Samba

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These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

        

 Basics 13/13

  • Identification

    Samba is the File, Print and Active Directory Server for Unix

    What programming language(s) are used to implement the project?
  • Basic project website content


    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]

    Since 1992, Samba has provided secure, stable and fast file and print services for all clients using the SMB/CIFS protocol, such as all versions of DOS and Windows, OS/2, Linux and many others.

    https://samba.org



    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]


    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]

    https://www.samba.org/samba/devel/ describes that Samba is in GIT, and points to a longer wiki article.



    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/Contribute explains how to create good patches for Samba, and where to submit them (samba-technical ML or github PR)


  • FLOSS license

    What license(s) is the project released under?



    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]

    The GPL-3.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]

    The GPL-3.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]
  • Documentation


    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]

    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]
  • Other


    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]

    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]

    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]

    https://bugzilla.samba.org/ is in English, as is the Mailing list and our wiki.



    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]


(Advanced) What other users have additional rights to edit this badge entry? Currently: []



  • Public version-controlled source repository


    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]

    https://git.samba.org/samba.git

    Also Repository on GitHub, which provides public git repositories with URLs.



    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    https://git.samba.org/samba.git also Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made.



    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]

    The (eg) v4-3-test and master branches are updated as patches are accepted, and become tagged when released.



    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]

    The canonical and official project repository on https://git.samba.org/samba.git, which uses git. git is distributed. Development is via a centralised repository on GitLab, which also uses git. git is distributed and GitLab could be replaced (with pain). Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • Unique version numbering


    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]

    We always bump the release number for releases, even when an embargo'ed release is withdrawn and re-released.



    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]

    We are close to this, but our major version doesn't change for every incompatilbe change (eg 3. -> 4. changed for the big move to AD, the 4.0 -> 4.1 change included some incompatible changes).



    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]
  • Release notes


    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]

    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]
  • Working build system


    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]


    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]

    Samba uses WAF, which is written in python. It is not the most common build tool, but neither is it unique.



    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    Samba can be built using entirely free software.


  • Automated test suite


    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]


    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]

    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    We have an incredibly extensive testsuite, but even so code coverage above 50% is actually impractical in C based projects.



    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    All code must pass autobuild before it is merged into master or a release branch.

    https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/The_Samba_Selftest_System


  • New functionality testing


    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]

    Untested code is broken code, patches are not generally accepted without tests.



    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]


    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]

  • Warning flags


    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]

    Our build system enabled as many -W and -Werror flags as possible. Some warnings remain, we control where we allow some warnings at all on a per-subsystem basis to raise the bar.



    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]

    Because the build is run with -Werror for developers, warnings must be addressed.



    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]

    We are maximally strict where possible, on a per-subsystem basis. We routinely investigate new warning flags to enable and use them with -Werror to ensure they remain warning-free.


  • Secure development knowledge


    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]


    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]

  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]

    We match the samba crypto as windows, published in the WSPP documentation on MSDN.

    Just because the protocols are reviewed doesn't mean they are any good however (eg single DES, RC4)

    https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=blob;f=lib/crypto/REQUIREMENTS;hb=HEAD



    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    We still have some internal crypto that we don't link to a library for (some AES modes), but only on systems without a modern GnuTLS.

    For this rule, we don't consider MD4 to be cryptography, the role is to compress the password before use in cryptography, it is never used as a checksum.



    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]


    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]

    We are constrained by legacy support for NTLM, but with the default NTLMv2 we send from the client, and accept as a server we meet this.

    We support single DES for some calls (NTLM, LSA QuerySecret), and don't currently have a way to disable all use of single DES (which is the weakest link here).

    https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=blob;f=lib/crypto/REQUIREMENTS;hb=HEAD



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]

    Constrained by needing to support NTLM and other Windows protocols but we are close enough to say 'MET', NTLMv2 is fundamentally a HMAC-MD5 scheme and SMB2 encryption is AES based. The main challenge is RC4 in LDAP and RPC encryption. Adding more documentation would be good.

    https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=blob;f=lib/crypto/REQUIREMENTS;hb=HEAD



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]

    Constrained by needing to support NTLM but NTLMv2 is not subject to a known serious weakness.

    https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=blob;f=lib/crypto/REQUIREMENTS;hb=HEAD



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]

    Not possible with most of our protocols.



    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]

    Constrained by support of NTLM and arcfour-hmac-md5 on Kerberos. The hash required for arcfour-hmac-md5 is unsalted.

    The deprecated LanMan and NTLM password schemes are also not able to be salted. It may be possible to a username salted NTLMv2 however we need to share a data storage format with Windows (as an AD DC) that precludes that.

    In short, we can't use PBKDF2 due to the protocol restrictions, and at all times the keys are password equivalent anyway.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]

  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]

    Downloads of new versions are GPG signed and over https://.

    No automatic update is provided by Samba.



    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]

    GPG signatures are available, and the git repo is available over https:// As there is no automatic update this otherwise doesn't apply.


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]


    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

  • Other security issues


    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]

  • Static code analysis


    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]

    We use Coverity



    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]

    Coverity is very good, it knows about many things, particularly common vulnerabilities.



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]

    Coverity issues are addressed on a continuing basis.



    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    Coverity reports are mailed to senior devs regularly.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]


    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]


    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]


    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]

    All security issues, be they from user investigation, dynamic or static analysis are dealt with promptly.



This data is available under the Creative Commons Attribution version 3.0 or later license (CC-BY-3.0+). All are free to share and adapt the data, but must give appropriate credit. Please credit Andrew Bartlett and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Andrew Bartlett.
Entry created on 2016-06-10 19:39:34 UTC, last updated on 2023-04-26 02:19:16 UTC.

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