.github

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 14058 is passing Here is how to embed it:
You can show your badge status by embedding this in your markdown file:
[![OpenSSF Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14058/badge)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14058)
or by embedding this in your HTML:
<a href="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14058"><img src="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14058/badge"></a>


These are the Silver level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 17/17 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Shared workflows, community health files and org profile for Monumental Archive

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

  • Prerequisites


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST achieve a passing level badge. [achieve_passing]

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    CONTRIBUTING.md's 'Requirements for acceptable contributions' section: every change arrives by pull request, must pass mise run ci (the coding standard in executable form), uses Conventional Commits with imperative lowercase subjects, and is squash-merged. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • Project oversight


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD have a legal mechanism where all developers of non-trivial amounts of project software assert that they are legally authorized to make these contributions. The most common and easily-implemented approach for doing this is by using a Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO), where users add "signed-off-by" in their commits and the project links to the DCO website. However, this MAY be implemented as a Contributor License Agreement (CLA), or other legal mechanism. (URL required) [dco]
    The DCO is the recommended mechanism because it's easy to implement, tracked in the source code, and git directly supports a "signed-off" feature using "commit -s". To be most effective it is best if the project documentation explains what "signed-off" means for that project. A CLA is a legal agreement that defines the terms under which intellectual works have been licensed to an organization or project. A contributor assignment agreement (CAA) is a legal agreement that transfers rights in an intellectual work to another party; projects are not required to have CAAs, since having CAA increases the risk that potential contributors will not contribute, especially if the receiver is a for-profit organization. The Apache Software Foundation CLAs (the individual contributor license and the corporate CLA) are examples of CLAs, for projects which determine that the risks of these kinds of CLAs to the project are less than their benefits.

    Developer Certificate of Origin 1.1. Every commit must carry Signed-off-by; the commit-msg hook catches it locally and lint:dco enforces it in the gate, with no exemption list — the release commit and Renovate sign off too. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and document its project governance model (the way it makes decisions, including key roles). (URL required) [governance]
    There needs to be some well-established documented way to make decisions and resolve disputes. In small projects, this may be as simple as "the project owner and lead makes all final decisions". There are various governance models, including benevolent dictator and formal meritocracy; for more details, see Governance models. Both centralized (e.g., single-maintainer) and decentralized (e.g., group maintainers) approaches have been successfully used in projects. The governance information does not need to document the possibility of creating a project fork, since that is always possible for FLOSS projects.

    GOVERNANCE.md documents the decision model explicitly rather than aspirationally: one maintainer deciding in the open, significant decisions made in writing and in public before they are implemented (the docs-first standup, recorded as issues and pull requests), declined paths recorded with reasons so they are re-litigated against the record, and a written succession plan. It is served from the organisation's .github repository as a default community health file, so it governs every repository that does not carry its own. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST adopt a code of conduct and post it in a standard location. (URL required) [code_of_conduct]
    Projects may be able to improve the civility of their community and to set expectations about acceptable conduct by adopting a code of conduct. This can help avoid problems before they occur and make the project a more welcoming place to encourage contributions. This should focus only on behavior within the community/workplace of the project. Example codes of conduct are the Linux kernel code of conduct, the Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct, the Debian Code of Conduct, the Ubuntu Code of Conduct, the Fedora Code of Conduct, the GNOME Code Of Conduct, the KDE Community Code of Conduct, the Python Community Code of Conduct, The Ruby Community Conduct Guideline, and The Rust Code of Conduct.

    CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md at the repository root, in the standard location, and served as the organisation default to every repository in the org. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and publicly document the key roles in the project and their responsibilities, including any tasks those roles must perform. It MUST be clear who has which role(s), though this might not be documented in the same way. (URL required) [roles_responsibilities]
    The documentation for governance and roles and responsibilities may be in one place.

