pi-outpost

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Baseline Level 3 criteria. These are criteria version v2026.08.28.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Self-hosted web interface for the pi coding agent: chat, files, documents and an integrated terminal, with the agent's shell confined by OS sandboxes.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

 Controls 11/21 ●

  • Controls


    When a job is assigned permissions in a CI/CD pipeline, the source code or configuration MUST only assign the minimum privileges necessary for the corresponding activity. [OSPS-AC-04.02]
    Configure the project's CI/CD pipelines to assign the lowest available permissions to users and services by default, elevating permissions only when necessary for specific tasks. In some version control systems, this may be possible at the organizational or repository level. If not, set permissions at the top level of the pipeline.

    https://github.com/laurentftech/pi-outpost/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml
    The CodeQL analysis job requests packages: read for private packs and actions: read for private repositories. This public repository uses no private packs in its CodeQL configuration, so these scopes exceed the permissions necessary for the configured activity.



    CI/CD pipelines which accept trusted collaborator input MUST sanitize and validate that input prior to use in the pipeline. [OSPS-BR-01.04]
    CI/CD pipelines should sanitize (quote, escape or exit on expected values) all collaborator inputs on explicit workflow executions. While collaborators are generally trusted, manual inputs to a workflow cannot be reviewed and could be abused by an account takeover or insider threat.

    https://github.com/laurentftech/pi-outpost/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml
    The scenario-coverage step inserts github.event.pull_request.base.ref directly into its run script rather than passing the collaborator-controlled ref through a quoted environment variable. Trusted collaborator metadata therefore does not consistently receive the required sanitization.



    When an official release is created, all assets within that release MUST be clearly associated with the release identifier or another unique identifier for the asset. [OSPS-BR-02.02]
    Assign a unique version identifier to each software asset produced by the project, following a consistent naming convention or numbering scheme. Examples include SemVer, CalVer, or git commit id.

    https://github.com/laurentftech/pi-outpost/releases/tag/v0.61.0
    The release tag and package manifests identify version 0.61.0. Executable filenames include the version, OS and architecture. MCP bundles are associated with the uniquely versioned GitHub Release and carry internal version metadata even though their filenames are stable. Container tags and npm package versions identify their releases.



    The project MUST define a policy for managing secrets and credentials used by the project. The policy should include guidelines for storing, accessing, and rotating secrets and credentials. [OSPS-BR-07.02]
    Document how secrets and credentials are managed and used within the project. This should include details on how secrets are stored (e.g., using a secrets management tool), how access is controlled, and how secrets are rotated or updated. Ensure that sensitive information is not hard-coded in the source code or stored in version control systems.

    https://github.com/laurentftech/pi-outpost/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#development-setup
    Credential hygiene, secret scanning and OIDC publication are documented. The project does not have a complete policy covering storage, access and rotation of credentials used for development, CI and publication. The Open WebUI deployment-key rotation instructions cover operator deployment secrets rather than the project's own credentials.



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the integrity and authenticity of the release assets. [OSPS-DO-03.01]
    Instructions in the project should contain information about the technology used, the commands to run, and the expected output. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    https://github.com/laurentftech/pi-outpost/blob/main/docs/sea-packaging.md#verify-a-download
    The documentation explains release integrity and authenticity verification using gh attestation verify <file> -R laurentftech/pi-outpost, including offline verification with the attached pi-outpost-<version>.sigstore.json bundle. v0.61.0 is the first release carrying that bundle. Provenance verification is distinct from operating-system code signing.



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the expected identity of the person or process authoring the software release. [OSPS-DO-03.02]
    The expected identity may be in the form of key IDs used to sign, issuer and identity from a sigstore certificate, or other similar forms. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    https://github.com/laurentftech/pi-outpost/blob/main/docs/sea-packaging.md#verify-a-download
    The guide identifies this repository's tagged release workflow as the release author and instructs users to verify with gh attestation verify <file> -R laurentftech/pi-outpost, including the offline bundle option. GitHub CLI validates the repository-bound signing identity and reports the signer workflow. On 2026-11-08, all five v0.61.0 assets also passed stricter verification constrained to laurentftech/pi-outpost/.github/workflows/release.yml and refs/tags/v0.61.0. The certificate identifies that exact workflow/tag and source commit d8928a87d57e419aab78a89756e5b64ce37898e0.



