Veredictum

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 13/13 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    An independent conformance instrument for openEHR clinical data repositories. A machine-readable catalogue of 1103 spec-cited test cases and 247 operation bindings is driven against a running CDR over its own REST wire; verdicts are a pure function of the party statement, the recordings, the catalogue and the capability matrix, and the emitted record is sealed with a SHA-256 digest manifest and a detached OpenPGP signature so anyone can re-check it. Every expectation cites the released openEHR specification section it enforces, and the specification text is vendored so each citation resolves.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]
    This MUST be in language that potential users can understand (e.g., it uses minimal jargon).

    The README opens by saying what the instrument is and what it does: it grades openEHR clinical data repositories against the released specifications, with a specification citation on every finding. https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum#readme


    Enough for a badge!

    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    CONTRIBUTING.md is the contribution process, SUPPORT.md is the question/defect/report routing, GitHub Discussions (Q&A) is enabled, and the tracker has three typed issue templates (defect, enhancement, task): https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md and https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/SUPPORT.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]
    We presume that projects on GitHub use issues and pull requests unless otherwise noted. This information can be short, e.g., stating that the project uses pull requests, an issue tracker, or posts to a mailing list (which one?)

    CONTRIBUTING.md documents how to contribute: setup and shared git hooks, the gate commands, the hard rules, and the pull-request conventions: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    CONTRIBUTING.md states the requirements for an acceptable contribution: the gate commands every PR must pass (cargo build/clippy -D warnings/fmt --check/nextest/deny check, plus veredictum validate at zero findings), the hard rules (every expectation cites its specification section; never weaken, skip or delete a test; coverage ratchets up only; a red row is attributed before anything changes; comment form per RFC 505 and RFC 1574), enforced-signed commits, conventional-commit subjects, a same-PR changelog entry, and tests with behaviour changes: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • FLOSS license


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]
    FLOSS is software released in a way that meets the Open Source Definition or Free Software Definition. Examples of such licenses include the CC0, MIT, BSD 2-clause, BSD 3-clause revised, Apache 2.0, Lesser GNU General Public License (LGPL), and the GNU General Public License (GPL). For our purposes, this means that the license MUST be: The software MAY also be licensed other ways (e.g., "GPLv2 or proprietary" is acceptable).

    Apache-2.0, in LICENSE at the repository root, declared machine-readably in REUSE.toml: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/LICENSE


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]
    The OSI uses a rigorous approval process to determine which licenses are OSS.

    Apache-2.0 is OSI-approved (https://opensource.org/license/apache-2-0). Vendored specification text and clinical models keep their upstream terms, recorded per tree in PROVENANCE.md and declared in REUSE.toml.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]
    One convention is posting the license as a top-level file named LICENSE or COPYING, which MAY be followed by an extension such as ".txt" or ".md". An alternative convention is to have a directory named LICENSES containing license file(s); these files are typically named as their SPDX license identifier followed by an appropriate file extension, as described in the REUSE Specification. Note that this criterion is only a requirement on the source repository. You do NOT need to include the license file when generating something from the source code (such as an executable, package, or container). For example, when generating an R package for the Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN), follow standard CRAN practice: if the license is a standard license, use the standard short license specification (to avoid installing yet another copy of the text) and list the LICENSE file in an exclusion file such as .Rbuildignore. Similarly, when creating a Debian package, you may put a link in the copyright file to the license text in /usr/share/common-licenses, and exclude the license file from the created package (e.g., by deleting the file after calling dh_auto_install). We encourage including machine-readable license information in generated formats where practical.

    LICENSE in the standard root location, with NOTICE beside it (Apache-2.0 section 4), LICENSES/ carrying the full texts for the vendored trees, and REUSE.toml declaring per-path licensing: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/LICENSE


