wdm

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There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

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These are the Baseline Level 3 criteria. These are criteria version v2026.02.19.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Webnestify Docker Manager

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

    wdm is a Go CLI/TUI for managing a curated set of Docker Compose self-hosting templates. The project is maintained in the public GitHub repository at
    https://github.com/wnstify/wdm, with releases, verification instructions, security policy, contributor guidance, CI, CodeQL, govulncheck, Scorecard, and signed release
    assets.

 Controls 21/21

  • Controls


    When a job is assigned permissions in a CI/CD pipeline, the source code or configuration MUST only assign the minimum privileges necessary for the corresponding activity. [OSPS-AC-04.02]
    Configure the project's CI/CD pipelines to assign the lowest available permissions to users and services by default, elevating permissions only when necessary for specific tasks. In some version control systems, this may be possible at the organizational or repository level. If not, set permissions at the top level of the pipeline.

    GitHub Actions permissions are explicitly scoped per workflow/job. The default workflow permission is contents: read; privileged permissions such as contents: write, id-token: write, and attestations: write are limited to the tag-gated signed-release job that needs them to publish release assets, mint provenance, and
    create the GitHub Release.



    CI/CD pipelines which accept trusted collaborator input MUST sanitize and validate that input prior to use in the pipeline. [OSPS-BR-01.04]
    CI/CD pipelines should sanitize (quote, escape or exit on expected values) all collaborator inputs on explicit workflow executions. While collaborators are generally trusted, manual inputs to a workflow cannot be reviewed and could be abused by an account takeover or insider threat.

    The release workflow validates trusted collaborator-provided tag input before using it for version stamping or release creation. Tag releases must match the supported
    vMAJOR.MINOR.PATCH format, and publishing is gated to push events on refs/tags/v* in wnstify/wdm. See:
    https://github.com/wnstify/wdm/blob/main/.github/workflows/release.yml



    When an official release is created, all assets within that release MUST be clearly associated with the release identifier or another unique identifier for the asset. [OSPS-BR-02.02]
    Assign a unique version identifier to each software asset produced by the project, following a consistent naming convention or numbering scheme. Examples include SemVer, CalVer, or git commit id.

    Release assets are published under a unique Git tag such as v1.0.0. The binary is stamped with the tag version, the GitHub Release is created with that tag, and the
    release assets are tied together by SHA256SUMS, SHA256SUMS.sig, SHA256SUMS.cosign.bundle, provenance, and the changelog entry for that release.



    The project MUST define a policy for managing secrets and credentials used by the project. The policy should include guidelines for storing, accessing, and rotating secrets and credentials. [OSPS-BR-07.02]
    Document how secrets and credentials are managed and used within the project. This should include details on how secrets are stored (e.g., using a secrets management tool), how access is controlled, and how secrets are rotated or updated. Ensure that sensitive information is not hard-coded in the source code or stored in version control systems.

    SECURITY.md defines the secrets and credentials policy, including what must not be committed, where repository and release credentials are stored, which jobs can access
    release signing material, and when secrets must be rotated. See: https://github.com/wnstify/wdm/blob/main/SECURITY.md#secrets-and-credentials



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the integrity and authenticity of the release assets. [OSPS-DO-03.01]
    Instructions in the project should contain information about the technology used, the commands to run, and the expected output. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    SECURITY.md documents how to verify release integrity and authenticity using the signed SHA256SUMS, the detached Ed25519 signature, the cosign bundle, checksum
    verification, and the SLSA provenance attestation.



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the expected identity of the person or process authoring the software release. [OSPS-DO-03.02]
    The expected identity may be in the form of key IDs used to sign, issuer and identity from a sigstore certificate, or other similar forms. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    SECURITY.md documents the expected release identity: source repository wnstify/wdm, OIDC issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com, release workflow
    .github/workflows/release.yml, and the tag-scoped certificate identity for releases.



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include a descriptive statement about the scope and duration of support for each release. [OSPS-DO-04.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for the project's released software assets, the project should have a SUPPORT.md file, a "Support" section in SECURITY.md, or other documentation explaining the support lifecycle, including the expected duration of support for each release, the types of support provided (e.g., bug fixes, security updates), and any relevant policies or procedures for obtaining support.

