pam-approver

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Baseline Level 2 criteria. These are criteria version v2026.02.19.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Mobile-friendly approver UI for Google Cloud Privileged Access Manager (PAM).

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

    Mobile-friendly, backend-less approver UI for Google Cloud Privileged Access Manager (PAM); a static SPA that calls the PAM API directly from the browser.

 Controls 18/19 ●

  • Controls


    Enough for a badge!

    When a CI/CD task is executed with no permissions specified, the CI/CD system MUST default the task's permissions to the lowest permissions granted in the pipeline. [OSPS-AC-04.01]
    Configure the project's settings to assign the lowest available permissions to new pipelines by default, granting additional permissions only when necessary for specific tasks.

    The repository's default GitHub Actions token permission is set to read-only (default_workflow_permissions: read, with can_approve_pull_request_reviews: false), so any task executed without explicit permissions defaults to the lowest level rather than write. In addition, every workflow declares least privilege explicitly: cd.yml, release-drafter.yml, and scorecard.yml set top-level permissions: {} (deny-all) and grant only the specific scopes each job needs, and tailwind-update.yml defaults to contents: read. See https://github.com/schack/pam-approver/blob/main/.github/workflows/cd.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    When an official release is created, that release MUST be assigned a unique version identifier. [OSPS-BR-02.01]
    Assign a unique version identifier to each release produced by the project, following a consistent naming convention or numbering scheme. Examples include SemVer, CalVer, or git commit id.

    Enough for a badge!

    When an official release is created, that release MUST contain a descriptive log of functional and security modifications. [OSPS-BR-04.01]
    Ensure that all releases include a descriptive change log. It is recommended to ensure that the change log is human-readable and includes details beyond commit messages, such as descriptions of the security impact or relevance to different use cases. To ensure machine readability, place the content under a markdown header such as "## Changelog".

    Every official release is assigned a unique CalVer identifier of the form YEAR.MONTH.SEQUENCE (e.g. 2026.6.0). The version is computed automatically from existing tags so each release gets a distinct, non-reused number, and the scheme is documented in CONTRIBUTING.md "Releases". Released git tags and container image tags carry that identifier. See https://github.com/schack/pam-approver/releases


    Enough for a badge!

    When a build and release pipeline ingests dependencies, it MUST use standardized tooling where available. [OSPS-BR-05.01]
    Use a common tooling for your ecosystem, such as package managers or dependency management tools to ingest dependencies at build time. This may include using a dependency file, lock file, or manifest to specify the required dependencies, which are then pulled in by the build system.

    The pipeline ingests dependencies with standardized tooling where available: ▎ - Container base images (nginx, Debian) are pulled via standard Docker/BuildKit (FROM + multi-arch buildx), pinned by tag and digest. ▎ - GitHub Actions are consumed via the native uses: mechanism, pinned by commit SHA, and tracked for updates by Dependabot (.github/dependabot.yml). ▎ - There are no language-package runtime dependencies to ingest (the app ships zero npm dependencies by design), so no package-manager install step is needed. ▎ - The single standalone tool, the Tailwind CSS CLI, has no suitable package-manager distribution for this use, so it is fetched over HTTPS from its official GitHub release and verified against the publisher's sha256sums.txt (and re-verified in the Dockerfile with sha256sum -c) before use.


    Enough for a badge!

    When an official release is created, that release MUST be signed or accounted for in a signed manifest including each asset's cryptographic hashes. [OSPS-BR-06.01]
    Sign all released software assets at build time with a cryptographic signature or attestations, such as GPG or PGP signature, Sigstore signatures, SLSA provenance, or SLSA VSAs. Include the cryptographic hashes of each asset in a signed manifest or metadata file.

    Every official release's container image is signed with Sigstore cosign (keyless, via GitHub OIDC). The signature is applied to the multi-arch image index digest, and that OCI manifest accounts for each asset (per-architecture manifests and layers) by its SHA-256 digest, so the signed object cryptographically covers every component. Releases also ship SLSA provenance and an SBOM attestation. Verification steps are documented in SECURITY.md (https://github.com/schack/pam-approver/blob/main/SECURITY.md):


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include a description of how the project selects, obtains, and tracks its dependencies. [OSPS-DO-06.01]
    It is recommended to publish this information alongside the project's technical & design documentation on a publicly viewable resource such as the source code repository, project website, or other channel.

    The primary branch (main) is protected by a GitHub repository ruleset that requires a pull request and requires the test and build status checks (from .github/workflows/cd.yml) to pass before merging, with strict up-to-date enforcement and no bypass actors. Changes therefore cannot land on main unless the automated checks pass.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include instructions on how to build the software, including required libraries, frameworks, SDKs, and dependencies. [OSPS-DO-07.01]
    It is recommended to publish this information alongside the project's contributor documentation, such as in CONTRIBUTING.md or other developer task documentation. This may also be documented using Makefile targets or other automation scripts.

