httptap

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Baseline Level 3 criteria. These criteria are from baseline version v2025.10.10 with updated criteria text from version v2026.02.19. Criteria that are new in version v2026.02.19 are labeled "future" and will begin to be enforced starting 2026-06-01. Please provide answers to the "future" criteria before that date.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Rich-powered CLI that breaks each HTTP request into DNS, connect, TLS, wait, and transfer phases with waterfall timelines, compact summaries, or metrics-only output.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

 Controls 21/21 ●

  • Controls


    Enough for a badge!

    When a job is assigned permissions in a CI/CD pipeline, the source code or configuration MUST only assign the minimum privileges necessary for the corresponding activity. [OSPS-AC-04.02]
    Configure the project's CI/CD pipelines to assign the lowest available permissions to users and services by default, elevating permissions only when necessary for specific tasks. In some version control systems, this may be possible at the organizational or repository level. If not, set permissions at the top level of the pipeline.

    Every CI job declares explicit minimum permissions at the job level (e.g., security-events: write only for SARIF uploads, id-token: write only for OIDC publishing). Workflow-level default is permissions: {} so no ambient privileges are inherited. Enforced on every PR by zizmor persona=pedantic; Scorecard Token-Permissions check scores 10/10. See any workflow under .github/workflows/.


    Enough for a badge!

    (Future criterion) CI/CD pipelines which accept trusted collaborator input MUST sanitize and validate that input prior to use in the pipeline. [OSPS-BR-01.04]
    CI/CD pipelines should sanitize (quote, escape or exit on expected values) all collaborator inputs on explicit workflow executions. While collaborators are generally trusted, manual inputs to a workflow cannot be reviewed and could be abused by an account takeover or insider threat.

    Trusted-collaborator inputs (e.g., inputs.version, inputs.bump in the Release workflow) are passed through env: blocks and consumed as environment variables rather than interpolated into shell strings. Every workflow is audited by zizmor persona=pedantic, which catches template-injection patterns on every PR. No findings to date.


    Enough for a badge!

    When an official release is created, all assets within that release MUST be clearly associated with the release identifier or another unique identifier for the asset. [OSPS-BR-02.02]
    Assign a unique version identifier to each software asset produced by the project, following a consistent naming convention or numbering scheme. Examples include SemVer, CalVer, or git commit id.

    Each release has a unique semantic version identifier (e.g. 0.4.7) assigned in pyproject.toml, published to PyPI (https://pypi.org/project/httptap/#history), and tagged as vX.Y.Z in git (https://github.com/ozeranskii/httptap/tags). [version_unique]


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST define a policy for managing secrets and credentials used by the project. The policy should include guidelines for storing, accessing, and rotating secrets and credentials. [OSPS-BR-07.02]
    Document how secrets and credentials are managed and used within the project. This should include details on how secrets are stored (e.g., using a secrets management tool), how access is controlled, and how secrets are rotated or updated. Ensure that sensitive information is not hard-coded in the source code or stored in version control systems.

    Secrets policy documented in SECURITY.md and GOVERNANCE.md:


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the integrity and authenticity of the release assets. [OSPS-DO-03.01]
    Instructions in the project should contain information about the technology used, the commands to run, and the expected output. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    Release artifacts (wheel, sdist) are signed via Sigstore keyless signing and ship SLSA v1.0 build provenance via actions/attest-build-provenance; verification: gh attestation verify dist/httptap-*.whl --repo ozeranskii/httptap. Signing keys are ephemeral (issued per-run by Sigstore Fulcio), never stored on PyPI. https://github.com/ozeranskii/httptap/blob/main/.github/workflows/release.yml [signed_releases]


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the expected identity of the person or process authoring the software release. [OSPS-DO-03.02]
    The expected identity may be in the form of key IDs used to sign, issuer and identity from a sigstore certificate, or other similar forms. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    Release artifacts (wheel, sdist) are signed via Sigstore keyless signing and ship SLSA v1.0 build provenance via actions/attest-build-provenance; verification: gh attestation verify dist/httptap-*.whl --repo ozeranskii/httptap. Signing keys are ephemeral (issued per-run by Sigstore Fulcio), never stored on PyPI. https://github.com/ozeranskii/httptap/blob/main/.github/workflows/release.yml [signed_releases]


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include a descriptive statement about the scope and duration of support for each release. [OSPS-DO-04.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for the project's released software assets, the project should have a SUPPORT.md file, a "Support" section in SECURITY.md, or other documentation explaining the support lifecycle, including the expected duration of support for each release, the types of support provided (e.g., bug fixes, security updates), and any relevant policies or procedures for obtaining support.

