iiif-server

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There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

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These are the Baseline Level 3 criteria. These are criteria version v2026.08.28.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    IIIF Image API server (3.0 + 2.1, complete feature table) in pure Rust. Design phase — see docs/design-spec.md.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

 Controls 20/21 ●

  • Controls


    When a job is assigned permissions in a CI/CD pipeline, the source code or configuration MUST only assign the minimum privileges necessary for the corresponding activity. [OSPS-AC-04.02]
    Configure the project's CI/CD pipelines to assign the lowest available permissions to users and services by default, elevating permissions only when necessary for specific tasks. In some version control systems, this may be possible at the organizational or repository level. If not, set permissions at the top level of the pipeline.

    Every workflow declares an explicit permissions: block scoped to what that job actually needs, on top of a read-only default set by the repository baseline. The strongest case is enforced by a lint: no workflow that runs caller-supplied code may hold id-token: write, and lint:capability-boundary fails the build if one ever does.



    CI/CD pipelines which accept trusted collaborator input MUST sanitize and validate that input prior to use in the pipeline. [OSPS-BR-01.04]
    CI/CD pipelines should sanitize (quote, escape or exit on expected values) all collaborator inputs on explicit workflow executions. While collaborators are generally trusted, manual inputs to a workflow cannot be reviewed and could be abused by an account takeover or insider threat.

    Collaborator-supplied input to the CI/CD pipeline is validated by the shared workflows (allowlisted inputs, release-stub shape) and zizmor fails the gate on untrusted-context interpolation.



    When an official release is created, all assets within that release MUST be clearly associated with the release identifier or another unique identifier for the asset. [OSPS-BR-02.02]
    Assign a unique version identifier to each software asset produced by the project, following a consistent naming convention or numbering scheme. Examples include SemVer, CalVer, or git commit id.

    Verified on the published release v0.2.3: every asset is named for the release (iiif-server-0.2.3.spdx.json, iiif-server-0.2.3-image.spdx.json, sbom-image-iiif-server-0.2.3.spdx.json) and each is bound by digest in checksums.txt and in the attestations.intoto.jsonl evidence bundle; the container image is tagged v0.2.3 in GHCR and attested by digest. https://github.com/monumental-archive/iiif-server/releases/tag/v0.2.3



    The project MUST define a policy for managing secrets and credentials used by the project. The policy should include guidelines for storing, accessing, and rotating secrets and credentials. [OSPS-BR-07.02]
    Document how secrets and credentials are managed and used within the project. This should include details on how secrets are stored (e.g., using a secrets management tool), how access is controlled, and how secrets are rotated or updated. Ensure that sensitive information is not hard-coded in the source code or stored in version control systems.

    docs/continuity.md is the secrets policy in operational form: an asset table naming every credential the project uses, where it is stored, who can reach it, and how it is rotated or recreated — including the one standing token, whose expiry is designed to fail loudly rather than silently under-claim. The policy is short because the architecture removes most secrets: publishing is keyless via OIDC and trusted publishing, and no signing key exists to store. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/docs/continuity.md



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the integrity and authenticity of the release assets. [OSPS-DO-03.01]
    Instructions in the project should contain information about the technology used, the commands to run, and the expected output. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    docs/deployment.md 'Verifying what you pulled' gives the gh attestation verify command a consumer runs to check the image's integrity and provenance. https://github.com/monumental-archive/iiif-server/blob/main/docs/deployment.md#verifying-what-you-pulled



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the expected identity of the person or process authoring the software release. [OSPS-DO-03.02]
    The expected identity may be in the form of key IDs used to sign, issuer and identity from a sigstore certificate, or other similar forms. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    The same section states the expected author identity: the signer's workflow (monumental-archive/signer/.github/workflows/sign.yml), passed as --signer-workflow, with the source ref. https://github.com/monumental-archive/iiif-server/blob/main/docs/deployment.md#verifying-what-you-pulled



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include a descriptive statement about the scope and duration of support for each release. [OSPS-DO-04.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for the project's released software assets, the project should have a SUPPORT.md file, a "Support" section in SECURITY.md, or other documentation explaining the support lifecycle, including the expected duration of support for each release, the types of support provided (e.g., bug fixes, security updates), and any relevant policies or procedures for obtaining support.

