opnDossier

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 11920 is silver Here is how to embed it:
You can show your badge status by embedding this in your markdown file:
[![OpenSSF Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/11920/badge)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/11920)
or by embedding this in your HTML:
<a href="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/11920"><img src="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/11920/badge"></a>


These are the Silver level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 17/17 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Generate meaninigful output from your opnSense configuration file, inspired by TKCERT/pfFocus

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

    opnDossier is a Go CLI tool for network operators and security
    professionals working with OPNsense firewalls. It is at v1.2.1 with
    active development.

    • Documentation: MkDocs site, comprehensive README, CONTRIBUTING.md,
      AGENTS.md, Code of Conduct, SECURITY.md
    • Testing: 71.5% statement coverage across 30 test packages, with
      unit, integration, golden file, and fuzz tests
    • CI/CD: GitHub Actions with golangci-lint (38 linters), cross-platform
      testing (Linux/macOS/Windows), CodeQL, OSSF Scorecard, Codecov
      integration, Dependabot for dependencies. All actions pinned to SHA
      hashes
    • Releases: GoReleaser with Cosign keyless signing, SBOM generation,
      SLSA provenance attestations

  • Prerequisites


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST achieve a passing level badge. [achieve_passing]

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    The CONTRIBUTING.md specifically lists code quality requirements (golangci-lint, >80% test coverage), coding standards (Go conventions
    documented in AGENTS.md), commit message format (Conventional Commits with scope), documentation standards, and a detailed PR checklist
    including security considerations.

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#quality-standards


  • Project oversight


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD have a legal mechanism where all developers of non-trivial amounts of project software assert that they are legally authorized to make these contributions. The most common and easily-implemented approach for doing this is by using a Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO), where users add "signed-off-by" in their commits and the project links to the DCO website. However, this MAY be implemented as a Contributor License Agreement (CLA), or other legal mechanism. (URL required) [dco]
    The DCO is the recommended mechanism because it's easy to implement, tracked in the source code, and git directly supports a "signed-off" feature using "commit -s". To be most effective it is best if the project documentation explains what "signed-off" means for that project. A CLA is a legal agreement that defines the terms under which intellectual works have been licensed to an organization or project. A contributor assignment agreement (CAA) is a legal agreement that transfers rights in an intellectual work to another party; projects are not required to have CAAs, since having CAA increases the risk that potential contributors will not contribute, especially if the receiver is a for-profit organization. The Apache Software Foundation CLAs (the individual contributor license and the corporate CLA) are examples of CLAs, for projects which determine that the risks of these kinds of CLAs to the project are less than their benefits.

    All commits include Signed-off-by: trailers. DCO is enforced via GitHub App on all pull requests. The CONTRIBUTING.md documents the requirement. Example from git log: Signed-off-by: UncleSp1d3r <unclesp1d3r@evilbitlabs.io>

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and document its project governance model (the way it makes decisions, including key roles). (URL required) [governance]
    There needs to be some well-established documented way to make decisions and resolve disputes. In small projects, this may be as simple as "the project owner and lead makes all final decisions". There are various governance models, including benevolent dictator and formal meritocracy; for more details, see Governance models. Both centralized (e.g., single-maintainer) and decentralized (e.g., group maintainers) approaches have been successfully used in projects. The governance information does not need to document the possibility of creating a project fork, since that is always possible for FLOSS projects.

    The project documents its governance model in the "Project Governance" section of CONTRIBUTING.md. It describes a maintainer-driven model with decisions made through consensus on GitHub issues and pull requests. Decision-making tiers are defined: bug fixes (any maintainer), new features (maintainer approval), architecture changes (maintainer approval with rationale), and breaking changes (community input + maintainer approval).

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#project-governance


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST adopt a code of conduct and post it in a standard location. (URL required) [code_of_conduct]
    Projects may be able to improve the civility of their community and to set expectations about acceptable conduct by adopting a code of conduct. This can help avoid problems before they occur and make the project a more welcoming place to encourage contributions. This should focus only on behavior within the community/workplace of the project. Example codes of conduct are the Linux kernel code of conduct, the Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct, the Debian Code of Conduct, the Ubuntu Code of Conduct, the Fedora Code of Conduct, the GNOME Code Of Conduct, the KDE Community Code of Conduct, the Python Community Code of Conduct, The Ruby Community Conduct Guideline, and The Rust Code of Conduct.

