PCI DSS MCP

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 12547 is passing Here is how to embed it:
You can show your badge status by embedding this in your markdown file:
[![OpenSSF Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/12547/badge)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/12547)
or by embedding this in your HTML:
<a href="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/12547"><img src="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/12547/badge"></a>


These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 13/13 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    PCI DSS v4.0.1 static analysis scanner for Go payment services, delivered as a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

    v0.1.0 is the first public release. Static analysis only - coverage is limited to 14 of 249 PCI DSS v4.0.1 requirements; full compliance audit requires a QSA.

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]
    This MUST be in language that potential users can understand (e.g., it uses minimal jargon).

    The README's one-line tagline and the "What it does in 60 seconds" section succinctly describe the project as a static PCI DSS v4.0.1 compliance scanner for Go payment services, delivered as a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for AI-assisted editors. The language targets the intended audience (Go developers working on payment services) using standard domain terminology. https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/README.md#what-it-does-in-60-seconds


    Enough for a badge!

    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    (1) Obtain: README documents installation at https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp#install and setup at https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp#setup. (2) Feedback: bug reports and feature requests are accepted via GitHub Issues at https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/issues — CONTRIBUTING.md documents the expected information for a useful report. (3) Contribute: CONTRIBUTING.md at https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md describes the pull request workflow, development environment, test commands, and code style conventions. Private security vulnerability reports go through SECURITY.md at https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/SECURITY.md rather than public issues.


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]
    We presume that projects on GitHub use issues and pull requests unless otherwise noted. This information can be short, e.g., stating that the project uses pull requests, an issue tracker, or posts to a mailing list (which one?)

    ONTRIBUTING.md explicitly states "Pull requests are the only accepted contribution channel" and documents a 5-step workflow: fork, create a topic branch from main, run the local test suite (make test / make vet), open a pull request against main, and address review feedback. A single maintainer reviews contributions within approximately one week. https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#contribution-process


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    CONTRIBUTING.md documents acceptable-contribution requirements in three dedicated sections: "Code style" (error handling rules including no silent error discard and the Go nil-interface trap, comment discipline, table-driven test convention, no emoji), "Commit messages" (Conventional Commits format with imperative mood and a 72-character body wrap), and "Scanner design conventions" (binding rules for new detection rules - INFO findings for verified-OK, context-aware matching, three-tier severity, suppression with audit trail). New detection rules must also follow the fixture TDD cycle documented under "Running tests". https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#code-style


  • FLOSS license


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]
    FLOSS is software released in a way that meets the Open Source Definition or Free Software Definition. Examples of such licenses include the CC0, MIT, BSD 2-clause, BSD 3-clause revised, Apache 2.0, Lesser GNU General Public License (LGPL), and the GNU General Public License (GPL). For our purposes, this means that the license MUST be: The software MAY also be licensed other ways (e.g., "GPLv2 or proprietary" is acceptable).

    The MIT license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]
    The OSI uses a rigorous approval process to determine which licenses are OSS.

    The MIT license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]
    One convention is posting the license as a top-level file named LICENSE or COPYING, which MAY be followed by an extension such as ".txt" or ".md". An alternative convention is to have a directory named LICENSES containing license file(s); these files are typically named as their SPDX license identifier followed by an appropriate file extension, as described in the REUSE Specification. Note that this criterion is only a requirement on the source repository. You do NOT need to include the license file when generating something from the source code (such as an executable, package, or container). For example, when generating an R package for the Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN), follow standard CRAN practice: if the license is a standard license, use the standard short license specification (to avoid installing yet another copy of the text) and list the LICENSE file in an exclusion file such as .Rbuildignore. Similarly, when creating a Debian package, you may put a link in the copyright file to the license text in /usr/share/common-licenses, and exclude the license file from the created package (e.g., by deleting the file after calling dh_auto_install). We encourage including machine-readable license information in generated formats where practical.

    Non-trivial license location file in repository: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/LICENSE.


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]
    This documentation must be in some media (such as text or video) that includes: how to install it, how to start it, how to use it (possibly with a tutorial using examples), and how to use it securely (e.g., what to do and what not to do) if that is an appropriate topic for the software. The security documentation need not be long. The project MAY use hypertext links to non-project material as documentation. If the project does not produce software, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    Some documentation basics file contents found.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]
    The documentation of an external interface explains to an end-user or developer how to use it. This would include its application program interface (API) if the software has one. If it is a library, document the major classes/types and methods/functions that can be called. If it is a web application, define its URL interface (often its REST interface). If it is a command-line interface, document the parameters and options it supports. In many cases it's best if most of this documentation is automatically generated, so that this documentation stays synchronized with the software as it changes, but this isn't required. The project MAY use hypertext links to non-project material as documentation. Documentation MAY be automatically generated (where practical this is often the best way to do so). Documentation of a REST interface may be generated using Swagger/OpenAPI. Code interface documentation MAY be generated using tools such as JSDoc (JavaScript), ESDoc (JavaScript), pydoc (Python), devtools (R), pkgdown (R), and Doxygen (many). Merely having comments in implementation code is not sufficient to satisfy this criterion; there needs to be an easy way to see the information without reading through all the source code. If the project does not produce software, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    Human-readable tool reference lives at docs/tools.md and documents every MCP tool's input parameters and output structure. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/docs/tools.md

    Machine-readable schema is provided at the protocol level. Every MCP tool declares a typed OutputSchema auto-inferred from Go struct jsonschema tags. An MCP client can retrieve the formal input and output schemas via the tools/list protocol call without any extra documentation.