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include a descriptive statement about the scope and duration of support for each release. [OSPS-DO-04.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for the project's released software assets, the project should have a SUPPORT.md file, a "Support" section in SECURITY.md, or other documentation explaining the support lifecycle, including the expected duration of support for each release, the types of support provided (e.g., bug fixes, security updates), and any relevant policies or procedures for obtaining support.

    https://github.com/laurentftech/pi-outpost/blob/main/SECURITY.md#supported-versions
    Security fixes target the latest stable release; older releases have no guaranteed backports and prereleases are evaluated individually. Support follows the current stable release rather than a promised LTS duration. Operators are advised to keep pi-outpost and its runtimes current.



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST provide a descriptive statement when releases or versions will no longer receive security updates. [OSPS-DO-05.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for security fixes, the project should have a SUPPORT.md or other documentation explaining the project's policy for security updates.

    https://github.com/laurentftech/pi-outpost/blob/main/SECURITY.md#supported-versions
    The published policy limits security fixes to the latest stable release. Once a release is no longer the latest stable, security backports are not guaranteed; prereleases are evaluated individually.



    The project documentation MUST have a policy that code collaborators are reviewed prior to granting escalated permissions to sensitive resources. [OSPS-GV-04.01]
    Publish an enforceable policy in the project documentation that requires code collaborators to be reviewed and approved before being granted escalated permissions to sensitive resources, such as merge approval or access to secrets. It is recommended that vetting includes establishing a justifiable lineage of identity such as confirming the contributor's association with a known trusted organization.

    https://github.com/laurentftech/pi-outpost/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#roles
    Governance requires roles and permissions to be documented before access is granted. It does not define a review of collaborators' trustworthiness before granting elevated access to sensitive resources.



    When the project has made a release, all compiled released software assets MUST be delivered with a software bill of materials. [OSPS-QA-02.02]
    It is recommended to auto-generate SBOMs at build time using a tool that has been vetted for accuracy. This enables users to ingest this data in a standardized approach alongside other projects in their environment.

    https://github.com/laurentftech/pi-outpost/releases/tag/v0.61.0
    The release workflow does not generate or deliver a software bill of materials for the compiled SEA distributions. The six published release assets contain three executables, two MCP bundles and the Sigstore provenance bundle, with no companion SBOM. A source dependency lockfile is not a delivered SBOM for those compiled assets.



    When the project has made a release comprising multiple source code repositories, all subprojects MUST enforce security requirements that are as strict or stricter than the primary codebase. [OSPS-QA-04.02]
    Any additional subproject code repositories produced by the project and compiled into a release must enforce security requirements as applicable to the status and intent of the respective codebase. In addition to following the corresponding OSPS Baseline requirements, this may include requiring a security review, ensuring that it is free of vulnerabilities, and ensuring that it is free of known security issues.

    https://github.com/laurentftech/pi-outpost/blob/main/package.json
    The release is built from one source repository containing all 11 project workspaces. Published package repository fields, MCP bundle build paths and container build contexts all refer to this repository. There are no submodules or separately maintained source subprojects in the official release inventory.



    The project documentation MUST clearly document when and how tests are run. [OSPS-QA-06.02]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains how to run the tests locally and how to run the tests in the CI/CD pipeline. The documentation should explain what the tests are testing and how to interpret the results.

    https://github.com/laurentftech/pi-outpost/blob/main/docs/development.md#tests
    Development, contribution and quality guides document test commands, when to run them, CI triggers, supported test platforms, browser checks, packaging/sandbox suites and documented exclusions, including documentation-only PRs.



    The project documentation MUST include a policy that all major changes to the software produced by the project should add or update tests of the functionality in an automated test suite. [OSPS-QA-06.03]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains the policy for adding or updating tests. The policy should explain what constitutes a major change and what tests should be added or updated.

    https://github.com/laurentftech/pi-outpost/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#changes-and-tests
    The written contribution policy requires automated tests for new or changed behaviour, and a regression test that fails without a bug fix. [test_policy_mandated]



    When a commit is made to the primary branch, the project's version control system MUST require at least one non-author human approval of the changes before merging. [OSPS-QA-07.01]
    Configure the project's version control system to require at least one non-author human approval of changes before merging into the release or primary branch. This can be achieved by requiring a pull request to be reviewed and approved by at least one other collaborator before it can be merged.

    https://github.com/laurentftech/pi-outpost/rules/22049027
    The active ruleset requires zero approving reviews, and GOVERNANCE.md explicitly says that no second approval is required because the project has one maintainer. At least one non-author human approval must become mandatory to meet this criterion; automated or self-review is insufficient.



