libsir

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These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

        

 Basics 13/13

  • Identification

    The Standard Incident Reporter library: A lightweight, cross-platform C library for information distribution.

    What programming language(s) are used to implement the project?
  • Basic project website content


    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]

    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    GitHub.



    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]

    Projects on GitHub by default use issues and pull requests, as encouraged by documentation such as https://guides.github.com/activities/contributing-to-open-source/.



    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    The project hasn't gotten off the ground enough to require instructing people about contributing


  • FLOSS license

    What license(s) is the project released under?



    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]

    The MIT license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]

    The MIT license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]

    Non-trivial licenses directory file in repository: https://github.com/aremmell/libsir/tree/master/LICENSES.


  • Documentation


    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]

    https://libsir.rml.dev is a full Doxygen-generated site



    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]

    https://libsir.rml.dev is a full Doxygen-generated site, including a section called "public interface," another called "public types," etc.


  • Other


    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]

    Given only https: URLs.



    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]

    GitHub supports discussions on issues and pull requests.



    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]

    Documentation is in English: https://libsir.rml.dev (source code is also documented with Doxygen comments). GitHub Issues are in English.



    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]

    Myself and one other contributor essentially work daily on libsir.



(Advanced) What other users have additional rights to edit this badge entry? Currently: []



This is not just a logging library (even though that's what we call it)–it's much more. It provides the ability for software to send information about its state and configuration to virtually any machine with a digital pathway to the machine it's running on. With our new plugin architecture, we plan to implement TCP socket destinations, REST API endpoint POST destinations, and more. We already have syslog (and macOS' native os_log) support, and plan to add support for the Windows Event Viewer soon as well.

  • Public version-controlled source repository


    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]

    Repository on GitHub, which provides public git repositories with URLs.



    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made.



    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]

    The GitHub repository's master branch reflects the current development state at any given time except when we tag a release, so the state of the software is always available for review.



    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • Unique version numbering


    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]

    We use standard major.minor.revision versioning. https://github.com/aremmell/libsir/releases



    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]

    This will be met going forward, but the project has been in a significant state of flux, so potentially breaking changes have gone under a minor or even revision bump.



    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

    We tag each release with the version number (e.g. v2.2.3) https://github.com/aremmell/libsir/releases


  • Release notes


    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]

    We manually publish the changelog with each release (https://github.com/aremmell/libsir/releases), and we have a dedicated page on the site (https://libsir.rml.dev/md_docs_2sources_2changelog.html)



    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]

    We have not encountered any vulnerabilities as of yet–we use quite a hefty CI pipeline w/ every SAST and linter known to man picking apart the code.


  • Bug-reporting process


    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    Bug fixes are listed in the change log for each release (https://github.com/aremmell/libsir/releases). We have never received a bug report externally.



    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]

    We also have not had any enhancement requests externally, so it's all in-house, and we are constantly churning those.



    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]
  • Vulnerability report process


    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]

    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]

    We do not have a way to privately accept a vulnerability report other than via email (my email address is in the header of every source file).



    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]

    Have not had any reports.


  • Working build system


    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]

    Non-trivial build file in repository: https://github.com/aremmell/libsir/blob/master/Makefile.



    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]

    Non-trivial build file in repository: https://github.com/aremmell/libsir/blob/master/Makefile.



    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    bash, gmake, and gcc are all you really need, but we support virtually every tooling system and platform under the sun.


  • Automated test suite


    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]

    The test suite (build/bin/sirtests) is run on every configuration in the CI pipeline, and this page includes instructions for manually invoking it: https://libsir.rml.dev/testsuite.html



    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]

    Command-line arguments (providing none runs all available tests): https://libsir.rml.dev/testsuite.html



    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    We have ~95% coverage according to Coveralls (see badges in README.md)



    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    We use GitLab CI with runners in the form of servers in the back rooms of our homes (literally–I have two 1U servers on a shelf): https://gitlab.com/libsir/libsir/-/pipelines


  • New functionality testing


    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]

    New tests are added to the test suite as force of habit when new functionality is introduced.



    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]

    The evidence is in the GitHub commit history, and new tests are mentioned in release notes for individual releases.



    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]

    We do not currently have instructions for change proposals, because we do not receive any at this time.


  • Warning flags


    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]

    We use (at least): PVS-Studio, Flawfinder, cppcheck, Valgrind, clang-analyzer, GCC extra warnings, Clang extra warnings, MSVC extra warnings, etc.



    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]

    We cannot even compile with warnings (-Werror is set on all configurations)



    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]

    If we have overdone anything, it is the use of optional -W flags in GCC and Clang! We also use -Wextra, -Wpedantic, -Wall


  • Secure development knowledge


    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]

    Both libsir contributors are seasoned software development professionals (I work in Big Tech, and John works on mainframe simulators when he's not consulting on embedded projects). I would not say that I have memorized the list of items I just read, but I would like to think I have a firm grasp on what is secure and what is not by this time in my career (and John is also extremely experienced)



    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]

    Due to the nature of libsir, our potential attack surface is rather small (our primary use case is as a static library within a larger software application), but yes, we are both aware of the various ways in which software can be attacked by a person with knowledge and malicious intent.


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]

    We use the FNV-1a (32 and 64-bit) hash algorithm to uniquely identify data, but do not encrypt or decrypt anything.



    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    No cryptography takes places within the confines of libsir. If some day it does, we would lean on publicly available and known crypto providers.



    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]

    It could be argued that using a cryptographic hash (even just to match data buffers together) is cryptography, so in that case, FNV-1a is FLOSS, and that is the closest we get to doing crypto.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]


    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]

    To my knowledge, no collisions have been reported for FNV-1a.



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]

    To my knowledge, no collisions have been reported for FNV-1a.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]


    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]


    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]

  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]

    No network connections are made currently. If any are in the future, they will use TLS/SSH.



    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]

  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]


    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

  • Other security issues


    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]

  • Static code analysis


    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]

    PVS-Studio, cppcheck, Flawfinder, clang-analyzer



    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]

    Flawfinder



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]

    They are fixed immediately, no matter the severity.



    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    CI pipeline runs static analysis on every commit.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]

    Clang Ubsan/Asan, Valgrind



    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]

    Msan, DUMA (Detect Unintended Memory Access)



    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]

    We have several preprocessor macros that control the behavior of assert. It can be enabled, disabled, or shimmed with a discreet log call explaining there would have been an assert if it were enabled.



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]

    They are fixed immediately; CI will not complete if any are detected.



This data is available under the Creative Commons Attribution version 3.0 or later license (CC-BY-3.0+). All are free to share and adapt the data, but must give appropriate credit. Please credit Ryan M. Lederman and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Ryan M. Lederman.
Entry created on 2023-09-22 03:09:50 UTC, last updated on 2023-09-22 04:37:43 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2023-09-22 04:37:43 UTC.

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