wasmCloud

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Baseline Level 3 criteria. These are criteria version v2026.08.28.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    wasmCloud is a cloud native platform for running WebAssembly workloads across any cloud, Kubernetes, datacenter, or edge.

    Using wasmCloud, you can run microservices, functions, and agents as ultra-dense, deny-by-default bytecode sandboxes that are far more secure and efficient than traditional containers.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

 Controls 19/21 ●

  • Controls


    Enough for a badge!

    When a job is assigned permissions in a CI/CD pipeline, the source code or configuration MUST only assign the minimum privileges necessary for the corresponding activity. [OSPS-AC-04.02]
    Configure the project's CI/CD pipelines to assign the lowest available permissions to users and services by default, elevating permissions only when necessary for specific tasks. In some version control systems, this may be possible at the organizational or repository level. If not, set permissions at the top level of the pipeline.

    Every workflow in .github/workflows sets a top-level permissions block of contents: read, and each job that needs more (for example id-token: write and attestations: write in release-tag.yml) requests only those scopes at the job level. zizmor's excessive-permissions audit runs on every pull request that changes a workflow (https://github.com/wasmCloud/wasmCloud/blob/main/.github/workflows/lint-workflows.yml), and the repository default GITHUB_TOKEN permission is read-only.


    Enough for a badge!

    CI/CD pipelines which accept trusted collaborator input MUST sanitize and validate that input prior to use in the pipeline. [OSPS-BR-01.04]
    CI/CD pipelines should sanitize (quote, escape or exit on expected values) all collaborator inputs on explicit workflow executions. While collaborators are generally trusted, manual inputs to a workflow cannot be reviewed and could be abused by an account takeover or insider threat.

    Collaborator input to pipelines (workflow_dispatch inputs, PR titles, branch names) reaches run steps only through env variables, never by direct expression interpolation; zizmor's template-injection audit enforces this on every pull request that changes a workflow (https://github.com/wasmCloud/wasmCloud/blob/main/.github/workflows/lint-workflows.yml). Dispatch inputs are choice-typed where possible, and free-form inputs are validated before use: release-train.yml rejects a version override that is not SemVer (https://github.com/wasmCloud/wasmCloud/blob/main/.github/workflows/release-train.yml).


    Enough for a badge!

    When an official release is created, all assets within that release MUST be clearly associated with the release identifier or another unique identifier for the asset. [OSPS-BR-02.02]
    Assign a unique version identifier to each software asset produced by the project, following a consistent naming convention or numbering scheme. Examples include SemVer, CalVer, or git commit id.

    [version_unique]


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST define a policy for managing secrets and credentials used by the project. The policy should include guidelines for storing, accessing, and rotating secrets and credentials. [OSPS-BR-07.02]
    Document how secrets and credentials are managed and used within the project. This should include details on how secrets are stored (e.g., using a secrets management tool), how access is controlled, and how secrets are rotated or updated. Ensure that sensitive information is not hard-coded in the source code or stored in version control systems.

    SECURITY.md defines the policy for secrets and credentials used by CI and release automation (https://github.com/wasmCloud/wasmCloud/blob/main/SECURITY.md#secrets-and-credentials): prefer short-lived credentials (Sigstore keyless signing, OIDC role assumption, octo-sts/GitHub App tokens); stored secrets are GitHub Actions secrets with the narrowest scope, never in the repository, images, artifacts or logs, with secret scanning and push protection on; only org maintainers and repository admins can manage them; and secrets are rotated immediately on possible exposure, when a holder loses access, and at least yearly.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the integrity and authenticity of the release assets. [OSPS-DO-03.01]
    Instructions in the project should contain information about the technology used, the commands to run, and the expected output. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    Per security-insights.yml: repository.release.attestations predicate-uri includes slsa Comment says: "Release binaries, container images and WIT interface packages carry Sigstore-signed SLSA provenance. Verify with gh attestation verify --repo wasmCloud/wasmCloud.". [signed_releases]


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the expected identity of the person or process authoring the software release. [OSPS-DO-03.02]
    The expected identity may be in the form of key IDs used to sign, issuer and identity from a sigstore certificate, or other similar forms. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    Per security-insights.yml: repository.release.attestations predicate-uri includes slsa Comment says: "Release binaries, container images and WIT interface packages carry Sigstore-signed SLSA provenance. Verify with gh attestation verify --repo wasmCloud/wasmCloud.". [signed_releases]


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include a descriptive statement about the scope and duration of support for each release. [OSPS-DO-04.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for the project's released software assets, the project should have a SUPPORT.md file, a "Support" section in SECURITY.md, or other documentation explaining the support lifecycle, including the expected duration of support for each release, the types of support provided (e.g., bug fixes, security updates), and any relevant policies or procedures for obtaining support.