    The project has adopted the Contributor Covenant v2.0, posted in the standard location (CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md). It includes enforcement guidelines with four escalation levels (correction, warning, temporary ban, permanent ban) and enforcement contact (support@evilbitlabs.io).

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and publicly document the key roles in the project and their responsibilities, including any tasks those roles must perform. It MUST be clear who has which role(s), though this might not be documented in the same way. (URL required) [roles_responsibilities]
    The documentation for governance and roles and responsibilities may be in one place.

    Key roles are documented in the "Project Governance" section of CONTRIBUTING.md with a roles table defining Maintainer (merge PRs, manage releases, set direction, review security reports), Security Contact (triage vulnerability reports, coordinate fixes, publish advisories), and Contributor (submit issues, PRs, participate in discussions). Current holders are listed for each role.

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#roles


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to continue with minimal interruption if any one person dies, is incapacitated, or is otherwise unable or unwilling to continue support of the project. In particular, the project MUST be able to create and close issues, accept proposed changes, and release versions of software, within a week of confirmation of the loss of support from any one individual. This MAY be done by ensuring someone else has any necessary keys, passwords, and legal rights to continue the project. Individuals who run a FLOSS project MAY do this by providing keys in a lockbox and a will providing any needed legal rights (e.g., for DNS names). (URL required) [access_continuity]

    The project documents a continuity plan in the "Continuity Plan" subsection of CONTRIBUTING.md's governance section. Key provisions:

    • The GitHub organization (EvilBit-Labs) has multiple administrators
    • CI/CD pipelines are fully automated and documented
    • All standards, architecture, and processes are documented in AGENTS.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, and docs/
    • Security response procedures are documented with alternative contacts
    • Release signing uses Sigstore keyless signatures (no personal keys)

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#continuity-plan


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD have a "bus factor" of 2 or more. (URL required) [bus_factor]
    A "bus factor" (aka "truck factor") is the minimum number of project members that have to suddenly disappear from a project ("hit by a bus") before the project stalls due to lack of knowledgeable or competent personnel. The truck-factor tool can estimate this for projects on GitHub. For more information, see Assessing the Bus Factor of Git Repositories by Cosentino et al.

    The EvilBit Labs GitHub organization has two members (unclesp1d3r, KryptoKat08), both with owner-level access. Either maintainer can independently create/close issues, merge PRs, manage releases, publish to GitHub, and administer the repository. The project does not depend on any single individual for continued operation.
    URL: https://github.com/orgs/EvilBit-Labs/people


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented roadmap that describes what the project intends to do and not do for at least the next year. (URL required) [documentation_roadmap]
    The project might not achieve the roadmap, and that's fine; the purpose of the roadmap is to help potential users and contributors understand the intended direction of the project. It need not be detailed.

    The project has a documented roadmap in project_spec/ROADMAP_V2.0.md describing planned features, architectural improvements, and priorities. GitHub milestones and issues are also used for tracking planned work.

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/project_spec/ROADMAP_V2.0.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include documentation of the architecture (aka high-level design) of the software produced by the project. If the project does not produce software, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [documentation_architecture]
    A software architecture explains a program's fundamental structures, i.e., the program's major components, the relationships among them, and the key properties of these components and relationships.

    The project includes comprehensive architecture documentation covering system design, component interactions, data flow, technology stack, and modular report generator architecture. Mermaid diagrams illustrate the data model and component relationships.

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/docs/development/architecture.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST document what the user can and cannot expect in terms of security from the software produced by the project (its "security requirements"). (URL required) [documentation_security]
    These are the security requirements that the software is intended to meet.

    Security expectations are documented in multiple locations: SECURITY.md covers vulnerability reporting and security features; the security assurance case (docs/security/security-assurance.md) documents the threat model, trust boundaries, Saltzer & Schroeder design principles, and CWE/SANS Top 25 countermeasures. The README lists security features (no telemetry, input validation, SBOM generation, offline operation).

