Artemis

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Gold level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Silver level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 3/5 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Artemis - Interactive Learning with Automated Feedback

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.
  • Prerequisites


    The project MUST achieve a silver level badge. [achieve_silver]

  • Project oversight


    The project MUST have a "bus factor" of 2 or more. (URL required) [bus_factor]
    A "bus factor" (aka "truck factor") is the minimum number of project members that have to suddenly disappear from a project ("hit by a bus") before the project stalls due to lack of knowledgeable or competent personnel. The truck-factor tool can estimate this for projects on GitHub. For more information, see Assessing the Bus Factor of Git Repositories by Cosentino et al.

    Multiple active maintainers share development, review, merge, and release responsibilities. The maintainer confirmed independent continuity access for at least two people. https://docs.artemis.tum.de/about/governance



    The project MUST have at least two unassociated significant contributors. (URL required) [contributors_unassociated]
    Contributors are associated if they are paid to work by the same organization (as an employee or contractor) and the organization stands to benefit from the project's results. Financial grants do not count as being from the same organization if they pass through other organizations (e.g., science grants paid to different organizations from a common government or NGO source do not cause contributors to be associated). Someone is a significant contributor if they have made non-trivial contributions to the project in the past year. Examples of good indicators of a significant contributor are: written at least 1,000 lines of code, contributed 50 commits, or contributed at least 20 pages of documentation.

    Reviewed 2025-10-19 through 2026-10-19. Benedikt Fein (University of Passau, b-fein) made substantive merged documentation and programming-exercise changes: https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/pull/11583 and https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/pull/12661 . Eduard Frankford (University of Innsbruck, eduardfrankford) contributed a websocket deadlock fix and regression tests, lecture form improvements and a coverage-tooling correction: https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/pull/13834 , https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/pull/13965 and https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/pull/14243 . The maintainer confirmed the distinct university affiliations on 2026-10-19; staff listings corroborate them: https://www.fim.uni-passau.de/en/chair-for-software-engineering-ii/team and https://www.uibk.ac.at/de/informatik/team/ . These are non-trivial contributions; the numerical examples are not mandatory minimums.


  • Other


    The project MUST include a license statement in each source file. This MAY be done by including the following inside a comment near the beginning of each file: SPDX-License-Identifier: [SPDX license expression for project]. [license_per_file]
    This MAY also be done by including a statement in natural language identifying the license. The project MAY also include a stable URL pointing to the license text, or the full license text. Note that the criterion license_location requires the project license be in a standard location. See this SPDX tutorial for more information about SPDX license expressions. Note the relationship with copyright_per_file, whose content would typically precede the license information.

    The repository has an MIT LICENSE, but source files do not uniformly carry a license statement or SPDX identifier. Generated source needs a generator-level solution. https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/blob/develop/LICENSE


 Change Control 2/4 ●

  • Public version-controlled source repository


    The project's source repository MUST use a common distributed version control software (e.g., git or mercurial). [repo_distributed]
    Git is not specifically required and projects can use centralized version control software (such as subversion) with justification.

    The public repository uses Git with complete clone/fork support. https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis



    The project MUST clearly identify small tasks that can be performed by new or casual contributors. (URL required) [small_tasks]
    This identification is typically done by marking selected issues in an issue tracker with one or more tags the project uses for the purpose, e.g., up-for-grabs, first-timers-only, "Small fix", microtask, or IdealFirstBug. These new tasks need not involve adding functionality; they can be improving documentation, adding test cases, or anything else that aids the project and helps the contributor understand more about the project.

    The good first issue label identifies tasks for new contributors, and CONTRIBUTING links it. https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aopen+label%3A%22good+first+issue%22



    The project MUST require two-factor authentication (2FA) for developers for changing a central repository or accessing sensitive data (such as private vulnerability reports). This 2FA mechanism MAY use mechanisms without cryptographic mechanisms such as SMS, though that is not recommended. [require_2FA]

    The authenticated GitHub organization API still reported two_factor_requirement_enabled=false for ls1intum on 2026-10-19. No alternative requirement covering all central-repository changes and private-vulnerability-report access has been verified. Individual accounts using 2FA do not establish mandatory enforcement. Coordinate any account-access changes with authorized organization administrators. https://github.com/ls1intum



    The project's two-factor authentication (2FA) SHOULD use cryptographic mechanisms to prevent impersonation. Short Message Service (SMS) based 2FA, by itself, does NOT meet this criterion, since it is not encrypted. [secure_2FA]
    A 2FA mechanism that meets this criterion would be a Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP) application that automatically generates an authentication code that changes after a certain period of time. Note that GitHub supports TOTP.

 Quality 7/7 ●

  • Coding standards


    The project MUST document its code review requirements, including how code review is conducted, what must be checked, and what is required to be acceptable. (URL required) [code_review_standards]
    See also two_person_review and contribution_requirements.

