caribbean-countdowns

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 12911 is silver Here is how to embed it:
You can show your badge status by embedding this in your markdown file:
[![OpenSSF Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/12911/badge)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/12911)
or by embedding this in your HTML:
<a href="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/12911"><img src="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/12911/badge"></a>


These are the Silver level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 17/17 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.
    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

  • Prerequisites


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST achieve a passing level badge. [achieve_passing]

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    https://github.com/countdowns-co/caribbean-countdowns/blob/main/README.md


  • Project oversight


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD have a legal mechanism where all developers of non-trivial amounts of project software assert that they are legally authorized to make these contributions. The most common and easily-implemented approach for doing this is by using a Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO), where users add "signed-off-by" in their commits and the project links to the DCO website. However, this MAY be implemented as a Contributor License Agreement (CLA), or other legal mechanism. (URL required) [dco]
    The DCO is the recommended mechanism because it's easy to implement, tracked in the source code, and git directly supports a "signed-off" feature using "commit -s". To be most effective it is best if the project documentation explains what "signed-off" means for that project. A CLA is a legal agreement that defines the terms under which intellectual works have been licensed to an organization or project. A contributor assignment agreement (CAA) is a legal agreement that transfers rights in an intellectual work to another party; projects are not required to have CAAs, since having CAA increases the risk that potential contributors will not contribute, especially if the receiver is a for-profit organization. The Apache Software Foundation CLAs (the individual contributor license and the corporate CLA) are examples of CLAs, for projects which determine that the risks of these kinds of CLAs to the project are less than their benefits.

    The project uses the Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO). Contributors are required to sign off all commits using git commit -s, which appends Signed-off-by: Name <email> to each commit message. This certifies that the contributor has the right to submit the code under the project's MIT licence. The requirement and instructions are documented in CONTRIBUTING.md. URL: https://github.com/countdowns-co/caribbean-countdowns/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and document its project governance model (the way it makes decisions, including key roles). (URL required) [governance]
    There needs to be some well-established documented way to make decisions and resolve disputes. In small projects, this may be as simple as "the project owner and lead makes all final decisions". There are various governance models, including benevolent dictator and formal meritocracy; for more details, see Governance models. Both centralized (e.g., single-maintainer) and decentralized (e.g., group maintainers) approaches have been successfully used in projects. The governance information does not need to document the possibility of creating a project fork, since that is always possible for FLOSS projects.

    The project governance model is documented in GOVERNANCE.md. It follows a single-maintainer model: the primary maintainer makes all final decisions on features, architecture, and releases. For substantial changes an issue is opened first to discuss the approach. All PRs require maintainer review via CODEOWNERS. The document also covers roles, succession, and how governance changes are handled.

    URL: https://github.com/countdowns-co/caribbean-countdowns/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST adopt a code of conduct and post it in a standard location. (URL required) [code_of_conduct]
    Projects may be able to improve the civility of their community and to set expectations about acceptable conduct by adopting a code of conduct. This can help avoid problems before they occur and make the project a more welcoming place to encourage contributions. This should focus only on behavior within the community/workplace of the project. Example codes of conduct are the Linux kernel code of conduct, the Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct, the Debian Code of Conduct, the Ubuntu Code of Conduct, the Fedora Code of Conduct, the GNOME Code Of Conduct, the KDE Community Code of Conduct, the Python Community Code of Conduct, The Ruby Community Conduct Guideline, and The Rust Code of Conduct.

    The project has adopted the Contributor Covenant v2.1 as its code of conduct. It is posted at the standard location CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md in the repository root. It covers expected behaviour, unacceptable conduct, scope (all project spaces), and enforcement/reporting process.

    URL: https://github.com/countdowns-co/caribbean-countdowns/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and publicly document the key roles in the project and their responsibilities, including any tasks those roles must perform. It MUST be clear who has which role(s), though this might not be documented in the same way. (URL required) [roles_responsibilities]
    The documentation for governance and roles and responsibilities may be in one place.