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/docs/security/security-assurance.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a "quick start" guide for new users to help them quickly do something with the software. (URL required) [documentation_quick_start]
    The idea is to show users how to get started and make the software do anything at all. This is critically important for potential users to get started.

    The README includes a Quick Start section with basic usage examples. The documentation site provides installation instructions for multiple platforms (pre-built binaries, go install, build from source). Users can go from install to first report in under 5 minutes.

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier#quick-start


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST make an effort to keep the documentation consistent with the current version of the project results (including software produced by the project). Any known documentation defects making it inconsistent MUST be fixed. If the documentation is generally current, but erroneously includes some older information that is no longer true, just treat that as a defect, then track and fix as usual. [documentation_current]
    The documentation MAY include information about differences or changes between versions of the software and/or link to older versions of the documentation. The intent of this criterion is that an effort is made to keep the documentation consistent, not that the documentation must be perfect.

    Documentation is maintained alongside code changes. The PR template requires documentation updates for user-facing changes. AGENTS.md (section 12.1) mandates "Documentation updated" as part of the code review checklist. The MkDocs site is auto-deployed on push to main.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project repository front page and/or website MUST identify and hyperlink to any achievements, including this best practices badge, within 48 hours of public recognition that the achievement has been attained. (URL required) [documentation_achievements]
    An achievement is any set of external criteria that the project has specifically worked to meet, including some badges. This information does not need to be on the project website front page. A project using GitHub can put achievements on the repository front page by adding them to the README file.

    The project displays the OSSF badge on the README.md in GitHub and on the user guide.


  • Accessibility and internationalization


    Enough for a badge!

    The project (both project sites and project results) SHOULD follow accessibility best practices so that persons with disabilities can still participate in the project and use the project results where it is reasonable to do so. [accessibility_best_practices]
    For web applications, see the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG 2.0) and its supporting document Understanding WCAG 2.0; see also W3C accessibility information. For GUI applications, consider using the environment-specific accessibility guidelines (such as Gnome, KDE, XFCE, Android, iOS, Mac, and Windows). Some TUI applications (e.g. `ncurses` programs) can do certain things to make themselves more accessible (such as `alpine`'s `force-arrow-cursor` setting). Most command-line applications are fairly accessible as-is. This criterion is often N/A, e.g., for program libraries. Here are some examples of actions to take or issues to consider:
    • Provide text alternatives for any non-text content so that it can be changed into other forms people need, such as large print, braille, speech, symbols or simpler language ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.1)
    • Color is not used as the only visual means of conveying information, indicating an action, prompting a response, or distinguishing a visual element. ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.1)
    • The visual presentation of text and images of text has a contrast ratio of at least 4.5:1, except for large text, incidental text, and logotypes ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.3)
    • Make all functionality available from a keyboard (WCAG guideline 2.1)
    • A GUI or web-based project SHOULD test with at least one screen-reader on the target platform(s) (e.g. NVDA, Jaws, or WindowEyes on Windows; VoiceOver on Mac & iOS; Orca on Linux/BSD; TalkBack on Android). TUI programs MAY work to reduce overdraw to prevent redundant reading by screen-readers.

    The project is a CLI tool with plain text output. Terminal output respects TERM=dumb and NO_COLOR environment variables for accessibility in screen readers and CI environments. The documentation site uses MkDocs Material, which follows web accessibility standards.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD be internationalized to enable easy localization for the target audience's culture, region, or language. If internationalization (i18n) does not apply (e.g., the software doesn't generate text intended for end-users and doesn't sort human-readable text), select "not applicable" (N/A). [internationalization]
    Localization "refers to the adaptation of a product, application or document content to meet the language, cultural and other requirements of a specific target market (a locale)." Internationalization is the "design and development of a product, application or document content that enables easy localization for target audiences that vary in culture, region, or language." (See W3C's "Localization vs. Internationalization".) Software meets this criterion simply by being internationalized. No localization for another specific language is required, since once software has been internationalized it's possible for others to work on localization.

    The project is a CLI tool targeting English-speaking network operators and security professionals. OPNsense configuration files and security standards (STIG, SANS) are English-only. Internationalization is not applicable for the target audience.