    GOVERNANCE.md carries a 'Roles and responsibilities' table naming three roles - maintainer/owner, contributor, automation - and what each is responsible for. Who holds the maintainer role is unambiguous: the @monumental-archive/owners team, which CODEOWNERS routes every review to in every repository, and joining that team is what becoming a maintainer concretely means. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#roles-and-responsibilities


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to continue with minimal interruption if any one person dies, is incapacitated, or is otherwise unable or unwilling to continue support of the project. In particular, the project MUST be able to create and close issues, accept proposed changes, and release versions of software, within a week of confirmation of the loss of support from any one individual. This MAY be done by ensuring someone else has any necessary keys, passwords, and legal rights to continue the project. Individuals who run a FLOSS project MAY do this by providing keys in a lockbox and a will providing any needed legal rights (e.g., for DNS names). (URL required) [access_continuity]

    docs/continuity.md is exactly this document: assets and their recovery paths, a break-glass procedure for the tag-minting App, a succession plan, and an explicit list of deliberate single points of failure. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/docs/continuity.md


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The project SHOULD have a "bus factor" of 2 or more. (URL required) [bus_factor]
    A "bus factor" (aka "truck factor") is the minimum number of project members that have to suddenly disappear from a project ("hit by a bus") before the project stalls due to lack of knowledgeable or competent personnel. The truck-factor tool can estimate this for projects on GitHub. For more information, see Assessing the Bus Factor of Git Repositories by Cosentino et al.

    The bus factor is 1 — a single maintainer. Recorded plainly in docs/slsa-reference.md as headcount-blocked, with docs/continuity.md carrying the succession and break-glass paths that exist precisely because of it. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/docs/continuity.md


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented roadmap that describes what the project intends to do and not do for at least the next year. (URL required) [documentation_roadmap]
    The project might not achieve the roadmap, and that's fine; the purpose of the roadmap is to help potential users and contributors understand the intended direction of the project. It need not be detailed.

    docs/direction.md is the roadmap and it is unusually explicit about what the project will NOT do: a target table naming the level intended on each SLSA track, the claims policy, and the deliberate ceilings (BuildEnv is held at L0 by choice, Gold-level criteria are not claimed while there is one maintainer). Open items are tracked as issues and the table is the first thing a closing issue updates. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/docs/direction.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include documentation of the architecture (aka high-level design) of the software produced by the project. If the project does not produce software, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [documentation_architecture]
    A software architecture explains a program's fundamental structures, i.e., the program's major components, the relationships among them, and the key properties of these components and relationships.

    The architecture is documented as five layers (GitHub-magic content, the toolbelt, the task contract, the shared workflows, settings-as-code) in CLAUDE.md and README.md, with per-track designs in docs/build-track.md, docs/source-track.md and docs/dependency-track.md and the pipeline specification in docs/release.md. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/docs/release.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST document what the user can and cannot expect in terms of security from the software produced by the project (its "security requirements"). (URL required) [documentation_security]
    These are the security requirements that the software is intended to meet.

    SECURITY.md states what users may expect (private reporting, 14-day acknowledgement, scope), and docs/slsa-reference.md plus docs/build-assessment.md and docs/source-assessment.md state the security properties claimed and, just as explicitly, the ones not claimed and why. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/docs/slsa-reference.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a "quick start" guide for new users to help them quickly do something with the software. (URL required) [documentation_quick_start]
    The idea is to show users how to get started and make the software do anything at all. This is critically important for potential users to get started.

    README.md's 'Notes for consumers' is the quick start: copy four files from scaffold/, add about six lines of workflow calling the shared gate, then mise trust && mise install and mise run ci. docs/runbook.md carries the longer wiring sequence. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/README.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST make an effort to keep the documentation consistent with the current version of the project results (including software produced by the project). Any known documentation defects making it inconsistent MUST be fixed. If the documentation is generally current, but erroneously includes some older information that is no longer true, just treat that as a defect, then track and fix as usual. [documentation_current]
    The documentation MAY include information about differences or changes between versions of the software and/or link to older versions of the documentation. The intent of this criterion is that an effort is made to keep the documentation consistent, not that the documentation must be perfect.