    Key roles and responsibilities are documented in GOVERNANCE.md. The Maintainer role is defined with specific responsibilities: reviewing and merging PRs, managing releases and version tags, triaging issues, maintaining CI configuration, and handling security disclosures. The Contributor role is also defined. It is clear who holds the Maintainer role.

    URL: https://github.com/countdowns-co/caribbean-countdowns/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to continue with minimal interruption if any one person dies, is incapacitated, or is otherwise unable or unwilling to continue support of the project. In particular, the project MUST be able to create and close issues, accept proposed changes, and release versions of software, within a week of confirmation of the loss of support from any one individual. This MAY be done by ensuring someone else has any necessary keys, passwords, and legal rights to continue the project. Individuals who run a FLOSS project MAY do this by providing keys in a lockbox and a will providing any needed legal rights (e.g., for DNS names). (URL required) [access_continuity]

    Continuity is addressed in GOVERNANCE.md. All project assets (repository, CI, releases) are held under the countdowns-co GitHub organisation rather than a personal account, so ownership can be transferred to a trusted contributor without losing project history, issues, or settings. The documented process: contributors with merged PRs may request maintainer access by opening an issue. GitHub organisation ownership transfer can be completed within a week of confirming unavailability of the primary maintainer. DNS and Cloudflare access follow the same handoff process via stored credentials.

    URL: https://github.com/countdowns-co/caribbean-countdowns/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The project SHOULD have a "bus factor" of 2 or more. (URL required) [bus_factor]
    A "bus factor" (aka "truck factor") is the minimum number of project members that have to suddenly disappear from a project ("hit by a bus") before the project stalls due to lack of knowledgeable or competent personnel. The truck-factor tool can estimate this for projects on GitHub. For more information, see Assessing the Bus Factor of Git Repositories by Cosentino et al.

    The project currently has one primary maintainer giving a bus factor of 1. Risk is partially mitigated by the organisation-based structure (all assets under countdowns-co, transferable to a trusted contributor per GOVERNANCE.md), full public source history on GitHub, and documented architecture and processes. The project is open to additional maintainers — contributors with merged PRs may request co-maintainer access.


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented roadmap that describes what the project intends to do and not do for at least the next year. (URL required) [documentation_roadmap]
    The project might not achieve the roadmap, and that's fine; the purpose of the roadmap is to help potential users and contributors understand the intended direction of the project. It need not be detailed.

    The project roadmap is documented in ROADMAP.md. It covers near-term (3 months), medium-term (3–9 months), and long-term goals through 2027, and explicitly lists what is out of scope.

    URL: https://github.com/countdowns-co/caribbean-countdowns/blob/main/ROADMAP.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include documentation of the architecture (aka high-level design) of the software produced by the project. If the project does not produce software, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [documentation_architecture]
    A software architecture explains a program's fundamental structures, i.e., the program's major components, the relationships among them, and the key properties of these components and relationships.

    The project architecture is documented in README.md. URL: https://github.com/countdowns-co/caribbean-countdowns/blob/main/README.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST document what the user can and cannot expect in terms of security from the software produced by the project (its "security requirements"). (URL required) [documentation_security]
    These are the security requirements that the software is intended to meet.

    URL: https://github.com/countdowns-co/caribbean-countdowns/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a "quick start" guide for new users to help them quickly do something with the software. (URL required) [documentation_quick_start]
    The idea is to show users how to get started and make the software do anything at all. This is critically important for potential users to get started.

    README.md includes a Quick start section with the four commands needed to clone, install, and run the site locally. It notes the local URL, explains which parts work without build-time data, and shows how to run the test and lint suite.

    URL: https://github.com/countdowns-co/caribbean-countdowns/blob/main/README.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST make an effort to keep the documentation consistent with the current version of the project results (including software produced by the project). Any known documentation defects making it inconsistent MUST be fixed. If the documentation is generally current, but erroneously includes some older information that is no longer true, just treat that as a defect, then track and fix as usual. [documentation_current]
    The documentation MAY include information about differences or changes between versions of the software and/or link to older versions of the documentation. The intent of this criterion is that an effort is made to keep the documentation consistent, not that the documentation must be perfect.