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    If the project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) store passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). If the project sites do not store passwords for this purpose, select "not applicable" (N/A). [sites_password_security]
    Note that the use of GitHub meets this criterion. This criterion only applies to passwords used for authentication of external users into the project sites (aka inbound authentication). If the project sites must log in to other sites (aka outbound authentication), they may need to store authorization tokens for that purpose differently (since storing a hash would be useless). This applies criterion crypto_password_storage to the project sites, similar to sites_https.

    The project sites (GitHub, documentation site) do not manage their own password storage. GitHub handles authentication. The project software itself does not store passwords.


 Change Control 1/1 ●

  • Previous versions


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST maintain the most often used older versions of the product or provide an upgrade path to newer versions. If the upgrade path is difficult, the project MUST document how to perform the upgrade (e.g., the interfaces that have changed and detailed suggested steps to help upgrade). [maintenance_or_update]

    The project maintains the two most recent minor versions (1.2.x, 1.1.x) per the supported versions table in SECURITY.md. Older versions (1.0.x and below) are documented as unsupported with a clear upgrade path to the latest release.

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/SECURITY.md


 Reporting 3/3 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    The project uses GitHub Issues to allow users to submit and track issue reports.

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/issues


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST give credit to the reporter(s) of all vulnerability reports resolved in the last 12 months, except for the reporter(s) who request anonymity. If there have been no vulnerabilities resolved in the last 12 months, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [vulnerability_report_credit]

    No vulnerability reports have been received in the last 12 months. SECURITY.md documents the credit policy: "We will credit you in the security advisory (if you want to be credited)."

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented process for responding to vulnerability reports. (URL required) [vulnerability_response_process]
    This is strongly related to vulnerability_report_process, which requires that there be a documented way to report vulnerabilities. It also related to vulnerability_report_response, which requires response to vulnerability reports within a certain time frame.

    The project has a documented vulnerability response process in SECURITY.md with defined timelines: acknowledge within 1 week, initial assessment within 2 weeks, fix target within 90 days. Disclosure is coordinated via GitHub Security Advisory. The process includes scope definition and safe harbor provisions.

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/SECURITY.md


 Quality 19/19 ●

  • Coding standards


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST identify the specific coding style guides for the primary languages it uses, and require that contributions generally comply with it. (URL required) [coding_standards]
    In most cases this is done by referring to some existing style guide(s), possibly listing differences. These style guides can include ways to improve readability and ways to reduce the likelihood of defects (including vulnerabilities). Many programming languages have one or more widely-used style guides. Examples of style guides include Google's style guides and SEI CERT Coding Standards.

    The project identifies specific coding style guides in AGENTS.md (section 5: "Go Development Standards") covering naming conventions, error handling, logging, documentation, import organization, and 10+ common linter patterns with fixes. CONTRIBUTING.md references these standards for all contributions.

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/AGENTS.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST automatically enforce its selected coding style(s) if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can do so in the selected language(s). [coding_standards_enforced]
    This MAY be implemented using static analysis tool(s) and/or by forcing the code through code reformatters. In many cases the tool configuration is included in the project's repository (since different projects may choose different configurations). Projects MAY allow style exceptions (and typically will); where exceptions occur, they MUST be rare and documented in the code at their locations, so that these exceptions can be reviewed and so that tools can automatically handle them in the future. Examples of such tools include ESLint (JavaScript), Rubocop (Ruby), and devtools check (R).

    Coding standards are automatically enforced by golangci-lint v2.8 with 38 active linters in CI. gofumpt enforces formatting stricter than gofmt. goimports enforces import organization. The CI build fails if any linter issue is found. Pre-commit hooks (just check) run the same checks locally.

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/.golangci.yml


  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    Build systems for native binaries MUST honor the relevant compiler and linker (environment) variables passed in to them (e.g., CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS, and LDFLAGS) and pass them to compiler and linker invocations. A build system MAY extend them with additional flags; it MUST NOT simply replace provided values with its own. If no native binaries are being generated, select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_standard_variables]
    It should be easy to enable special build features like Address Sanitizer (ASAN), or to comply with distribution hardening best practices (e.g., by easily turning on compiler flags to do so).

