OpenTrApp

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 12755 is passing Here is how to embed it:
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These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 13/13 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    OpenTrApp is a free and open-source desktop application, released under the MIT license. It does not run AI agents itself. Instead, it acts as a security wrapper for the autonomous command-line AI agents that a user chooses to run on their own computer. The reference agent is OpenClaw, and the design is intended to support other command-line agents as well.

    The application builds and manages a five-container security perimeter around the agent. The agent's runtime, its tools, and its add-on skills are isolated from the user's files and from the rest of the system, and they have no direct path to the internet. All of the agent's network traffic passes through a controlled egress chain that applies both an application-layer and a network-layer policy, and the agent's API credentials are held in a separate proxy container so the agent cannot read them directly. The application also provides supplementary security tools, including a scanner that inspects third-party agent skills for known risky patterns and an optional local AI component that reviews ambiguous cases. OpenTrApp does not claim to make running an autonomous agent completely safe. Its goal is to raise the cost of a compromise through layered defenses, and it documents the remaining risks in a public threat model.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]
    This MUST be in language that potential users can understand (e.g., it uses minimal jargon).

    The repository README opens with a short paragraph that states what OpenTrApp does and the problem it solves, which is running autonomous command-line AI agents inside a contained security perimeter on the user's own computer.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/README.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    The README links to the GitHub releases page for obtaining the software and to the architecture and usage documentation. The repository issue tracker is the channel for feedback and bug reports, CONTRIBUTING.md explains how to contribute, and SECURITY.md describes the private channel for security reports.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]
    We presume that projects on GitHub use issues and pull requests unless otherwise noted. This information can be short, e.g., stating that the project uses pull requests, an issue tracker, or posts to a mailing list (which one?)

    CONTRIBUTING.md documents the contribution process. It explains how to clone and build the project, lists the test gates that continuous integration runs on every pull request and on every push to the main branch, and states that changes are proposed through GitHub pull requests.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    CONTRIBUTING.md sets out the requirements for acceptable contributions, including agreement to the Code of Conduct, keeping all continuous integration test gates green, and following the project's repository layout and manifest conventions.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • FLOSS license


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]
    FLOSS is software released in a way that meets the Open Source Definition or Free Software Definition. Examples of such licenses include the CC0, MIT, BSD 2-clause, BSD 3-clause revised, Apache 2.0, Lesser GNU General Public License (LGPL), and the GNU General Public License (GPL). For our purposes, this means that the license MUST be: The software MAY also be licensed other ways (e.g., "GPLv2 or proprietary" is acceptable).

    OpenTrApp is released under the MIT license, which is a free and open-source software license.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/LICENSE


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]
    The OSI uses a rigorous approval process to determine which licenses are OSS.

    The MIT license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]
    One convention is posting the license as a top-level file named LICENSE or COPYING, which MAY be followed by an extension such as ".txt" or ".md". An alternative convention is to have a directory named LICENSES containing license file(s); these files are typically named as their SPDX license identifier followed by an appropriate file extension, as described in the REUSE Specification. Note that this criterion is only a requirement on the source repository. You do NOT need to include the license file when generating something from the source code (such as an executable, package, or container). For example, when generating an R package for the Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN), follow standard CRAN practice: if the license is a standard license, use the standard short license specification (to avoid installing yet another copy of the text) and list the LICENSE file in an exclusion file such as .Rbuildignore. Similarly, when creating a Debian package, you may put a link in the copyright file to the license text in /usr/share/common-licenses, and exclude the license file from the created package (e.g., by deleting the file after calling dh_auto_install). We encourage including machine-readable license information in generated formats where practical.