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]
    This documentation must be in some media (such as text or video) that includes: how to install it, how to start it, how to use it (possibly with a tutorial using examples), and how to use it securely (e.g., what to do and what not to do) if that is an appropriate topic for the software. The security documentation need not be long. The project MAY use hypertext links to non-project material as documentation. If the project does not produce software, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    A published mdBook documentation site with installation, running the instrument, command reference, the web console, the conformance method, catalogue authoring and a glossary: https://veredictum.eu/docs/ . ARCHITECTURE.md carries the design record behind it.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]
    The documentation of an external interface explains to an end-user or developer how to use it. This would include its application program interface (API) if the software has one. If it is a library, document the major classes/types and methods/functions that can be called. If it is a web application, define its URL interface (often its REST interface). If it is a command-line interface, document the parameters and options it supports. In many cases it's best if most of this documentation is automatically generated, so that this documentation stays synchronized with the software as it changes, but this isn't required. The project MAY use hypertext links to non-project material as documentation. Documentation MAY be automatically generated (where practical this is often the best way to do so). Documentation of a REST interface may be generated using Swagger/OpenAPI. Code interface documentation MAY be generated using tools such as JSDoc (JavaScript), ESDoc (JavaScript), pydoc (Python), devtools (R), pkgdown (R), and Doxygen (many). Merely having comments in implementation code is not sufficient to satisfy this criterion; there needs to be an easy way to see the information without reading through all the source code. If the project does not produce software, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    The external interface is the CLI and the library. The command reference chapter documents every subcommand and flag (https://veredictum.eu/docs/commands.html), the published API documentation is complete (https://docs.rs/veredictum — 100% of the crate documented, missing_docs is a lint), and schemas/ publishes JSON Schema for every artifact family the interface accepts and emits.


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]
    This requires that the project home page URL and the version control repository URL begin with "https:", not "http:". You can get free certificates from Let's Encrypt. Projects MAY implement this criterion using (for example) GitHub pages, GitLab pages, or SourceForge project pages. If you support HTTP, we urge you to redirect the HTTP traffic to HTTPS.

    Both project sites are HTTPS-only: https://veredictum.eu (site and documentation) and https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum . Downloads come from HTTPS GitHub Releases, crates.io and GHCR.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]
    Examples of acceptable mechanisms include archived mailing list(s), GitHub issue and pull request discussions, Bugzilla, Mantis, and Trac. Asynchronous discussion mechanisms (like IRC) are acceptable if they meet these criteria; make sure there is a URL-addressable archiving mechanism. Proprietary JavaScript, while discouraged, is permitted.

    GitHub Discussions is enabled with a Q&A category, and the issue tracker is public with typed templates: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/discussions


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]
    English is currently the lingua franca of computer technology; supporting English increases the number of different potential developers and reviewers worldwide. A project can meet this criterion even if its core developers' primary language is not English.

    Every project document, the documentation site, the tracker, the changelog and all code comments are in English.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]
    As a minimum, the project should attempt to respond to significant problem and vulnerability reports. A project that is actively pursuing a badge is probably maintained. All projects and people have limited resources, and typical projects must reject some proposed changes, so limited resources and proposal rejections do not by themselves indicate an unmaintained project.

    When a project knows that it will no longer be maintained, it should set this criterion to "Unmet" and use the appropriate mechanism(s) to indicate to others that it is not being maintained. For example, use “DEPRECATED” as the first heading of its README, add “DEPRECATED” near the beginning of its home page, add “DEPRECATED” to the beginning of its code repository project description, add a no-maintenance-intended badge in its README and/or home page, mark it as deprecated in any package repositories (e.g., npm deprecate), and/or use the code repository's marking system to archive it (e.g., GitHub's "archive" setting, GitLab’s "archived" marking, Gerrit's "readonly" status, or SourceForge’s "abandoned" project status). Additional discussion can be found here.

    Actively maintained by its maintainer: four releases in the current cycle (latest 0.1.0-alpha.4), continuous issue triage on a tracker past #100, and scheduled watchers that file their own issues. MAINTAINERS.md is honest that this is one maintainer today: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/MAINTAINERS.md


 Change Control 9/9 ●

  • Public version-controlled source repository


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]
    The URL MAY be the same as the project URL. The project MAY use private (non-public) branches in specific cases while the change is not publicly released (e.g., for fixing a vulnerability before it is revealed to the public).

    Public git repository on GitHub: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    git — every change is tracked, and every commit in the history is OpenPGP-signed (the main ruleset refuses an unsigned one).


    Enough for a badge!

    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]
    Projects MAY choose to omit specific interim versions from their public source repositories (e.g., ones that fix specific non-public security vulnerabilities, may never be publicly released, or include material that cannot be legally posted and are not in the final release).

    Every change reaches main as a squash-merged pull request as soon as it is green, so main is the interim version between releases and is publicly readable at https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/commits/main . CHANGELOG.md accumulates the unreleased entries.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]
    Git is not specifically required and projects can use centralized version control software (such as subversion) with justification.

    git, a distributed version control system.


  • Unique version numbering


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]
    This MAY be met in a variety of ways including a commit IDs (such as git commit id or mercurial changeset id) or a version number (including version numbers that use semantic versioning or date-based schemes like YYYYMMDD).