    Documentation is kept current by rule and by gate: docs are updated in the same pull request as the change, docs/direction.md is the single table a closing issue must update, and the scheduled audit re-checks link liveness and settings drift so stale documentation surfaces on a cadence.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project repository front page and/or website MUST identify and hyperlink to any achievements, including this best practices badge, within 48 hours of public recognition that the achievement has been attained. (URL required) [documentation_achievements]
    An achievement is any set of external criteria that the project has specifically worked to meet, including some badges. This information does not need to be on the project website front page. A project using GitHub can put achievements on the repository front page by adding them to the README file.

    The README front page carries a derived badge block linking every achievement: OpenSSF Scorecard, the three SLSA track levels, REUSE compliance, the archived DOI, and this best-practices badge. The block is rendered by mise run fix:badges from the repository's own facts and a lint fails the build if it drifts. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/README.md


  • Accessibility and internationalization


    Enough for a badge!

    The project (both project sites and project results) SHOULD follow accessibility best practices so that persons with disabilities can still participate in the project and use the project results where it is reasonable to do so. [accessibility_best_practices]
    For web applications, see the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG 2.0) and its supporting document Understanding WCAG 2.0; see also W3C accessibility information. For GUI applications, consider using the environment-specific accessibility guidelines (such as Gnome, KDE, XFCE, Android, iOS, Mac, and Windows). Some TUI applications (e.g. `ncurses` programs) can do certain things to make themselves more accessible (such as `alpine`'s `force-arrow-cursor` setting). Most command-line applications are fairly accessible as-is. This criterion is often N/A, e.g., for program libraries. Here are some examples of actions to take or issues to consider:
    • Provide text alternatives for any non-text content so that it can be changed into other forms people need, such as large print, braille, speech, symbols or simpler language ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.1)
    • Color is not used as the only visual means of conveying information, indicating an action, prompting a response, or distinguishing a visual element. ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.1)
    • The visual presentation of text and images of text has a contrast ratio of at least 4.5:1, except for large text, incidental text, and logotypes ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.3)
    • Make all functionality available from a keyboard (WCAG guideline 2.1)
    • A GUI or web-based project SHOULD test with at least one screen-reader on the target platform(s) (e.g. NVDA, Jaws, or WindowEyes on Windows; VoiceOver on Mac & iOS; Orca on Linux/BSD; TalkBack on Android). TUI programs MAY work to reduce overdraw to prevent redundant reading by screen-readers.

    The project has no bespoke website: documentation is plain Markdown rendered by GitHub, which is keyboard-navigable and screen-reader friendly, and the content is text with descriptive link text rather than images carrying meaning.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD be internationalized to enable easy localization for the target audience's culture, region, or language. If internationalization (i18n) does not apply (e.g., the software doesn't generate text intended for end-users and doesn't sort human-readable text), select "not applicable" (N/A). [internationalization]
    Localization "refers to the adaptation of a product, application or document content to meet the language, cultural and other requirements of a specific target market (a locale)." Internationalization is the "design and development of a product, application or document content that enables easy localization for target audiences that vary in culture, region, or language." (See W3C's "Localization vs. Internationalization".) Software meets this criterion simply by being internationalized. No localization for another specific language is required, since once software has been internationalized it's possible for others to work on localization.

    The software produced is shell tasks, workflows and configuration; it emits maintainer-facing diagnostics only and has no end-user interface strings to localise.


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    If the project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) store passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). If the project sites do not store passwords for this purpose, select "not applicable" (N/A). [sites_password_security]
    Note that the use of GitHub meets this criterion. This criterion only applies to passwords used for authentication of external users into the project sites (aka inbound authentication). If the project sites must log in to other sites (aka outbound authentication), they may need to store authorization tokens for that purpose differently (since storing a hash would be useless). This applies criterion crypto_password_storage to the project sites, similar to sites_https.

    The project sites are GitHub; the project stores no passwords of its own.


