api

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Gold level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Silver level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 5/5 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Simple Container (sc) is a cloud-agnostic deployment tool designed to simplify microservices deployment, infrastructure provisioning, and CI/CD automation.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

  • Prerequisites


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST achieve a silver level badge. [achieve_silver]

  • Project oversight


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a "bus factor" of 2 or more. (URL required) [bus_factor]
    A "bus factor" (aka "truck factor") is the minimum number of project members that have to suddenly disappear from a project ("hit by a bus") before the project stalls due to lack of knowledgeable or competent personnel. The truck-factor tool can estimate this for projects on GitHub. For more information, see Assessing the Bus Factor of Git Repositories by Cosentino et al.

    URL: https://github.com/simple-container-com/api/blob/main/docs/MAINTAINERS.md#sensitive-resource-access-map

    Three active maintainers with merge access (per current git shortlog of main).


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have at least two unassociated significant contributors. (URL required) [contributors_unassociated]
    Contributors are associated if they are paid to work by the same organization (as an employee or contractor) and the organization stands to benefit from the project's results. Financial grants do not count as being from the same organization if they pass through other organizations (e.g., science grants paid to different organizations from a common government or NGO source do not cause contributors to be associated). Someone is a significant contributor if they have made non-trivial contributions to the project in the past year. Examples of good indicators of a significant contributor are: written at least 1,000 lines of code, contributed 50 commits, or contributed at least 20 pages of documentation.

    URL: https://github.com/simple-container-com/api/blob/main/docs/MAINTAINERS.md#sensitive-resource-access-map

    Three active maintainers with merge access (per current git shortlog of main).


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include a license statement in each source file. This MAY be done by including the following inside a comment near the beginning of each file: SPDX-License-Identifier: [SPDX license expression for project]. [license_per_file]
    This MAY also be done by including a statement in natural language identifying the license. The project MAY also include a stable URL pointing to the license text, or the full license text. Note that the criterion license_location requires the project license be in a standard location. See this SPDX tutorial for more information about SPDX license expressions. Note the relationship with copyright_per_file, whose content would typically precede the license information.

    Every hand-written .go source file carries // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT (551 files), matching the root MIT LICENSE, added in PR #335 and enforced by the golangci-lint goheader linter on every PR. Generated mocks under pkg/**/mocks/ are excluded (regenerated).


 Change Control 4/4 ●

  • Public version-controlled source repository


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's source repository MUST use a common distributed version control software (e.g., git or mercurial). [repo_distributed]
    Git is not specifically required and projects can use centralized version control software (such as subversion) with justification.

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly identify small tasks that can be performed by new or casual contributors. (URL required) [small_tasks]
    This identification is typically done by marking selected issues in an issue tracker with one or more tags the project uses for the purpose, e.g., up-for-grabs, first-timers-only, "Small fix", microtask, or IdealFirstBug. These new tasks need not involve adding functionality; they can be improving documentation, adding test cases, or anything else that aids the project and helps the contributor understand more about the project.

    Small, well-scoped tasks for new contributors are labelled good first issue: https://github.com/simple-container-com/api/issues?q=is:open+is:issue+label:"good first issue"


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST require two-factor authentication (2FA) for developers for changing a central repository or accessing sensitive data (such as private vulnerability reports). This 2FA mechanism MAY use mechanisms without cryptographic mechanisms such as SMS, though that is not recommended. [require_2FA]

    GitHub requires 2FA as of March 2023. [osps_ac_01_01]


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's two-factor authentication (2FA) SHOULD use cryptographic mechanisms to prevent impersonation. Short Message Service (SMS) based 2FA, by itself, does NOT meet this criterion, since it is not encrypted. [secure_2FA]
    A 2FA mechanism that meets this criterion would be a Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP) application that automatically generates an authentication code that changes after a certain period of time. Note that GitHub supports TOTP.

    only passkeys


 Quality 7/7 ●

  • Coding standards


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST document its code review requirements, including how code review is conducted, what must be checked, and what is required to be acceptable. (URL required) [code_review_standards]
    See also two_person_review and contribution_requirements.