    One SemVer version per release, held in Cargo.toml, checked against the tag by the release pipeline (the tag matches the manifest version step) and against CITATION.cff and .zenodo.json, and reported by veredictum --version.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]
    Projects should generally prefer whatever format is expected by their users, e.g., because it is the normal format used by their ecosystem. Many ecosystems prefer SemVer, and SemVer is generally preferred for application programmer interfaces (APIs) and software development kits (SDKs). CalVer tends to be used by projects that are large, have an unusually large number of independently-developed dependencies, have a constantly-changing scope, or are time-sensitive. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value, because including a micro level supports simultaneously-maintained branches whenever that becomes necessary. Other version numbering formats may be used as version numbers, including git commit IDs or mercurial changeset IDs, as long as they uniquely identify versions. However, some alternatives (such as git commit IDs) can cause problems as release identifiers, because users may not be able to easily determine if they are up-to-date. The version ID format may be unimportant for identifying software releases if all recipients only run the latest version (e.g., it is the code for a single website or internet service that is constantly updated via continuous delivery).

    Semantic Versioning 2.0.0, stated in CHANGELOG.md and carried by the tags (0.0.1-alpha.1 through 0.1.0-alpha.4): https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

    Every release is a v-prefixed git tag, and the refs/tags/v* ruleset requires the tag to be signed and forbids deleting or moving it: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/tags


  • Release notes


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]
    The release notes MAY be implemented in a variety of ways. Many projects provide them in a file named "NEWS", "CHANGELOG", or "ChangeLog", optionally with extensions such as ".txt", ".md", or ".html". Historically the term "change log" meant a log of every change, but to meet these criteria what is needed is a human-readable summary. The release notes MAY instead be provided by version control system mechanisms such as the GitHub Releases workflow.

    CHANGELOG.md follows Keep a Changelog 1.1.0, a user-visible change must add its entry in the same pull request (CI enforces this), and the release pipeline extracts that section verbatim as the GitHub release body: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/releases


    Enough for a badge!

    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]
    This criterion helps users determine if a given update will fix a vulnerability that is publicly known, to help users make an informed decision about updating. If users typically cannot practically update the software themselves on their computers, but must instead depend on one or more intermediaries to perform the update (as is often the case for a kernel and low-level software that is intertwined with a kernel), the project may choose "not applicable" (N/A) instead, since this additional information will not be helpful to those users. Similarly, a project may choose N/A if all recipients only run the latest version (e.g., it is the code for a single website or internet service that is constantly updated via continuous delivery). This criterion only applies to the project results, not its dependencies. Listing the vulnerabilities of all transitive dependencies of a project becomes unwieldy as dependencies increase and vary, and is unnecessary since tools that examine and track dependencies can do this in a more scalable way.

    No publicly known vulnerability has been fixed in any release so far, so no release notes name one. When one is fixed, SECURITY.md commits to naming the reporter in the advisory and the changelog, and the CVE with it.


 Reporting 8/8 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    CONTRIBUTING.md points at the tracker with three typed templates, and SUPPORT.md routes questions, instrument defects, disputed catalogue expectations and vulnerability reports separately: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/SUPPORT.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    GitHub Issues, with three typed templates (defect, enhancement, task), labels and milestones, used for both defects and enhancement requests: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    Every issue in the tracker is triaged and answered; the tracker is the project's working surface rather than an inbox (past #100 filed, 10 open at the time of writing, the rest closed with their resolution recorded). No report has been left without a response.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]
    The response MAY be 'no' or a discussion about its merits. The goal is simply that there be some response to some requests, which indicates that the project is still alive. For purposes of this criterion, projects need not count fake requests (e.g., from spammers or automated systems). If a project is no longer making enhancements, please select "unmet" and include the URL that makes this situation clear to users. If a project tends to be overwhelmed by the number of enhancement requests, please select "unmet" and explain.

    Enhancement requests use their own template and are answered on the issue: accepted with a milestone, or closed with the reason. GOVERNANCE.md § What this project will not do records the standing refusals in advance, so a request that falls there gets a documented answer: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]

    The GitHub issue tracker and Discussions are public and permanently readable: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/issues?q=is%3Aissue


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]
    Projects hosted on GitHub SHOULD consider enabling privately reporting a security vulnerability. Projects on GitLab SHOULD consider using its ability for privately reporting a vulnerability. Projects MAY identify a mailing address on https://PROJECTSITE/security, often in the form security@example.org. This vulnerability reporting process MAY be the same as its bug reporting process. Vulnerability reports MAY always be public, but many projects have a private vulnerability reporting mechanism.

