests locally and how to run the tests in the CI/CD pipeline. The documentation should explain what the tests are testing and how to interpret the results.

    CONTRIBUTING.md now includes a "Running tests" section documenting how to run the full suite locally (go test ./...), per-package, with verbose output, and fuzz tests. It explains what each package tests, what a passing run looks like, and how CI runs the tests automatically on every push and PR via the test job in ci.yml.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project's documentation MUST include a policy that all major changes to the software produced by the project should add or update tests of the functionality in an automated test suite. [OSPS-QA-06.03]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains the policy for adding or updating tests. The policy should explain what constitutes a major change and what tests should be added or updated.

    CONTRIBUTING.md defines an explicit testing policy that specifies what constitutes a major change (new provider, new CLI flag, regex/parsing changes, bug fixes, scanner logic changes) and requires tests for each. Bug fixes must include a regression test. PRs that reduce coverage without justification are rejected. The full suite must pass before submission.


    Enough for a badge!

    When a commit is made to the primary branch, the project's version control system MUST require at least one non-author human approval of the changes before merging. [OSPS-QA-07.01]
    Configure the project's version control system to require at least one non-author human approval of changes before merging into the release or primary branch. This can be achieved by requiring a pull request to be reviewed and approved by at least one other collaborator before it can be merged.

    This is a single-maintainer project with one contributor. Requiring a non-author approval is not feasible as there are no other collaborators with merge access. All changes are reviewed by the sole maintainer before merging.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project MUST perform a threat modeling and attack surface analysis to understand and protect against attacks on critical code paths, functions, and interactions within the system. [OSPS-SA-03.02]
    Threat modeling is an activity where the project looks at the codebase, associated processes and infrastructure, interfaces, key components and "thinks like a hacker" and brainstorms how the system be be broken or compromised. Each identified threat is listed out so the project can then think about how to proactively avoid or close off any gaps/vulnerabilities that could arise. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    SECURITY.md contains a threat model covering six identified threats across all critical attack surfaces: compromised upstream APIs (T1), directory traversal on file I/O (T2), token leakage via output channels (T3), regex DoS on content parsing (T4), malicious config file injection (T5), and supply chain compromise of Shapin itself (T6). Each threat includes impact rating, likelihood, specific mitigations applied in the code, and residual risk. The assessment also defines trust boundaries between the tool, the local filesystem, external APIs, and user-supplied credentials. It is updated with new features and breaking changes.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, any vulnerabilities in the software components not affecting the project MUST be accounted for in a VEX document, augmenting the vulnerability report with non-exploitability details. [OSPS-VM-04.02]
    Establish a VEX feed communicating the exploitability status of known vulnerabilities, including assessment details or any mitigations in place preventing vulnerable code from being executed.

    A vex.json OpenVEX document is maintained in the repository and published as a release asset. It starts with an empty statements array — entries are added when Grype identifies vulnerabilities in the SBOM that are not exploitable in this project's context, with justification and impact statements per the OpenVEX spec.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. [OSPS-VM-05.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    SECURITY.md defines a SCA remediation policy with severity-based thresholds: Critical must be fixed before the next release, High within the next release cycle, Medium within 90 days or documented as not affected in vex.json. The process covers how Grype findings flow from CI SARIF upload to remediation or VEX justification. License policy requires OSI-approved licenses compatible with MIT.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include a policy to address SCA violations prior to any release. [OSPS-VM-05.02]
    Document a policy in the project to address applicable Software Composition Analysis results before any release, and add status checks that verify compliance with that policy prior to release.

    A sca-gate job runs Grype against the SBOM before every release, failing on Critical or High findings with fail-build: true and severity-cutoff: high. Both the release and docker jobs depend on sca-gate via needs:, so no release can proceed if the gate fails. Non-applicable findings are suppressed via vex.json. The policy and process are documented in SECURITY.md.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, all changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for malicious dependencies and known vulnerabilities in dependencies, then blocked in the event of violations, except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-05.03]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Software Composition Analysis tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    The grype job in ci.yml runs on every push to main and every PR. It scans the SBOM with Grype, uploads results as SARIF to GitHub Code Scanning, then runs a second gate step with fail-build: true and severity-cutoff: high. The vex.json is passed to suppress documented non-exploitable findings. Once added as a required status check in branch protection, this blocks any merge with unaddressed Critical or High vulnerabilities.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SAST findings. [OSPS-VM-06.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of Static Application Security Testing (SAST) findings. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    SECURITY.md defines the SAST remediation policy: Critical/High findings block merges, Medium findings must be resolved within 30 days, false positives are dismissed in GitHub Code Scanning with a documented reason (never silently ignored), and unresolved findings are tracked as GitHub issues. VEX is not used for SAST — it applies only to SCA findings in dependencies.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, all changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for security weaknesses and blocked in the event of violations except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-06.02]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    The codeql and gosec jobs in ci.yml run automatically on every push to main and every pull request. Both upload SARIF to GitHub Code Scanning. Once codeql and gosec are added as required status checks in branch protection (Settings → Branches → required status checks), no PR can be merged if either fails. The gosec gate uses fail-build behaviour via the SARIF upload step, and CodeQL fails the job on any finding above the configured threshold.



This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Antoine GRICOURT and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Antoine GRICOURT.
Entry created on 2026-04-12 08:01:17 UTC, last updated on 2026-04-12 09:20:06 UTC.