m3l-groundwork

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Baseline Level 3 criteria. These are criteria version v2026.08.28.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Deterministic TypeScript + Claude Code project bootstrapper, with an adaptive /customize pass over live TypeScript and Anthropic guidance.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

 Controls 21/21 ●

  • Controls


    Enough for a badge!

    When a job is assigned permissions in a CI/CD pipeline, the source code or configuration MUST only assign the minimum privileges necessary for the corresponding activity. [OSPS-AC-04.02]
    Configure the project's CI/CD pipelines to assign the lowest available permissions to users and services by default, elevating permissions only when necessary for specific tasks. In some version control systems, this may be possible at the organizational or repository level. If not, set permissions at the top level of the pipeline.

    Permissions are set per job, never inherited from a broad default (default workflow permissions are read; top-level permissions are read or empty). Each write scope sits in the job that needs it, with the reason in the file: publish in release.yml, scorecard.yml, security-audit.yml and labeler.yml.


    Enough for a badge!

    CI/CD pipelines which accept trusted collaborator input MUST sanitize and validate that input prior to use in the pipeline. [OSPS-BR-01.04]
    CI/CD pipelines should sanitize (quote, escape or exit on expected values) all collaborator inputs on explicit workflow executions. While collaborators are generally trusted, manual inputs to a workflow cannot be reviewed and could be abused by an account takeover or insider threat.

    Collaborator input reaches a shell only through env vars: soak.yml passes inputs.version as SOAK_VERSION, which bin/soak.sh rejects unless it matches [0-9A-Za-z.+-]; environments.yml passes a boolean dry_run through env. No workflow takes a comment or other free text into a shell.


    Enough for a badge!

    When an official release is created, all assets within that release MUST be clearly associated with the release identifier or another unique identifier for the asset. [OSPS-BR-02.02]
    Assign a unique version identifier to each software asset produced by the project, following a consistent naming convention or numbering scheme. Examples include SemVer, CalVer, or git commit id.

    Each release is a version-named tag and GitHub Release, and its assets carry the version in their names: monte3l-groundwork-<version>.tgz and its .sigstore.json bundle. The release workflow adds an SBOM (.cdx.json) from the next release.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST define a policy for managing secrets and credentials used by the project. The policy should include guidelines for storing, accessing, and rotating secrets and credentials. [OSPS-BR-07.02]
    Document how secrets and credentials are managed and used within the project. This should include details on how secrets are stored (e.g., using a secrets management tool), how access is controlled, and how secrets are rotated or updated. Ensure that sensitive information is not hard-coded in the source code or stored in version control systems.

    SECURITY.md, "Secrets and credentials", states what the project does not store (no npm token, no signing key, no personal access token), inventories every secret with where it is stored and what uses it, and sets rules for storing (narrowest GitHub secret scope, environment secrets restricted to main), accessing (the two organization owners, with 2FA) and rotating (on exposure, at most one-year expiries, yearly replacement of non-expiring keys).


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the integrity and authenticity of the release assets. [OSPS-DO-03.01]
    Instructions in the project should contain information about the technology used, the commands to run, and the expected output. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    npm provenance (Sigstore-backed, OIDC-issued, no long-lived key) plus a build-provenance attestation attached to the GitHub Release; see https://github.com/monte3l/m3l-groundwork/blob/main/SECURITY.md#verifying-releases for verification instructions. [signed_releases]


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the expected identity of the person or process authoring the software release. [OSPS-DO-03.02]
    The expected identity may be in the form of key IDs used to sign, issuer and identity from a sigstore certificate, or other similar forms. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    npm provenance (Sigstore-backed, OIDC-issued, no long-lived key) plus a build-provenance attestation attached to the GitHub Release; see https://github.com/monte3l/m3l-groundwork/blob/main/SECURITY.md#verifying-releases for verification instructions. [signed_releases]


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include a descriptive statement about the scope and duration of support for each release. [OSPS-DO-04.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for the project's released software assets, the project should have a SUPPORT.md file, a "Support" section in SECURITY.md, or other documentation explaining the support lifecycle, including the expected duration of support for each release, the types of support provided (e.g., bug fixes, security updates), and any relevant policies or procedures for obtaining support.

    SECURITY.md, "Scope and duration of support", states what is covered (the latest 1.x release and the /customize plugin as it stands on main) and that a release is supported until the next release in its line is published. There is no fixed calendar duration and no long-term-support line.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST provide a descriptive statement when releases or versions will no longer receive security updates. [OSPS-DO-05.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for security fixes, the project should have a SUPPORT.md or other documentation explaining the project's policy for security updates.

    SECURITY.md, "Scope and duration of support", states that once a newer release in its line is published, the superseded release receives no fixes, security fixes included, and that the remedy is to upgrade.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST have a policy that code collaborators are reviewed prior to granting escalated permissions to sensitive resources. [OSPS-GV-04.01]
    Publish an enforceable policy in the project documentation that requires code collaborators to be reviewed and approved before being granted escalated permissions to sensitive resources, such as merge approval or access to secrets. It is recommended that vetting includes establishing a justifiable lineage of identity such as confirming the contributor's association with a known trusted organization.

    GOVERNANCE.md#granting-access is the policy: only an org owner grants access, with the other owner's agreement, after a track-record check and an out-of-band identity check; access starts at triage; either owner can revoke it; access is reviewed at least once a year.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, all compiled released software assets MUST be delivered with a software bill of materials. [OSPS-QA-02.02]
    It is recommended to auto-generate SBOMs at build time using a tool that has been vetted for accuracy. This enables users to ingest this data in a standardized approach alongside other projects in their environment.