    The software builds with a single command using Docker, which is the only required tool. docker build . (or docker compose up --build, README "Run locally": https://github.com/schack/pam-approver#run-locally) builds the image. All libraries, frameworks, and SDKs are fetched and version-pinned inside the multi-stage Dockerfile (https://github.com/schack/pam-approver/blob/main/Dockerfile) — the Tailwind CSS standalone CLI (downloaded and SHA-256 verified) and the nginx base image — so nothing needs manual installation. The build runs in CI on every PR (.github/workflows/cd.yml) and the Dockerfile is hadolint-linted.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include a list of project members with access to sensitive resources. [OSPS-GV-01.01]
    Document project participants and their roles through such artifacts as members.md, governance.md, maintainers.md, or similar file within the source code repository of the project. This may be as simple as including names or account handles in a list of maintainers, or more complex depending on the project's governance.

    pam-approver is a single-maintainer project. SECURITY.md lists the sole member with access to sensitive resources (Henrik Schack, @schack), who holds GitHub repository admin and GHCR package publish access, and documents that there are no long-lived secrets or signing keys to manage (keyless OIDC signing via cosign, a public OAuth client ID, and no stored client secret or deployment credential). See https://github.com/schack/pam-approver/blob/main/SECURITY.md#maintainers-and-access-to-sensitive-resources


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include descriptions of the roles and responsibilities for members of the project. [OSPS-GV-01.02]
    Document project participants and their roles through such artifacts as members.md, governance.md, maintainers.md, or similar file within the source code repository of the project.

    SECURITY.md documents the roles and responsibilities. As the sole maintainer, Henrik Schack (@schack) is responsible for reviewing and merging pull requests, cutting and signing releases, keeping dependencies current, and triaging and resolving bug and security reports, with no other members or delegated roles at this time. See https://github.com/schack/pam-approver/blob/main/SECURITY.md#maintainers-and-access-to-sensitive-resources


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include a guide for code contributors that includes requirements for acceptable contributions. [OSPS-GV-03.02]
    Extend the CONTRIBUTING.md or CONTRIBUTING/ contents in the project documentation to outline the requirements for acceptable contributions, including coding standards, testing requirements, and submission guidelines for code contributors. It is recommended that this guide is the source of truth for both contributors and approvers.

    https://github.com/schack/pam-approver/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md [contribution_requirements]


    Not enough for a badge.

    While active, the version control system MUST require all code contributors to assert that they are legally authorized to make the associated contributions on every commit. [OSPS-LE-01.01]
    Include a DCO in the project's repository, requiring code contributors to assert that they are legally authorized to commit the associated contributions on every commit. Use a status check to ensure the assertion is made. A CLA also satisfies this requirement. Some version control systems, such as GitHub, may include this in the platform terms of service.

    Not currently enforced. pam-approver is a single-maintainer project: every human commit is authored by the maintainer, who is the copyright holder, so there is no third-party contribution whose legal provenance is in question. The remaining commits on the branch are automated (Dependabot, the Tailwind-update workflow, and release-drafter), which cannot meaningfully assert a DCO. No DCO or CLA sign-off requirement is in place today; one would be added before accepting external code contributions.


    Enough for a badge!

    When a commit is made to the primary branch, any automated status checks for commits MUST pass or be manually bypassed. [OSPS-QA-03.01]
    Configure the project's version control system to require that all automated status checks pass or require manual acknowledgement before a commit can be merged into the primary branch. It is recommended that any optional status checks are NOT configured as a pass or fail requirement that approvers may be tempted to bypass.

    The primary branch (main) is protected by a GitHub repository ruleset that requires a pull request plus passing test and build status checks (from .github/workflows/cd.yml) before any change can merge, with strict up-to-date enforcement and no bypass actors. Status checks must pass for a change to land on main.


    Enough for a badge!

    Prior to a commit being accepted, the project's CI/CD pipelines MUST run at least one automated test suite to ensure the changes meet expectations. [OSPS-QA-06.01]
    Automated tests should be run prior to every merge into the primary branch. The test suite should be run in a CI/CD pipeline and the results should be visible to all contributors. The test suite should be run in a consistent environment and should be run in a way that allows contributors to run the tests locally. Examples of test suites include unit tests, integration tests, and end-to-end tests.