    The org SECURITY.md (served to this repository, which carries no copy) states support scope and duration: only the latest release receives security fixes, by rolling forward. MAINTENANCE.md adds this repository's response window: advisories triaged within 7 days and released as signed patch releases. https://github.com/monumental-archive/iiif-server/blob/main/MAINTENANCE.md



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST provide a descriptive statement when releases or versions will no longer receive security updates. [OSPS-DO-05.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for security fixes, the project should have a SUPPORT.md or other documentation explaining the project's policy for security updates.

    The org SECURITY.md states that a release stops receiving security updates when the next release exists; MAINTENANCE.md states the tag policy (immutable versions, floating 0.x tags). https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/SECURITY.md



    The project documentation MUST have a policy that code collaborators are reviewed prior to granting escalated permissions to sensitive resources. [OSPS-GV-04.01]
    Publish an enforceable policy in the project documentation that requires code collaborators to be reviewed and approved before being granted escalated permissions to sensitive resources, such as merge approval or access to secrets. It is recommended that vetting includes establishing a justifiable lineage of identity such as confirming the contributor's association with a known trusted organization.

    GOVERNANCE.md section 'Escalation and permissions' carries the policy: a collaborator is reviewed before being granted any escalated permission. Concretely, before an account joins @monumental-archive/owners or receives write access anywhere, the maintainer reviews who they are, why the access is needed and what the smallest sufficient grant is - and the grant is then recorded in the settings-as-code baseline so drift is auditable. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#escalation-and-permissions



    When the project has made a release, all compiled released software assets MUST be delivered with a software bill of materials. [OSPS-QA-02.02]
    It is recommended to auto-generate SBOMs at build time using a tool that has been vetted for accuracy. This enables users to ingest this data in a standardized approach alongside other projects in their environment.

    Every release ships SPDX SBOMs as release assets, generated by the release pipeline rather than hand-kept. Verified on v0.2.3: iiif-server-0.2.3.spdx.json (source), iiif-server-0.2.3-image.spdx.json and sbom-image-iiif-server-0.2.3.spdx.json (image). The binary is built with cargo-auditable (mise.toml) so the dependency tree is also embedded in the shipped executable. https://github.com/monumental-archive/iiif-server/releases/tag/v0.2.3



    When the project has made a release comprising multiple source code repositories, all subprojects MUST enforce security requirements that are as strict or stricter than the primary codebase. [OSPS-QA-04.02]
    Any additional subproject code repositories produced by the project and compiled into a release must enforce security requirements as applicable to the status and intent of the respective codebase. In addition to following the corresponding OSPS Baseline requirements, this may include requiring a security review, ensuring that it is free of vulnerabilities, and ensuring that it is free of known security issues.

    A release is this single repository's container image; the workspace crates are publish = false and released only inside it, so there are no additional subprojects released alongside it.



    The project documentation MUST clearly document when and how tests are run. [OSPS-QA-06.02]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains how to run the tests locally and how to run the tests in the CI/CD pipeline. The documentation should explain what the tests are testing and how to interpret the results.

    README.md states that mise run ci locally is exactly what CI runs, and CLAUDE.md 'Commands' lists when each check runs: the gate on every pull request and push to main, the fuzz and validator audits on the Monday cron. https://github.com/monumental-archive/iiif-server/blob/main/README.md



    The project documentation MUST include a policy that all major changes to the software produced by the project should add or update tests of the functionality in an automated test suite. [OSPS-QA-06.03]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains the policy for adding or updating tests. The policy should explain what constitutes a major change and what tests should be added or updated.