    Additional reference documentation lives under docs/. This includes docs/severity.md for the finding severity model. Also docs/scoping.md for taint-analysis scoping. Also docs/ci-cd.md for CI/CD integration. Also docs/pci-coverage.md for the PCI DSS v4.0.1 requirement coverage map.


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]
    This requires that the project home page URL and the version control repository URL begin with "https:", not "http:". You can get free certificates from Let's Encrypt. Projects MAY implement this criterion using (for example) GitHub pages, GitLab pages, or SourceForge project pages. If you support HTTP, we urge you to redirect the HTTP traffic to HTTPS.

    Given only https: URLs.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]
    Examples of acceptable mechanisms include archived mailing list(s), GitHub issue and pull request discussions, Bugzilla, Mantis, and Trac. Asynchronous discussion mechanisms (like IRC) are acceptable if they meet these criteria; make sure there is a URL-addressable archiving mechanism. Proprietary JavaScript, while discouraged, is permitted.

    GitHub supports discussions on issues and pull requests.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]
    English is currently the lingua franca of computer technology; supporting English increases the number of different potential developers and reviewers worldwide. A project can meet this criterion even if its core developers' primary language is not English.

    All project documentation is written in English. This includes README.md and SECURITY.md and CONTRIBUTING.md and CHANGELOG.md and every file under docs/. Bug reports and code comments are accepted in English via GitHub Issues at https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/issues and via pull requests at https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/pulls


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]
    As a minimum, the project should attempt to respond to significant problem and vulnerability reports. A project that is actively pursuing a badge is probably maintained. All projects and people have limited resources, and typical projects must reject some proposed changes, so limited resources and proposal rejections do not by themselves indicate an unmaintained project.

    When a project knows that it will no longer be maintained, it should set this criterion to "Unmet" and use the appropriate mechanism(s) to indicate to others that it is not being maintained. For example, use “DEPRECATED” as the first heading of its README, add “DEPRECATED” near the beginning of its home page, add “DEPRECATED” to the beginning of its code repository project description, add a no-maintenance-intended badge in its README and/or home page, mark it as deprecated in any package repositories (e.g., npm deprecate), and/or use the code repository's marking system to archive it (e.g., GitHub's "archive" setting, GitLab’s "archived" marking, Gerrit's "readonly" status, or SourceForge’s "abandoned" project status). Additional discussion can be found here.

    The project is actively maintained by a single maintainer. First public release v0.1.0 was cut on 2026-04-15. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/releases/tag/v0.1.0

    Continuous integration runs on every push to main and every pull request. This includes tests on Linux and macOS under the Go race detector. Also golangci-lint. Also govulncheck. Also CodeQL analysis. Also OpenSSF Scorecard.

    Dependabot is enabled for Go modules and GitHub Actions updates. Dependabot security alerts and automated security fixes are active. Branch protection on main enforces 6 required status checks before any merge.


 Change Control 9/9 ●

  • Public version-controlled source repository


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]
    The URL MAY be the same as the project URL. The project MAY use private (non-public) branches in specific cases while the change is not publicly released (e.g., for fixing a vulnerability before it is revealed to the public).

    Repository on GitHub, which provides public git repositories with URLs.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made.


    Enough for a badge!

    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]
    Projects MAY choose to omit specific interim versions from their public source repositories (e.g., ones that fix specific non-public security vulnerabilities, may never be publicly released, or include material that cannot be legally posted and are not in the final release).

    The project uses standard Git development. Every commit is visible in the main branch history at https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/commits/main

    Commits leading up to release v0.1.0 are preserved and reviewable. Future development between releases will continue to land as individual commits through pull requests against main. Branch protection on main requires status checks and does not allow force-push overwrites of history.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]
    Git is not specifically required and projects can use centralized version control software (such as subversion) with justification.

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • Unique version numbering


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]
    This MAY be met in a variety of ways including a commit IDs (such as git commit id or mercurial changeset id) or a version number (including version numbers that use semantic versioning or date-based schemes like YYYYMMDD).

    The project follows Semantic Versioning 2.0.0. Each release is identified by a unique vMAJOR.MINOR.PATCH Git tag. The first public release is tagged v0.1.0. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/releases/tag/v0.1.0

    Tags are created as annotated Git tags with metadata. The Go module proxy and checksum database enforce tag immutability. A tag cannot be reused for a different release.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]
    Projects should generally prefer whatever format is expected by their users, e.g., because it is the normal format used by their ecosystem. Many ecosystems prefer SemVer, and SemVer is generally preferred for application programmer interfaces (APIs) and software development kits (SDKs). CalVer tends to be used by projects that are large, have an unusually large number of independently-developed dependencies, have a constantly-changing scope, or are time-sensitive. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value, because including a micro level supports simultaneously-maintained branches whenever that becomes necessary. Other version numbering formats may be used as version numbers, including git commit IDs or mercurial changeset IDs, as long as they uniquely identify versions. However, some alternatives (such as git commit IDs) can cause problems as release identifiers, because users may not be able to easily determine if they are up-to-date. The version ID format may be unimportant for identifying software releases if all recipients only run the latest version (e.g., it is the code for a single website or internet service that is constantly updated via continuous delivery).