    The license is stored in a file named LICENSE at the root of the repository, which is the standard location, and GitHub reports the repository license as MIT.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/LICENSE


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]
    This documentation must be in some media (such as text or video) that includes: how to install it, how to start it, how to use it (possibly with a tutorial using examples), and how to use it securely (e.g., what to do and what not to do) if that is an appropriate topic for the software. The security documentation need not be long. The project MAY use hypertext links to non-project material as documentation. If the project does not produce software, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    The README provides basic documentation, including the project's purpose, capabilities, requirements, installation steps, and limitations. The docs directory adds further documentation, including an architecture overview in docs/trifecta.md and a one-page perimeter explainer in docs/perimeter-explained.md.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/README.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]
    The documentation of an external interface explains to an end-user or developer how to use it. This would include its application program interface (API) if the software has one. If it is a library, document the major classes/types and methods/functions that can be called. If it is a web application, define its URL interface (often its REST interface). If it is a command-line interface, document the parameters and options it supports. In many cases it's best if most of this documentation is automatically generated, so that this documentation stays synchronized with the software as it changes, but this isn't required. The project MAY use hypertext links to non-project material as documentation. Documentation MAY be automatically generated (where practical this is often the best way to do so). Documentation of a REST interface may be generated using Swagger/OpenAPI. Code interface documentation MAY be generated using tools such as JSDoc (JavaScript), ESDoc (JavaScript), pydoc (Python), devtools (R), pkgdown (R), and Doxygen (many). Merely having comments in implementation code is not sufficient to satisfy this criterion; there needs to be an easy way to see the information without reading through all the source code. If the project does not produce software, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    The external interface is the desktop application's graphical interface, together with the setup wizard and the Telegram chat interface used to talk to the agent. The README describes how the setup wizard guides the user through installation, credential entry, and pairing, and the capabilities section describes what the agent can and cannot do. The architecture document in docs/trifecta.md describes the internal component interfaces in more detail.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/README.md


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]
    This requires that the project home page URL and the version control repository URL begin with "https:", not "http:". You can get free certificates from Let's Encrypt. Projects MAY implement this criterion using (for example) GitHub pages, GitLab pages, or SourceForge project pages. If you support HTTP, we urge you to redirect the HTTP traffic to HTTPS.

    The project home page at https://opentrapp.com is served over HTTPS and returns a successful response over TLS. The source repository and the release download URLs are hosted on GitHub, which serves all content over HTTPS.
    Evidence: https://opentrapp.com


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]
    Examples of acceptable mechanisms include archived mailing list(s), GitHub issue and pull request discussions, Bugzilla, Mantis, and Trac. Asynchronous discussion mechanisms (like IRC) are acceptable if they meet these criteria; make sure there is a URL-addressable archiving mechanism. Proprietary JavaScript, while discouraged, is permitted.

    The project uses the GitHub issue tracker as its discussion mechanism for proposed changes and issues. It is searchable, every issue and comment can be referenced by its own URL, new people can join a discussion with a free GitHub account, and it does not require any proprietary client software.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]
    English is currently the lingua franca of computer technology; supporting English increases the number of different potential developers and reviewers worldwide. A project can meet this criterion even if its core developers' primary language is not English.

    All project documentation is written in English, and the project accepts bug reports and code comments in English.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/README.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]
    As a minimum, the project should attempt to respond to significant problem and vulnerability reports. A project that is actively pursuing a badge is probably maintained. All projects and people have limited resources, and typical projects must reject some proposed changes, so limited resources and proposal rejections do not by themselves indicate an unmaintained project.

    When a project knows that it will no longer be maintained, it should set this criterion to "Unmet" and use the appropriate mechanism(s) to indicate to others that it is not being maintained. For example, use “DEPRECATED” as the first heading of its README, add “DEPRECATED” near the beginning of its home page, add “DEPRECATED” to the beginning of its code repository project description, add a no-maintenance-intended badge in its README and/or home page, mark it as deprecated in any package repositories (e.g., npm deprecate), and/or use the code repository's marking system to archive it (e.g., GitHub's "archive" setting, GitLab’s "archived" marking, Gerrit's "readonly" status, or SourceForge’s "abandoned" project status). Additional discussion can be found here.

