monumental-archive-db

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

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These are the Baseline Level 2 criteria. These are criteria version v2026.08.28.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    The Monumental Archive's PostgreSQL image: official postgres + PostGIS, pgaudit, edtf_postgres — native multi-arch, tested before published, cosign-signed

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

 Controls 18/19 ●

  • Controls


    Enough for a badge!

    When a CI/CD task is executed with no permissions specified, the CI/CD system MUST default the task's permissions to the lowest permissions granted in the pipeline. [OSPS-AC-04.01]
    Configure the project's settings to assign the lowest available permissions to new pipelines by default, granting additional permissions only when necessary for specific tasks.

    Every workflow declares permissions: contents: read at the top level, so a job that specifies nothing inherits read-only. Elevated scopes are granted per job and annotated inline with the reason — packages: write only on the jobs that push, id-token: write only where Sigstore needs it.


    Enough for a badge!

    When an official release is created, that release MUST be assigned a unique version identifier. [OSPS-BR-02.01]
    Assign a unique version identifier to each release produced by the project, following a consistent naming convention or numbering scheme. Examples include SemVer, CalVer, or git commit id.

    Every published image carries a unique identifier by construction: its immutable OCI manifest digest, plus a :sha-<commit> tag giving per-commit traceability. A tag-immutability repository ruleset prevents any tag from moving, and consumers pin digests. The project deliberately has no semantic version surface — its version is the postgres major plus three extension pins — but uniqueness is absolute rather than merely conventional.


    Enough for a badge!

    When an official release is created, that release MUST contain a descriptive log of functional and security modifications. [OSPS-BR-04.01]
    Ensure that all releases include a descriptive change log. It is recommended to ensure that the change log is human-readable and includes details beyond commit messages, such as descriptions of the security impact or relevance to different use cases. To ensure machine readability, place the content under a markdown header such as "## Changelog".

    The project creates no official releases. It is a rolling publisher: fixes land on main and a new digest publishes, with no version tags and no maintained back-branches, stated as a deliberate exclusion in https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/docs/roadmap.md. What exists instead: every published digest is traceable to exactly one commit through its :sha-<commit> tag, the history is conventional-commit formatted so the functional and security changes between any two digests are readable with git log, and security modifications specifically are published as GitHub security advisories naming the fixing digest.


    Enough for a badge!

    When a build and release pipeline ingests dependencies, it MUST use standardized tooling where available. [OSPS-BR-05.01]
    Use a common tooling for your ecosystem, such as package managers or dependency management tools to ingest dependencies at build time. This may include using a dependency file, lock file, or manifest to specify the required dependencies, which are then pulled in by the build system.

    Dependencies are ingested entirely through standardized tooling: apt from PGDG and Debian for the extensions, the OCI registry protocol for both digest-pinned images, and mise for the development toolchain. Nothing is fetched with ad-hoc curl-to-shell, and there is no vendored or hand-copied dependency anywhere.


    Enough for a badge!

    When an official release is created, that release MUST be signed or accounted for in a signed manifest including each asset's cryptographic hashes. [OSPS-BR-06.01]
    Sign all released software assets at build time with a cryptographic signature or attestations, such as GPG or PGP signature, Sigstore signatures, SLSA provenance, or SLSA VSAs. Include the cryptographic hashes of each asset in a signed manifest or metadata file.

    An OCI manifest is precisely a signed manifest containing each asset's cryptographic hash: it lists every layer by sha256 digest, and the manifest itself is cosign-signed keylessly with this repository's publish workflow on main as the certificate identity, anchored through @refs/heads/main$. The pipeline then runs cosign verify against that exact identity immediately after signing. SPDX SBOM and provenance (mode=max) attestations accompany it. https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/SECURITY.md#verifying-what-you-pulled


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include a description of how the project selects, obtains, and tracks its dependencies. [OSPS-DO-06.01]
    It is recommended to publish this information alongside the project's technical & design documentation on a publicly viewable resource such as the source code repository, project website, or other channel.