    All documentation (README.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, SECURITY.md, GOVERNANCE.md, ROADMAP.md, CHANGELOG.md) is maintained in the same repository as the source code and updated as part of the same pull request workflow. Any documentation defect can be reported via GitHub Issues and is tracked and fixed through the standard PR process.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project repository front page and/or website MUST identify and hyperlink to any achievements, including this best practices badge, within 48 hours of public recognition that the achievement has been attained. (URL required) [documentation_achievements]
    An achievement is any set of external criteria that the project has specifically worked to meet, including some badges. This information does not need to be on the project website front page. A project using GitHub can put achievements on the repository front page by adding them to the README file.

    The repository front page (README.md) already displays and hyperlinks to both achievements: the OpenSSF Scorecard badge (linking to the public scorecard viewer) and the CII Best Practices badge (linking to the project entry at bestpractices.dev). Both were added within 48 hours of the respective achievements being confirmed.

    URL: https://github.com/countdowns-co/caribbean-countdowns/blob/main/README.md


  • Accessibility and internationalization


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The project (both project sites and project results) SHOULD follow accessibility best practices so that persons with disabilities can still participate in the project and use the project results where it is reasonable to do so. [accessibility_best_practices]
    For web applications, see the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG 2.0) and its supporting document Understanding WCAG 2.0; see also W3C accessibility information. For GUI applications, consider using the environment-specific accessibility guidelines (such as Gnome, KDE, XFCE, Android, iOS, Mac, and Windows). Some TUI applications (e.g. `ncurses` programs) can do certain things to make themselves more accessible (such as `alpine`'s `force-arrow-cursor` setting). Most command-line applications are fairly accessible as-is. This criterion is often N/A, e.g., for program libraries. Here are some examples of actions to take or issues to consider:
    • Provide text alternatives for any non-text content so that it can be changed into other forms people need, such as large print, braille, speech, symbols or simpler language ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.1)
    • Color is not used as the only visual means of conveying information, indicating an action, prompting a response, or distinguishing a visual element. ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.1)
    • The visual presentation of text and images of text has a contrast ratio of at least 4.5:1, except for large text, incidental text, and logotypes ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.3)
    • Make all functionality available from a keyboard (WCAG guideline 2.1)
    • A GUI or web-based project SHOULD test with at least one screen-reader on the target platform(s) (e.g. NVDA, Jaws, or WindowEyes on Windows; VoiceOver on Mac & iOS; Orca on Linux/BSD; TalkBack on Android). TUI programs MAY work to reduce overdraw to prevent redundant reading by screen-readers.

    The site is built with semantic HTML and is fully static (all content available without JavaScript), which provides a baseline level of accessibility. However, no formal WCAG 2.1 audit or screen reader testing has been conducted. A systematic accessibility review is tracked in the project backlog and planned for the medium term.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD be internationalized to enable easy localization for the target audience's culture, region, or language. If internationalization (i18n) does not apply (e.g., the software doesn't generate text intended for end-users and doesn't sort human-readable text), select "not applicable" (N/A). [internationalization]
    Localization "refers to the adaptation of a product, application or document content to meet the language, cultural and other requirements of a specific target market (a locale)." Internationalization is the "design and development of a product, application or document content that enables easy localization for target audiences that vary in culture, region, or language." (See W3C's "Localization vs. Internationalization".) Software meets this criterion simply by being internationalized. No localization for another specific language is required, since once software has been internationalized it's possible for others to work on localization.

    The site is fully internationalized. All user-facing text is managed through a 4-language system (English, French, Kréyol haïtien, Spanish) using a CSS class pattern (t-en, t-fr, t-kr, t-es). Adding a new language requires no structural changes — only new translation strings. The site was designed for a multilingual audience from the start.

    URL: https://github.com/countdowns-co/caribbean-countdowns/blob/main/README.md


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    If the project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) store passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). If the project sites do not store passwords for this purpose, select "not applicable" (N/A). [sites_password_security]
    Note that the use of GitHub meets this criterion. This criterion only applies to passwords used for authentication of external users into the project sites (aka inbound authentication). If the project sites must log in to other sites (aka outbound authentication), they may need to store authorization tokens for that purpose differently (since storing a hash would be useless). This applies criterion crypto_password_storage to the project sites, similar to sites_https.