    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

    Each release is identified by an annotated Git tag in the repository. The v0.1.0 release has an annotated tag visible at https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/releases/tag/v0.1.0 and in the Git tag list at https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/tags


  • Release notes


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]
    The release notes MAY be implemented in a variety of ways. Many projects provide them in a file named "NEWS", "CHANGELOG", or "ChangeLog", optionally with extensions such as ".txt", ".md", or ".html". Historically the term "change log" meant a log of every change, but to meet these criteria what is needed is a human-readable summary. The release notes MAY instead be provided by version control system mechanisms such as the GitHub Releases workflow.

    Non-trivial release notes file in repository: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md.


    Enough for a badge!

    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]
    This criterion helps users determine if a given update will fix a vulnerability that is publicly known, to help users make an informed decision about updating. If users typically cannot practically update the software themselves on their computers, but must instead depend on one or more intermediaries to perform the update (as is often the case for a kernel and low-level software that is intertwined with a kernel), the project may choose "not applicable" (N/A) instead, since this additional information will not be helpful to those users. Similarly, a project may choose N/A if all recipients only run the latest version (e.g., it is the code for a single website or internet service that is constantly updated via continuous delivery). This criterion only applies to the project results, not its dependencies. Listing the vulnerabilities of all transitive dependencies of a project becomes unwieldy as dependencies increase and vary, and is unnecessary since tools that examine and track dependencies can do this in a more scalable way.

    v0.1.0 is the first public release. There were no publicly known vulnerabilities with a CVE assignment in the project results at the time of this release. The release notes still include an explicit Security section confirming no run-time vulnerabilities are fixed in this release and that govulncheck runs clean against the dependency set. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/releases/tag/v0.1.0


 Reporting 8/8 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    Non-trivial SECURITY[.md] file found file in repository: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/SECURITY.md. [osps_do_02_01]


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    The project uses GitHub Issues as its issue tracker. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/issues

    CONTRIBUTING.md directs bug reports and feature requests to GitHub Issues. SECURITY.md documents a private channel for vulnerability reports so security issues do not land in the public tracker


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    The project was published with its first public release v0.1.0 on 2026-04-15. No bug reports have been submitted yet. CONTRIBUTING.md sets an expected initial response time of approximately one week for contributions and bug reports. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#contribution-process

    Tracker state at time of submission: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]
    The response MAY be 'no' or a discussion about its merits. The goal is simply that there be some response to some requests, which indicates that the project is still alive. For purposes of this criterion, projects need not count fake requests (e.g., from spammers or automated systems). If a project is no longer making enhancements, please select "unmet" and include the URL that makes this situation clear to users. If a project tends to be overwhelmed by the number of enhancement requests, please select "unmet" and explain.

    The project was published with its first public release v0.1.0 on 2026-04-15. No enhancement requests have been submitted yet. The maintainer will respond to incoming enhancement requests through the same GitHub Issues channel used for bug reports. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]

    GitHub Issues serves as the public searchable archive for all bug reports and responses. Every issue has a stable URL. All comments are preserved. The archive covers both open and closed issues and is searchable by full-text query, labels, author, and status. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/issues?q=is%3Aissue


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]
    Projects hosted on GitHub SHOULD consider enabling privately reporting a security vulnerability. Projects on GitLab SHOULD consider using its ability for privately reporting a vulnerability. Projects MAY identify a mailing address on https://PROJECTSITE/security, often in the form security@example.org. This vulnerability reporting process MAY be the same as its bug reporting process. Vulnerability reports MAY always be public, but many projects have a private vulnerability reporting mechanism.

    The project publishes its vulnerability reporting process in SECURITY.md at the root of the repository. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/SECURITY.md

    GitHub also surfaces the policy in the repository Security tab and exposes a "Report a vulnerability" entry point at https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/security


    Enough for a badge!

    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]
    Examples include a private defect report submitted on the web using HTTPS (TLS) or an email encrypted using OpenPGP. If vulnerability reports are always public (so there are never private vulnerability reports), choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    SECURITY.md documents two private channels for vulnerability reports.

    The preferred channel is GitHub Security Advisories. Reporters submit through the form at https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/security/advisories/new which keeps the report confidential until a fix is released.

    The alternative channel is direct email to the maintainer with the address listed in commit history. The required information is documented (description, reproduction steps, affected versions, severity assessment).