    Selection is governed: the image is postgres plus exactly three extensions because the consuming archive needs those three, and a fourth is a recorded governance decision rather than a routine addition, with the bar stated in https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/docs/roadmap.md. Obtaining is documented in https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/docs/decisions/0001-own-the-installation.md, which explains why PostGIS and pgaudit are installed here from PGDG rather than inherited. Tracking is the Renovate pin convention in https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#coding-standard — apt versions in ARG *_VERSION lines with a # renovate: comment above them, because an inline version would silently lose coverage.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include instructions on how to build the software, including required libraries, frameworks, SDKs, and dependencies. [OSPS-DO-07.01]
    It is recommended to publish this information alongside the project's contributor documentation, such as in CONTRIBUTING.md or other developer task documentation. This may also be documented using Makefile targets or other automation scripts.

    https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#development-quick-start — clone, mise install (which installs the pinned toolchain and the git hooks), then task ci for the full gate or task build for the image alone. The only prerequisite not installed by mise is Docker or a compatible engine, which is stated explicitly.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include a list of project members with access to sensitive resources. [OSPS-GV-01.01]
    Document project participants and their roles through such artifacts as members.md, governance.md, maintainers.md, or similar file within the source code repository of the project. This may be as simple as including names or account handles in a list of maintainers, or more complex depending on the project's governance.

    https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#roles-and-responsibilities names the single maintainer who holds access to sensitive resources, and https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#access-continuity is explicit about what that access consists of — notably that no long-lived tokens or signing keys exist to hold, because GHCR uses the run's own token and signing is keyless.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include descriptions of the roles and responsibilities for members of the project [OSPS-GV-01.02]
    Document project participants and their roles through such artifacts as members.md, governance.md, maintainers.md, or similar file within the source code repository of the project.

    https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#roles-and-responsibilities — maintainer and contributor roles with what each owns, plus the decision model and how it would evolve if the project gained regular contributors.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include a guide for code contributors that includes requirements for acceptable contributions. [OSPS-GV-03.02]
    Extend the CONTRIBUTING.md or CONTRIBUTING/ contents in the project documentation to outline the requirements for acceptable contributions, including coding standards, testing requirements, and submission guidelines for code contributors. It is recommended that this guide is the source of truth for both contributors and approvers.

    https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#requirements-for-an-acceptable-contribution — one pull request per issue, conventional commits, signed commits, DCO sign-off, a green gate, respect for the decision register, and new words in .codespellrc rather than a lint bypass.


    Not enough for a badge.

    The version control system MUST require all code contributors to assert that they are legally authorized to make the associated contributions on every commit. [OSPS-LE-01.01]
    Include a DCO in the project's repository, requiring code contributors to assert that they are legally authorized to commit the associated contributions on every commit. Use a status check to ensure the assertion is made. A CLA also satisfies this requirement. Some version control systems, such as GitHub, may include this in the platform terms of service.

    Honest miss, and stricter than it first appears. https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md does require DCO sign-off and links the Developer Certificate of Origin, so the legal mechanism is documented — but this control asks that the version control system REQUIRE the assertion on every commit, and nothing enforces it. There is no DCO check on pull requests and no commit-msg hook validating the trailer, and in fact no commit in the repository's history currently carries a Signed-off-by line. The documented policy and the enforced reality have diverged, which is exactly the gap this control exists to catch. Tracked for fix: a DCO status check on pull requests plus a local commit-msg hook, matching how conventional commits are already enforced twice over.


    Enough for a badge!

    When a commit is made to the primary branch, any automated status checks for commits MUST pass or be manually bypassed. [OSPS-QA-03.01]
    Configure the project's version control system to require that all automated status checks pass or require manual acknowledgement before a commit can be merged into the primary branch. It is recommended that any optional status checks are NOT configured as a pass or fail requirement that approvers may be tempted to bypass.

    Direct pushes to main are blocked by the main-protection ruleset, so every commit arrives through a pull request, and the full gate runs as required status checks that must pass before merge. The same tasks run locally on every commit through the lefthook hooks, so the checks are not first encountered in CI.


    Enough for a badge!

    Prior to a commit being accepted, the project's CI/CD pipelines MUST run at least one automated test suite to ensure the changes meet expectations. [OSPS-QA-06.01]
    Automated tests should be run prior to every merge into the primary branch. The test suite should be run in a CI/CD pipeline and the results should be visible to all contributors. The test suite should be run in a consistent environment and should be run in a way that allows contributors to run the tests locally. Examples of test suites include unit tests, integration tests, and end-to-end tests.