    The project sites do not store passwords for authentication of external users. The site is fully static with no login system, and no credentials are stored by this project.


 Change Control 1/1 ●

  • Previous versions


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST maintain the most often used older versions of the product or provide an upgrade path to newer versions. If the upgrade path is difficult, the project MUST document how to perform the upgrade (e.g., the interfaces that have changed and detailed suggested steps to help upgrade). [maintenance_or_update]

    The project is a website, not a versioned software library — end users access it via a URL and always receive the current version automatically. There is no installation to upgrade and no older version to maintain. CHANGELOG.md documents changes between versions for contributors and transparency. No upgrade path documentation is needed as there is nothing to install or update on the user side.


 Reporting 3/3 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    GitHub Issues is our issue tracker. Same URL: https://github.com/countdowns-co/caribbean-countdowns/issues


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST give credit to the reporter(s) of all vulnerability reports resolved in the last 12 months, except for the reporter(s) who request anonymity. If there have been no vulnerabilities resolved in the last 12 months, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [vulnerability_report_credit]

    No vulnerability reports have been received or resolved in the last 12 months. The project launched in 2026 and has had no confirmed security vulnerabilities to date.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented process for responding to vulnerability reports. (URL required) [vulnerability_response_process]
    This is strongly related to vulnerability_report_process, which requires that there be a documented way to report vulnerabilities. It also related to vulnerability_report_response, which requires response to vulnerability reports within a certain time frame.

    SECURITY.md documents the full response process: reports are acknowledged within 48 hours of receipt, and a fix is targeted within 14 days for confirmed vulnerabilities. The preferred channel is GitHub Security Advisories (private disclosure). Public issue reports for security vulnerabilities are explicitly discouraged.

    URL: https://github.com/countdowns-co/caribbean-countdowns/blob/main/SECURITY.md


 Quality 19/19 ●

  • Coding standards


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST identify the specific coding style guides for the primary languages it uses, and require that contributions generally comply with it. (URL required) [coding_standards]
    In most cases this is done by referring to some existing style guide(s), possibly listing differences. These style guides can include ways to improve readability and ways to reduce the likelihood of defects (including vulnerabilities). Many programming languages have one or more widely-used style guides. Examples of style guides include Google's style guides and SEI CERT Coding Standards.

    CONTRIBUTING.md identifies the style guides for the project's primary languages and requires contributions to comply. JavaScript follows the MDN JavaScript guidelines, with key rules (strict equality, no undefined variables, no unused variables) automatically enforced by ESLint on every PR. Astro components follow the Astro documentation syntax guidelines. Compliance is enforced automatically — PRs that fail the lint step cannot be merged.

    URL: https://github.com/countdowns-co/caribbean-countdowns/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST automatically enforce its selected coding style(s) if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can do so in the selected language(s). [coding_standards_enforced]
    This MAY be implemented using static analysis tool(s) and/or by forcing the code through code reformatters. In many cases the tool configuration is included in the project's repository (since different projects may choose different configurations). Projects MAY allow style exceptions (and typically will); where exceptions occur, they MUST be rare and documented in the code at their locations, so that these exceptions can be reviewed and so that tools can automatically handle them in the future. Examples of such tools include ESLint (JavaScript), Rubocop (Ruby), and devtools check (R).

    ESLint enforces the project's JavaScript coding standards automatically on every PR via the CI pipeline. The configuration is committed to the repository (eslint.config.js). PRs that produce ESLint errors cannot be merged. No style exceptions currently exist in the codebase.


  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    Build systems for native binaries MUST honor the relevant compiler and linker (environment) variables passed in to them (e.g., CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS, and LDFLAGS) and pass them to compiler and linker invocations. A build system MAY extend them with additional flags; it MUST NOT simply replace provided values with its own. If no native binaries are being generated, select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_standard_variables]
    It should be easy to enable special build features like Address Sanitizer (ASAN), or to comply with distribution hardening best practices (e.g., by easily turning on compiler flags to do so).