    SECURITY.md: do not open a public issue, report through GitHub private vulnerability reporting, with the expected contents listed: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]
    Examples include a private defect report submitted on the web using HTTPS (TLS) or an email encrypted using OpenPGP. If vulnerability reports are always public (so there are never private vulnerability reports), choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    GitHub private vulnerability reporting is enabled and is the documented route (https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/security/advisories/new). SECURITY.md § Repository security settings records it as the posture of record.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]
    If there have been no vulnerabilities reported in the last 6 months, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    No vulnerability report has been received to date, so there is none to have responded to. SECURITY.md commits to an acknowledgement within 5 working days and an assessment with a severity and fix window within 14 calendar days.


 Quality 13/13 ●

  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]
    A build system determines what actions need to occur to rebuild the software (and in what order), and then performs those steps. For example, it can invoke a compiler to compile the source code. If an executable is created from source code, it must be possible to modify the project's source code and then generate an updated executable with those modifications. If the software produced by the project depends on external libraries, the build system does not need to build those external libraries. If there is no need to build anything to use the software after its source code is modified, select "not applicable" (N/A).

    cargo builds the workspace from source: cargo build --locked --workspace --all-targets, run on every pull request and push by the CI build & test job. The toolchain pins itself from rust-toolchain.toml, so there is nothing to install by hand.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]
    For example, Maven, Ant, cmake, the autotools, make, rake (Ruby), or devtools (R).

    cargo and rustc, the standard Rust build tooling, with the exact channel pinned in rust-toolchain.toml and the dependency set locked in a committed Cargo.lock.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    The whole build runs on FLOSS: rustc and cargo (MIT/Apache-2.0), cargo-nextest, cargo-deny, cargo-hack and cargo-machete, on GitHub-hosted Linux runners.


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]
    The project MAY use multiple automated test suites (e.g., one that runs quickly, vs. another that is more thorough but requires special equipment). There are many test frameworks and test support systems available, including Selenium (web browser automation), Junit (JVM, Java), RUnit (R), testthat (R).

    An automated test suite in the repository: 365 test functions across 61 files, run by cargo nextest run --locked --workspace, plus veredictum validate over the whole artifact tree (every machine gate over the catalogue, zero findings the only passing result) and the verification pack, a recorded transcript with adjudicated verdicts that any runner claiming this catalogue must reproduce.


    Enough for a badge!

    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]
    For example, "make check", "mvn test", or "rake test" (Ruby).

    cargo nextest run (the project's runner by decision, configured in .config/nextest.toml). CONTRIBUTING.md § The gates lists it with the rest of the gate commands.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    The suite covers the instrument's functionality rather than a corner of it: 365 tests over the parsers, the artifact model, the assertion vocabulary and the verdict computation, plus the console SSR suite, the catalogue-wide validate gate, the console journey tests and the fuzz harnesses. Coverage is measured by cargo-llvm-cov and published continuously through SonarQube Cloud, whose live badge is in the README badge row: https://sonarcloud.io/component_measures?id=rubentalstra_Veredictum&metric=coverage


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    .github/workflows/ci.yml runs on every pull request and every push to main, with all jobs (guards, workflow-audit, dockerfile lint, rustfmt, clippy, build and test, rustdoc, MSRV, cargo-deny, fuzz-harness build, unused dependencies, console journeys, screenshot guard) gathered behind a single required conclusion check, and a CI guard that fails if any job is left out of it: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/actions/workflows/ci.yml


  • New functionality testing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]
    As long as a policy is in place, even by word of mouth, that says developers should add tests to the automated test suite for major new functionality, select "Met."

    CONTRIBUTING.md § Pull requests: tests accompany behaviour changes; and § Hard rules: never weaken, skip or delete a test, never edit a test to route around a defect it exposes — leave it failing with a TODO naming its issue. Coverage ratchets up only: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]
    Major functionality would typically be mentioned in the release notes. Perfection is not required, merely evidence that tests are typically being added in practice to the automated test suite when new major functionality is added to the software produced by the project.