    Go does not use C/C++ compiler environment variables (CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS, LDFLAGS). The Go toolchain manages compilation internally. The build does honor CGO_ENABLED, GOOS, and GOARCH which are the standard Go build variables.


    Enough for a badge!

    The build and installation system SHOULD preserve debugging information if they are requested in the relevant flags (e.g., "install -s" is not used). If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_preserve_debug]
    E.G., setting CFLAGS (C) or CXXFLAGS (C++) should create the relevant debugging information if those languages are used, and they should not be stripped during installation. Debugging information is needed for support and analysis, and also useful for measuring the presence of hardening features in the compiled binaries.

    The default development build (go build) preserves full debug information. Only release builds strip debug info via -ldflags="-s -w" in GoReleaser. Developers can always build with debug info using standard go build without flags.


    Enough for a badge!

    The build system for the software produced by the project MUST NOT recursively build subdirectories if there are cross-dependencies in the subdirectories. If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_non_recursive]
    The project build system's internal dependency information needs to be accurate, otherwise, changes to the project may not build correctly. Incorrect builds can lead to defects (including vulnerabilities). A common mistake in large build systems is to use a "recursive build" or "recursive make", that is, a hierarchy of subdirectories containing source files, where each subdirectory is independently built. Unless each subdirectory is fully independent, this is a mistake, because the dependency information is incorrect.

    Go's build system does not use recursive make or subdirectory builds. go build ./... resolves all dependencies through the module system in a single pass. There are no cross-directory build dependencies that require ordering.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to repeat the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_repeatable]
    GCC and clang users may find the -frandom-seed option useful; in some cases, this can be resolved by forcing some sort order. More suggestions can be found at the reproducible build site.

    The project is configured for reproducible builds:

    • CGO_ENABLED=0 for static, portable binaries
    • -trimpath removes local filesystem paths from binaries
    • mod_timestamp: "{{ .CommitTimestamp }}" ensures module timestamps match the commit
    • go.sum is committed, pinning all dependency hashes
    • GoReleaser uses CommitDate for all date stamps

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/.goreleaser.yaml


  • Installation system


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way to easily install and uninstall the software produced by the project using a commonly-used convention. [installation_common]
    Examples include using a package manager (at the system or language level), "make install/uninstall" (supporting DESTDIR), a container in a standard format, or a virtual machine image in a standard format. The installation and uninstallation process (e.g., its packaging) MAY be implemented by a third party as long as it is FLOSS.

    Multiple standard installation methods are provided:

    • go install github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier@latest
    • Pre-built binaries for Linux, macOS (Intel/Silicon), Windows, FreeBSD
    • Linux packages: deb, rpm, apk, archlinux (via NFPM)
    • Homebrew cask (via tap repository)
    • Docker: ghcr.io/evilbit-labs/opndossier
    • Build from source: just build

    Enough for a badge!

    The installation system for end-users MUST honor standard conventions for selecting the location where built artifacts are written to at installation time. For example, if it installs files on a POSIX system it MUST honor the DESTDIR environment variable. If there is no installation system or no standard convention, select "not applicable" (N/A). [installation_standard_variables]

    Go binaries are statically compiled and do not use DESTDIR or other POSIX installation conventions. Installation is via go install (which uses $GOPATH/bin) or by copying the pre-built binary. Linux packages (deb/rpm/apk) follow FHS conventions via NFPM configuration.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way for potential developers to quickly install all the project results and support environment necessary to make changes, including the tests and test environment. This MUST be performed with a commonly-used convention. [installation_development_quick]
    This MAY be implemented using a generated container and/or installation script(s). External dependencies would typically be installed by invoking system and/or language package manager(s), per external_dependencies.

    CONTRIBUTING.md provides a complete developer setup guide: prerequisites (Go 1.21+, Just, git, golangci-lint), clone instructions, and verification commands (just check). A new developer can be running tests within minutes. The project also uses mise-en-place to manage development tool versions and includes a devcontainer configuration.

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • Externally-maintained components


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST list external dependencies in a computer-processable way. (URL required) [external_dependencies]
    Typically this is done using the conventions of package manager and/or build system. Note that this helps implement installation_development_quick.

    All external dependencies are declared in go.mod and go.sum, which are computer-processable. CycloneDX SBOMs are generated per release in JSON format, listing all transitive dependencies with version and license information.