    The project is actively maintained. The main branch receives frequent commits, the most recent release is version 0.6.0 from June 2026, and the maintainer triages issues and dependency updates on an ongoing basis.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/commits/main


 Change Control 9/9 ●

  • Public version-controlled source repository


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]
    The URL MAY be the same as the project URL. The project MAY use private (non-public) branches in specific cases while the change is not publicly released (e.g., for fixing a vulnerability before it is revealed to the public).

    The source repository is publicly readable on GitHub and has a stable URL.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    The project uses Git, so every change is recorded in the commit history with the content of the change, the author, and the date and time it was made.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/commits/main


    Enough for a badge!

    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]
    Projects MAY choose to omit specific interim versions from their public source repositories (e.g., ones that fix specific non-public security vulnerabilities, may never be publicly released, or include material that cannot be legally posted and are not in the final release).

    Development happens in the open on the main branch with frequent interim commits between releases. The repository contains the full development history, not only final release snapshots, so changes can be reviewed as they are made.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/commits/main


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]
    Git is not specifically required and projects can use centralized version control software (such as subversion) with justification.

    The project uses Git, which is a widely used distributed version control system.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp


  • Unique version numbering


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]
    This MAY be met in a variety of ways including a commit IDs (such as git commit id or mercurial changeset id) or a version number (including version numbers that use semantic versioning or date-based schemes like YYYYMMDD).

    Each release has a unique version identifier in the form vX.Y.Z. The most recent release is version 0.6.0.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/releases


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]
    Projects should generally prefer whatever format is expected by their users, e.g., because it is the normal format used by their ecosystem. Many ecosystems prefer SemVer, and SemVer is generally preferred for application programmer interfaces (APIs) and software development kits (SDKs). CalVer tends to be used by projects that are large, have an unusually large number of independently-developed dependencies, have a constantly-changing scope, or are time-sensitive. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value, because including a micro level supports simultaneously-maintained branches whenever that becomes necessary. Other version numbering formats may be used as version numbers, including git commit IDs or mercurial changeset IDs, as long as they uniquely identify versions. However, some alternatives (such as git commit IDs) can cause problems as release identifiers, because users may not be able to easily determine if they are up-to-date. The version ID format may be unimportant for identifying software releases if all recipients only run the latest version (e.g., it is the code for a single website or internet service that is constantly updated via continuous delivery).

    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

    Each release is identified in version control by a Git tag of the form vX.Y.Z, for example v0.6.0.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/tags


  • Release notes


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]
    The release notes MAY be implemented in a variety of ways. Many projects provide them in a file named "NEWS", "CHANGELOG", or "ChangeLog", optionally with extensions such as ".txt", ".md", or ".html". Historically the term "change log" meant a log of every change, but to meet these criteria what is needed is a human-readable summary. The release notes MAY instead be provided by version control system mechanisms such as the GitHub Releases workflow.

    Each release includes human-readable release notes that summarize the major changes, both on the GitHub release page and as a release-notes file in the docs directory. For example, the version 0.6.0 release has a detailed notes body on its release page and a matching docs/release-notes-v0.6.0.md file.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/releases/latest


    Enough for a badge!

    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]
    This criterion helps users determine if a given update will fix a vulnerability that is publicly known, to help users make an informed decision about updating. If users typically cannot practically update the software themselves on their computers, but must instead depend on one or more intermediaries to perform the update (as is often the case for a kernel and low-level software that is intertwined with a kernel), the project may choose "not applicable" (N/A) instead, since this additional information will not be helpful to those users. Similarly, a project may choose N/A if all recipients only run the latest version (e.g., it is the code for a single website or internet service that is constantly updated via continuous delivery). This criterion only applies to the project results, not its dependencies. Listing the vulnerabilities of all transitive dependencies of a project becomes unwieldy as dependencies increase and vary, and is unnecessary since tools that examine and track dependencies can do this in a more scalable way.