    The policy is applied in practice: the three document-processing defects found by fuzzing (literal nesting depth, brace-expansion variants, citation-resolution stack overflow) each landed in 0.1.0-alpha.4 with their pinned regression test, and every added catalogue case is its own negative or positive test: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/releases


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    Documented in CONTRIBUTING.md as a stated requirement on every contributor, with the full working discipline in CLAUDE.md, and the gate commands listed so a contributor can run exactly what CI will run: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]
    Examples of compiler warning flags include gcc/clang "-Wall". Examples of a "safe" language mode include JavaScript "use strict" and perl5's "use warnings". A separate "linter" tool is simply a tool that examines the source code to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes. These are typically enabled within the source code or build instructions.

    Warning flags are on by default and turned up: the workspace lint tables in Cargo.toml put clippy::all and clippy::pedantic at deny, add a long list of named bug-class lints at deny (unwrap_used, expect_used, panic, indexing_slicing, as_conversions, iter_over_hash_type and more), and set rust lints unsafe_code = forbid, dead_code = deny, non_ascii_idents = forbid: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/Cargo.toml


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]
    These are the warnings identified by the implementation of the warnings criterion. The project should fix warnings or mark them in the source code as false positives. Ideally there would be no warnings, but a project MAY accept some warnings (typically less than 1 warning per 100 lines or less than 10 warnings).

    CI runs cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings (plus the console's ssr and wasm hydrate targets) and cargo fmt --all --check on every pull request and push, so a warning fails the build and main carries none.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    Well beyond the defaults. The workspace lint tables put clippy::all and clippy::pedantic at deny and then name dozens of specific bug-class lints at deny (unwrap_used, expect_used, panic, panic_in_result_fn, indexing_slicing, string_slice, as_conversions, iter_over_hash_type, precedence_bits, unchecked_time_subtraction, allow_attributes_without_reason and more, each with its reason in a comment), and the rust table sets unsafe_code = forbid, non_ascii_idents = forbid, dead_code = deny and let_underscore_drop/lock = deny. CI runs clippy with -D warnings on every target, so any of them fails the build: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/Cargo.toml


 Security 16/16 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]
    This requires understanding the following design principles, including the 8 principles from Saltzer and Schroeder:
    • economy of mechanism (keep the design as simple and small as practical, e.g., by adopting sweeping simplifications)
    • fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default)
    • complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable)
    • open design (security mechanisms should not depend on attacker ignorance of its design, but instead on more easily protected and changed information like keys and passwords)
    • separation of privilege (ideally, access to important objects should depend on more than one condition, so that defeating one protection system won't enable complete access. E.G., multi-factor authentication, such as requiring both a password and a hardware token, is stronger than single-factor authentication)
    • least privilege (processes should operate with the least privilege necessary)
    • least common mechanism (the design should minimize the mechanisms common to more than one user and depended on by all users, e.g., directories for temporary files)
    • psychological acceptability (the human interface must be designed for ease of use - designing for "least astonishment" can help)
    • limited attack surface (the attack surface - the set of the different points where an attacker can try to enter or extract data - should be limited)
    • input validation with allowlists (inputs should typically be checked to determine if they are valid before they are accepted; this validation should use allowlists (which only accept known-good values), not denylists (which attempt to list known-bad values)).
    A "primary developer" in a project is anyone who is familiar with the project's code base, is comfortable making changes to it, and is acknowledged as such by most other participants in the project. A primary developer would typically make a number of contributions over the past year (via code, documentation, or answering questions). Developers would typically be considered primary developers if they initiated the project (and have not left the project more than three years ago), have the option of receiving information on a private vulnerability reporting channel (if there is one), can accept commits on behalf of the project, or perform final releases of the project software. If there is only one developer, that individual is the primary developer. Many books and courses are available to help you understand how to develop more secure software and discuss design. For example, the Secure Software Development Fundamentals course is a free set of three courses that explain how to develop more secure software (it's free if you audit it; for an extra fee you can earn a certificate to prove you learned the material).

    ARCHITECTURE.md is the design record, and the security-relevant design is stated rather than assumed: the instrument trusts only the released specifications and its own recorded inputs, a verdict is a pure function of four inputs so no server-controlled value can influence its own result, and records are sealed with a SHA-256 digest manifest and a detached OpenPGP signature that verify-record re-checks. SECURITY.md § Scope notes names the trust boundaries that matter here (credentials for the system under test, verdict integrity, release-artifact integrity): https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/ARCHITECTURE.md


    Enough for a badge!

    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]
    Examples (depending on the type of software) include SQL injection, OS injection, classic buffer overflow, cross-site scripting, missing authentication, and missing authorization. See the CWE/SANS top 25 or OWASP Top 10 for commonly used lists. Many books and courses are available to help you understand how to develop more secure software and discuss common implementation errors that lead to vulnerabilities. For example, the Secure Software Development Fundamentals course is a free set of three courses that explain how to develop more secure software (it's free if you audit it; for an extra fee you can earn a certificate to prove you learned the material).