    Every pull request runs the test job in .github/workflows/cd.yml before it can be merged: it runs the shell test suite (tests/entrypoint_test.sh), the JS unit tests (node --test over tests/app.test.js), and the container header tests (tests/nginx_headers_test.sh), plus hadolint and shellcheck. The build job depends on test, and both are required status checks in the main branch ruleset, so no change is accepted to the primary branch unless the automated test suite passes.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include design documentation demonstrating all actions and actors within the system. [OSPS-SA-01.01]
    Include designs in the project documentation that explains the actions and actors. Actors include any subsystem or entity that can influence another segment in the system. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    The README "How it fits together" section (https://github.com/schack/pam-approver#how-it-fits-together) documents the design with an architecture diagram and describes all actors and data flows: the approver (browser), IAP (gateway in front of the static nginx pod), Google Identity Services (browser-based OAuth), the Google PAM REST API (called directly from the browser with a Bearer token), and Google IAM (which enforces per-user authorization). The actions are documented too: sign in, list entitlements/pending grants, and approve or deny with a reason ("Approving grants" section). SECURITY.md "Security model" further documents the actors, the token flow, and the trust boundaries. Given there is no backend and no server-side state, these cover the full set of actors and actions in the system.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include descriptions of all external software interfaces of the released software assets. [OSPS-SA-02.01]
    Document all software interfaces (APIs) of the released software assets, explaining how users can interact with the software and what data is expected or produced. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    https://github.com/schack/pam-approver#required-environment
    https://github.com/schack/pam-approver#how-it-fits-together [documentation_interface]


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project MUST perform a security assessment to understand the most likely and impactful potential security problems that could occur within the software. [OSPS-SA-03.01]
    Performing a security assessment informs both project members as well as downstream consumers that the project understands what problems could arise within the software. Understanding what threats could be realized helps the project manage and address risk. This information is useful to downstream consumers to demonstrate the security acumen and practices of the project. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    A security assessment of the system is documented across SECURITY.md "Security model" (https://github.com/schack/pam-approver/blob/main/SECURITY.md) and the README "Security posture" section (https://github.com/schack/pam-approver#security-posture). Because the app is a static single-page app with no backend, the most likely and impactful risks are identified and mitigated: client-side XSS (strict CSP with no unsafe-inline, output via textContent), credential exposure (no client secret or refresh tokens, public OAuth client ID, access token kept only in the browser and never written to the image), clickjacking (frame-ancestors none, X-Frame-Options DENY), authorization bypass (enforced by Google IAM on the PAM API, not the app, plus OAuth hd domain checks), injection into the rendered config.js (entrypoint.sh validates env values), and supply-chain risk (pinned/digest-locked dependencies, SBOM, cosign-signed images, Dependabot, Trivy/Scorecard scanning).


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include a policy for coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD), with a clear timeframe for response. [OSPS-VM-01.01]
    Create a SECURITY.md file at the root of the directory, outlining the project's policy for coordinated vulnerability disclosure. Include a method for reporting vulnerabilities. Set expectations for how the project will respond and address reported issues.

    SECURITY.md documents a coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy (https://github.com/schack/pam-approver/blob/main/SECURITY.md#reporting-a-vulnerability): vulnerabilities are reported privately via GitHub private vulnerability reporting or email (not public issues); the maintainer acknowledges within a few days; and once a fix is available a new image is published and the advisory is disclosed. This is coordinated (private until a fix ships) with a stated response timeframe.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST provide a means for private vulnerability reporting directly to the security contacts within the project. [OSPS-VM-03.01]
    Provide a means for security researchers to report vulnerabilities privately to the project. This may be a dedicated email address, a web form, VCS specialized tools, email addresses for security contacts, or other methods.

    SECURITY.md provides two private reporting channels directly to the security contact (https://github.com/schack/pam-approver/blob/main/SECURITY.md#reporting-a-vulnerability): GitHub private vulnerability reporting via the repository Security tab (enabled on the repo, so "Report a vulnerability" → https://github.com/schack/pam-approver/security/advisories/new works), and email to the maintainer at henrik@schack.dk. Reporters are explicitly asked not to open public issues.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST publicly publish data about discovered vulnerabilities. [OSPS-VM-04.01]
    Provide information about known vulnerabilities in a predictable public channel, such as a CVE entry, blog post, or other medium. To the degree possible, this information should include affected version(s), how a consumer can determine if they are vulnerable, and instructions for mitigation or remediation.

    SECURITY.md states that once a fix is available, a new image is published and the advisory is disclosed (https://github.com/schack/pam-approver/blob/main/SECURITY.md#reporting-a-vulnerability). Disclosure uses GitHub Security Advisories on the repository, which are public, receive a GHSA identifier, and are syndicated to the GitHub Advisory Database. No vulnerabilities have been discovered to date, so none have needed publishing yet, but the channel (GitHub Security Advisories) and the documented practice to disclose after a fix are in place.



This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Henrik Schack and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Henrik Schack.
Entry created on 2026-06-23 19:20:33 UTC, last updated on 2026-06-27 03:40:02 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-06-27 03:40:02 UTC.