    Initial response is committed within 72 hours. Full disclosure process is documented in SECURITY.md. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/SECURITY.md#reporting-a-vulnerability


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]
    If there have been no vulnerabilities reported in the last 6 months, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    No vulnerability reports have been received yet. The project was published on 2026-04-15. SECURITY.md publicly commits to an initial response within 72 hours of any incoming vulnerability report. This is well within the 14-day requirement. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/SECURITY.md#reporting-a-vulnerability


 Quality 13/13 ●

  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]
    A build system determines what actions need to occur to rebuild the software (and in what order), and then performs those steps. For example, it can invoke a compiler to compile the source code. If an executable is created from source code, it must be possible to modify the project's source code and then generate an updated executable with those modifications. If the software produced by the project depends on external libraries, the build system does not need to build those external libraries. If there is no need to build anything to use the software after its source code is modified, select "not applicable" (N/A).

    Non-trivial build file in repository: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/Makefile.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]
    For example, Maven, Ant, cmake, the autotools, make, rake (Ruby), or devtools (R).

    Non-trivial build file in repository: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/Makefile.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    The project builds using only FLOSS tooling. The Go toolchain (BSD-style license) compiles the binary via go build. GNU Make (GPL) orchestrates the build through the Makefile. CI verifies buildability on Ubuntu and macOS runners using only the public Go installation. No proprietary tools are required at any step. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/Makefile


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]
    The project MAY use multiple automated test suites (e.g., one that runs quickly, vs. another that is more thorough but requires special equipment). There are many test frameworks and test support systems available, including Selenium (web browser automation), Junit (JVM, Java), RUnit (R), testthat (R).

    The project uses an automated test suite built on Go's standard testing package (BSD-style license FLOSS) with the race detector enabled. Custom test fixtures under testdata/ are released as MIT FLOSS along with the rest of the project.

    How to run is documented in CONTRIBUTING.md under "Running tests" with the make test and make test-fixture commands. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#running-tests

    The CI workflow at .github/workflows/ci.yml shows the exact invocation used in continuous integration on Ubuntu and macOS runners. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]
    For example, "make check", "mvn test", or "rake test" (Ruby).

    The test suite is invoked using the canonical Go testing command go test with the standard ./... package pattern. The Makefile target make test wraps go test ./... -count=1 -race to enable the race detector and disable the test cache. Both make test and direct go test ./... work and are documented in CONTRIBUTING.md. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/Makefile


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    The test suite achieves 83.7 percent statement coverage across 20+ packages measured by go test -coverprofile. Per-package coverage ranges from 71.6 percent
    (scanner/auditscanner) to 100 percent (internal/analysis). Every production package has test files. No package is untested.

    In addition to unit tests the project includes a fixture-driven regression suite at testdata/vulnerable-payment-service/ that contains 52 intentional violations covering every detection rule end-to-end. The acceptance test at scanner/reportscanner/fixture_test.go enforces the contract on every CI run. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/scanner/reportscanner/fixture_test.go


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    The project runs continuous integration via GitHub Actions on every push to main and every pull request. Five workflows are configured. CI runs the test suite on Ubuntu and macOS under the race detector with a coverage job. Lint runs golangci-lint. govulncheck checks the dependency tree against the Go vulnerability database. CodeQL performs static security analysis. OpenSSF Scorecard performs supply-chain checks.

    Branch protection on main requires 6 required status checks to pass before any merge. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/tree/main/.github/workflows


  • New functionality testing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]
    As long as a policy is in place, even by word of mouth, that says developers should add tests to the automated test suite for major new functionality, select "Met."

    CONTRIBUTING.md documents a formal binding policy under "Running tests". Any patch that adds removes or reclassifies a scanner detection finding must update the fixture testdata/vulnerable-payment-service/ and EXPECTED-FINDINGS.md in the same commit. The required workflow is RED then GREEN. First update the expectation and confirm make test-fixture fails. Then implement the change and confirm the fixture passes again with no regressions.

    The policy is enforced by CI. The fixture acceptance test runs on every pull request and main push. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#running-tests


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]
    Major functionality would typically be mentioned in the release notes. Perfection is not required, merely evidence that tests are typically being added in practice to the automated test suite when new major functionality is added to the software produced by the project.

    Evidence is visible in the current state of the repository. The project contains 90 test files distributed across 20 packages outside testdata/. Every production package has at least one test file. No package is left untested.

    In addition the project includes a fixture-driven regression suite at testdata/vulnerable-payment-service/ with a machine-readable EXPECTED-FINDINGS.md contract. The fixture was built up alongside scanner development. Every detection rule that landed in v0.1.0 added a corresponding fixture fragment and an EXPECTED-FINDINGS.md entry. The fixture acceptance test at scanner/reportscanner/fixture_test.go runs on every CI build.

    Continuous integration runs the full test suite on every push to main and every pull request. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/actions/workflows/ci.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    The test policy is documented in CONTRIBUTING.md which is the project's canonical instructions document for change proposals. The "Running tests" section explicitly states the fixture TDD cycle for any patch that adds removes or reclassifies a scanner detection finding. The "Contribution process" section also includes running the test suite locally as a required pre-PR step. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#running-tests


  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]
    Examples of compiler warning flags include gcc/clang "-Wall". Examples of a "safe" language mode include JavaScript "use strict" and perl5's "use warnings". A separate "linter" tool is simply a tool that examines the source code to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes. These are typically enabled within the source code or build instructions.