    The common error classes are addressed by construction and by machine check: memory unsafety is out of reach (unsafe_code = forbid), the lint set denies the specific classes that produce wrong answers (unwrap/expect/panic, indexing_slicing, string_slice, as_conversions, precedence_bits, integer overflow via overflow-checks in release), every reader that parses outside input has a fuzz harness, and CodeQL plus SonarQube Cloud run their security queries on every pull request.


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]
    These cryptographic criteria do not always apply because some software has no need to directly use cryptographic capabilities.

    Only published standard primitives: SHA-256 (FIPS 180-4) for the digest manifest, OpenPGP detached signatures for sealing a record, TLS via rustls for every outbound connection, and JWT (RFC 7519) for bearer authentication against a system under test. Nothing bespoke.


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    The project implements no cryptography of its own. It calls maintained libraries: sha2, pgp, rustls (through reqwest with default features off), and jsonwebtoken on aws-lc-rs: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/app/veredictum/Cargo.toml


    Enough for a badge!

    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]
    See the Open Standards Requirement for Software by the Open Source Initiative.

    Every cryptographic dependency is FLOSS under MIT and/or Apache-2.0 (sha2, pgp, rustls, aws-lc-rs, jsonwebtoken), and cargo-deny gates the licence set on every pull request.


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]
    These minimum bitlengths are: symmetric key 112, factoring modulus 2048, discrete logarithm key 224, discrete logarithmic group 2048, elliptic curve 224, and hash 224 (password hashing is not covered by this bitlength, more information on password hashing can be found in the crypto_password_storage criterion). See https://www.keylength.com for a comparison of keylength recommendations from various organizations. The software MAY allow smaller keylengths in some configurations (ideally it would not, since this allows downgrade attacks, but shorter keylengths are sometimes necessary for interoperability).

    SHA-256 digests throughout (no truncation). TLS key exchange and cipher suites are rustls defaults, which are TLS 1.2/1.3 suites at current key sizes. The OpenPGP signing key is the operator's own, and MAINTAINERS.md documents the project's own signing identities.


    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]
    ECB mode is almost never appropriate because it reveals identical blocks within the ciphertext as demonstrated by the ECB penguin, and CTR mode is often inappropriate because it does not perform authentication and causes duplicates if the input state is repeated. In many cases it's best to choose a block cipher algorithm mode designed to combine secrecy and authentication, e.g., Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and EAX. Projects MAY allow users to enable broken mechanisms (e.g., during configuration) where necessary for compatibility, but then users know they're doing it.

    No broken or known-insecure primitive is used or accepted anywhere: no MD5, no SHA-1, no DES/3DES/RC4, and no TLS below 1.2 (rustls implements 1.2 and 1.3 only).


    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    No broken or weak primitive is used or accepted: SHA-256 throughout with no truncation, no MD5, no SHA-1, no DES/3DES/RC4, and TLS through rustls, which implements 1.2 and 1.3 only. Signature verification is a real check rather than a formality — verify-record recomputes every digest and verifies the detached signature, so a substituted byte fails.


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]

    All network security is standard TLS through rustls, whose default suites are ECDHE (TLS 1.2) and TLS 1.3, both forward-secret. No bespoke transport cryptography exists.


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]
    This criterion applies only when the software is enforcing authentication of users using passwords for external users (aka inbound authentication), such as server-side web applications. It does not apply in cases where the software stores passwords for authenticating into other systems (aka outbound authentication, e.g., the software implements a client for some other system), since at least parts of that software must have often access to the unhashed password.

    The project stores no passwords for authentication of external users. The web console has no login at all (which is why the publish flag binds it to loopback), and credentials for a system under test are never stored: the party's IXIT declares only the name of the environment variable, so the secret stays in the operator's environment and never enters the catalogue, a record or a log.


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]
    A cryptographically secure random number generator may be a hardware random number generator, or it may be a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG) using an algorithm such as Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG, Yarrow, or Fortuna. Examples of calls to secure random number generators include Java's java.security.SecureRandom and JavaScript's window.crypto.getRandomValues. Examples of calls to insecure random number generators include Java's java.util.Random and JavaScript's Math.random.