    When a release fixes publicly known vulnerabilities, the release notes identify them. For example, the version 0.3.2 release notes document the resolution of the RustSec advisories fixed in that release. Releases that fix no publicly known vulnerabilities do not list any.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/releases/tag/v0.3.2


 Reporting 8/8 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    The project publishes a process for submitting reports. General bugs are reported through the GitHub issue tracker, and security issues are reported through the private process described in SECURITY.md.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    The project uses the GitHub issue tracker to track individual issues.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    The GitHub issue tracker is the channel for bug reports and is monitored by the maintainer. No external bug reports have been submitted in the recent period, so there are no unacknowledged reports outstanding. SECURITY.md commits to acknowledging reports within 48 hours.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]
    The response MAY be 'no' or a discussion about its merits. The goal is simply that there be some response to some requests, which indicates that the project is still alive. For purposes of this criterion, projects need not count fake requests (e.g., from spammers or automated systems). If a project is no longer making enhancements, please select "unmet" and include the URL that makes this situation clear to users. If a project tends to be overwhelmed by the number of enhancement requests, please select "unmet" and explain.

    Enhancement requests are handled through the same GitHub issue tracker. No enhancement requests have been submitted in the recent period, so there are none outstanding.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]

    The GitHub issue tracker provides a publicly available and searchable archive of reports and responses, in which each item has its own URL.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/issues


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]
    Projects hosted on GitHub SHOULD consider enabling privately reporting a security vulnerability. Projects on GitLab SHOULD consider using its ability for privately reporting a vulnerability. Projects MAY identify a mailing address on https://PROJECTSITE/security, often in the form security@example.org. This vulnerability reporting process MAY be the same as its bug reporting process. Vulnerability reports MAY always be public, but many projects have a private vulnerability reporting mechanism.

    The process for reporting vulnerabilities is published in SECURITY.md, which describes what information to send, where to send it, and the in-scope and out-of-scope categories. It links to the threat model for the full attacker-capability matrix.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]
    Examples include a private defect report submitted on the web using HTTPS (TLS) or an email encrypted using OpenPGP. If vulnerability reports are always public (so there are never private vulnerability reports), choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    Private vulnerability reports are supported through two channels. SECURITY.md provides a private email address for reports, and GitHub private vulnerability reporting is enabled on the repository.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]
    If there have been no vulnerabilities reported in the last 6 months, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    No vulnerabilities have been reported through the security channel in the last six months, so this criterion is not applicable. The documented commitment in SECURITY.md is to acknowledge a report within 48 hours, which is well within the 14-day requirement.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/SECURITY.md


 Quality 13/13 ●

  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]
    A build system determines what actions need to occur to rebuild the software (and in what order), and then performs those steps. For example, it can invoke a compiler to compile the source code. If an executable is created from source code, it must be possible to modify the project's source code and then generate an updated executable with those modifications. If the software produced by the project depends on external libraries, the build system does not need to build those external libraries. If there is no need to build anything to use the software after its source code is modified, select "not applicable" (N/A).

    The software has a working build system that rebuilds it from source. The frontend builds with TypeScript and Vite, the Rust backend builds with Cargo, and the full desktop application is packaged with the Tauri build command. These steps are documented in CONTRIBUTING.md and run in continuous integration.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]
    For example, Maven, Ant, cmake, the autotools, make, rake (Ruby), or devtools (R).

    The build uses widely adopted tools, including Cargo for Rust, npm and Vite for the frontend, and the Tauri build system for packaging.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    All build tooling is free and open-source software, including the Rust toolchain and Cargo, Node.js, npm, Vite, and Tauri.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]
    The project MAY use multiple automated test suites (e.g., one that runs quickly, vs. another that is more thorough but requires special equipment). There are many test frameworks and test support systems available, including Selenium (web browser automation), Junit (JVM, Java), RUnit (R), testthat (R).