    SUPPORT.md (https://github.com/wasmCloud/wasmCloud/blob/main/SUPPORT.md#supported-releases) states the scope and duration of support: only the latest minor release is supported; fixes ship in the next release on the two-week train, critical vulnerability fixes ship out of cycle; the previous minor stops receiving fixes when a new minor ships; wash, wash-runtime, runtime-operator, runtime-gateway and the Helm chart share one version and support window.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST provide a descriptive statement when releases or versions will no longer receive security updates. [OSPS-DO-05.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for security fixes, the project should have a SUPPORT.md or other documentation explaining the project's policy for security updates.

    SUPPORT.md (https://github.com/wasmCloud/wasmCloud/blob/main/SUPPORT.md#supported-releases) states that a minor release stops receiving any fixes, including security fixes, when the next minor release ships (for example 2.11 stops when 2.12.0 is released), and that wasmCloud 1.x is end of life as of v1.9.2. SECURITY.md#supported-versions links it.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST have a policy that code collaborators are reviewed prior to granting escalated permissions to sensitive resources. [OSPS-GV-04.01]
    Publish an enforceable policy in the project documentation that requires code collaborators to be reviewed and approved before being granted escalated permissions to sensitive resources, such as merge approval or access to secrets. It is recommended that vetting includes establishing a justifiable lineage of identity such as confirming the contributor's association with a known trusted organization.

    CONTRIBUTION_LADDER.md (https://github.com/wasmCloud/wasmCloud/blob/main/CONTRIBUTION_LADDER.md#granting-access) requires review before escalated access (write, maintain or admin on a repository, org ownership, secrets or deployment environments, publishing releases or packages): no one receives it until the PR approving their role merges into MAINTAINERS.md; an org maintainer then grants the lowest level the role needs to the account with the person's contribution history; access is removed on emeritus status and reviewed yearly.


    Not enough for a badge.

    When the project has made a release, all compiled released software assets MUST be delivered with a software bill of materials. [OSPS-QA-02.02]
    It is recommended to auto-generate SBOMs at build time using a tool that has been vetted for accuracy. This enables users to ingest this data in a standardized approach alongside other projects in their environment.

    The release workflow generates SPDX SBOMs for every release binary and container image and attaches them, with Sigstore SBOM attestations, to the GitHub Release (https://github.com/wasmCloud/wasmCloud/blob/main/.github/workflows/release-tag.yml, .github/actions/release-binary-sbom, .github/actions/release-image-sbom). This landed on 2026-10-29, after the latest release (v2.11.0), so the first release carrying SBOMs is v2.12.0.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release comprising multiple source code repositories, all subprojects MUST enforce security requirements that are as strict or stricter than the primary codebase. [OSPS-QA-04.02]
    Any additional subproject code repositories produced by the project and compiled into a release must enforce security requirements as applicable to the status and intent of the respective codebase. In addition to following the corresponding OSPS Baseline requirements, this may include requiring a security review, ensuring that it is free of vulnerabilities, and ensuring that it is free of known security issues.

    wasmCloud's releases are cut from wasmCloud/wasmCloud. The other code repositories (wasmCloud/go, wasmCloud/typescript) enforce the same or stricter rules on main: pull requests with at least one approving review, code owner review, stale review dismissal, required status checks, no force pushes or deletion, plus required DCO and CodeQL code-scanning checks.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST clearly document when and how tests are run. [OSPS-QA-06.02]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains how to run the tests locally and how to run the tests in the CI/CD pipeline. The documentation should explain what the tests are testing and how to interpret the results.

    [test]


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include a policy that all major changes to the software produced by the project should add or update tests of the functionality in an automated test suite. [OSPS-QA-06.03]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains the policy for adding or updating tests. The policy should explain what constitutes a major change and what tests should be added or updated.

    The contribution guide requires tests for new functionality. Its pull request process (https://github.com/wasmCloud/wasmCloud/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#pull-request-process) says contributors must write tests for any new functionality and ensure all tests pass, and its testing section (https://github.com/wasmCloud/wasmCloud/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#testing) requires unit tests for new functionality, integration tests for CLI commands where appropriate, and tests for error cases and edge conditions. All changes go through reviewed pull requests, and the automated test suites run in GitHub Actions on every pull request (https://github.com/wasmCloud/wasmCloud/actions). [test_policy_mandated]


    Enough for a badge!

    When a commit is made to the primary branch, the project's version control system MUST require at least one non-author human approval of the changes before merging. [OSPS-QA-07.01]
    Configure the project's version control system to require at least one non-author human approval of changes before merging into the release or primary branch. This can be achieved by requiring a pull request to be reviewed and approved by at least one other collaborator before it can be merged.