    Support scope and duration documented in SECURITY.md (Supported Versions) and GOVERNANCE.md (Releases). Currently the 0.4.x minor series receives security patches; prior minor series are not supported. Semver 2.0.0 is followed and breaking changes are flagged in CHANGELOG.md. https://github.com/ozeranskii/httptap/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST provide a descriptive statement when releases or versions will no longer receive security updates. [OSPS-DO-05.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for security fixes, the project should have a SUPPORT.md or other documentation explaining the project's policy for security updates.

    SECURITY.md's Supported Versions table explicitly states which minor series still receive security updates and which do not. The project follows an N/N-1 policy: at any point in time, only the current minor series is supported; older minors stop receiving security updates the moment the next minor is released. Documented in SECURITY.md and ROADMAP.md. https://github.com/ozeranskii/httptap/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST have a policy that code collaborators are reviewed prior to granting escalated permissions to sensitive resources. [OSPS-GV-04.01]
    Publish an enforceable policy in the project documentation that requires code collaborators to be reviewed and approved before being granted escalated permissions to sensitive resources, such as merge approval or access to secrets. It is recommended that vetting includes establishing a justifiable lineage of identity such as confirming the contributor's association with a known trusted organization.

    GOVERNANCE.md documents the policy: write/admin access to the repository, PyPI publishing, and the release GitHub Environment is granted only after explicit maintainer review. New collaborators receive read-only permissions by default (GitHub platform behaviour); any escalation requires a GOVERNANCE.md update and a maintainer decision. https://github.com/ozeranskii/httptap/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#roles


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, all compiled released software assets MUST be delivered with a software bill of materials. [OSPS-QA-02.02]
    It is recommended to auto-generate SBOMs at build time using a tool that has been vetted for accuracy. This enables users to ingest this data in a standardized approach alongside other projects in their environment.

    Every GitHub Release attaches a software bill of materials in both CycloneDX JSON (httptap-X.Y.Z.cdx.json) and SPDX JSON (httptap-X.Y.Z.spdx.json) formats, generated by anchore/sbom-action (Syft) during the release workflow's build job. Verifiable at https://github.com/ozeranskii/httptap/releases.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release comprising multiple source code repositories, all subprojects MUST enforce security requirements that are as strict or stricter than the primary codebase. [OSPS-QA-04.02]
    Any additional subproject code repositories produced by the project and compiled into a release must enforce security requirements as applicable to the status and intent of the respective codebase. In addition to following the corresponding OSPS Baseline requirements, this may include requiring a security review, ensuring that it is free of vulnerabilities, and ensuring that it is free of known security issues.

    The project consists of a single source code repository (ozeranskii/httptap). There are no subprojects to subject to comparable or stricter security requirements.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, project's documentation MUST clearly document when and how tests are run. [OSPS-QA-06.02]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains how to run the tests locally and how to run the tests in the CI/CD pipeline. The documentation should explain what the tests are testing and how to interpret the results.

    The project uses pytest (MIT-licensed FLOSS) for automated testing. Tests live under tests/ and are invoked via uv run pytest. Running instructions are in README.md and CONTRIBUTING.md. Tests are executed on every PR and push via GitHub Actions CI: https://github.com/ozeranskii/httptap/actions/workflows/ci.yml [test]


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project's documentation MUST include a policy that all major changes to the software produced by the project should add or update tests of the functionality in an automated test suite. [OSPS-QA-06.03]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains the policy for adding or updating tests. The policy should explain what constitutes a major change and what tests should be added or updated.