    Code-review requirements are documented at https://github.com/simple-container-com/api/blob/main/docs/CONTRIBUTING.md (code review required; branch protection enforces a 1-reviewer minimum; an LLM-driven pre-merge pass via the public OpenAI Codex / Google Gemini CLIs on larger PRs; security-sensitive changes under pkg/security, push.yaml, sc.sh pull in additional reviewers + human security review) and https://github.com/simple-container-com/api/blob/main/docs/MAINTAINERS.md (consensus via PR review; path-scoped ownership via .github/CODEOWNERS). Enforced by branch protection: signed commits, review approval, green checks, DCO.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have at least 50% of all proposed modifications reviewed before release by a person other than the author, to determine if it is a worthwhile modification and free of known issues which would argue against its inclusion [two_person_review]

    Branch protection on main requires required approving review count: 1. GitHub branch protection does not count the PR author's own approval toward this requirement — only non-author approvals are accepted. Verified via Scorecard Branch-Protection check: codeowner review is required on main, last push approval is required to merge on branch main. [osps_qa_07_01]


  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a reproducible build. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [build_reproducible]
    A reproducible build means that multiple parties can independently redo the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. In some cases, this can be resolved by forcing some sort order. JavaScript developers may consider using npm shrinkwrap and webpack OccurrenceOrderPlugin. GCC and clang users may find the -frandom-seed option useful. The build environment (including the toolset) can often be defined for external parties by specifying the cryptographic hash of a specific container or virtual machine that they can use for rebuilding. The reproducible builds project has documentation on how to do this.

    Release binaries (sc, cloud-helpers, github-actions) and the published sc-<os>-<arch>.tar.gz archives are built deterministically. The publishing workflow (.github/workflows/push.yaml) and the welder build tasks use -trimpath + -buildvcs=false + CGO_ENABLED=0 + a Go toolchain pinned in go.mod + a deterministic version ld-flag, and the tarball is produced with tar --sort=name --mtime=@0 --owner=0 --group=0 --numeric-owner --mode=u=rwx,go=rx | gzip -9 -n (fixed entry order/mtime/owner/mode, no embedded gzip timestamp). Verified bit-for-bit: two independent builds under different umasks (022 vs 077) produced identical binary and archive sha256 digests. AI-assistant embeddings are committed (no LLM at build). Inputs + a rebuild-and-compare recipe vs the published cosign/SLSA digest: https://github.com/simple-container-com/api/blob/main/docs/REPRODUCIBLE-BUILD.md . Delivered in PR #335 (merged).


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    A test suite MUST be invocable in a standard way for that language. (URL required) [test_invocation]
    For example, "make check", "mvn test", or "rake test" (Ruby).

    The test suite is invoked the standard Go way: go test ./... (unit) and go test -tags integration ./... (integration); an aggregate coverage run is welder run coverage. Documented at https://github.com/simple-container-com/api/blob/main/docs/CONTRIBUTING.md and https://github.com/simple-container-com/api/blob/main/docs/TESTING.md .


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST implement continuous integration, where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result. (URL required) [test_continuous_integration]
    In most cases this means that each developer who works full-time on the project integrates at least daily.

    CI runs on every push and pull request via GitHub Actions: .github/workflows/branch.yaml builds and runs the full go test suite, coverage.yml measures statement coverage, and fuzz.yml runs the fuzz targets - on each change. Workflows: https://github.com/simple-container-com/api/tree/main/.github/workflows .


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 90% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage90]

    Go's go test -coverprofile measures statement coverage. The unit suite provides 90.3% statement coverage on the documented measurement scope (the unit-testable core), computed by welder run coverage + .github/workflows/coverage.yml on every PR/push. Scope + per-row-justified exclusions: https://github.com/simple-container-com/api/blob/main/docs/TESTING.md#coverage-scope . Delivered in PR #332 (merged). Full-repo unfiltered coverage (27.6%) also reported.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% branch coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_branch_coverage80]

    N/A for Go: standard FLOSS tooling (go test -cover/-covermode=atomic) measures statement coverage, not branch coverage, and there is no widely-used FLOSS branch-coverage tool for Go. Statement coverage is 90.3% on the documented scope, via table-driven tests exercising both success and error branches.


 Security 5/5 ●

  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 MUST be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    All outbound network traffic uses HTTPS (TLS 1.2+) or SSH (Sigstore Fulcio + Rekor, GitHub API, AWS/GCP/Azure SDKs, dist.simple-container.com). Go stdlib net/http.Transport defaults reject TLS 1.0/1.1. No FTP / telnet / plaintext HTTP code paths.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    Go stdlib crypto/tls defaults to TLS 1.3 with TLS 1.2 floor. The codebase does not override MinVersion to any value below tls.VersionTLS12 in any production code path.


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    Enough for a badge!

    The project website, repository (if accessible via the web), and download site (if separate) MUST include key hardening headers with nonpermissive values. (URL required) [hardened_site]
    Note that GitHub and GitLab are known to meet this. Sites such as https://securityheaders.com/ can quickly check this. The key hardening headers are: Content Security Policy (CSP), HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS), X-Content-Type-Options (as "nosniff"), and X-Frame-Options. Fully static web sites with no ability to log in via the web pages could omit some hardening headers with less risk, but there's no reliable way to detect such sites, so we require these headers even if they are fully static sites.