    Every pull request runs task ci, which includes the smoke test — booting the built image and asserting the extensions actually load via pg_get_loaded_modules(). The publish pipeline runs the same suite per-architecture on native amd64 and arm64 runners, and again against the published bytes pulled back from the registry by digest. https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/actions


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include design documentation demonstrating all actions and actors within the system. [OSPS-SA-01.01]
    Include designs in the project documentation that explains the actions and actors. Actors include any subsystem or entity that can influence another segment in the system. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/docs/assurance-case.md documents the actors and actions: the five trust boundaries (publish, build-stage, apt, in-image privilege, registry identity), the four supply-chain substitution points an adversary could target, what crosses each boundary and by what mechanism, and what is explicitly out of scope. https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/docs/decisions/0001-own-the-installation.md carries the load-bearing architectural decision behind the design.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include descriptions of all external software interfaces of the released software assets. [OSPS-SA-02.01]
    Document all software interfaces (APIs) of the released software assets, explaining how users can interact with the software and what data is expected or produced. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    The released asset's external interfaces are the PostgreSQL wire protocol on 5432, the environment-variable contract inherited unchanged from the official postgres image, the PGDATA volume, and the three extensions the image adds. All are documented in https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db#readme, together with the baked server configuration (shared_preload_libraries and wal_level=logical) that changes behaviour relative to a stock postgres image — which is the part a consumer could not infer from upstream documentation.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project MUST perform a security assessment to understand the most likely and impactful potential security problems that could occur within the software. [OSPS-SA-03.01]
    Performing a security assessment informs both project members as well as downstream consumers that the project understands what problems could arise within the software. Understanding what threats could be realized helps the project manage and address risk. This information is useful to downstream consumers to demonstrate the security acumen and practices of the project. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    Two documents, deliberately different in kind. https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/docs/assurance-case.md is the standing assessment: threat model in order of exposure, the four substitution points, and a table of weakness classes with countermeasures and evidence. https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/docs/security-review-2026.md is a dated assessment performed 2026-08-09 against a specific commit, with five findings and a disposition for each — including two that resulted in fixes.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include a policy for coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD), with a clear timeframe for response. [OSPS-VM-01.01]
    Create a SECURITY.md file at the root of the directory, outlining the project's policy for coordinated vulnerability disclosure. Include a method for reporting vulnerabilities. Set expectations for how the project will respond and address reported issues.

    https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/SECURITY.md#reporting-a-vulnerability sets out coordinated disclosure with explicit timeframes: acknowledgement within 7 days, a triage verdict (accepted, out of scope, or upstream) within 14, then a fix republished as a new digest with that digest named in the published advisory. Reporters are credited. The scope boundary between this image and its upstreams is stated precisely so a reporter knows where to send what.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST provide a means for private vulnerability reporting directly to the security contacts within the project. [OSPS-VM-03.01]
    Provide a means for security researchers to report vulnerabilities privately to the project. This may be a dedicated email address, a web form, VCS specialized tools, email addresses for security contacts, or other methods.

    GitHub private vulnerability reporting is enabled and linked directly: https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/security/advisories/new — the report stays private until a fix ships. An email fallback to the maintainer address on the commits is documented for anyone who cannot use it.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST publicly publish data about discovered vulnerabilities. [OSPS-VM-04.01]
    Provide information about known vulnerabilities in a predictable public channel, such as a CVE entry, blog post, or other medium. To the degree possible, this information should include affected version(s), how a consumer can determine if they are vulnerable, and instructions for mitigation or remediation.

    Vulnerabilities are published as GitHub security advisories on https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/security/advisories, with the fixing digest named in each, per the commitment in https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/SECURITY.md#what-to-expect. Package-level CVE state is additionally public on every run: the publish workflow runs a report-only trivy scan so each published digest has its scan output on the run log.



You can use tools and AI systems to propose changes via a simple URL, such as https://www.bestpractices.dev/en/projects/13998/choose/edit?osps_ac_01_01_status=Met&osps_ac_01_01_justification=GitHub+enforced. See our automation proposals system for how to do that. This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Carl Allen and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Carl Allen.
Entry created on 2026-08-09 00:45:46 UTC, last updated on 2026-08-09 01:33:27 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-08-09 00:58:03 UTC.