 Change Control 1/1 ●

  • Previous versions


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST maintain the most often used older versions of the product or provide an upgrade path to newer versions. If the upgrade path is difficult, the project MUST document how to perform the upgrade (e.g., the interfaces that have changed and detailed suggested steps to help upgrade). [maintenance_or_update]

    Consumers pin this repository by tag or commit SHA and move at their own pace; MAINTENANCE.md documents the versioned surface, what a release means and what may change between versions, and Renovate opens the upgrade pull request for every consumer automatically. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/MAINTENANCE.md


 Reporting 3/3 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    GitHub Issues, used for every individual issue. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/issues


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST give credit to the reporter(s) of all vulnerability reports resolved in the last 12 months, except for the reporter(s) who request anonymity. If there have been no vulnerabilities resolved in the last 12 months, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [vulnerability_report_credit]

    No vulnerability report has been resolved in the last 12 months, so there is no reporter to credit. SECURITY.md commits to crediting reporters who do not request anonymity.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented process for responding to vulnerability reports. (URL required) [vulnerability_response_process]
    This is strongly related to vulnerability_report_process, which requires that there be a documented way to report vulnerabilities. It also related to vulnerability_report_response, which requires response to vulnerability reports within a certain time frame.

    SECURITY.md documents the process end to end: private reporting through the repository's Security tab, acknowledgement within 14 days, what to expect afterwards, and the scope. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/SECURITY.md


 Quality 17/19 ●

  • Coding standards


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST identify the specific coding style guides for the primary languages it uses, and require that contributions generally comply with it. (URL required) [coding_standards]
    In most cases this is done by referring to some existing style guide(s), possibly listing differences. These style guides can include ways to improve readability and ways to reduce the likelihood of defects (including vulnerabilities). Many programming languages have one or more widely-used style guides. Examples of style guides include Google's style guides and SEI CERT Coding Standards.

    CONTRIBUTING.md names the gate as the coding standard in executable form, and the standards are specific per language: shellcheck for shell (with bash pinned by [task_config] shell because Ubuntu's sh is dash), actionlint and zizmor for workflow YAML, rumdl for Markdown, typos for spelling with the locale registers written down, and Conventional Commits with a 72-column subject ceiling. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST automatically enforce its selected coding style(s) if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can do so in the selected language(s). [coding_standards_enforced]
    This MAY be implemented using static analysis tool(s) and/or by forcing the code through code reformatters. In many cases the tool configuration is included in the project's repository (since different projects may choose different configurations). Projects MAY allow style exceptions (and typically will); where exceptions occur, they MUST be rare and documented in the code at their locations, so that these exceptions can be reviewed and so that tools can automatically handle them in the future. Examples of such tools include ESLint (JavaScript), Rubocop (Ruby), and devtools check (R).

    Automatically, in the gate: shellcheck, actionlint, zizmor, rumdl, typos and committed all run in mise run ci on every pull request, and fix:* siblings apply the machine-fixable subset. Style is never a review comment here.


  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    Build systems for native binaries MUST honor the relevant compiler and linker (environment) variables passed in to them (e.g., CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS, and LDFLAGS) and pass them to compiler and linker invocations. A build system MAY extend them with additional flags; it MUST NOT simply replace provided values with its own. If no native binaries are being generated, select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_standard_variables]
    It should be easy to enable special build features like Address Sanitizer (ASAN), or to comply with distribution hardening best practices (e.g., by easily turning on compiler flags to do so).

    The criterion's own N/A condition applies verbatim: no native binaries are generated. The only build in the project produces a source tarball (build-source-archive.yml), so there is no compiler or linker invocation for CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS or LDFLAGS to be passed to or replaced.


    Enough for a badge!

    The build and installation system SHOULD preserve debugging information if they are requested in the relevant flags (e.g., "install -s" is not used). If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_preserve_debug]
    E.G., setting CFLAGS (C) or CXXFLAGS (C++) should create the relevant debugging information if those languages are used, and they should not be stripped during installation. Debugging information is needed for support and analysis, and also useful for measuring the presence of hardening features in the compiled binaries.

    Nothing is compiled, so there is no debugging information to preserve or strip. The project's only build produces a source tarball of text files (github-<version>.tar.gz, verified bit for bit under build_repeatable), and there is no end-user installation system that could strip anything.