    The project enables four FLOSS static analysis tools all wired into CI as required status checks.

    go vet runs through the make vet target. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/Makefile

    golangci-lint runs in .github/workflows/lint.yml on every push and pull request. It bundles errcheck govet ineffassign staticcheck unused and other linters.

    govulncheck runs in .github/workflows/govulncheck.yml against the live dependency tree.

    GitHub CodeQL runs in .github/workflows/codeql.yml with the security-and-quality query suite.

    All four are required status checks in branch protection on main. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/tree/main/.github/workflows


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]
    These are the warnings identified by the implementation of the warnings criterion. The project should fix warnings or mark them in the source code as false positives. Ideally there would be no warnings, but a project MAY accept some warnings (typically less than 1 warning per 100 lines or less than 10 warnings).

    All four linter workflows (go vet, golangci-lint, govulncheck, CodeQL) are required status checks in branch protection on main. A warning from any of them blocks the merge. The current state of main has zero outstanding warnings. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/actions

    CONTRIBUTING.md prohibits silent error suppression. The Code style section requires either handling errors or logging them via slog. Suppressed scanner findings emit a SUPPRESSED record with the reason rather than disappearing.

    Recent evidence: incorrect GitHub Actions SHA pins were detected by the Scorecard workflow and fixed in commit f12e951 within the same session.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    The .golangci.yml configuration enables a curated strict linter set with default: none and explicit enable list. Enabled linters include errcheck govet staticcheck ineffassign unused misspell gocyclo unconvert and bodyclose. Formatters gofmt and goimports are enforced. URL:
    https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/.golangci.yml

    Output settings are maximum strict. max-issues-per-linter is 0 (unlimited) and max-same-issues is 0 (unlimited). All findings are reported with no truncation.

    Practical exclusions cover testdata/vulnerable-payment-service/ which is intentionally vulnerable Go code used as the regression fixture and would generate noise. Test files have relaxed gocyclo errcheck and unparam rules to accommodate idiomatic Go test patterns.


 Security 16/16 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]
    This requires understanding the following design principles, including the 8 principles from Saltzer and Schroeder:
    • economy of mechanism (keep the design as simple and small as practical, e.g., by adopting sweeping simplifications)
    • fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default)
    • complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable)
    • open design (security mechanisms should not depend on attacker ignorance of its design, but instead on more easily protected and changed information like keys and passwords)
    • separation of privilege (ideally, access to important objects should depend on more than one condition, so that defeating one protection system won't enable complete access. E.G., multi-factor authentication, such as requiring both a password and a hardware token, is stronger than single-factor authentication)
    • least privilege (processes should operate with the least privilege necessary)
    • least common mechanism (the design should minimize the mechanisms common to more than one user and depended on by all users, e.g., directories for temporary files)
    • psychological acceptability (the human interface must be designed for ease of use - designing for "least astonishment" can help)
    • limited attack surface (the attack surface - the set of the different points where an attacker can try to enter or extract data - should be limited)
    • input validation with allowlists (inputs should typically be checked to determine if they are valid before they are accepted; this validation should use allowlists (which only accept known-good values), not denylists (which attempt to list known-bad values)).
    A "primary developer" in a project is anyone who is familiar with the project's code base, is comfortable making changes to it, and is acknowledged as such by most other participants in the project. A primary developer would typically make a number of contributions over the past year (via code, documentation, or answering questions). Developers would typically be considered primary developers if they initiated the project (and have not left the project more than three years ago), have the option of receiving information on a private vulnerability reporting channel (if there is one), can accept commits on behalf of the project, or perform final releases of the project software. If there is only one developer, that individual is the primary developer. Many books and courses are available to help you understand how to develop more secure software and discuss design. For example, the Secure Software Development Fundamentals course is a free set of three courses that explain how to develop more secure software (it's free if you audit it; for an extra fee you can earn a certificate to prove you learned the material).

    The project's primary developer designs and maintains a PCI DSS v4.0.1 static-analysis scanner, which requires working knowledge of common attack surfaces and secure-design principles. The scanner rules implemented in the project directly encode secure-design patterns including least-privilege authentication, input validation, cryptographic agility, TLS configuration hardening, PAN data handling, audit logging, secure error handling, session management, and supply-chain dependency verification. The developer also applied secure-development conventions to the project itself: SHA-pinned GitHub Actions, branch protection with required status checks, govulncheck in CI, CodeQL static analysis, OpenSSF Scorecard, Dependabot alerts, and a documented vulnerability disclosure process in SECURITY.md.


    Enough for a badge!

    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]
    Examples (depending on the type of software) include SQL injection, OS injection, classic buffer overflow, cross-site scripting, missing authentication, and missing authorization. See the CWE/SANS top 25 or OWASP Top 10 for commonly used lists. Many books and courses are available to help you understand how to develop more secure software and discuss common implementation errors that lead to vulnerabilities. For example, the Secure Software Development Fundamentals course is a free set of three courses that explain how to develop more secure software (it's free if you audit it; for an extra fee you can earn a certificate to prove you learned the material).

