OSSEC

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

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These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

        

 Basics 13/13

  • Identification

    OSSEC is an Open Source Host-based Intrusion Detection System that performs log analysis, file integrity checking, policy monitoring, rootkit detection, real-time alerting and active response. It runs on most operating systems, including Linux, MacOS, Solaris, HP-UX, AIX and Windows.

    What programming language(s) are used to implement the project?
  • Basic project website content


    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]

    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]

    Yes, the OSSEC project accepts pull requests. Further information is available here https://ossec.github.io/about.html#community-support and https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids



    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]
  • FLOSS license

    What license(s) is the project released under?



    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]

    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]


    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]
  • Documentation


    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]

    https://ossec.github.io/docs/

    additionally the Documentation is covered under SCM at: https://github.com/ossec/ossec-docs



    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]

    Provides plenty of documentation on how to install, implement, and provides code based examples: http://ossec.github.io/docs/examples/output/index.html


  • Other


    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]

    https://ossec.github.io supports TLS v1.2



    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]

    GitHub issue tracker and pull requests support discussion



    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]

    Bug reports are accepted at: https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/issues, it is accepted in English and supports comment threading.

    English Documentation is provided at: https://ossec.github.io/docs/

    additionally the Documentation is covered under SCM at: https://github.com/ossec/ossec-docs



    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]


(Advanced) What other users have additional rights to edit this badge entry? Currently: []



  • Public version-controlled source repository


    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]

    Yes, the project is hosted on a publically accessible github: https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/



    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]

    Yes the project is branched per release (ex: https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/commits/v2.8.3), as well as future milestone release(s) ex: (https://gthub.com/ossec/ossec-hids/commits/2_9_b) as well as a common master branch: https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/commits/master



    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]

    The project uses git, https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/


  • Unique version numbering


    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]

    Yes, the project uses SemVer format. Example: https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/releases



    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]


    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

    Git tags are used for each release, and proposed release: Ex: https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/commits/v2.8.3, other tags are used for integration with external parties like Coverity, etc


  • Release notes


    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]

    The central changelog is maintained at: https://ossec.github.io/docs/whatsnew/index.html, additionally each release includes a changelog, example: https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/releases/tag/2.8.2



    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]

    Yes, example: https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/releases/tag/2.8.2 (resolving CVE-2015-3222)


  • Bug-reporting process


    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    Yes, a public bug tracker is available at: https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/issues



    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    Bugs are tracked as individual issues at: https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/issues



    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    Bugs are accepted or rejected at: https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/issues, Core team members are notified of a bug report immediately. Standard response for accept/reject is within 24 hours



    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]

    Feature requests/Enhancements are tracked at https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/issues, Core team members are notified immediately. Standard response for accept/reject is within 24 hours



    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]

    Public access to the Issue tracker is available at https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/issues


  • Vulnerability report process


    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]

    Same as the bug reporting process, can be done through GitHub, but documentation also specifies that security issues can be sent through to an email: https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/blob/master/BUGS



    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]

    Private security reports can also be sent via email in the same way: https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/blob/master/BUGS



    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]

    Met, our response time for the last CVE submitted (CVE-2015-3222) was resolved within 24 hours.


  • Working build system


    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]

    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]

    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    https://ossec.github.io/docs/development/build/index.html

    OSSEC uses gcc, gnu make, cmake, and other open source tools to build.


  • Automated test suite


    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]

    Our rule test suite: https://ossec.github.io/docs/development/build/test-rules.html

    Automated build bot repository (for integration with services like travisci, etc):

    https://github.com/ossec/ossec-buildbot

    Vagrant test suite:

    https://github.com/ossec/ossec-vagrant



    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]

    Test suite requires python, ossec, and the build tools to compile ossec: https://ossec.github.io/docs/development/build/test-rules.html#requirements



    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    Each test suite (rules, buildbot, vagrant) covers different build & test suites, from regression testing (in the case of rules) to automatic building via buildbot & travis integration. Any branch can be applied in this context. Automatic testing is integrated in github for the stable and development branches now



    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    Automatic build testing is integrated with github & travis at: https://travis-ci.org/ossec


  • New functionality testing


    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]

    All pull requests are automatically tested at the time they are committed via: https://travis-ci.org/ossec



    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]

    Automatic build testing history is tracked at: https://travis-ci.org/ossec/ossec-hids

    Failures are automatically reported back into the pull request at github.com



    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]

    All testing for commits, new or otherwise, runs through https://travis-ci.org/ossec/ossec-hids. Internal testing for new rule and decoders is maintained at: https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/tree/master/contrib/logtesting


  • Warning flags


    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]

    Code is currently built with FORTIFY_SOURCE on distros that support this functionality. Binary packaging also includes -fPIE -pie -Wl,-z,relro



    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]

    All warnings have been addressed either as a fixed issue or in the code itself. https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/search?q=warnings&type=Issues&utf8=%E2%9C%93



    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]

    Project proves to be strict with warnings such that all warnings raised as an issue have been addressed, fixed, and the issue has been closed. In instances where warnings are triggered but they are trivial, they are flagged in the code. But, it is also noted in their repo that there are a number of instances where fixing warnings is too time consuming for little purpose, so they note that they assure the code works despite the warnings. https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/blob/a7ca63d6d074f2f6bdb49f4bc79a054c31dcafc7/src/external/zlib-1.2.8/FAQ


  • Secure development knowledge


    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]

    "This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"



    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]

    "This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]

    OpenSSL



    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    OpenSSL



    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]


    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]


    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]

    Currently the project relies on MD5 & SHA1 for the File Integrity Monitoring system. The project is currently in the process of updating this to SHA256.



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]

    SHA-1 and MD5 are used



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]


    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]


    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]

  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]

    Commits and release tags are signed before release. These keys are digitally signed by 3rd parties, and are downloaded over HTTPS.



    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]

    We only rely on releases digitally signed with the release maintainers GPG keys. These keys are both signed by 3rd parties, and only available via either known public PGP serves (MIT, bitkey) or via https (ex: https://www.atomicorp.com/RPM-GPG-KEY.atomicorp.txt)


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]

    No unpatched high severity vulnerabilities.



    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    Most vulnerabilities reported have been addressed and fixed: https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/search?q=vulnerability&type=Issues&utf8=%E2%9C%93


  • Other security issues


    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]

  • Static code analysis


    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]

    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]


    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]

    Vulnerabilities are addressed and fixed.



    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    Static source code analysis is performed often (last check was 7 days ago), but not daily or on every commit.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]

    The project currently uses Coverity scans at: https://scan.coverity.com/projects/1847



    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]

    We currently test the software with Coverity on an scheduled basis, and spot check the software with valgrind. However we do not feel that this is good enough to warrant a "Met" categorization. We intend to build static analysis in at the commit level.



    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]

    This is currently planned for the next round of improvements in our travis-ci integration



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]


This data is available under the Creative Commons Attribution version 3.0 license (CC-BY-3.0) per the terms of use. All are free to share and adapt the data, but must give appropriate credit. Please credit Scott R. Shinn and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Scott R. Shinn.
Entry created on 2015-11-05 17:49:54 UTC, last updated on 2016-08-21 20:38:19 UTC.

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