    Where a cryptographic random value is needed — the nonce in the detached OpenPGP signature over a record manifest — the source is the operating system CSPRNG, rand::rngs::OsRng (app/veredictum/src/exec/signature.rs, app/veredictum/src/record.rs). The seeded arrival schedule in the load generator is deliberately reproducible and is not a security value.


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]
    An even stronger mechanism is releasing the software with digitally signed packages, since that mitigates attacks on the distribution system, but this only works if the users can be confident that the public keys for signatures are correct and if the users will actually check the signature.

    Every delivery channel is HTTPS with an integrity check on top: release binaries carry a sha256sum, a CycloneDX SBOM and a Sigstore bundle verified by gh attestation verify --signer-workflow, container images are pulled by digest from GHCR with provenance attestations, and the crate comes from crates.io over HTTPS. The verification commands are published: https://veredictum.eu/docs/installation.html


    Enough for a badge!

    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]
    These hashes can be modified in transit.

    No hash or signature is ever delivered over an unsigned or unencrypted channel: checksums and Sigstore bundles are release assets on the HTTPS GitHub release page, attestations are verified against the signing workflow identity rather than a hash published beside the file, and release tags are signed under a ruleset that forbids moving or deleting them.


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    Enough for a badge!

    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]
    The vulnerability must be patched and released by the project itself (patches may be developed elsewhere). A vulnerability becomes publicly known (for this purpose) once it has a CVE with publicly released non-paywalled information (reported, for example, in the National Vulnerability Database) or when the project has been informed and the information has been released to the public (possibly by the project). A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known. Note: this means that users might be left vulnerable to all attackers worldwide for up to 60 days. This criterion is often much easier to meet than what Google recommends in Rebooting responsible disclosure, because Google recommends that the 60-day period start when the project is notified even if the report is not public. Also note that this badge criterion, like other criteria, applies to the individual project. Some projects are part of larger umbrella organizations or larger projects, possibly in multiple layers, and many projects feed their results to other organizations and projects as part of a potentially-complex supply chain. An individual project often cannot control the rest, but an individual project can work to release a vulnerability patch in a timely way. Therefore, we focus solely on the individual project's response time. Once a patch is available from the individual project, others can determine how to deal with the patch (e.g., they can update to the newer version or they can apply just the patch as a cherry-picked solution).

    No vulnerability has been reported in this project to date, so none is outstanding. The machinery to meet the window is in place and running: cargo-deny against the RustSec advisory database on every pull request, Dependabot security updates exempt from the update cooldowns, weekly Trivy scans of the published image that file their own tracking issue, and an accepted-advisory VEX register with a CI guard that refuses an advisory exception without a published OpenVEX justification.


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    There are no known critical or medium vulnerabilities in this project, publicly reported or otherwise, and none outstanding. SECURITY.md states the only supported version is the most recent release: a fix lands on main and ships in the next tagged release, with no backport line.


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]
    A project MAY leak "sample" credentials for testing and unimportant databases, as long as they are not intended to limit public access.

    No credential is committed. Secret scanning and push protection are enabled on the repository (SECURITY.md § Repository security settings records the posture, including the two sub-settings still to be switched on, with their real state), and the design keeps credentials out of the tree by construction: a party's IXIT declares only the name of the environment variable that carries the credential, and leaking one into an artifact, a log, a recorded exchange or an error message is an in-scope vulnerability in this instrument.


 Analysis 8/8 ●

  • Static code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]
    A static code analysis tool examines the software code (as source code, intermediate code, or executable) without executing it with specific inputs. For purposes of this criterion, compiler warnings and "safe" language modes do not count as static code analysis tools (these typically avoid deep analysis because speed is vital). Some static analysis tools focus on detecting generic defects, others focus on finding specific kinds of defects (such as vulnerabilities), and some do a combination. Examples of such static code analysis tools include cppcheck (C, C++), clang static analyzer (C, C++), SpotBugs (Java), FindBugs (Java) (including FindSecurityBugs), PMD (Java), Brakeman (Ruby on Rails), lintr (R), goodpractice (R), Coverity Quality Analyzer, SonarQube, Codacy, and HP Enterprise Fortify Static Code Analyzer. Larger lists of tools can be found in places such as the Wikipedia list of tools for static code analysis, OWASP information on static code analysis, NIST list of source code security analyzers, and Wheeler's list of static analysis tools. If there are no FLOSS static analysis tools available for the implementation language(s) used, you may select 'N/A'.