    The project produces a static website, not native binaries. No compiler or linker is involved in the build process.


    Enough for a badge!

    The build and installation system SHOULD preserve debugging information if they are requested in the relevant flags (e.g., "install -s" is not used). If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_preserve_debug]
    E.G., setting CFLAGS (C) or CXXFLAGS (C++) should create the relevant debugging information if those languages are used, and they should not be stripped during installation. Debugging information is needed for support and analysis, and also useful for measuring the presence of hardening features in the compiled binaries.

    The project produces a static website with no compiled binaries. There is no build or installation system that handles debugging symbols or stripping.


    Enough for a badge!

    The build system for the software produced by the project MUST NOT recursively build subdirectories if there are cross-dependencies in the subdirectories. If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_non_recursive]
    The project build system's internal dependency information needs to be accurate, otherwise, changes to the project may not build correctly. Incorrect builds can lead to defects (including vulnerabilities). A common mistake in large build systems is to use a "recursive build" or "recursive make", that is, a hierarchy of subdirectories containing source files, where each subdirectory is independently built. Unless each subdirectory is fully independent, this is a mistake, because the dependency information is incorrect.

    The project produces a static website built. There is no custom build system with recursive subdirectory compilation or cross-dependencies between build units.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to repeat the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_repeatable]
    GCC and clang users may find the -frandom-seed option useful; in some cases, this can be resolved by forcing some sort order. More suggestions can be found at the reproducible build site.

    The build is fully deterministic. Given the same source files and the same input data, Astro always produces identical output. The CI pipeline uses locked dependencies (npm ci) to ensure the same versions are resolved on every run. No timestamps or random seeds are embedded in the build output. The same commit built twice produces the same static files.


  • Installation system


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way to easily install and uninstall the software produced by the project using a commonly-used convention. [installation_common]
    Examples include using a package manager (at the system or language level), "make install/uninstall" (supporting DESTDIR), a container in a standard format, or a virtual machine image in a standard format. The installation and uninstallation process (e.g., its packaging) MAY be implemented by a third party as long as it is FLOSS.

    The project produces a static website accessed via a URL. There is nothing to install or uninstall — users simply visit the site in a browser.


    Enough for a badge!

    The installation system for end-users MUST honor standard conventions for selecting the location where built artifacts are written to at installation time. For example, if it installs files on a POSIX system it MUST honor the DESTDIR environment variable. If there is no installation system or no standard convention, select "not applicable" (N/A). [installation_standard_variables]

    The project produces a static website with no installation system for end-users. There are no built artifacts written to a local filesystem.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way for potential developers to quickly install all the project results and support environment necessary to make changes, including the tests and test environment. This MUST be performed with a commonly-used convention. [installation_development_quick]
    This MAY be implemented using a generated container and/or installation script(s). External dependencies would typically be installed by invoking system and/or language package manager(s), per external_dependencies.

    The full development environment is set up with two commands using the standard Node.js convention. This is documented in the Quick start section of README.md.

    URL: https://github.com/countdowns-co/caribbean-countdowns/blob/main/README.md


  • Externally-maintained components


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST list external dependencies in a computer-processable way. (URL required) [external_dependencies]
    Typically this is done using the conventions of package manager and/or build system. Note that this helps implement installation_development_quick.

    All external dependencies are listed in package.json in standard npm format, which is machine-readable and processed automatically by the Node.js package manager. Both runtime and development dependencies are declared with pinned version ranges.

    URL: https://github.com/countdowns-co/caribbean-countdowns/blob/main/package.json


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST monitor or periodically check their external dependencies (including convenience copies) to detect known vulnerabilities, and fix exploitable vulnerabilities or verify them as unexploitable. [dependency_monitoring]
    This can be done using an origin analyzer / dependency checking tool / software composition analysis tool such as OWASP's Dependency-Check, Sonatype's Nexus Auditor, Synopsys' Black Duck Software Composition Analysis, and Bundler-audit (for Ruby). Some package managers include mechanisms to do this. It is acceptable if the components' vulnerability cannot be exploited, but this analysis is difficult and it is sometimes easier to simply update or fix the part.