    Contribution and reviewer guidelines document author tasks, four-reviewer expectations, feature-maintainer approval, final review, and CI readiness. https://docs.artemis.tum.de/developer/reviewer-guidelines and https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/blob/develop/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md



    The project MUST have at least 50% of all proposed modifications reviewed before release by a person other than the author, to determine if it is a worthwhile modification and free of known issues which would argue against its inclusion [two_person_review]

    The 2026-10-19 OpenSSF Scorecard scan at merged revision 3d0bd7dfb4cd077394cc7cc22293855ed0dad9d5 found 27 of 30 changesets approved by reviewers, above the 50% threshold (Code-Review 9/10; overall Scorecard 9.0). An independent check of the 28 PR merges among the latest 30 first-parent commits found 27 had a non-author human approval before merge, including all three coverage PRs. This records recent practice; reassess the preceding release interval when updating the criterion. https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/ls1intum/Artemis ; https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/pull/14286 ; https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/pull/14280 ; https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/pull/14279


  • Working build system


    The project MUST have a reproducible build. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [build_reproducible]
    A reproducible build means that multiple parties can independently redo the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. In some cases, this can be resolved by forcing some sort order. JavaScript developers may consider using npm shrinkwrap and webpack OccurrenceOrderPlugin. GCC and clang users may find the -frandom-seed option useful. The build environment (including the toolset) can often be defined for external parties by specifying the cryptographic hash of a specific container or virtual machine that they can use for rebuilding. The reproducible builds project has documentation on how to do this.

    On 2026-10-19 the project maintainer confirmed that another maintainer independently built the same source revision in a separate build and obtained the identical complete WAR SHA-256. This records the maintainer attestation of independent bit-for-bit reproduction. The documented release-build procedure regenerates the production client, compiled server and bundled SBOMs using -Preproducible, frozen dependencies, controlled toolchain inputs and no reused build output: https://docs.artemis.tum.de/developer/best-practices#repeatable-builds . Implementation and the earlier controlled-environment build pair are documented in https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/pull/14258 . The earlier same-checkout pair establishes repeatability; the separately confirmed independent rebuild supplies the Gold evidence. A container image is one possible way to describe a build environment, not a mandatory form of this criterion.


  • Automated test suite


    A test suite MUST be invocable in a standard way for that language. (URL required) [test_invocation]
    For example, "make check", "mvn test", or "rake test" (Ruby).

    The standard Gradle wrapper test and pnpm Vitest commands are documented. https://docs.artemis.tum.de/developer/setup



    The project MUST implement continuous integration, where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result. (URL required) [test_continuous_integration]
    In most cases this means that each developer who works full-time on the project integrates at least daily.

    The CI workflow tests pull requests and protected-branch pushes and publishes test reports. https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/blob/develop/.github/workflows/ci.yml



    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 90% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage90]

    Client Vitest statements: 82,875/90,018 (92.06%) in complete successful CI https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/actions/runs/39163316687 . Client production sources match merged develop 3d0bd7dfb4cd077394cc7cc22293855ed0dad9d5. Complete successful seven-shard server CI for merged PR #14286 reports 91.98% JaCoCo instructions, the Java statement proxy: https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/actions/runs/39164068412 . Recombining all seven passing execution artifacts from that run and https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/actions/runs/39163868255 plus https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/actions/runs/39160461237 against the merged production classes gives 534,108/577,958 instructions (92.41%) and 99,314/107,851 lines (92.08%), preserving existing exclusions. This is a recomputed union of complete successful CI runs, not a new standalone develop run. The README weighted line badge is not used as statement evidence.



    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% branch coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_branch_coverage80]

    Client Vitest branches: 33,791/42,138 (80.19%) in complete successful CI https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/actions/runs/39163316687 ; client production sources match merged develop 3d0bd7dfb4cd077394cc7cc22293855ed0dad9d5. Complete successful seven-shard server CI for merged PR #14286 reports 38,456/47,889 branches (80.30%): https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/actions/runs/39164068412 . Recombining passing execution data from all seven shards of that run plus https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/actions/runs/39163868255 and https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/actions/runs/39160461237 against merged production classes gives 38,842/47,897 branches (81.09%), with existing exclusions. The recomputation is not a new standalone CI run. Both application language suites exceed 80%.


 Security 3/5 ●

  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    The software produced by the project MUST support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 MUST be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    HTTPS and SSH are supported, and operators must protect external traffic. Some distributed deployment links use plaintext protocols inside an operator-controlled private network; secure deployment requires isolation or additional TLS termination. This exception is documented rather than claiming universal TLS defaults. https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/blob/develop/.github/SECURITY.md#infrastructure-and-transport-security



    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    Supported Java/Node runtimes and the documented production TLS configuration support TLS 1.2 and later; external reverse-proxy TLS configuration remains the operator responsibility. https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/blob/develop/src/main/resources/config/application-prod.yml


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    The project website, repository (if accessible via the web), and download site (if separate) MUST include key hardening headers with nonpermissive values. (URL required) [hardened_site]
    Note that GitHub and GitLab are known to meet this. Sites such as https://securityheaders.com/ can quickly check this. The key hardening headers are: Content Security Policy (CSP), HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS), X-Content-Type-Options (as "nosniff"), and X-Frame-Options. Fully static web sites with no ability to log in via the web pages could omit some hardening headers with less risk, but there's no reliable way to detect such sites, so we require these headers even if they are fully static sites.