    Enough for a badge!

    The build system for the software produced by the project MUST NOT recursively build subdirectories if there are cross-dependencies in the subdirectories. If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_non_recursive]
    The project build system's internal dependency information needs to be accurate, otherwise, changes to the project may not build correctly. Incorrect builds can lead to defects (including vulnerabilities). A common mistake in large build systems is to use a "recursive build" or "recursive make", that is, a hierarchy of subdirectories containing source files, where each subdirectory is independently built. Unless each subdirectory is fully independent, this is a mistake, because the dependency information is incorrect.

    The project's only build is single-pass and has no subdirectories to recurse into: build-source-archive.yml produces one source tarball in one step, so there are no cross-directory dependencies that a recursive build could order wrongly.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to repeat the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_repeatable]
    GCC and clang users may find the -frandom-seed option useful; in some cases, this can be resolved by forcing some sort order. More suggestions can be found at the reproducible build site.

    Building does occur, and it is verified bit for bit on every release. This repository publishes the source-archive class, so publish.yml runs build-source and repro-build-source as two independent builds and the repro gate compares their outputs (check source-archive) before anything is signed or attached — a mismatch fails the release. Verified on the live release: v1.22.2 ships github-1.22.2.tar.gz with checksums.txt, an SPDX SBOM and an attestations.intoto.jsonl bundle. A scheduled repro-check also re-verifies published history from cold.


  • Installation system


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way to easily install and uninstall the software produced by the project using a commonly-used convention. [installation_common]
    Examples include using a package manager (at the system or language level), "make install/uninstall" (supporting DESTDIR), a container in a standard format, or a virtual machine image in a standard format. The installation and uninstallation process (e.g., its packaging) MAY be implemented by a third party as long as it is FLOSS.

    Consumption is one convention and one command: mise trust && mise install brings the pinned toolchain, and a consuming repository adopts the governance by copying scaffold/ and calling the shared workflow by SHA. Nothing is installed system-wide and removal is deleting the pin.


    Enough for a badge!

    The installation system for end-users MUST honor standard conventions for selecting the location where built artifacts are written to at installation time. For example, if it installs files on a POSIX system it MUST honor the DESTDIR environment variable. If there is no installation system or no standard convention, select "not applicable" (N/A). [installation_standard_variables]

    There is no installation system for end users; tooling is installed into mise's own managed directory.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way for potential developers to quickly install all the project results and support environment necessary to make changes, including the tests and test environment. This MUST be performed with a commonly-used convention. [installation_development_quick]
    This MAY be implemented using a generated container and/or installation script(s). External dependencies would typically be installed by invoking system and/or language package manager(s), per external_dependencies.

    mise trust && mise install installs the entire pinned toolchain — every linter and tool the gate uses — from the lockfile, and mise run ci then runs exactly what CI runs. That is the whole developer setup. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • Externally-maintained components


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST list external dependencies in a computer-processable way. (URL required) [external_dependencies]
    Typically this is done using the conventions of package manager and/or build system. Note that this helps implement installation_development_quick.

    Machine-readable and pinned: mise/config.toml lists every tool with an exact version and mise.lock carries per-platform checksums; renovate.json drives automated updates; every uses: is pinned to a full commit SHA. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/mise/config.toml


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST monitor or periodically check their external dependencies (including convenience copies) to detect known vulnerabilities, and fix exploitable vulnerabilities or verify them as unexploitable. [dependency_monitoring]
    This can be done using an origin analyzer / dependency checking tool / software composition analysis tool such as OWASP's Dependency-Check, Sonatype's Nexus Auditor, Synopsys' Black Duck Software Composition Analysis, and Bundler-audit (for Ruby). Some package managers include mechanisms to do this. It is acceptable if the components' vulnerability cannot be exploited, but this analysis is difficult and it is sometimes easier to simply update or fix the part.