    The primary developer is building a static analysis scanner whose purpose is to detect common vulnerability classes in Go payment services. The scanner rule inventory is a direct, code-level catalogue of common error kinds and their mitigations. Representative examples:

    • Hardcoded credentials and high-entropy secrets in config files. Mitigation: environment variables and secret managers, enforced by SEC-PREFIX, SEC-HIGH-ENTROPY, SEC-CONNSTR, SEC-CREDENTIAL-KEY rules.
    • Insecure TLS configuration (InsecureSkipVerify, missing MinVersion, weak versions, weak ciphers). Mitigation: explicit TLS 1.2+ with curated cipher suite, enforced by TLS-INSECURE-SKIP-VERIFY, TLS-MISSING-MIN-VERSION, TLS-WEAK-VERSION, TLS-WEAK-CIPHER rules.
    • Weak or broken cryptography (MD5, SHA1, hardcoded keys, plain HTTP for CHD). Mitigation: SHA-256 or stronger, KMS-provided keys, HTTPS-only transport, enforced by CRYPTO-WEAK-HASH, CRYPTO-HARDCODED-KEY, CRYPTO-PLAIN-HTTP rules.
    • PAN data leakage to logs, databases, and error responses. Mitigation: masking, tokenization, memory zeroing, enforced by the PAN scanner rules combined with taint-aware data-flow analysis that downgrades transit-only CHD and keeps storage-bound CHD at HIGH severity.
    • Weak authentication (hardcoded passwords, missing MFA, weak password policy). Mitigation: MFA enforcement and strong password policy, enforced by AUTH-HARDCODED-PWD, AUTH-WEAK-POLICY, AUTH-MISSING-MFA, AUTH-BYTE-COUNT rules.
    • Missing audit logging on payment flows. Mitigation: structured logging middleware with PCI DSS 10.2.1 field coverage (timestamp, event type, user identification, outcome, affected resource), verified by the audit scanner.
    • Error handling that leaks internal detail to HTTP responses. Mitigation: generic client-facing errors with internal detail logged only. Enforced by ERR-LEAK-DIRECT,
      ERR-LEAK-FORMAT, ERR-LEAK-WRITE, ERR-LEAK-ENCODE rules.
    • Unsafe payment page scripts (missing CSP, missing SRI, inline scripts, weak nonces). Mitigation: strict CSP with nonces or hashes plus SRI on external scripts, enforced by the script scanner rules.
    • Vulnerable dependencies with published CVEs. Mitigation: OSV.dev advisory database lookup via the dep scanner and govulncheck in CI.
    • Data retention violations (no TTL on CHD caches, missing memory zeroing). Mitigation: TTL enforcement and explicit zeroing hooks, enforced by the retention scanner rules.
    • SQL schemas that store sensitive columns without encryption. Mitigation: encryption-at-rest via GORM hooks, enforced by SQL-SENSITIVE-COLUMN, SQL-TEXT-TYPE, GORM-SENSITIVE-TAG, GORM-NO-ENCRYPT-HOOK rules.

    Each rule in the scanner encodes both a vulnerability class and a concrete mitigation technique.


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]
    These cryptographic criteria do not always apply because some software has no need to directly use cryptographic capabilities.

    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    Enough for a badge!

    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]
    See the Open Standards Requirement for Software by the Open Source Initiative.

    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]
    These minimum bitlengths are: symmetric key 112, factoring modulus 2048, discrete logarithm key 224, discrete logarithmic group 2048, elliptic curve 224, and hash 224 (password hashing is not covered by this bitlength, more information on password hashing can be found in the crypto_password_storage criterion). See https://www.keylength.com for a comparison of keylength recommendations from various organizations. The software MAY allow smaller keylengths in some configurations (ideally it would not, since this allows downgrade attacks, but shorter keylengths are sometimes necessary for interoperability).

    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]
    ECB mode is almost never appropriate because it reveals identical blocks within the ciphertext as demonstrated by the ECB penguin, and CTR mode is often inappropriate because it does not perform authentication and causes duplicates if the input state is repeated. In many cases it's best to choose a block cipher algorithm mode designed to combine secrecy and authentication, e.g., Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and EAX. Projects MAY allow users to enable broken mechanisms (e.g., during configuration) where necessary for compatibility, but then users know they're doing it.

    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]

    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]
    This criterion applies only when the software is enforcing authentication of users using passwords for external users (aka inbound authentication), such as server-side web applications. It does not apply in cases where the software stores passwords for authenticating into other systems (aka outbound authentication, e.g., the software implements a client for some other system), since at least parts of that software must have often access to the unhashed password.

    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]
    A cryptographically secure random number generator may be a hardware random number generator, or it may be a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG) using an algorithm such as Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG, Yarrow, or Fortuna. Examples of calls to secure random number generators include Java's java.security.SecureRandom and JavaScript's window.crypto.getRandomValues. Examples of calls to insecure random number generators include Java's java.util.Random and JavaScript's Math.random.