    External dependencies are monitored through two automated mechanisms: Dependabot checks for known vulnerabilities daily and opens pull requests for updates, and npm audit runs on every CI build blocking merges when high-severity vulnerabilities are detected. Both are active on the repository.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST either:
    1. make it easy to identify and update reused externally-maintained components; or
    2. use the standard components provided by the system or programming language.
    Then, if a vulnerability is found in a reused component, it will be easy to update that component. [updateable_reused_components]
    A typical way to meet this criterion is to use system and programming language package management systems. Many FLOSS programs are distributed with "convenience libraries" that are local copies of standard libraries (possibly forked). By itself, that's fine. However, if the program *must* use these local (forked) copies, then updating the "standard" libraries as a security update will leave these additional copies still vulnerable. This is especially an issue for cloud-based systems; if the cloud provider updates their "standard" libraries but the program won't use them, then the updates don't actually help. See, e.g., "Chromium: Why it isn't in Fedora yet as a proper package" by Tom Callaway.

    All reused components are managed through npm and declared in package.json. Updating any dependency is a single command (npm update) or handled automatically by Dependabot pull requests. No vendored or forked copies of libraries exist in the repository — all dependencies are fetched from the npm registry.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD avoid using deprecated or obsolete functions and APIs where FLOSS alternatives are available in the set of technology it uses (its "technology stack") and to a supermajority of the users the project supports (so that users have ready access to the alternative). [interfaces_current]

    The project uses modern, current APIs throughout. ESLint's no-deprecated checking and astro check flag deprecated usage at the TypeScript level. All dependencies are kept current via Dependabot. No deprecated browser APIs, Node.js APIs, or Astro APIs are knowingly used in the codebase.


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    An automated test suite MUST be applied on each check-in to a shared repository for at least one branch. This test suite MUST produce a report on test success or failure. [automated_integration_testing]
    This requirement can be viewed as a subset of test_continuous_integration, but focused on just testing, without requiring continuous integration.

    The CI pipeline runs automatically on every push and pull request to main. It executes npm test (type checker) and npm run lint (linter) and reports pass/failure as a required status check on every pull request. Results are visible in the GitHub Actions tab and block merging on failure.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST add regression tests to an automated test suite for at least 50% of the bugs fixed within the last six months. [regression_tests_added50]

    All code bugs fixed in the last six months were linting or type errors — caught by the automated test suite and permanently prevented from regression. The six ESLint issues fixed in ngo.js (unused variables, loose equality) are now caught by ESLint on every PR. The TypeScript error in CountdownTimer.ts is permanently caught by astro check. Both tools run on every check-in, making the fixes themselves act as regression tests. No fixed bug can be silently reintroduced without CI failing.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage80]
    Many FLOSS tools are available to measure test coverage, including gcov/lcov, Blanket.js, Istanbul, JCov, and covr (R). Note that meeting this criterion is not a guarantee that the test suite is thorough, instead, failing to meet this criterion is a strong indicator of a poor test suite.

    The software produced is a static website (HTML output), not a library. The JS files are small browser utility scripts without complex business logic. No FLOSS tool can measure coverage of classic browser scripts without module refactoring.


  • New functionality testing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a formal written policy that as major new functionality is added, tests for the new functionality MUST be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy_mandated]

    CONTRIBUTING.md contains the explicit policy: "when major new functionality is added, tests for that functionality must be added to the automated test suite before the PR is merged." This is a formal written requirement enforced through the mandatory PR review process.

    URL: https://github.com/countdowns-co/caribbean-countdowns/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include, in its documented instructions for change proposals, the policy that tests are to be added for major new functionality. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    in CONTRIBUTING.md under ## Tests and CI: "when major new functionality is added, tests for that functionality must be added to the automated test suite before the PR is merged."

    URL: https://github.com/countdowns-co/caribbean-countdowns/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#tests-and-ci


  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    ESLint is configured with no-undef as error (strict) and eqeqeq as error (strict). All warnings are already fixed, leaving zero issues. That demonstrates the project enforces strictness where practical.