    Continuously: Renovate and Dependabot open updates as new versions and advisories land, trivy runs in the gate, and the dependency track records VEX decisions keyed by package and version with coverage derived rather than asserted. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/docs/dependency-track.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST either:
    1. make it easy to identify and update reused externally-maintained components; or
    2. use the standard components provided by the system or programming language.
    Then, if a vulnerability is found in a reused component, it will be easy to update that component. [updateable_reused_components]
    A typical way to meet this criterion is to use system and programming language package management systems. Many FLOSS programs are distributed with "convenience libraries" that are local copies of standard libraries (possibly forked). By itself, that's fine. However, if the program *must* use these local (forked) copies, then updating the "standard" libraries as a security update will leave these additional copies still vulnerable. This is especially an issue for cloud-based systems; if the cloud provider updates their "standard" libraries but the program won't use them, then the updates don't actually help. See, e.g., "Chromium: Why it isn't in Fedora yet as a proper package" by Tom Callaway.

    Every reused component is identified by exact version in mise/config.toml with checksums in mise.lock, and updating is a Renovate pull request that the gate verifies — including a lint that fails when a version moves without its lock entry.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD avoid using deprecated or obsolete functions and APIs where FLOSS alternatives are available in the set of technology it uses (its "technology stack") and to a supermajority of the users the project supports (so that users have ready access to the alternative). [interfaces_current]

    Dependencies are held at current versions by automated updates rather than allowed to drift, and actionlint fails the gate on deprecated GitHub Actions features, so obsolete interfaces surface as a red build rather than as rot.


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    An automated test suite MUST be applied on each check-in to a shared repository for at least one branch. This test suite MUST produce a report on test success or failure. [automated_integration_testing]
    This requirement can be viewed as a subset of test_continuous_integration, but focused on just testing, without requiring continuous integration.

    gate.yml runs on every push and every pull request to main and reports success or failure as a required check; it self-applies the same reusable workflow this project publishes to the organisation. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/.github/workflows/gate.yml


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST add regression tests to an automated test suite for at least 50% of the bugs fixed within the last six months. [regression_tests_added50]

    Not measured, so not claimed. In practice several recent fixes did ship with the check that would have caught them — the badge-block drift produced lint:badges, the signer pin produced lint:signer-pin — but there is no policy requiring it and no measurement of the proportion, and asserting 50% without measuring it would be a guess.


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage80]
    Many FLOSS tools are available to measure test coverage, including gcov/lcov, Blanket.js, Istanbul, JCov, and covr (R). Note that meeting this criterion is not a guarantee that the test suite is thorough, instead, failing to meet this criterion is a strong indicator of a poor test suite.

    Statement coverage is not measured for this repository and is not expected to be. The product is bash and YAML; no coverage tool meets this project's tooling priors for bash (kcov is source-only and Linux-only), a verdict recorded with its revisit trigger in docs/tooling-verdicts.md. The coverage ratchet the project ships is enforced in every consuming repository that has compiled code. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/docs/tooling-verdicts.md


  • New functionality testing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a formal written policy that as major new functionality is added, tests for the new functionality MUST be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy_mandated]

    CONTRIBUTING.md, 'Requirements for acceptable contributions' item 3, is the formal written policy: a change that adds or changes behaviour adds the check that holds it - a test that fails without the change where a test suite exists, and a lint, audit task or workflow assertion in configuration and policy repositories. It is stated as policy: the gate's checks are the specification, and functionality nothing enforces is functionality the next change may silently remove. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include, in its documented instructions for change proposals, the policy that tests are to be added for major new functionality. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    The policy is stated in the documented instructions for change proposals themselves: CONTRIBUTING.md, item 3 of 'Requirements for acceptable contributions' - a change that adds or changes behaviour adds the check that holds it, and a bug fix adds the case that reproduced the bug. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    Maximally strict by rule: CLAUDE.md requires tools enter the belt 'at maximum defensible enforcement', every task runs under set -euo pipefail, and linters are guarded only to skip where they genuinely do not apply — never to soften. Warnings fail the build.