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/go.mod


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST monitor or periodically check their external dependencies (including convenience copies) to detect known vulnerabilities, and fix exploitable vulnerabilities or verify them as unexploitable. [dependency_monitoring]
    This can be done using an origin analyzer / dependency checking tool / software composition analysis tool such as OWASP's Dependency-Check, Sonatype's Nexus Auditor, Synopsys' Black Duck Software Composition Analysis, and Bundler-audit (for Ruby). Some package managers include mechanisms to do this. It is acceptable if the components' vulnerability cannot be exploited, but this analysis is difficult and it is sometimes easier to simply update or fix the part.

    Dependencies are monitored through multiple channels:

    • Dependabot: Weekly automated PRs for Go modules, GitHub Actions, Docker, and devcontainers
    • Grype: Vulnerability scanning in CI on every push
    • Snyk: Additional dependency and code scanning
    • CodeQL: Semantic security analysis
    • OSSF Scorecard: Supply chain security assessment (weekly)

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/.github/dependabot.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST either:
    1. make it easy to identify and update reused externally-maintained components; or
    2. use the standard components provided by the system or programming language.
    Then, if a vulnerability is found in a reused component, it will be easy to update that component. [updateable_reused_components]
    A typical way to meet this criterion is to use system and programming language package management systems. Many FLOSS programs are distributed with "convenience libraries" that are local copies of standard libraries (possibly forked). By itself, that's fine. However, if the program *must* use these local (forked) copies, then updating the "standard" libraries as a security update will leave these additional copies still vulnerable. This is especially an issue for cloud-based systems; if the cloud provider updates their "standard" libraries but the program won't use them, then the updates don't actually help. See, e.g., "Chromium: Why it isn't in Fedora yet as a proper package" by Tom Callaway.

    All external components are managed through Go modules with pinned versions in go.mod. Dependabot creates automated PRs for updates. No vendored copies or convenience copies exist; all dependencies are fetched from their canonical sources.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD avoid using deprecated or obsolete functions and APIs where FLOSS alternatives are available in the set of technology it uses (its "technology stack") and to a supermajority of the users the project supports (so that users have ready access to the alternative). [interfaces_current]

    The project uses current, non-deprecated APIs. Go modules ensure the latest compatible versions are used. The golangci-lint configuration includes staticcheck which warns about deprecated stdlib usage. No deprecated API calls exist in the codebase.


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    An automated test suite MUST be applied on each check-in to a shared repository for at least one branch. This test suite MUST produce a report on test success or failure. [automated_integration_testing]
    This requirement can be viewed as a subset of test_continuous_integration, but focused on just testing, without requiring continuous integration.

    GitHub Actions CI runs the full automated test suite on every push to main and on every pull request. The pipeline includes unit tests, integration tests (with -tags=integration), and linting. All must pass before merge.

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST add regression tests to an automated test suite for at least 50% of the bugs fixed within the last six months. [regression_tests_added50]

    Recent bug-fix PRs include regression tests or are covered by existing test suites. Examples from the last 6 months:

    • PR #256 (fix: sort map iterations) — added deterministic output tests
    • PR #254 (fix: Dest Port column) — added field handling tests
    • PR #252 (security overhaul) — added fuzz tests
    • PR #167 (fix: replace panic error handling) — added error path tests

    The PR template and AGENTS.md mandate tests for all changes. CI enforces test passage.

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/pulls?q=is%3Apr+is%3Amerged+fix


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage80]
    Many FLOSS tools are available to measure test coverage, including gcov/lcov, Blanket.js, Istanbul, JCov, and covr (R). Note that meeting this criterion is not a guarantee that the test suite is thorough, instead, failing to meet this criterion is a strong indicator of a poor test suite.

    Yes, the project meets this criterion. The project uses Go's built-in go test -cover tooling (FLOSS) which measures statement coverage. Current total statement coverage is 81.9%, exceeding the 80% threshold. Coverage is also tracked via Codecov in CI with every PR.