    The project includes automated test suites that are part of this open-source repository. They are Rust unit tests run with cargo test, frontend unit tests run with Vitest, end-to-end browser tests run with Playwright, a manifest and orchestration validation suite, and a cross-module integration suite.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]
    For example, "make check", "mvn test", or "rake test" (Ruby).

    Each suite is invoked in the standard way for its language. The Rust tests run with cargo test, the frontend tests run with npm test using Vitest, the type checker runs with tsc, and the browser tests run with Playwright. A Makefile also groups these gates for convenience.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    The test suite covers most of the project's functionality across both the Rust backend and the TypeScript frontend. It includes unit tests, strict type checking, end-to-end browser flows, manifest and orchestration validation, and cross-module contract tests, and security-relevant behavior has dedicated tests.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    Continuous integration runs on every pull request and on every push to the main branch using GitHub Actions. The workflow runs the Rust, frontend, type-checking, orchestration, integration, and browser test gates.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml


  • New functionality testing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]
    As long as a policy is in place, even by word of mouth, that says developers should add tests to the automated test suite for major new functionality, select "Met."

    The project's policy is that new functionality is added together with tests. This is stated in CONTRIBUTING.md, which lists the test gates that every change must keep green.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]
    Major functionality would typically be mentioned in the release notes. Perfection is not required, merely evidence that tests are typically being added in practice to the automated test suite when new major functionality is added to the software produced by the project.

    The policy is followed in practice. Recent features were added together with their tests, and the test counts have grown release over release across the Rust, frontend, orchestration, and security suites.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/commits/main


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    CONTRIBUTING.md documents the expectation that changes land with tests and describes the test gates that a contributor must satisfy.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]
    Examples of compiler warning flags include gcc/clang "-Wall". Examples of a "safe" language mode include JavaScript "use strict" and perl5's "use warnings". A separate "linter" tool is simply a tool that examines the source code to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes. These are typically enabled within the source code or build instructions.

    The project enables strict warning and linting tools. The frontend lint runs ESLint with a maximum of zero warnings, TypeScript is compiled in strict mode, and the Rust build and tests run in continuous integration. The cargo deny tool checks advisories, licenses, and bans.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]
    These are the warnings identified by the implementation of the warnings criterion. The project should fix warnings or mark them in the source code as false positives. Ideally there would be no warnings, but a project MAY accept some warnings (typically less than 1 warning per 100 lines or less than 10 warnings).

    Warnings are treated as build failures rather than ignored. ESLint runs with a zero-warning threshold, so any warning fails continuous integration, and the frontend warning backlog was driven to zero and is kept there.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    The project maximizes warning detection where practical. ESLint runs at the strict type-checked configuration with a zero-warning threshold, TypeScript uses strict mode, and cargo deny enforces strict advisory, license, ban, and source checks.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/app/src-tauri/deny.toml


 Security 16/16 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]
    This requires understanding the following design principles, including the 8 principles from Saltzer and Schroeder:
    • economy of mechanism (keep the design as simple and small as practical, e.g., by adopting sweeping simplifications)
    • fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default)
    • complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable)
    • open design (security mechanisms should not depend on attacker ignorance of its design, but instead on more easily protected and changed information like keys and passwords)
    • separation of privilege (ideally, access to important objects should depend on more than one condition, so that defeating one protection system won't enable complete access. E.G., multi-factor authentication, such as requiring both a password and a hardware token, is stronger than single-factor authentication)
    • least privilege (processes should operate with the least privilege necessary)
    • least common mechanism (the design should minimize the mechanisms common to more than one user and depended on by all users, e.g., directories for temporary files)
    • psychological acceptability (the human interface must be designed for ease of use - designing for "least astonishment" can help)
    • limited attack surface (the attack surface - the set of the different points where an attacker can try to enter or extract data - should be limited)
    • input validation with allowlists (inputs should typically be checked to determine if they are valid before they are accepted; this validation should use allowlists (which only accept known-good values), not denylists (which attempt to list known-bad values)).
    A "primary developer" in a project is anyone who is familiar with the project's code base, is comfortable making changes to it, and is acknowledged as such by most other participants in the project. A primary developer would typically make a number of contributions over the past year (via code, documentation, or answering questions). Developers would typically be considered primary developers if they initiated the project (and have not left the project more than three years ago), have the option of receiving information on a private vulnerability reporting channel (if there is one), can accept commits on behalf of the project, or perform final releases of the project software. If there is only one developer, that individual is the primary developer. Many books and courses are available to help you understand how to develop more secure software and discuss design. For example, the Secure Software Development Fundamentals course is a free set of three courses that explain how to develop more secure software (it's free if you audit it; for an extra fee you can earn a certificate to prove you learned the material).