 Security 13/13 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST implement secure design principles (from "know_secure_design"), where applicable. If the project is not producing software, select "not applicable" (N/A). [implement_secure_design]
    For example, the project results should have fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default). They should also have complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable). Note that in some cases principles will conflict, in which case a choice must be made (e.g., many mechanisms can make things more complex, contravening "economy of mechanism" / keep it simple).

    The project applies secure design principles throughout:

    • Fail-safe defaults — CSP blocks all inline scripts and non-origin resources by default; the site serves no dynamic content without explicit configuration
    • Economy of mechanism — fully static architecture with no server-side logic, no authentication system, no database; attack surface is minimal by design
    • Least privilege — the community API endpoint is read-only by default; write operations are rate-limited; CI credentials are scoped to deployment only
    • Complete mediation — all dependency changes go through automated audit before reaching production; all code changes require reviewed pull requests
    • Separation of privilege — data is separated from code (private storage at build time); secrets never enter the repository

  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    Static website, no cryptographic mechanisms in the project code.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD support multiple cryptographic algorithms, so users can quickly switch if one is broken. Common symmetric key algorithms include AES, Twofish, and Serpent. Common cryptographic hash algorithm alternatives include SHA-2 (including SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 AND SHA-512) and SHA-3. [crypto_algorithm_agility]

    The project does not implement cryptography. All TLS and transport security is handled entirely by the hosting and delivery infrastructure, outside the project's codebase. There are no cryptographic algorithms to select or switch between.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST support storing authentication credentials (such as passwords and dynamic tokens) and private cryptographic keys in files that are separate from other information (such as configuration files, databases, and logs), and permit users to update and replace them without code recompilation. If the project never processes authentication credentials and private cryptographic keys, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_credential_agility]

    The project does not process authentication credentials or private cryptographic keys. The site is fully static with no login system, no password storage, and no key management in the codebase.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 SHOULD be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    All network communications use HTTPS exclusively. Plain HTTP is rejected at the infrastructure level — requests are redirected to HTTPS automatically. TLS 1.2 or later is enforced; older SSL versions are disabled. No insecure protocols (FTP, HTTP, telnet) are supported or configurable.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    TLS 1.2 is the minimum version enforced across all connections. TLS 1.3 is supported and preferred. Older versions (SSL, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1) are disabled.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform TLS certificate verification by default when using TLS, including on subresources. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_certificate_verification]
    Note that incorrect TLS certificate verification is a common mistake. For more information, see "The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser Software" by Martin Georgiev et al. and "Do you trust this application?" by Michael Catanzaro.

    TLS certificate verification is handled by the browser for all connections, including subresources. The site makes no direct TLS connections in server-side code — there is no custom TLS implementation that could bypass certificate verification. The single API call (community stats endpoint) is a browser fetch() to an HTTPS URL, which enforces certificate verification by default with no option to disable it.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform certificate verification before sending HTTP headers with private information (such as secure cookies). If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_verification_private]

    The site sets no authentication cookies and transmits no private HTTP headers. There is no private information sent over HTTP headers — the site is fully public and unauthenticated


  • Secure release


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST cryptographically sign releases of the project results intended for widespread use, and there MUST be a documented process explaining to users how they can obtain the public signing keys and verify the signature(s). The private key for these signature(s) MUST NOT be on site(s) used to directly distribute the software to the public. If releases are not intended for widespread use, select "not applicable" (N/A). [signed_releases]
    The project results include both source code and any generated deliverables where applicable (e.g., executables, packages, and containers). Generated deliverables MAY be signed separately from source code. These MAY be implemented as signed git tags (using cryptographic digital signatures). Projects MAY provide generated results separately from tools like git, but in those cases, the separate results MUST be separately signed.

    The project produces a static website accessed via a URL — there are no downloadable releases, packages, executables, or artifacts intended for end-user installation. Users do not download or install the project results; they visit the live site in a browser. There is nothing to sign or verify from an end-user perspective.


    Barely enough for a badge.