  • New functionality testing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a formal written policy that as major new functionality is added, tests for the new functionality MUST be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy_mandated]

    AGENTS.md section 12.1 mandates: "Write comprehensive tests for new functionality." CONTRIBUTING.md requires ">80% coverage" for all PRs. The PR template checklist includes an explicit test requirement. These constitute a formal written policy.

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include, in its documented instructions for change proposals, the policy that tests are to be added for major new functionality. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    Documented in CONTRIBUTING.md under the Quality Standards section: "Tests required for new functionality (>80% coverage)." The PR template checklist explicitly includes test requirements. AGENTS.md section 7 provides detailed test organization guidance and section 12.1 mandates writing comprehensive tests.

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    The project uses 38 active linters including strict options. gofumpt (stricter than gofmt) is enforced. gosec checks for security issues. gocritic with performance and diagnostic tags. The project has documented rationale for each disabled linter in .golangci.yml.

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/.golangci.yml


 Security 13/13 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST implement secure design principles (from "know_secure_design"), where applicable. If the project is not producing software, select "not applicable" (N/A). [implement_secure_design]
    For example, the project results should have fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default). They should also have complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable). Note that in some cases principles will conflict, in which case a choice must be made (e.g., many mechanisms can make things more complex, contravening "economy of mechanism" / keep it simple).

    The project implements secure design principles documented in the security assurance case (docs/security/security-assurance.md):

    • Economy of mechanism: Pure Go, minimal dependencies
    • Fail-safe defaults: XXE-safe by default, overwrite protection, offline-first
    • Complete mediation: All XML elements → typed structs, all CLI args validated by Cobra, all output paths checked
    • Open design: Fully open source, no security by obscurity
    • Separation of privilege: Parser, schema, audit, export are separate modules
    • Least privilege: Reads config files, writes reports, no modifications, no commands, no network
    • Least common mechanism: No shared mutable state

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/docs/security/security-assurance.md


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD support multiple cryptographic algorithms, so users can quickly switch if one is broken. Common symmetric key algorithms include AES, Twofish, and Serpent. Common cryptographic hash algorithm alternatives include SHA-2 (including SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 AND SHA-512) and SHA-3. [crypto_algorithm_agility]

    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST support storing authentication credentials (such as passwords and dynamic tokens) and private cryptographic keys in files that are separate from other information (such as configuration files, databases, and logs), and permit users to update and replace them without code recompilation. If the project never processes authentication credentials and private cryptographic keys, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_credential_agility]

    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 SHOULD be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform TLS certificate verification by default when using TLS, including on subresources. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_certificate_verification]
    Note that incorrect TLS certificate verification is a common mistake. For more information, see "The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser Software" by Martin Georgiev et al. and "Do you trust this application?" by Michael Catanzaro.

    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform certificate verification before sending HTTP headers with private information (such as secure cookies). If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_verification_private]

  • Secure release


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST cryptographically sign releases of the project results intended for widespread use, and there MUST be a documented process explaining to users how they can obtain the public signing keys and verify the signature(s). The private key for these signature(s) MUST NOT be on site(s) used to directly distribute the software to the public. If releases are not intended for widespread use, select "not applicable" (N/A). [signed_releases]
    The project results include both source code and any generated deliverables where applicable (e.g., executables, packages, and containers). Generated deliverables MAY be signed separately from source code. These MAY be implemented as signed git tags (using cryptographic digital signatures). Projects MAY provide generated results separately from tools like git, but in those cases, the separate results MUST be separately signed.

    All releases are cryptographically signed with Cosign v3 keyless signatures via Sigstore transparency log. Each release includes:

    • SHA256 checksums (opnDossier_checksums.txt)
    • Cosign signature bundle (opnDossier_checksums.txt.sigstore.json)
    • SLSA Level 3 provenance attestations via actions/attest-build-provenance

    The release notes include verification instructions with the exact cosign verify-blob command.

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/.goreleaser.yaml


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that in the version control system, each important version tag (a tag that is part of a major release, minor release, or fixes publicly noted vulnerabilities) be cryptographically signed and verifiable as described in signed_releases. [version_tags_signed]

    Git tag signing is enabled via git config (tag.gpgSign = true), so all future version tags will be GPG-signed automatically. Prior releases (v1.0.0-rc1, v1.1.0) used unsigned annotated tags. Release artifacts are independently signed via Cosign, and tags with associated releases are set to immutable for the repo.