    README.md documents the release support lifecycle. Each stable release is supported until the next stable release is published, and the support scope covers the wdm
    binary, release verification assets, catalog bundle, and curated templates. See: https://github.com/wnstify/wdm/blob/main/README.md#release-support-lifecycle



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST provide a descriptive statement when releases or versions will no longer receive security updates. [OSPS-DO-05.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for security fixes, the project should have a SUPPORT.md or other documentation explaining the project's policy for security updates.

    README.md states that only the latest stable release receives security fixes and that older releases become unsupported when a newer stable release is published. See:
    https://github.com/wnstify/wdm/blob/main/README.md#release-support-lifecycle



    While active, the project documentation MUST have a policy that code collaborators are reviewed prior to granting escalated permissions to sensitive resources. [OSPS-GV-04.01]
    Publish an enforceable policy in the project documentation that requires code collaborators to be reviewed and approved before being granted escalated permissions to sensitive resources, such as merge approval or access to secrets. It is recommended that vetting includes establishing a justifiable lineage of identity such as confirming the contributor's association with a known trusted organization.

    SECURITY-DESIGN.md documents collaborator access review before granting write, admin, release, secret, or ruleset access. It requires least privilege and removal of
    escalated access when no longer needed. See: https://github.com/wnstify/wdm/blob/main/SECURITY-DESIGN.md#collaborator-access-review



    When the project has made a release, all compiled released software assets MUST be delivered with a software bill of materials. [OSPS-QA-02.02]
    It is recommended to auto-generate SBOMs at build time using a tool that has been vetted for accuracy. This enables users to ingest this data in a standardized approach alongside other projects in their environment.

    The release workflow generates an SPDX 2.3 JSON SBOM for the compiled wdm-linux-amd64 binary and publishes it as wdm-linux-amd64.spdx.json. SECURITY.md lists it as
    one of the release assets. See: https://github.com/wnstify/wdm/blob/main/.github/workflows/release.yml and
    https://github.com/wnstify/wdm/blob/main/SECURITY.md#artifacts



    When the project has made a release comprising multiple source code repositories, all subprojects MUST enforce security requirements that are as strict or stricter than the primary codebase. [OSPS-QA-04.02]
    Any additional subproject code repositories produced by the project and compiled into a release must enforce security requirements as applicable to the status and intent of the respective codebase. In addition to following the corresponding OSPS Baseline requirements, this may include requiring a security review, ensuring that it is free of vulnerabilities, and ensuring that it is free of known security issues.

    The project release is built from a single source repository, wnstify/wdm. There are no release subprojects spread across multiple source code repositories, so this
    control does not apply. Repository: https://github.com/wnstify/wdm



    While active, project's documentation MUST clearly document when and how tests are run. [OSPS-QA-06.02]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains how to run the tests locally and how to run the tests in the CI/CD pipeline. The documentation should explain what the tests are testing and how to interpret the results.

    CONTRIBUTING.md documents how tests are run locally and explains that GitHub Actions run required unit, lint, vulnerability, static-analysis, and DCO checks on pull
    requests and pushes. See: https://github.com/wnstify/wdm/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#build-and-test



    While active, the project's documentation MUST include a policy that all major changes to the software produced by the project should add or update tests of the functionality in an automated test suite. [OSPS-QA-06.03]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains the policy for adding or updating tests. The policy should explain what constitutes a major change and what tests should be added or updated.

    CONTRIBUTING.md requires major functional changes to add or update automated tests for the changed behavior, or explain why automated coverage is not practical and
    describe manual verification. See: https://github.com/wnstify/wdm/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#build-and-test



    When a commit is made to the primary branch, the project's version control system MUST require at least one non-author human approval of the changes before merging. [OSPS-QA-07.01]
    Configure the project's version control system to require at least one non-author human approval of changes before merging into the release or primary branch. This can be achieved by requiring a pull request to be reviewed and approved by at least one other collaborator before it can be merged.

    The project is currently maintained by a single human maintainer, so there is no eligible non-author human reviewer with project write access. The main branch is still protected: direct commits are blocked, required status checks must pass, commits must be signed, DCO signoff is required, and review threads must be resolved before merge.