    It is SUGGESTED that in the version control system, each important version tag (a tag that is part of a major release, minor release, or fixes publicly noted vulnerabilities) be cryptographically signed and verifiable as described in signed_releases. [version_tags_signed]

    Version tags are not currently GPG-signed. The project uses lightweight git tags for releases. Cryptographic signing of version tags is tracked in the project backlog.


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST check all inputs from potentially untrusted sources to ensure they are valid (an *allowlist*), and reject invalid inputs, if there are any restrictions on the data at all. [input_validation]
    Note that comparing input against a list of "bad formats" (aka a *denylist*) is normally not enough, because attackers can often work around a denylist. In particular, numbers are converted into internal formats and then checked if they are between their minimum and maximum (inclusive), and text strings are checked to ensure that they are valid text patterns (e.g., valid UTF-8, length, syntax, etc.). Some data may need to be "anything at all" (e.g., a file uploader), but these would typically be rare.

    The project's only server-side input point is the community stats API. It validates all untrusted input with an allowlist approach:

    • The URL pathname is checked exactly (/api/ngo-stats) — all other paths return 404
    • Only GET and POST methods are accepted — all others return 405
    • The POST body is parsed as JSON; malformed JSON returns 400
    • The contribution value is clamped to a valid numeric range (0–5) using Math.max/Math.min, with parseFloat defaulting to 0 for non-numeric input
    • The cumulative progress is hard-capped at 94

    The static site itself accepts no runtime user input. The suggest-event wizard is client-side only and generates no server-side request.


    Enough for a badge!

    Hardening mechanisms SHOULD be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. [hardening]
    Hardening mechanisms may include HTTP headers like Content Security Policy (CSP), compiler flags to mitigate attacks (such as -fstack-protector), or compiler flags to eliminate undefined behavior. For our purposes least privilege is not considered a hardening mechanism (least privilege is important, but separate).

    The site applies a comprehensive set of HTTP hardening headers on every response: Content Security Policy (script-src 'self' blocking all inline scripts and external script sources), HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS), X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, X-Frame-Options: DENY, and Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin. The CSP is the primary hardening control — it makes XSS defects unexploitable by preventing inline script execution entirely. No native binaries are produced so compiler hardening flags are not applicable.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide an assurance case that justifies why its security requirements are met. The assurance case MUST include: a description of the threat model, clear identification of trust boundaries, an argument that secure design principles have been applied, and an argument that common implementation security weaknesses have been countered. (URL required) [assurance_case]
    An assurance case is "a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a specified set of critical claims regarding a system’s properties are adequately justified for a given application in a given environment" ("Software Assurance Using Structured Assurance Case Models", Thomas Rhodes et al, NIST Interagency Report 7608). Trust boundaries are boundaries where data or execution changes its level of trust, e.g., a server's boundaries in a typical web application. It's common to list secure design principles (such as Saltzer and Schroeer) and common implementation security weaknesses (such as the OWASP top 10 or CWE/SANS top 25), and show how each are countered. The BadgeApp assurance case may be a useful example. This is related to documentation_security, documentation_architecture, and implement_secure_design.

    SECURITY.md contains a complete assurance case covering: threat model (web attacks, supply chain compromise, data tampering, denial of service), trust boundaries (five boundaries identified with descriptions), secure design principles applied (fail-safe defaults, economy of mechanism, least privilege, separation of privilege, complete mediation), and a countermeasure mapping against all ten OWASP Top 10 categories.

    URL: https://github.com/countdowns-co/caribbean-countdowns/blob/main/SECURITY.md


 Analysis 2/2 ●

  • Static code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one static analysis tool with rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    ESLint's no-undef rule catches undefined variables (a common source of unintended global state and injection-adjacent bugs), and eqeqeq enforces strict equality to prevent type coercion vulnerabilities.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) MUST be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    The project is written in JavaScript/TypeScript and Astro. No memory-unsafe languages are used.



This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit mangroroot and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: mangroroot.
Entry created on 2026-05-20 00:20:05 UTC, last updated on 2026-05-23 21:34:29 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-05-23 19:39:11 UTC.