    The main branch ruleset requires a pull request with at least one approving code-owner review, dismisses stale approvals on push, and requires approval of the most recent push, so every change is reviewed by someone other than its author before merge and release. Required status checks must also pass. [two_person_review]


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project MUST perform a threat modeling and attack surface analysis to understand and protect against attacks on critical code paths, functions, and interactions within the system. [OSPS-SA-03.02]
    Threat modeling is an activity where the project looks at the codebase, associated processes and infrastructure, interfaces, key components and "thinks like a hacker" and brainstorms how the system be be broken or compromised. Each identified threat is listed out so the project can then think about how to proactively avoid or close off any gaps/vulnerabilities that could arise. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    Threat model and trust boundaries: THREAT_MODEL.md (https://github.com/wasmCloud/wasmCloud/blob/main/THREAT_MODEL.md) defines the scope, actors, security goals and known limitations, and names four trust boundaries: component to host, workload to workload, workload to plugin, and workload to network. Gemara capability and threat catalogs (https://github.com/wasmCloud/wasmCloud/tree/main/docs/security) link each of 17 threats to the host capability and code that exposes it. SELF_ASSESSMENT.md (https://github.com/wasmCloud/wasmCloud/blob/main/SELF_ASSESSMENT.md#security-functions-and-features) lists the security functions that enforce them.

    Secure design principles: least privilege (a component is linked only against the imports its workload grants, with no ambient filesystem, network or environment access); safe defaults (the address policy denies loopback, link-local and metadata ranges, insecure registries are off, and policy-relaxing flags are opt-in and listed in THREAT_MODEL.md); complete mediation (every outbound wasi:http request and socket operation is checked against allowedHosts and the address policy); economy of mechanism (one TLS stack, rustls, and one sandbox, wasmtime); open design (all mechanisms are open source and documented); separation of privilege (operator, host and workload hold different credentials and grants); least common mechanism (per-workload stores, loopback network and resource quotas).

    Common implementation weaknesses: memory-safety weaknesses (CWE-787, 125, 416) are countered by Rust and Go, with unsafe_code = 'deny' across the workspace and wasmtime bounds checks and guard pages for guest code; injection (CWE-78, 89) by having no shell-outs on request paths and typed APIs; path traversal (CWE-22) by the hostPath allowlist and reserved paths; SSRF (CWE-918) by allowedHosts and the address policy; missing authentication (CWE-306) by NATS credentials and TLS; uncontrolled resource consumption (CWE-400) by memory, connection and file-descriptor quotas and epoch interruption; unsafe deserialization (CWE-502) by typed serde and protobuf decoding. CodeQL, cargo audit and cargo deny run in CI. [assurance_case]


    Not enough for a badge.

    Any vulnerabilities in the software components not affecting the project MUST be accounted for in a VEX document, augmenting the vulnerability report with non-exploitability details. [OSPS-VM-04.02]
    Establish a VEX feed communicating the exploitability status of known vulnerabilities, including assessment details or any mitigations in place preventing vulnerable code from being executed.

    Advisories that do not affect wasmCloud are recorded with a reason in .cargo/audit.toml (https://github.com/wasmCloud/wasmCloud/blob/main/.cargo/audit.toml), but the project does not yet publish them as VEX documents.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. [OSPS-VM-05.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    SECURITY.md defines remediation thresholds for SCA findings (https://github.com/wasmCloud/wasmCloud/blob/main/SECURITY.md#dependency-and-code-scanning). Vulnerabilities affecting released code: critical in an out-of-cycle patch within 7 days of a fix, high in the next release (at most 14 days), medium within 90 days, low best effort; non-applicable advisories are suppressed in .cargo/audit.toml with a reason. Licenses: every dependency must be on the deny.toml allowlist mirroring the CNCF allowed-license policy, or carry a linked CNCF exception.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include a policy to address SCA violations prior to any release. [OSPS-VM-05.02]
    Document a policy in the project to address applicable Software Composition Analysis results before any release, and add status checks that verify compliance with that policy prior to release.

    SECURITY.md#before-a-release (https://github.com/wasmCloud/wasmCloud/blob/main/SECURITY.md#before-a-release): a release PR can't merge while cargo audit or cargo deny check licenses fails, or while a known critical or high advisory affecting released code is open.


    Enough for a badge!

    All changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for malicious dependencies and known vulnerabilities in dependencies, then blocked in the event of violations, except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-05.03]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Software Composition Analysis tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    Per security-insights.yml: repository.security.tools type=SCA with integration.ci=true Comment says: "RustSec advisory check daily, on pushes to main, and on pull requests that change a Cargo manifest or the lockfile.".


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SAST findings. [OSPS-VM-06.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of Static Application Security Testing (SAST) findings. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    SECURITY.md#code-scanning (https://github.com/wasmCloud/wasmCloud/blob/main/SECURITY.md#code-scanning): CodeQL and zizmor alerts in released code follow the same severity timeline as vulnerabilities (critical 7 days, high next release, medium 90 days); each alert is fixed or dismissed in the Security tab with a stated reason.


    Enough for a badge!

    All changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for security weaknesses and blocked in the event of violations except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-06.02]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    Per security-insights.yml: repository.security.tools type=SAST with integration.ci=true Comment says: "Static analysis of GitHub Actions workflows.".



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Project badge entry owned by: Brooks Townsend.
Entry created on 2022-08-15 21:56:48 UTC, last updated on 2026-11-03 20:55:31 UTC. Last lost passing badge on 2023-11-02 18:23:16 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2023-11-02 18:38:53 UTC.