wrongsecrets

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

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These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

        

 Basics 13/13

  • Identification

    Vulnerable app with examples showing how to not use secrets

    What programming language(s) are used to implement the project?
  • Basic project website content


    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]

    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]

    Non-trivial contribution file in repository: https://github.com/OWASP/wrongsecrets/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md.



    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    Non-trivial contribution file in repository: https://github.com/OWASP/wrongsecrets/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md.


  • FLOSS license

    What license(s) is the project released under?



    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]

    The MIT license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). The AGPL-3.0-only license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]

    The MIT license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). The AGPL-3.0-only license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]

    Non-trivial license location file in repository: https://github.com/OWASP/wrongsecrets/blob/master/LICENSE.


  • Documentation


    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]

    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]
  • Other


    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]

    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]

    GitHub supports discussions on issues and pull requests.



    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]

    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]

(Advanced) What other users have additional rights to edit this badge entry? Currently: []



  • Public version-controlled source repository


    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]

    Repository on GitHub, which provides public git repositories with URLs.



    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made.



    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]

    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • Unique version numbering


    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]

    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]


    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]
  • Release notes


    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]

    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]

    See https://github.com/OWASP/wrongsecrets/releases : there has not been a CVE patched inside the code, as it is an intentionally vulnerable app


  • Bug-reporting process


    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]

    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]
  • Vulnerability report process


    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]

    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]

    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]
  • Working build system


    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]

    Non-trivial build file in repository: https://github.com/OWASP/wrongsecrets/blob/master/pom.xml.



    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]

    Non-trivial build file in repository: https://github.com/OWASP/wrongsecrets/blob/master/pom.xml.



    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    We are using Apache Maven (https://github.com/OWASP/wrongsecrets/blob/master/pom.xml) and have support for Podman&Colima(https://github.com/OWASP/wrongsecrets/blob/master/.github/workflows/container-alts-test.yml) for our docker setup. Our Kubernetes setups have been extensively tested with Minikube. We further rely on npm and Node (https://github.com/OWASP/wrongsecrets/blob/master/package.json). All commercial tools are optional and can be disabled, while still having a good experience within the project.


  • Automated test suite


    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]

    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]

    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    Yes, we have a coverage above 80%.



    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    Yes, we use feature/fix branching model.


  • New functionality testing


    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]

    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]

    Tests have been added for major changes, like: the Windows and musl support for development (https://github.com/OWASP/wrongsecrets/pull/664/files)



    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]
  • Warning flags


    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]
    • For java we use linters (Checkstyle) (TODO CONTINU EHERE!)
    • For Javascript we use eslint
    • For Terraform we use terraform fmt & terraform docs & tf lint
    • For markdown we use terraform docs
    • For shell scripts tf lint is triggered


    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]

    The project contiuously addresses warnings. In https://github.com/OWASP/wrongsecrets/tree/master/.github/workflows you van find quite a few checkers being enabled before allowing to pass. Similarly in https://github.com/OWASP/wrongsecrets-ctf-party/tree/main/.github/workflows we check for warnings before contiuing.



    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
  • Secure development knowledge


    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]

    Primary developer is a Principal Security Architect, secondary developer is a Security engineer. Contributors include, but are not limitted to java and k8s security experts.



    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]

  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]

    Given we are an intentional vulnerable app with regards to secrets management we used both secure as well as insecure algorithms to teach our users about the risks of using them wrongly.



    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    We do not have our own implementation of any of the cryptographic algorithms.



    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]

    We use open source crypto libraries, such as Bouncy Castle.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]

    Given we are an intentional vulnerable app with regards to secrets management we used both long and not long enough keys to teach our users about the risks of using them wrongly.



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]

    Given we are an intentional vulnerable app with regards to secrets management we used both secure as well as insecure algorithms to teach our users about the risks of using them wrongly.



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]

    Given we are an intentional vulnerable app with regards to secrets management we used both secure as well as insecure algorithms to teach our users about the risks of using them wrongly.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]

    Given we are an intentional vulnerable app with regards to secrets management we do use a TLS configuration providing PFS where relevant, however, we do not implement PFS mechanisms everywhere in order to teach our users about what happens if you don't.



    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]

    We don’t have authentication of external users for our project.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]

    This is an intentional vulnerable app which contains mistakes in this area to teach its users on the drawbacks of misconfiguring this


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]

    HTTPS is in place for our hosted services



    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]

    We have a vulnerable app that actually shows the dangers of SHA1 hash issues. We will extend this with an explanation (https://github.com/OWASP/wrongsecrets/issues/682)


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]

    This is met for as far as possible given it is an intentionally vulnerable app. See https://github.com/OWASP/wrongsecrets/security and https://github.com/OWASP/wrongsecrets-ctf-party/security where all the production based vulnerabilities are remmediated.



    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    This is met for as far as possible given it is an intentionally vulnerable app.


  • Other security issues


    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]

    This is met for as far as possible given it is an intentionally vulnerable app, where we teach people about secrets management and how secrets can be leaked. none of the secrets are valid access for anything. The canary tokens that do alow certain access, just trigger canary allerts&callbacks


  • Static code analysis


    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]

    We have Codeql running to detect bugs: https://github.com/OWASP/wrongsecrets/blob/master/.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml, we are in the process of implementing spotbugs https://github.com/OWASP/wrongsecrets/pull/699



    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]

    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]

    This is an intentional vulnerable app, so we do not fix everything. Only those that really pose a risk to hosting the app (Eg xss, container escape, arbitrary code execution)



    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    CodeQl and Spotbugs will run per push/commit.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]

    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]


    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]

    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]

    This is a vulnerable app, so that will not happen for all the findings



This data is available under the Creative Commons Attribution version 3.0 or later license (CC-BY-3.0+). All are free to share and adapt the data, but must give appropriate credit. Please credit Jeroen Willemsen and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Jeroen Willemsen.
Entry created on 2023-02-15 12:04:43 UTC, last updated on 2023-03-20 11:37:09 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2023-03-20 11:03:56 UTC.

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