    The project is an applied security architecture, and its design follows fail-safe defaults, least privilege, and separation of privilege. The agent runs with no default path to the internet, its API credentials are held away from it, and privilege is never loosened without an explicit human action. These principles are documented in the whitepaper, the threat model, and the architecture decision records.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/mThe project uses only standard, publicly documented cryptographic protocols and algorithms, all provided by established libraries. It implements no cryptographic algorithms of its own.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/docs/trifecta.md

    ain/docs/whitepaper.md


    Enough for a badge!

    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]
    Examples (depending on the type of software) include SQL injection, OS injection, classic buffer overflow, cross-site scripting, missing authentication, and missing authorization. See the CWE/SANS top 25 or OWASP Top 10 for commonly used lists. Many books and courses are available to help you understand how to develop more secure software and discuss common implementation errors that lead to vulnerabilities. For example, the Secure Software Development Fundamentals course is a free set of three courses that explain how to develop more secure software (it's free if you audit it; for an extra fee you can earn a certificate to prove you learned the material).

    The project documents the common error classes relevant to it and how they are countered, including prompt injection, command injection, path traversal, and server-side request forgery. The threat model maps attacker capabilities to mitigations, and the code applies specific countermeasures such as argument escaping, canonical path validation, and rejection of raw IP destinations at the egress boundary.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/docs/threat-model.md


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]
    These cryptographic criteria do not always apply because some software has no need to directly use cryptographic capabilities.

    The project uses only standard, publicly documented cryptographic protocols and algorithms, all provided by established libraries. It implements no cryptographic algorithms of its own.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/docs/trifecta.md


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    The project does not re-implement cryptography. It relies on established cryptographic software, namely TLS libraries for transport, Sigstore cosign for release signatures, and the Tauri update framework for update signatures.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]
    See the Open Standards Requirement for Software by the Open Source Initiative.

    All cryptographic functionality the project depends on is available as free and open-source software, including the TLS stack, Sigstore cosign, and the Tauri update framework.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]
    These minimum bitlengths are: symmetric key 112, factoring modulus 2048, discrete logarithm key 224, discrete logarithmic group 2048, elliptic curve 224, and hash 224 (password hashing is not covered by this bitlength, more information on password hashing can be found in the crypto_password_storage criterion). See https://www.keylength.com for a comparison of keylength recommendations from various organizations. The software MAY allow smaller keylengths in some configurations (ideally it would not, since this allows downgrade attacks, but shorter keylengths are sometimes necessary for interoperability).

    The project relies on the default key lengths of the libraries it uses, which meet current minimum requirements, including modern TLS and Ed25519 signatures. It does not configure shorter keys.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]
    ECB mode is almost never appropriate because it reveals identical blocks within the ciphertext as demonstrated by the ECB penguin, and CTR mode is often inappropriate because it does not perform authentication and causes duplicates if the input state is repeated. In many cases it's best to choose a block cipher algorithm mode designed to combine secrecy and authentication, e.g., Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and EAX. Projects MAY allow users to enable broken mechanisms (e.g., during configuration) where necessary for compatibility, but then users know they're doing it.