 Security 13/13 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST implement secure design principles (from "know_secure_design"), where applicable. If the project is not producing software, select "not applicable" (N/A). [implement_secure_design]
    For example, the project results should have fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default). They should also have complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable). Note that in some cases principles will conflict, in which case a choice must be made (e.g., many mechanisms can make things more complex, contravening "economy of mechanism" / keep it simple).

    The design principles are implemented, not just known: least privilege on every workflow permission block; an enforced capability boundary that forbids id-token: write in any workflow that runs caller-supplied code, with a lint that fails the build if it appears; no long-lived publishing credentials anywhere, only keyless trusted publishing and OIDC; and complete mediation of the supply chain by SHA-pinning every action with checksums and attestations.


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    Integrity everywhere is SHA-256 — per-platform checksums in mise.lock, image digests, attestation subjects — and signing is Sigstore's ECDSA P-256. No MD5 or SHA-1 is relied on as a security mechanism.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD support multiple cryptographic algorithms, so users can quickly switch if one is broken. Common symmetric key algorithms include AES, Twofish, and Serpent. Common cryptographic hash algorithm alternatives include SHA-2 (including SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 AND SHA-512) and SHA-3. [crypto_algorithm_agility]

    The project implements no cryptography and selects no algorithms; where cryptography is used it is Sigstore's and GitHub's, whose algorithm choices the project does not control.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST support storing authentication credentials (such as passwords and dynamic tokens) and private cryptographic keys in files that are separate from other information (such as configuration files, databases, and logs), and permit users to update and replace them without code recompilation. If the project never processes authentication credentials and private cryptographic keys, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_credential_agility]

    The software stores no authentication credentials or private keys at all. Secrets live in GitHub environment and organisation secrets, never in files in the repository, and release signing uses ephemeral keys.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 SHOULD be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    All network communication is HTTPS — GitHub APIs, tool downloads, registry publishing, transparency-log submission. No insecure protocol appears anywhere in the tree, and certificate verification is never disabled.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    The software does not implement or configure TLS; it invokes tools (git, gh, curl) whose TLS versions are theirs.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform TLS certificate verification by default when using TLS, including on subresources. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_certificate_verification]
    Note that incorrect TLS certificate verification is a common mistake. For more information, see "The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser Software" by Martin Georgiev et al. and "Do you trust this application?" by Michael Catanzaro.

    Certificate verification is never disabled: there is no --insecure, -k, or GIT_SSL_NO_VERIFY anywhere in the tracked tree, so every HTTPS call made by the project verifies by default.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform certificate verification before sending HTTP headers with private information (such as secure cookies). If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_verification_private]

    The software implements no TLS client of its own and sends no HTTP headers carrying private information.


  • Secure release


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST cryptographically sign releases of the project results intended for widespread use, and there MUST be a documented process explaining to users how they can obtain the public signing keys and verify the signature(s). The private key for these signature(s) MUST NOT be on site(s) used to directly distribute the software to the public. If releases are not intended for widespread use, select "not applicable" (N/A). [signed_releases]
    The project results include both source code and any generated deliverables where applicable (e.g., executables, packages, and containers). Generated deliverables MAY be signed separately from source code. These MAY be implemented as signed git tags (using cryptographic digital signatures). Projects MAY provide generated results separately from tools like git, but in those cases, the separate results MUST be separately signed.

    Verified against the published release rather than asserted: v1.22.2 carries attestations.intoto.jsonl (the Sigstore evidence bundle) and checksums.txt alongside the archive and its SPDX SBOM. Signing is keyless — Sigstore/Fulcio with a Rekor transparency-log entry, no long-lived key — and docs/runbook.md documents verification from the consumer's position under 'Verifying as a consumer would'. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/releases/tag/v1.22.2


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that in the version control system, each important version tag (a tag that is part of a major release, minor release, or fixes publicly noted vulnerabilities) be cryptographically signed and verifiable as described in signed_releases. [version_tags_signed]

    Release tags are annotated tag objects signed with Sigstore keyless signing by the release workflow, and the signature travels in the tag object itself: v1.25.0 carries a PKCS#7 SIGNED MESSAGE whose Fulcio certificate binds the signature to .github/workflows/release.yml@refs/heads/main in this repository - the same workflow identity the release evidence bundle is verified against. GitHub's UI reports these tags unverified with reason 'no_user' because it resolves signatures to GitHub accounts, and a keyless workflow identity is not an account; verification is against the certificate's subject alternative name, as described in signed_releases.