    When the project has made a release, the project MUST perform a threat modeling and attack surface analysis to understand and protect against attacks on critical code paths, functions, and interactions within the system. [OSPS-SA-03.02]
    Threat modeling is an activity where the project looks at the codebase, associated processes and infrastructure, interfaces, key components and "thinks like a hacker" and brainstorms how the system be be broken or compromised. Each identified threat is listed out so the project can then think about how to proactively avoid or close off any gaps/vulnerabilities that could arise. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    SECURITY-DESIGN.md documents threat modeling and attack surface analysis, including actors, actions, external interfaces, trust boundaries, critical paths, likely
    risks, and mitigations. It also states when the model must be updated. See:
    https://github.com/wnstify/wdm/blob/main/SECURITY-DESIGN.md#threat-modeling-and-attack-surface-analysis



    While active, any vulnerabilities in the software components not affecting the project MUST be accounted for in a VEX document, augmenting the vulnerability report with non-exploitability details. [OSPS-VM-04.02]
    Establish a VEX feed communicating the exploitability status of known vulnerabilities, including assessment details or any mitigations in place preventing vulnerable code from being executed.

    SECURITY.md requires vulnerabilities in components that do not affect wdm to be documented as VEX statements, including component, version, vulnerability identifier,
    affected version or commit range, status, and justification. See: https://github.com/wnstify/wdm/blob/main/SECURITY.md#dependency-and-static-analysis-findings



    While active, the project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. [OSPS-VM-05.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    SECURITY.md defines SCA and license remediation thresholds. go mod verify, go mod tidy -diff, Dependabot alerts, and govulncheck are treated as SCA inputs;
    reachable govulncheck findings, module verification failures, unexpected module drift, and incompatible or unknown direct/runtime dependency licenses block merge or
    release until resolved or documented. See: https://github.com/wnstify/wdm/blob/main/SECURITY.md#dependency-and-static-analysis-findings



    While active, the project documentation MUST include a policy to address SCA violations prior to any release. [OSPS-VM-05.02]
    Document a policy in the project to address applicable Software Composition Analysis results before any release, and add status checks that verify compliance with that policy prior to release.

    SECURITY.md states that no official release may be cut while required security checks are failing or while unresolved release-blocking SCA, malicious-dependency, or
    license findings affect the release. See: https://github.com/wnstify/wdm/blob/main/SECURITY.md#dependency-and-static-analysis-findings



    While active, all changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for malicious dependencies and known vulnerabilities in dependencies, then blocked in the event of violations, except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-05.03]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Software Composition Analysis tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    Dependency changes are automatically evaluated by CI through go mod verify, go mod tidy -diff, and govulncheck; required branch checks block merge when these
    checks fail. The documented policy requires release-blocking findings to be fixed or documented as non-exploitable. See:
    https://github.com/wnstify/wdm/blob/main/.github/workflows/lint.yml, https://github.com/wnstify/wdm/blob/main/.github/workflows/security.yml, and
    https://github.com/wnstify/wdm/blob/main/SECURITY.md#dependency-and-static-analysis-findings



    While active, the project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SAST findings. [OSPS-VM-06.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of Static Application Security Testing (SAST) findings. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    SECURITY.md defines the SAST remediation threshold. CodeQL and security-relevant linter findings are SAST inputs; critical SAST findings block merge and release, while
    high and medium findings must be fixed, downgraded with written rationale, or tracked before the next stable release. See:
    https://github.com/wnstify/wdm/blob/main/SECURITY.md#dependency-and-static-analysis-findings



    While active, all changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for security weaknesses and blocked in the event of violations except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-06.02]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    Changes are automatically evaluated by CodeQL and security-relevant linting in GitHub Actions. The main branch requires the CodeQL analyze-go check, and SECURITY.md
    documents that release-blocking SAST findings must be fixed or narrowly documented before merge or release. See:
    https://github.com/wnstify/wdm/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml, https://github.com/wnstify/wdm/blob/main/.github/workflows/lint.yml, and
    https://github.com/wnstify/wdm/blob/main/SECURITY.md#dependency-and-static-analysis-findings



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Project badge entry owned by: Simon Gajdosik.
Entry created on 2026-06-18 06:21:41 UTC, last updated on 2026-06-22 16:56:13 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-06-18 07:31:42 UTC.