    Each release's GitHub Release carries a CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM (monte3l-groundwork-<version>.tgz.cdx.json), attested with actions/attest and verifiable with gh attestation verify --predicate-type https://cyclonedx.org/bom. See SECURITY.md#verifying-releases.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release comprising multiple source code repositories, all subprojects MUST enforce security requirements that are as strict or stricter than the primary codebase. [OSPS-QA-04.02]
    Any additional subproject code repositories produced by the project and compiled into a release must enforce security requirements as applicable to the status and intent of the respective codebase. In addition to following the corresponding OSPS Baseline requirements, this may include requiring a security review, ensuring that it is free of vulnerabilities, and ensuring that it is free of known security issues.

    No release is built from more than one source repository; the vendored m3l-design copy lives in this repository (GOVERNANCE.md, Related repositories).


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST clearly document when and how tests are run. [OSPS-QA-06.02]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains how to run the tests locally and how to run the tests in the CI/CD pipeline. The documentation should explain what the tests are testing and how to interpret the results.

    CONTRIBUTING.md, "Test environments and how tests run", lists the three kinds of test, every environment they run in (local, ubuntu-latest, macos-latest, Node's current line, and the manual soak workflow on Linux x64, Linux arm64 and macOS), what triggers each, and how to read the results. Windows is not covered.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include a policy that all major changes to the software produced by the project should add or update tests of the functionality in an automated test suite. [OSPS-QA-06.03]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains the policy for adding or updating tests. The policy should explain what constitutes a major change and what tests should be added or updated.

    https://github.com/monte3l/m3l-groundwork/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#scope-of-a-pr. [test_policy_mandated]


    Enough for a badge!

    When a commit is made to the primary branch, the project's version control system MUST require at least one non-author human approval of the changes before merging. [OSPS-QA-07.01]
    Configure the project's version control system to require at least one non-author human approval of changes before merging into the release or primary branch. This can be achieved by requiring a pull request to be reviewed and approved by at least one other collaborator before it can be merged.

    The main ruleset requires one approving review from someone other than the author (required_approving_review_count=1, stale approvals dismissed on push, no bypass actors). See GOVERNANCE.md#decision-making.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project MUST perform a threat modeling and attack surface analysis to understand and protect against attacks on critical code paths, functions, and interactions within the system. [OSPS-SA-03.02]
    Threat modeling is an activity where the project looks at the codebase, associated processes and infrastructure, interfaces, key components and "thinks like a hacker" and brainstorms how the system be be broken or compromised. Each identified threat is listed out so the project can then think about how to proactively avoid or close off any gaps/vulnerabilities that could arise. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    https://github.com/monte3l/m3l-groundwork/blob/main/docs/assurance-case.md. [assurance_case]


    Enough for a badge!

    Any vulnerabilities in the software components not affecting the project MUST be accounted for in a VEX document, augmenting the vulnerability report with non-exploitability details. [OSPS-VM-04.02]
    Establish a VEX feed communicating the exploitability status of known vulnerabilities, including assessment details or any mitigations in place preventing vulnerable code from being executed.

    docs/m3l-groundwork.openvex.json is an OpenVEX document with a not_affected statement (component_not_present) for each of the 13 advisories recorded in docs/security-review.md, for versions 1.0.0 to 1.0.2; SECURITY.md, "Vulnerabilities that do not affect the project", explains its scope and upkeep. No vulnerability is currently open against any component the project ships or uses.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. [OSPS-VM-05.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    SECURITY.md, "Dependency and code-scanning findings", Remediation thresholds: critical or high SCA vulnerabilities block the PR that introduces them and are fixed within 60 days if published against a locked dependency; medium within 60 days; low with no deadline. A license outside the allow-list in dependency-review.yml blocks the PR that adds it, and one found on a locked dependency is fixed within 60 days. The process section covers identifying, prioritizing and remediating.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include a policy to address SCA violations prior to any release. [OSPS-VM-05.02]
    Document a policy in the project to address applicable Software Composition Analysis results before any release, and add status checks that verify compliance with that policy prior to release.

    SECURITY.md, "Dependency and code-scanning findings", sets the policy: a critical or high advisory in a dependency blocks a PR and blocks any release, and release.yml's pack job runs pnpm audit and npm audit before anything is built.


    Enough for a badge!

    All changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for malicious dependencies and known vulnerabilities in dependencies, then blocked in the event of violations, except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-05.03]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Software Composition Analysis tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    https://github.com/monte3l/m3l-groundwork/blob/main/.github/workflows/dependency-review.yml fails a PR on a high-severity finding; GitHub CodeQL and Dependabot alerts cover the rest. [dependency_monitoring]


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SAST findings. [OSPS-VM-06.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of Static Application Security Testing (SAST) findings. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    SECURITY.md, "Dependency and code-scanning findings", Remediation thresholds: a new CodeQL alert of error severity or critical or high security severity blocks the PR; one in merged code at medium or higher is fixed within 60 days of triage.


    Enough for a badge!

    All changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for security weaknesses and blocked in the event of violations except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-06.02]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    CodeQL default setup analyzes every push and PR, and the CodeQL check is a required status check on main. By GitHub's default it fails on new alerts of error severity or critical or high security severity.



You can use tools and AI systems to propose changes via a simple URL, such as https://www.bestpractices.dev/en/projects/14937/choose/edit?osps_ac_01_01_status=Met&osps_ac_01_01_justification=GitHub+enforced. See our automation proposals system for how to do that. This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Enrico Lionello and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Enrico Lionello.
Entry created on 2026-09-25 19:53:20 UTC, last updated on 2026-10-19 07:02:09 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-09-27 11:47:23 UTC.