    The project does not depend on broken cryptographic algorithms. Release and update integrity rely on modern signature schemes, and transport uses current TLS.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    The project does not depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses, such as SHA-1 or CBC-mode SSH.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/docs/threat-model.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]

    The project does not implement its own key-agreement protocol. Transport confidentiality is provided by standard TLS libraries, so there is no project-specific key agreement to which this criterion applies.


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]
    This criterion applies only when the software is enforcing authentication of users using passwords for external users (aka inbound authentication), such as server-side web applications. It does not apply in cases where the software stores passwords for authenticating into other systems (aka outbound authentication, e.g., the software implements a client for some other system), since at least parts of that software must have often access to the unhashed password.

    The software does not store passwords for authenticating external users. It has no user-account system.


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]
    A cryptographically secure random number generator may be a hardware random number generator, or it may be a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG) using an algorithm such as Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG, Yarrow, or Fortuna. Examples of calls to secure random number generators include Java's java.security.SecureRandom and JavaScript's window.crypto.getRandomValues. Examples of calls to insecure random number generators include Java's java.util.Random and JavaScript's Math.random.

    The application does not itself generate cryptographic keys or security nonces. Signing material is managed by the release tooling and the update framework rather than generated by the application at runtime.


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]
    An even stronger mechanism is releasing the software with digitally signed packages, since that mitigates attacks on the distribution system, but this only works if the users can be confident that the public keys for signatures are correct and if the users will actually check the signature.

    Release artifacts are delivered over HTTPS from GitHub and are cryptographically signed. Container images and release assets are signed with Sigstore cosign, SLSA build provenance is attached, and the desktop update framework verifies an update signature before applying an update. These measures counter man-in-the-middle tampering.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]
    These hashes can be modified in transit.

    The project does not rely on a cryptographic hash fetched over unencrypted HTTP. Integrity is established through signatures and HTTPS delivery rather than an unauthenticated hash.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    Enough for a badge!

    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]
    The vulnerability must be patched and released by the project itself (patches may be developed elsewhere). A vulnerability becomes publicly known (for this purpose) once it has a CVE with publicly released non-paywalled information (reported, for example, in the National Vulnerability Database) or when the project has been informed and the information has been released to the public (possibly by the project). A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known. Note: this means that users might be left vulnerable to all attackers worldwide for up to 60 days. This criterion is often much easier to meet than what Google recommends in Rebooting responsible disclosure, because Google recommends that the 60-day period start when the project is notified even if the report is not public. Also note that this badge criterion, like other criteria, applies to the individual project. Some projects are part of larger umbrella organizations or larger projects, possibly in multiple layers, and many projects feed their results to other organizations and projects as part of a potentially-complex supply chain. An individual project often cannot control the rest, but an individual project can work to release a vulnerability patch in a timely way. Therefore, we focus solely on the individual project's response time. Once a patch is available from the individual project, others can determine how to deal with the patch (e.g., they can update to the newer version or they can apply just the patch as a cherry-picked solution).

    There are no medium or higher severity vulnerabilities that have been publicly known for more than 60 days without a fix. Dependency advisories surfaced by cargo deny and Dependabot are addressed quickly. For example, a recent advisory in the tar crate was patched within a day.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    Critical vulnerabilities are prioritized and fixed rapidly. The project tracks advisories through cargo deny, Dependabot, and CodeQL and remediates them promptly.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/SECURITY.md


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]
    A project MAY leak "sample" credentials for testing and unimportant databases, as long as they are not intended to limit public access.