    When the project has made a release, the project MUST perform a threat modeling and attack surface analysis to understand and protect against attacks on critical code paths, functions, and interactions within the system. [OSPS-SA-03.02]
    Threat modeling is an activity where the project looks at the codebase, associated processes and infrastructure, interfaces, key components and "thinks like a hacker" and brainstorms how the system be be broken or compromised. Each identified threat is listed out so the project can then think about how to proactively avoid or close off any gaps/vulnerabilities that could arise. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    https://github.com/laurentftech/pi-outpost/blob/main/docs/openwebui-architecture.md#trust-model
    Threat analysis is maintained in design documents for the critical paths rather than one standalone document. The Open WebUI architecture models external actors, data flows, identity forgery/replay, cross-user reads, iframe isolation and poster-save capabilities; auth-token and credentials-onboarding designs analyze token theft, logging, brute force, TLS and origin checks. PDF/Office extraction designs model attacker-controlled documents, confinement and exhaustion. The sandboxing guide, Windows investigation and Docker design analyze shell/terminal/extension privileges, filesystem/network escape paths and actual OS enforcement limits. Each records mitigations or accepted limitations and feature designs update the relevant analysis when behavior changes.



    Any vulnerabilities in the software components not affecting the project MUST be accounted for in a VEX document, augmenting the vulnerability report with non-exploitability details. [OSPS-VM-04.02]
    Establish a VEX feed communicating the exploitability status of known vulnerabilities, including assessment details or any mitigations in place preventing vulnerable code from being executed.

    https://github.com/laurentftech/pi-outpost/security/dependabot
    Dependabot alert 82 (GHSA-g3hv-75wg-m249, minimatch via API Extractor) is dismissed with a concrete non-exploitability explanation: build-time-only use with project-controlled globs and no shipped/reachable external input. No VEX document records this component finding. A dismissal comment supplies triage evidence but does not satisfy the required VEX format.



    The project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. [OSPS-VM-05.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    https://github.com/laurentftech/pi-outpost/blob/main/SECURITY.md#verification-and-maintenance
    Dependency monitoring and manual advisory triage are documented, but the published policy does not define remediation thresholds for SCA vulnerability and license findings. A history of fixed or dismissed alerts does not define such thresholds.



    The project documentation MUST include a policy to address SCA violations prior to any release. [OSPS-VM-05.02]
    Document a policy in the project to address applicable Software Composition Analysis results before any release, and add status checks that verify compliance with that policy prior to release.

    https://github.com/laurentftech/pi-outpost/blob/main/docs/development.md#releasing
    The release procedure documents dependency updates and individual upstream limitations, but contains no SCA compliance policy/check requiring applicable vulnerability and license violations to be addressed before each release.



    All changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for malicious dependencies and known vulnerabilities in dependencies, then blocked in the event of violations, except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-05.03]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Software Composition Analysis tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    https://github.com/laurentftech/pi-outpost/rules/22049027
    The required checks are CI ok and the three CodeQL analyses. The CI jobs contain no SCA/dependency-audit gate, and Socket/SCA is not required by the active ruleset. Dependency vulnerabilities and malicious-package findings therefore lack the required automatic policy-based merge block.



    The project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SAST findings. [OSPS-VM-06.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of Static Application Security Testing (SAST) findings. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    https://github.com/laurentftech/pi-outpost/blob/main/docs/quality.md#merge-enforcement
    The quality guide documents the SAST remediation threshold: CodeQL high-or-higher security alerts block merging. CodeQL identifies findings on every main-targeted PR, main push and weekly; findings require review, and the merge policy requires the high-or-higher findings to be resolved before acceptance, with no administrator bypass. The policy is supported by the active code_scanning rule, not merely a historical count of fixed alerts.



    All changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for security weaknesses and blocked in the event of violations except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-06.02]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    https://github.com/laurentftech/pi-outpost/blob/main/docs/quality.md#merge-enforcement
    CodeQL evaluates main-targeted PRs for Actions, C# and JavaScript/TypeScript. The active protect_main ruleset requires all three analysis checks, blocks high-or-higher CodeQL security alerts and permits no bypass. This threshold and enforcement are documented in the quality guide.



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Entry created on 2026-11-07 12:35:44 UTC, last updated on 2026-11-08 19:31:42 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-11-07 13:32:38 UTC.