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST check all inputs from potentially untrusted sources to ensure they are valid (an *allowlist*), and reject invalid inputs, if there are any restrictions on the data at all. [input_validation]
    Note that comparing input against a list of "bad formats" (aka a *denylist*) is normally not enough, because attackers can often work around a denylist. In particular, numbers are converted into internal formats and then checked if they are between their minimum and maximum (inclusive), and text strings are checked to ensure that they are valid text patterns (e.g., valid UTF-8, length, syntax, etc.). Some data may need to be "anything at all" (e.g., a file uploader), but these would typically be rare.

    All inputs from potentially untrusted sources are validated:

    • CLI arguments validated by Cobra with type checking and allowed values
    • XML configuration files parsed into strictly typed Go structs (allowlist approach — unknown elements are ignored, not executed)
    • Output file paths checked for overwrite protection
    • internal/validator/ provides configuration validation
    • internal/config/validation.go validates application configuration
    • Security assurance case documents "Complete mediation" principle

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/internal/validator/


    Enough for a badge!

    Hardening mechanisms SHOULD be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. [hardening]
    Hardening mechanisms may include HTTP headers like Content Security Policy (CSP), compiler flags to mitigate attacks (such as -fstack-protector), or compiler flags to eliminate undefined behavior. For our purposes least privilege is not considered a hardening mechanism (least privilege is important, but separate).

    Multiple hardening mechanisms are in place:

    • Memory safety: Pure Go with garbage collection, no unsafe package
    • XXE protection: Go's encoding/xml does not support external entities or DTD processing
    • Bounds checking: Go runtime bounds-checks all array/slice access
    • No shell execution: No os/exec calls in application code
    • Static compilation: CGO_ENABLED=0 eliminates C library attack surface
    • GitHub Actions pinning: All Actions pinned to SHA hashes for supply chain security
    • Dependency scanning: Grype, Snyk, CodeQL in CI

    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide an assurance case that justifies why its security requirements are met. The assurance case MUST include: a description of the threat model, clear identification of trust boundaries, an argument that secure design principles have been applied, and an argument that common implementation security weaknesses have been countered. (URL required) [assurance_case]
    An assurance case is "a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a specified set of critical claims regarding a system’s properties are adequately justified for a given application in a given environment" ("Software Assurance Using Structured Assurance Case Models", Thomas Rhodes et al, NIST Interagency Report 7608). Trust boundaries are boundaries where data or execution changes its level of trust, e.g., a server's boundaries in a typical web application. It's common to list secure design principles (such as Saltzer and Schroeer) and common implementation security weaknesses (such as the OWASP top 10 or CWE/SANS top 25), and show how each are countered. The BadgeApp assurance case may be a useful example. This is related to documentation_security, documentation_architecture, and implement_secure_design.

    The project provides a comprehensive security assurance case in docs/security/security-assurance.md following NIST IR 7608 structure:

    • Threat model: Three threat actors (malicious config author, insider with report access, supply chain attacker), seven attack vectors mapped to security requirements
    • Trust boundaries: Clearly identified (untrusted input → parser → typed model → report generator → output)
    • Secure design principles: Saltzer & Schroeder principles applied and documented for each
    • Common vulnerabilities countered: CWE/SANS Top 25 mapped with status and countermeasures; OWASP Top 10 addressed where applicable

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/docs/security/security-assurance.md


 Analysis 2/2 ●

  • Static code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one static analysis tool with rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    CodeQL specifically targets common vulnerabilities (injection, buffer overflows, insecure data handling). gosec checks for Go-specific security issues. Grype checks dependencies against the National Vulnerability Database for known CVEs.

    URL: https://github.com/EvilBit-Labs/opnDossier/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml


  • Dynamic code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) MUST be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    The project is pure Go, which is a memory-safe language. Go uses garbage collection and bounds-checked arrays. The project does not use the unsafe package. No memory-unsafe languages are used.



This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit UncleSp1d3r and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: UncleSp1d3r.
Entry created on 2026-02-11 03:16:12 UTC, last updated on 2026-02-18 05:23:38 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-02-16 01:56:41 UTC.