    Several static analysers run on every pull request: CodeQL (https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/actions/workflows/codeql.yml), clippy at deny-tier with -D warnings, SonarQube Cloud (quality gate, reliability, security and maintainability ratings, all live in the README badge row), cargo-deny, cargo-machete, zizmor and actionlint over the workflows, hadolint over the Dockerfile, and Trivy over the published image.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    At least one analyser looks specifically for common vulnerability classes on every pull request: CodeQL runs its security query suites over the Rust and GitHub Actions sources on every push and pull request and again weekly, SonarQube Cloud publishes a security rating on the same events, zizmor audits the workflows for the Actions-specific classes (unpinned uses, credential-persisting checkouts, injectable contexts) at --min-severity=low, Trivy scans the published image, and cargo-deny checks the graph against the RustSec advisory database: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/actions/workflows/codeql.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]
    A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known. Note that criterion vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days requires that all such vulnerabilities be fixed within 60 days of being made public.

    Findings are fixed rather than filed: CodeQL and Scorecard results land in GitHub code scanning, cargo-deny failures block the merge, and an accepted advisory is only accepted with a published OpenVEX justification that a CI guard (scripts/checks/vex-advisories.sh) requires — security/vex/ carries the record. SECURITY.md § The Scorecard Branch-Protection warns, adjudicated shows the same treatment applied to each analyser warning first-hand rather than chased as a number.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    On every pull request and every push to main, and again on a weekly schedule for CodeQL, Scorecard and the published-image scan. No analysis lane is scheduled-only without also running on the merge path.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]
    A dynamic analysis tool examines the software by executing it with specific inputs. For example, the project MAY use a fuzzing tool (e.g., American Fuzzy Lop) or a web application scanner (e.g., OWASP ZAP or w3af). In some cases the OSS-Fuzz project may be willing to apply fuzz testing to your project. For purposes of this criterion the dynamic analysis tool needs to vary the inputs in some way to look for various kinds of problems or be an automated test suite with at least 80% branch coverage. The Wikipedia page on dynamic analysis and the OWASP page on fuzzing identify some dynamic analysis tools. The analysis tool(s) MAY be focused on looking for security vulnerabilities, but this is not required.

    cargo-fuzz (libFuzzer) harnesses in their own nightly workspace cover the readers that parse outside input — the citation readers, the decision tables, histogram decoding and the vendored archetype and template corpus packs. The scheduled lane fuzzes weekly (https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/actions/workflows/fuzz.yml) and CI compiles every harness on each pull request that touches the sources, so the lane cannot rot silently. The full test suite also runs against the instrument as built, and the release profile keeps overflow-checks on.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    There is no memory-unsafe code to analyse. unsafe_code = "forbid" applies to the whole workspace, and forbid cannot be relaxed by an attribute — not even #[allow] compiles under it — so introducing unsafe would require a deliberate change to stop inheriting the lint table rather than a local suppression. The libFuzzer harnesses still run over every outside-input reader with sanitizer instrumentation regardless: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/Cargo.toml


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]
    This criterion does not suggest enabling assertions during production; that is entirely up to the project and its users to decide. This criterion's focus is instead to improve fault detection during dynamic analysis before deployment. Enabling assertions in production use is completely different from enabling assertions during dynamic analysis (such as testing). In some cases enabling assertions in production use is extremely unwise (especially in high-integrity components). There are many arguments against enabling assertions in production, e.g., libraries should not crash callers, their presence may cause rejection by app stores, and/or activating an assertion in production may expose private data such as private keys. Beware that in many Linux distributions NDEBUG is not defined, so C/C++ assert() will by default be enabled for production in those environments. It may be important to use a different assertion mechanism or defining NDEBUG for production in those environments.

    Assertions stay on where the dynamic analysis runs: debug assertions and integer-overflow checks are enabled by default in the test and fuzz builds, and the release profile deliberately keeps overflow-checks = true and debug = line-tables-only, so an overflow panics loudly in production and names its file and line rather than wrapping silently: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/Cargo.toml


    Enough for a badge!

    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]
    If you are not running dynamic code analysis and thus have not found any vulnerabilities in this way, choose "not applicable" (N/A). A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known.

    Fixed as found: the fuzzing lane turned up three document-processing defects — literal nesting depth, brace-expansion variants and a citation-resolution stack overflow — and all three were fixed with pinned regression tests and shipped in 0.1.0-alpha.4, with the accumulated corpus kept so they stay covered: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/releases



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Project badge entry owned by: Ruben Talstra.
Entry created on 2026-08-26 14:17:43 UTC, last updated on 2026-08-27 17:48:50 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-08-27 15:20:01 UTC.