  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]
    An even stronger mechanism is releasing the software with digitally signed packages, since that mitigates attacks on the distribution system, but this only works if the users can be confident that the public keys for signatures are correct and if the users will actually check the signature.

    Distribution channels use HTTPS exclusively. [osps_br_03_02]


    Enough for a badge!

    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]
    These hashes can be modified in transit.

    The project does not publish or rely on externally retrieved cryptographic hashes for verification. Binary installation via go install github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp@v0.1.0 retrieves the module from the Go module proxy over HTTPS and verifies it against the SHA-256 hash stored in the public Go checksum database (sum.golang.org), which is itself accessed over HTTPS and backed by a transparent log.

    Source distribution is via HTTPS Git clone or SSH. GitHub Release tarballs and zip archives are served over HTTPS directly from github.com.

    No build step or installation instruction in the project fetches a hash file over plain HTTP.


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    Enough for a badge!

    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]
    The vulnerability must be patched and released by the project itself (patches may be developed elsewhere). A vulnerability becomes publicly known (for this purpose) once it has a CVE with publicly released non-paywalled information (reported, for example, in the National Vulnerability Database) or when the project has been informed and the information has been released to the public (possibly by the project). A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known. Note: this means that users might be left vulnerable to all attackers worldwide for up to 60 days. This criterion is often much easier to meet than what Google recommends in Rebooting responsible disclosure, because Google recommends that the 60-day period start when the project is notified even if the report is not public. Also note that this badge criterion, like other criteria, applies to the individual project. Some projects are part of larger umbrella organizations or larger projects, possibly in multiple layers, and many projects feed their results to other organizations and projects as part of a potentially-complex supply chain. An individual project often cannot control the rest, but an individual project can work to release a vulnerability patch in a timely way. Therefore, we focus solely on the individual project's response time. Once a patch is available from the individual project, others can determine how to deal with the patch (e.g., they can update to the newer version or they can apply just the patch as a cherry-picked solution).

    There are zero known vulnerabilities in the project at the time of this badge submission. The project is a first public release (v0.1.0) cut on 2026-04-15 and no CVE has been assigned against it.

    Dependency scanning runs on every CI build via govulncheck against the Go vulnerability database. The most recent main build (commit bd170c6) passed govulncheck with no findings. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/actions/workflows/govulncheck.yml

    Dependabot security alerts and automated security fixes are enabled on the repository to surface and remediate any future advisories that affect the dependency tree.


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    No critical vulnerabilities have been reported in the project since it became public on 2026-04-15. SECURITY.md documents an initial response commitment of 72 hours for any incoming vulnerability report and a 4-step disclosure process that includes fix development on a private branch followed by coordinated disclosure. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/SECURITY.md#disclosure-process

    Dependency-level vulnerabilities are detected automatically by Dependabot security alerts, govulncheck in CI, and OpenSSF Scorecard. Automated security fixes are enabled so that patched dependency versions are proposed as pull requests without manual intervention.


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]
    A project MAY leak "sample" credentials for testing and unimportant databases, as long as they are not intended to limit public access.

    The repository contains no real private credentials that grant access to any system. A public release scrub was performed before the repository was made public, covering 50+ paranoid patterns including API keys, AWS access keys, private keys, tokens, connection strings, and internal hostnames.

    The testdata/vulnerable-payment-service/ fixture does contain intentionally hardcoded strings that look like credentials. These are synthetic Go source fixtures used as the golden regression suite for the scanner's own detectors (SEC-PREFIX, SEC-HIGH-ENTROPY, SEC-CONNSTR, SEC-CREDENTIAL-KEY). They are not valid credentials to any live system and grant no access to anything. SECURITY.md explicitly marks this directory as out of scope for security reports. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/SECURITY.md#scope

    The repository is also scanned continuously by GitHub Secret Scanning, which is enabled by default on public repositories and actively alerts maintainers if any real provider credential pattern is detected.


 Analysis 8/8 ●

  • Static code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]
    A static code analysis tool examines the software code (as source code, intermediate code, or executable) without executing it with specific inputs. For purposes of this criterion, compiler warnings and "safe" language modes do not count as static code analysis tools (these typically avoid deep analysis because speed is vital). Some static analysis tools focus on detecting generic defects, others focus on finding specific kinds of defects (such as vulnerabilities), and some do a combination. Examples of such static code analysis tools include cppcheck (C, C++), clang static analyzer (C, C++), SpotBugs (Java), FindBugs (Java) (including FindSecurityBugs), PMD (Java), Brakeman (Ruby on Rails), lintr (R), goodpractice (R), Coverity Quality Analyzer, SonarQube, Codacy, and HP Enterprise Fortify Static Code Analyzer. Larger lists of tools can be found in places such as the Wikipedia list of tools for static code analysis, OWASP information on static code analysis, NIST list of source code security analyzers, and Wheeler's list of static analysis tools. If there are no FLOSS static analysis tools available for the implementation language(s) used, you may select 'N/A'.