    Formal written policy in CONTRIBUTING.md requires tests for all major new functionality; enforced in PR review and via CI coverage gates. https://github.com/ozeranskii/httptap/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md [test_policy_mandated]


    Enough for a badge!

    When a commit is made to the primary branch, the project's version control system MUST require at least one non-author human approval of the changes before merging. [OSPS-QA-07.01]
    Configure the project's version control system to require at least one non-author human approval of changes before merging into the release or primary branch. This can be achieved by requiring a pull request to be reviewed and approved by at least one other collaborator before it can be merged.

    Branch protection on main requires pull requests, disallows direct pushes, enforces status checks, and requires codeowner review. [osps_ac_03_01] [two_person_review]


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project MUST perform a threat modeling and attack surface analysis to understand and protect against attacks on critical code paths, functions, and interactions within the system. [OSPS-SA-03.02]
    Threat modeling is an activity where the project looks at the codebase, associated processes and infrastructure, interfaces, key components and "thinks like a hacker" and brainstorms how the system be be broken or compromised. Each identified threat is listed out so the project can then think about how to proactively avoid or close off any gaps/vulnerabilities that could arise. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    The assurance case (threat model, trust boundaries, applied secure-design principles, countered common implementation weaknesses) is documented at https://docs.httptap.dev/security/assurance-case/ [assurance_case]


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, any vulnerabilities in the software components not affecting the project MUST be accounted for in a VEX document, augmenting the vulnerability report with non-exploitability details. [OSPS-VM-04.02]
    Establish a VEX feed communicating the exploitability status of known vulnerabilities, including assessment details or any mitigations in place preventing vulnerable code from being executed.

    The project maintains an OpenVEX (https://github.com/openvex/spec) document at .vex/httptap.openvex.json that records, for every CVE published against a direct or transitive dependency, whether httptap itself is exploitable. The document is version-controlled (history tracks every exploitability assessment), updated as part of the vulnerability response process documented in SECURITY.md, and automatically attached to every GitHub Release as httptap-X.Y.Z.openvex.json alongside the CycloneDX and SPDX SBOMs. Downstream scanners (Grype, Trivy, Snyk) consume the VEX document to suppress false-positive alerts on vulnerable code paths that are not reachable from httptap.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. [OSPS-VM-05.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    Dependabot (weekly security and version updates via .github/dependabot.yml), CodeQL vulnerability queries, and GitHub native dependency-graph alerts on uv.lock monitor direct and transitive dependencies continuously. [dependency_monitoring]


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include a policy to address SCA violations prior to any release. [OSPS-VM-05.02]
    Document a policy in the project to address applicable Software Composition Analysis results before any release, and add status checks that verify compliance with that policy prior to release.

    Dependabot (weekly security and version updates via .github/dependabot.yml), CodeQL vulnerability queries, and GitHub native dependency-graph alerts on uv.lock monitor direct and transitive dependencies continuously. [dependency_monitoring]


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, all changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for malicious dependencies and known vulnerabilities in dependencies, then blocked in the event of violations, except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-05.03]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Software Composition Analysis tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    Dependabot (weekly security and version updates via .github/dependabot.yml), CodeQL vulnerability queries, and GitHub native dependency-graph alerts on uv.lock monitor direct and transitive dependencies continuously. [dependency_monitoring]


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SAST findings. [OSPS-VM-06.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of Static Application Security Testing (SAST) findings. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    CI fails on any CodeQL / ruff / mypy / zizmor finding, so medium+ severity issues cannot be merged; main is kept clean at all times. [static_analysis_fixed]


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, all changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for security weaknesses and blocked in the event of violations except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-06.02]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    CodeQL (SAST), ruff, mypy strict, and zizmor (pedantic) run on every PR and push via GitHub Actions. [static_analysis]



This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Sergei Ozeranskii and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Sergei Ozeranskii.
Entry created on 2026-04-12 14:22:24 UTC, last updated on 2026-04-12 18:37:26 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-04-12 14:44:49 UTC.