    Required security hardening headers missing: https://simple-container.com: content-security-policy, strict-transport-security, x-content-type-options, x-frame-options


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have performed a security review within the last 5 years. This review MUST consider the security requirements and security boundary. [security_review]
    This MAY be done by the project members and/or an independent evaluation. This evaluation MAY be supported by static and dynamic analysis tools, but there also must be human review to identify problems (particularly in design) that tools cannot detect.

    docs/SECURITY.md carries the STRIDE threat model + attack vectors V1–V5 (compromised CDN, signing-identity rotation, etc.). Reviewers (codex + gemini) run on every security-leaning PR — see commit history for evidence. [osps_sa_03_01]


    Enough for a badge!

    Hardening mechanisms MUST be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. (URL required) [hardening]
    Hardening mechanisms may include HTTP headers like Content Security Policy (CSP), compiler flags to mitigate attacks (such as -fstack-protector), or compiler flags to eliminate undefined behavior. For our purposes least privilege is not considered a hardening mechanism (least privilege is important, but separate).

    Hardening of the produced artifacts. (1) Build: release binaries use -trimpath + CGO_ENABLED=0 (static, reproducible - https://github.com/simple-container-com/api/blob/main/docs/REPRODUCIBLE-BUILD.md); container images use multi-stage Dockerfiles on SHA-digest-pinned base images (e.g. github-actions.Dockerfile and caddy.Dockerfile pin alpine:3.23@sha256:... and caddy:2.11.4@sha256:...). (2) CI: every workflow declares least-privilege permissions and pins third-party actions to full commit SHAs; release signing uses GitHub OIDC keyless Sigstore/cosign instead of long-lived secrets - https://github.com/simple-container-com/api/tree/main/.github/workflows. (3) Distribution: the install bootstrap sc.sh, when cosign is on PATH, verifies the keyless Sigstore signature against the maintainer identity and aborts on a verification/fetch failure (it warns and continues only when cosign is absent, to avoid hard-blocking fresh installs) - https://github.com/simple-container-com/api/blob/main/sc.sh.


 Analysis 2/2 ●

  • Dynamic code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST apply at least one dynamic analysis tool to any proposed major production release of the software produced by the project before its release. [dynamic_analysis]
    A dynamic analysis tool examines the software by executing it with specific inputs. For example, the project MAY use a fuzzing tool (e.g., American Fuzzy Lop) or a web application scanner (e.g., OWASP ZAP or w3af). In some cases the OSS-Fuzz project may be willing to apply fuzz testing to your project. For purposes of this criterion the dynamic analysis tool needs to vary the inputs in some way to look for various kinds of problems or be an automated test suite with at least 80% branch coverage. The Wikipedia page on dynamic analysis and the OWASP page on fuzzing identify some dynamic analysis tools. The analysis tool(s) MAY be focused on looking for security vulnerabilities, but this is not required.

    Native Go fuzzing is applied in CI as a dynamic-analysis tool: .github/workflows/fuzz.yml ('Go Fuzz') runs FuzzVerifyAndExtract and FuzzCacheGetPath against the security-critical HMAC integrity-cache parse path (pkg/security/cache.go) on every PR/push and for an extended budget on main. Fuzzing executes the code with generated inputs and surfaces crashes/panics. Workflow: https://github.com/simple-container-com/api/blob/main/.github/workflows/fuzz.yml .


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD include many run-time assertions in the software it produces and check those assertions during dynamic analysis. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]
    This criterion does not suggest enabling assertions during production; that is entirely up to the project and its users to decide. This criterion's focus is instead to improve fault detection during dynamic analysis before deployment. Enabling assertions in production use is completely different from enabling assertions during dynamic analysis (such as testing). In some cases enabling assertions in production use is extremely unwise (especially in high-integrity components). There are many arguments against enabling assertions in production, e.g., libraries should not crash callers, their presence may cause rejection by app stores, and/or activating an assertion in production may expose private data such as private keys. Beware that in many Linux distributions NDEBUG is not defined, so C/C++ assert() will by default be enabled for production in those environments. It may be important to use a different assertion mechanism or defining NDEBUG for production in those environments.

    The fuzz harnesses assert security invariants on every iteration: FuzzVerifyAndExtract requires forged/tampered ciphertext to be rejected and valid input to round-trip; FuzzCacheGetPath asserts no resolved path escapes the cache directory (path-traversal guard). Go's always-on runtime checks (bounds, nil-deref, integer-overflow -> panic) act as pervasive runtime assertions exercised throughout the fuzzed executions, so any violated invariant surfaces as a fuzz crash



This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Dmitriy Creed and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Dmitriy Creed.
Entry created on 2026-05-18 17:21:24 UTC, last updated on 2026-06-21 12:10:40 UTC. Last lost passing badge on 2026-05-18 19:51:03 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-05-18 19:54:09 UTC.