    The project runs four FLOSS static analysis tools in CI on every push and every pull request, including the release commit for v0.1.0.

    golangci-lint bundles errcheck, govet, staticcheck, ineffassign, unused, misspell, gocyclo, unconvert, and bodyclose. Configuration is at .golangci.yml. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/.golangci.yml

    GitHub CodeQL runs the Go security-and-quality query suite. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml

    govulncheck performs reachability-aware CVE scanning via the Go vulnerability database. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/.github/workflows/govulncheck.yml

    OpenSSF Scorecard runs supply-chain static checks. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/.github/workflows/scorecard.yml

    All four are wired into branch protection as required status checks.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    CodeQL security-and-quality query suite includes rules for common Go vulnerability patterns including SQL injection, command injection, path traversal, XSS, unsafe deserialization, hardcoded credentials, weak cryptography, and unsafe random number generation.

    staticcheck (bundled via golangci-lint) includes bug pattern checks SA1000 through SA9999 covering resource leaks, nil dereferences, incorrect error handling, and misuse of stdlib APIs.

    govulncheck maps the Go vulnerability database to reachable code paths in the project, flagging any dependency CVE that the project actually exercises.

    bodyclose catches missing HTTP response Body close calls which can lead to resource leaks and connection exhaustion.

    errcheck catches unchecked error returns which often mask security-relevant failures.


    Enough for a badge!

    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]
    A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known. Note that criterion vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days requires that all such vulnerabilities be fixed within 60 days of being made public.

    The main branch currently has zero outstanding static analysis findings. All four analysis workflows (golangci-lint, CodeQL, govulncheck, OpenSSF Scorecard) pass on commit bd170c6. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/actions

    Branch protection on main requires these checks to pass before any merge, so a medium or higher severity finding cannot accumulate on main. Any discovered finding must be addressed in the same pull request that surfaces it.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    Static analysis runs on every commit. All four analysis workflows (golangci-lint, CodeQL, govulncheck, OpenSSF Scorecard) are triggered on every push to main and every pull request. CodeQL, govulncheck, and Scorecard are additionally scheduled on a weekly cron to catch newly published vulnerabilities in the dependency tree even when no code change is pushed. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/tree/main/.github/workflows


  • Dynamic code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]
    A dynamic analysis tool examines the software by executing it with specific inputs. For example, the project MAY use a fuzzing tool (e.g., American Fuzzy Lop) or a web application scanner (e.g., OWASP ZAP or w3af). In some cases the OSS-Fuzz project may be willing to apply fuzz testing to your project. For purposes of this criterion the dynamic analysis tool needs to vary the inputs in some way to look for various kinds of problems or be an automated test suite with at least 80% branch coverage. The Wikipedia page on dynamic analysis and the OWASP page on fuzzing identify some dynamic analysis tools. The analysis tool(s) MAY be focused on looking for security vulnerabilities, but this is not required.

    The project runs the Go race detector as its dynamic analysis tool. make test invokes go test ./... -count=1 -race which enables runtime data-race detection across every test in the suite. The race detector is a dynamic tool that instruments memory accesses and detects concurrent read/write hazards at runtime.

    CI runs this configuration on every push and every pull request on both Ubuntu and macOS runners. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml


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    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    The project is written entirely in Go, which is a memory-safe language with bounds-checked arrays, automatic garbage collection, and no pointer arithmetic. The project does not use cgo and does not link against any C or C++ code. This criterion does not apply.


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    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]
    This criterion does not suggest enabling assertions during production; that is entirely up to the project and its users to decide. This criterion's focus is instead to improve fault detection during dynamic analysis before deployment. Enabling assertions in production use is completely different from enabling assertions during dynamic analysis (such as testing). In some cases enabling assertions in production use is extremely unwise (especially in high-integrity components). There are many arguments against enabling assertions in production, e.g., libraries should not crash callers, their presence may cause rejection by app stores, and/or activating an assertion in production may expose private data such as private keys. Beware that in many Linux distributions NDEBUG is not defined, so C/C++ assert() will by default be enabled for production in those environments. It may be important to use a different assertion mechanism or defining NDEBUG for production in those environments.

    The Go race detector is an assertion-enabling dynamic analysis mode. Enabling -race instruments every memory access and triggers a runtime failure on any detected data race, in addition to the standard test assertions. CI runs the full test suite under -race on every push and pull request. Race detector builds are significantly slower and more memory-intensive than production builds and are never shipped as the distributed binary. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/blob/main/Makefile


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    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]
    If you are not running dynamic code analysis and thus have not found any vulnerabilities in this way, choose "not applicable" (N/A). A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known.

    No medium or higher severity exploitable findings have been discovered by dynamic analysis. The Go race detector has reported zero data races on the most recent main build. CI test runs under -race pass on both Ubuntu and macOS. URL: https://github.com/shyshlakov/pci-dss-mcp/actions/workflows/ci.yml



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Project badge entry owned by: Oleksandr.
Entry created on 2026-04-15 05:21:46 UTC, last updated on 2026-04-15 06:10:22 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-04-15 06:10:22 UTC.