    The public repository does not contain valid private credentials. Credential files such as .env and .env.test are excluded by .gitignore, and GitHub secret scanning is enabled on the repository.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/.gitignore


 Analysis 8/8 ●

  • Static code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]
    A static code analysis tool examines the software code (as source code, intermediate code, or executable) without executing it with specific inputs. For purposes of this criterion, compiler warnings and "safe" language modes do not count as static code analysis tools (these typically avoid deep analysis because speed is vital). Some static analysis tools focus on detecting generic defects, others focus on finding specific kinds of defects (such as vulnerabilities), and some do a combination. Examples of such static code analysis tools include cppcheck (C, C++), clang static analyzer (C, C++), SpotBugs (Java), FindBugs (Java) (including FindSecurityBugs), PMD (Java), Brakeman (Ruby on Rails), lintr (R), goodpractice (R), Coverity Quality Analyzer, SonarQube, Codacy, and HP Enterprise Fortify Static Code Analyzer. Larger lists of tools can be found in places such as the Wikipedia list of tools for static code analysis, OWASP information on static code analysis, NIST list of source code security analyzers, and Wheeler's list of static analysis tools. If there are no FLOSS static analysis tools available for the implementation language(s) used, you may select 'N/A'.

    The project applies CodeQL static analysis. It runs in continuous integration over the JavaScript, TypeScript, Rust, and GitHub Actions code in the repository.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    CodeQL uses query packs that look for common vulnerability patterns in the analyzed languages.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]
    A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known. Note that criterion vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days requires that all such vulnerabilities be fixed within 60 days of being made public.

    No exploitable vulnerability identified by static code analysis is outstanding. The two note-severity CodeQL unused-variable warnings were false positives, since the variable is used in an inline format string, and have been dismissed. The three dependency-pin advisories on a developer devcontainer script have also been dismissed as developer tooling. The remaining open items in the code-scanning interface are OpenSSF Scorecard repository-posture checks surfaced as SARIF, none of which are exploitable vulnerabilities in the delivered software.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/security/code-scanning


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    Static analysis runs frequently. CodeQL runs on every push and every pull request and additionally on a weekly schedule.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml


  • Dynamic code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]
    A dynamic analysis tool examines the software by executing it with specific inputs. For example, the project MAY use a fuzzing tool (e.g., American Fuzzy Lop) or a web application scanner (e.g., OWASP ZAP or w3af). In some cases the OSS-Fuzz project may be willing to apply fuzz testing to your project. For purposes of this criterion the dynamic analysis tool needs to vary the inputs in some way to look for various kinds of problems or be an automated test suite with at least 80% branch coverage. The Wikipedia page on dynamic analysis and the OWASP page on fuzzing identify some dynamic analysis tools. The analysis tool(s) MAY be focused on looking for security vulnerabilities, but this is not required.

    The project applies fuzzing as dynamic analysis. A fuzzing workflow runs cargo fuzz against parsing and argument-handling surfaces.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/.github/workflows/fuzz.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    The fuzzing harness builds with the address sanitizer and coverage instrumentation, which detect memory-safety problems. The application code is written in memory-safe Rust and TypeScript.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/.github/workflows/fuzz.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]
    This criterion does not suggest enabling assertions during production; that is entirely up to the project and its users to decide. This criterion's focus is instead to improve fault detection during dynamic analysis before deployment. Enabling assertions in production use is completely different from enabling assertions during dynamic analysis (such as testing). In some cases enabling assertions in production use is extremely unwise (especially in high-integrity components). There are many arguments against enabling assertions in production, e.g., libraries should not crash callers, their presence may cause rejection by app stores, and/or activating an assertion in production may expose private data such as private keys. Beware that in many Linux distributions NDEBUG is not defined, so C/C++ assert() will by default be enabled for production in those environments. It may be important to use a different assertion mechanism or defining NDEBUG for production in those environments.

    The fuzzing builds enable sanitizer checks and debug assertions during analysis.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/.github/workflows/fuzz.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]
    If you are not running dynamic code analysis and thus have not found any vulnerabilities in this way, choose "not applicable" (N/A). A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known.

    There are no outstanding medium or higher severity findings from dynamic analysis. Fuzzing findings are addressed when they arise.
    Evidence: https://github.com/albertdobmeyer/opentrapp/blob/main/.github/workflows/fuzz.yml



This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Albert and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Albert.
Entry created on 2026-05-05 14:41:15 UTC, last updated on 2026-06-05 23:27:11 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-06-05 23:27:11 UTC.