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST check all inputs from potentially untrusted sources to ensure they are valid (an *allowlist*), and reject invalid inputs, if there are any restrictions on the data at all. [input_validation]
    Note that comparing input against a list of "bad formats" (aka a *denylist*) is normally not enough, because attackers can often work around a denylist. In particular, numbers are converted into internal formats and then checked if they are between their minimum and maximum (inclusive), and text strings are checked to ensure that they are valid text patterns (e.g., valid UTF-8, length, syntax, etc.). Some data may need to be "anything at all" (e.g., a file uploader), but these would typically be rare.

    The shared workflows validate their inputs against allowlists rather than trusting callers: the artifact classes: input accepts only a known set, the publish stub's filename and shape are checked by lint:release-stub, and workflow inputs that would otherwise be interpolated into shell are guarded — zizmor fails the gate on template-injection patterns.


    Enough for a badge!

    Hardening mechanisms SHOULD be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. [hardening]
    Hardening mechanisms may include HTTP headers like Content Security Policy (CSP), compiler flags to mitigate attacks (such as -fstack-protector), or compiler flags to eliminate undefined behavior. For our purposes least privilege is not considered a hardening mechanism (least privilege is important, but separate).

    Least-privilege permissions on every workflow; an enforced capability boundary forbidding id-token: write in any workflow that runs caller-supplied code, checked by lint:capability-boundary in the gate; every action pinned to a full commit SHA with checksums and attestations; keyless publishing with no standing credentials; secret scanning with push protection enforced organisation-wide. Each mechanism is written up control by control, against the threat it answers, in docs/build-assessment.md. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/docs/build-assessment.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide an assurance case that justifies why its security requirements are met. The assurance case MUST include: a description of the threat model, clear identification of trust boundaries, an argument that secure design principles have been applied, and an argument that common implementation security weaknesses have been countered. (URL required) [assurance_case]
    An assurance case is "a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a specified set of critical claims regarding a system’s properties are adequately justified for a given application in a given environment" ("Software Assurance Using Structured Assurance Case Models", Thomas Rhodes et al, NIST Interagency Report 7608). Trust boundaries are boundaries where data or execution changes its level of trust, e.g., a server's boundaries in a typical web application. It's common to list secure design principles (such as Saltzer and Schroeer) and common implementation security weaknesses (such as the OWASP top 10 or CWE/SANS top 25), and show how each are countered. The BadgeApp assurance case may be a useful example. This is related to documentation_security, documentation_architecture, and implement_secure_design.

    docs/release.md and docs/slsa-reference.md are the written assurance case, and docs/build-assessment.md and docs/source-assessment.md assess each claim against its evidence: the threat model (untrusted caller code reaching a privileged identity, unpinned supply-chain substitution, tampered artifacts), the countermeasures (the capability boundary, SHA pinning with checksums and attestations, keyless signing with transparency-log evidence), and an explicit record of what is NOT claimed. https://github.com/monumental-archive/.github/blob/main/docs/slsa-reference.md


 Analysis 2/2 ●

  • Static code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one static analysis tool with rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    zizmor is a vulnerability scanner specific to what this project produces — GitHub Actions workflows — covering template injection, excessive permissions, credential persistence and unpinned actions. CodeQL default setup is enforced organisation-wide and trivy adds misconfiguration and secret rules. All run in the gate on every pull request.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) MUST be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    No memory-unsafe language is used in this repository; it is shell, YAML and configuration. The belt ships a cargo-fuzz pair for the Rust repositories that consume it.



This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Carl Allen and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Carl Allen.
Entry created on 2026-08-13 07:47:41 UTC, last updated on 2026-08-13 19:08:33 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-08-13 08:01:08 UTC.