    Rechecked HTTPS GET responses on 2026-10-19. https://artemis.tum.de/ now returns HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, X-Frame-Options: DENY, and Content-Security-Policy. https://docs.artemis.tum.de/ returns none of those four headers. Gold explicitly requires them even for fully static sites. Configure the documentation hosting/proxy response headers and verify all project, repository and download endpoints before marking Met.


  • Other security issues


    The project MUST have performed a security review within the last 5 years. This review MUST consider the security requirements and security boundary. [security_review]
    This MAY be done by the project members and/or an independent evaluation. This evaluation MAY be supported by static and dynamic analysis tools, but there also must be human review to identify problems (particularly in design) that tools cannot detect.

    On 2026-10-19 the project maintainer confirmed monthly internal human security reviews by the core maintainer team, including the documented security requirements and trust boundaries. This meets the five-year window. The reviewed requirements and boundaries are documented at https://docs.artemis.tum.de/developer/security-assurance and https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/blob/develop/.github/SECURITY.md#security-audits-and-open-source-transparency . The confirmation concerns actual human reviews; an assurance document or automated scans alone are not treated as substitutes. Confidential findings need not be published in this entry.



    Hardening mechanisms MUST be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. (URL required) [hardening]
    Hardening mechanisms may include HTTP headers like Content Security Policy (CSP), compiler flags to mitigate attacks (such as -fstack-protector), or compiler flags to eliminate undefined behavior. For our purposes least privilege is not considered a hardening mechanism (least privilege is important, but separate).

    Production startup rejects published default credentials; documented headers, rendering restrictions, build isolation and security analysis provide defense in depth. https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/blob/develop/.github/SECURITY.md


 Analysis 2/2 ●

  • Dynamic code analysis


    The project MUST apply at least one dynamic analysis tool to any proposed major production release of the software produced by the project before its release. [dynamic_analysis]
    A dynamic analysis tool examines the software by executing it with specific inputs. For example, the project MAY use a fuzzing tool (e.g., American Fuzzy Lop) or a web application scanner (e.g., OWASP ZAP or w3af). In some cases the OSS-Fuzz project may be willing to apply fuzz testing to your project. For purposes of this criterion the dynamic analysis tool needs to vary the inputs in some way to look for various kinds of problems or be an automated test suite with at least 80% branch coverage. The Wikipedia page on dynamic analysis and the OWASP page on fuzzing identify some dynamic analysis tools. The analysis tool(s) MAY be focused on looking for security vulnerabilities, but this is not required.

    On 2026-10-19 the project maintainer confirmed that, before every proposed major production release, maintainers require successful complete server and client test runs for the release candidate, review runtime failures and coverage, and resolve significant findings before release. Both automated suites exceed 80% branch coverage, qualifying as dynamic-analysis tools under this criterion. Server complete passing CI: https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/actions/runs/39164068412 ; client complete passing CI: https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/actions/runs/39163316687 . Coverage and runtime-assertion evidence: https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/pull/14289 . This records the human pre-release review practice; the release: published workflow is not used to prove analysis before publication. Fuzzing remains outside the current scope.



    The project SHOULD include many run-time assertions in the software it produces and check those assertions during dynamic analysis. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]
    This criterion does not suggest enabling assertions during production; that is entirely up to the project and its users to decide. This criterion's focus is instead to improve fault detection during dynamic analysis before deployment. Enabling assertions in production use is completely different from enabling assertions during dynamic analysis (such as testing). In some cases enabling assertions in production use is extremely unwise (especially in high-integrity components). There are many arguments against enabling assertions in production, e.g., libraries should not crash callers, their presence may cause rejection by app stores, and/or activating an assertion in production may expose private data such as private keys. Beware that in many Linux distributions NDEBUG is not defined, so C/C++ assert() will by default be enabled for production in those environments. It may be important to use a different assertion mechanism or defining NDEBUG for production in those environments.

    Delivered server code has hundreds of Bean Validation runtime contracts, Spring Assert guards, and explicit constructor/invariant checks, including WorkerSettings. Tests exercise valid and invalid inputs against these production checks; these are not merely assertions inside test code. On 2026-10-19 the configured Gradle test task was inspected: enableAssertions=true and JVM arguments include -ea. https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/blob/develop/gradle/test.gradle ; https://docs.gradle.org/current/dsl/org.gradle.api.tasks.testing.Test.html#org.gradle.api.tasks.testing.Test:enableAssertions ; https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/blob/develop/src/main/java/de/tum/cit/aet/artemis/aiworker/config/WorkerSettings.java ; https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/blob/develop/src/test/java/de/tum/cit/aet/artemis/aiworker/api/WorkerBoundaryContractsTest.java . Full successful CI: https://github.com/ls1intum/Artemis/actions/runs/39164068412 . Production JVM assertion policy is a separate operator decision.



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Project badge entry owned by: Stephan Krusche.
Entry created on 2026-08-19 23:37:57 UTC, last updated on 2026-10-19 12:17:00 UTC. Last lost passing badge on 2026-10-17 11:01:01 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-10-17 11:03:02 UTC.