    Org CONTRIBUTING.md item 3 (served to this repository) requires new behaviour to add the check that holds it and bug fixes to add the reproducing case; CLAUDE.md adds that correctness fixes want a failing test first. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md



    When a commit is made to the primary branch, the project's version control system MUST require at least one non-author human approval of the changes before merging. [OSPS-QA-07.01]
    Configure the project's version control system to require at least one non-author human approval of changes before merging into the release or primary branch. This can be achieved by requiring a pull request to be reviewed and approved by at least one other collaborator before it can be merged.

    With a single maintainer there is no non-author human approval available, so this is not enforced. It is the headcount wall this project records rather than works around: the same boundary as Gold's two_person_review and SLSA Source L4, tracked as an open issue rather than quietly claimed. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/docs/slsa-reference.md



    When the project has made a release, the project MUST perform a threat modeling and attack surface analysis to understand and protect against attacks on critical code paths, functions, and interactions within the system. [OSPS-SA-03.02]
    Threat modeling is an activity where the project looks at the codebase, associated processes and infrastructure, interfaces, key components and "thinks like a hacker" and brainstorms how the system be be broken or compromised. Each identified threat is listed out so the project can then think about how to proactively avoid or close off any gaps/vulnerabilities that could arise. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    docs/assurance-case.md 'Threat model' and 'Trust boundaries' are the threat model and attack-surface analysis: hostile URLs and hostile master bytes as the critical paths, each with its control. https://github.com/monumental-archive/iiif-server/blob/main/docs/assurance-case.md



    Any vulnerabilities in the software components not affecting the project MUST be accounted for in a VEX document, augmenting the vulnerability report with non-exploitability details. [OSPS-VM-04.02]
    Establish a VEX feed communicating the exploitability status of known vulnerabilities, including assessment details or any mitigations in place preventing vulnerable code from being executed.

    Exactly this: the dependency track emits VEX documents keyed by package@version recording non-exploitability decisions for advisories that do not affect the project, with coverage derived rather than asserted, and the release path refuses to publish while an advisory in the SBOM is undecided. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/docs/dependency-track.md



    The project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. [OSPS-VM-05.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    deny.toml defines the thresholds: licence allowlist, wildcard bans, registry and git source restrictions, and reasoned skips; lint:deny runs it in the gate and audit:deny checks the RustSec feed weekly. https://github.com/monumental-archive/iiif-server/blob/main/deny.toml



    The project documentation MUST include a policy to address SCA violations prior to any release. [OSPS-VM-05.02]
    Document a policy in the project to address applicable Software Composition Analysis results before any release, and add status checks that verify compliance with that policy prior to release.

    The policy is enforced at the release boundary, not merely stated: the release path refuses to publish with an undecided advisory in its SBOM. It has already blocked a real release in the lab rather than being theoretical. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/docs/dependency-track.md



    All changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for malicious dependencies and known vulnerabilities in dependencies, then blocked in the event of violations, except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-05.03]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Software Composition Analysis tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    Automatically on every change: cargo-deny (deny.toml) in the gate and dependency-review on every pull request; Renovate raises security updates as advisories land. https://github.com/monumental-archive/iiif-server/blob/main/.github/workflows/dependency-review.yml



    The project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SAST findings. [OSPS-VM-06.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of Static Application Security Testing (SAST) findings. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    SECURITY.md section 'Static analysis policy' defines the remediation threshold, and it is zero: any SAST finding - CodeQL, the lint belt, zizmor and peers - fails the CI gate, and a red gate cannot merge, so findings are remediated or explicitly and reviewably suppressed with a written reason before the change lands. There is no severity triage queue for static findings because there is no state in which one is outstanding on a default branch. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/SECURITY.md



    All changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for security weaknesses and blocked in the event of violations except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-06.02]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    Every change is evaluated and blocked on violation: CodeQL (Rust and Actions) runs on this repository, and clippy at every group with -D warnings, cargo-deny and zizmor run in the gate, a required check. https://github.com/monumental-archive/iiif-server/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml



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Project badge entry owned by: Carl Allen.
Entry created on 2026-11-15 18:27:10 UTC, last updated on 2026-11-15 18:54:37 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-11-15 18:52:52 UTC.