ratchet

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Gold level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Silver level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 4/5

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Effect gate for AI agents. An agent asks before it charges a card, ships a deploy, or sends the email, and gets back a durable decision — so the same real-world action is attempted at most once. Ratchet never performs the effect itself and holds no vendor credentials.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.
  • Prerequisites


    The project MUST achieve a silver level badge. [achieve_silver]

  • Project oversight


    The project MUST have a "bus factor" of 2 or more. (URL required) [bus_factor]
    A "bus factor" (aka "truck factor") is the minimum number of project members that have to suddenly disappear from a project ("hit by a bus") before the project stalls due to lack of knowledgeable or competent personnel. The truck-factor tool can estimate this for projects on GitHub. For more information, see Assessing the Bus Factor of Git Repositories by Cosentino et al.

    Two people hold every credential the project depends on — the npm account, the domain registrar, Fly.io, and the database including AUTH_SECRET — and both hold admin on this repository, so either can create and close issues, accept proposed changes, and cut a release without recovering the other's personal account first. Roles and the full asset list: https://github.com/thearchitect0x-glitch/ratchet/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#continuity . Recovery procedure, written for somebody who is not the author: https://github.com/thearchitect0x-glitch/ratchet/blob/main/docs/handoff/RECOVERY.md



    The project MUST have at least two unassociated significant contributors. (URL required) [contributors_unassociated]
    Contributors are associated if they are paid to work by the same organization (as an employee or contractor) and the organization stands to benefit from the project's results. Financial grants do not count as being from the same organization if they pass through other organizations (e.g., science grants paid to different organizations from a common government or NGO source do not cause contributors to be associated). Someone is a significant contributor if they have made non-trivial contributions to the project in the past year. Examples of good indicators of a significant contributor are: written at least 1,000 lines of code, contributed 50 commits, or contributed at least 20 pages of documentation.

    Not met, and answered rather than left blank. Ratchet has one significant contributor, the maintainer. The second repository administrator is a partner at Deimos AI LLC and is therefore associated, which this criterion's own details explicitly exclude. Outside contribution is real but not yet significant by the threshold in those details (roughly 1,000 lines, 50 commits, or 20 pages of documentation within a year): https://github.com/thearchitect0x-glitch/ratchet/pull/12 was merged from a contributor with no connection to the company. Substantial work is scoped and open for anyone to take: https://github.com/thearchitect0x-glitch/ratchet/issues/15


  • Other


    The project MUST include a license statement in each source file. This MAY be done by including the following inside a comment near the beginning of each file: SPDX-License-Identifier: [SPDX license expression for project]. [license_per_file]
    This MAY also be done by including a statement in natural language identifying the license. The project MAY also include a stable URL pointing to the license text, or the full license text. Note that the criterion license_location requires the project license be in a standard location. See this SPDX tutorial for more information about SPDX license expressions. Note the relationship with copyright_per_file, whose content would typically precede the license information.

    Every source file carries SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 immediately alongside the copyright line, in that file's own comment syntax. https://github.com/thearchitect0x-glitch/ratchet/blob/main/src/domain/effects.ts


 Change Control 4/4

  • Public version-controlled source repository


    The project's source repository MUST use a common distributed version control software (e.g., git or mercurial). [repo_distributed]
    Git is not specifically required and projects can use centralized version control software (such as subversion) with justification.

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.



    The project MUST clearly identify small tasks that can be performed by new or casual contributors. (URL required) [small_tasks]
    This identification is typically done by marking selected issues in an issue tracker with one or more tags the project uses for the purpose, e.g., up-for-grabs, first-timers-only, "Small fix", microtask, or IdealFirstBug. These new tasks need not involve adding functionality; they can be improving documentation, adding test cases, or anything else that aids the project and helps the contributor understand more about the project.

    https://github.com/thearchitect0x-glitch/ratchet/labels/good%20first%20issue - four tasks, each self-contained and carrying file paths and acceptance criteria: guard the per-file licence headers with a test, property-test normalizeText directly, fuzz the MCP JSON-RPC parser, and document which error codes are worth retrying. All four are real work identified during development, not tasks invented to satisfy this criterion.



    The project MUST require two-factor authentication (2FA) for developers for changing a central repository or accessing sensitive data (such as private vulnerability reports). This 2FA mechanism MAY use mechanisms without cryptographic mechanisms such as SMS, though that is not recommended. [require_2FA]

    GitHub requires 2FA as of March 2023. [osps_ac_01_01]



    The project's two-factor authentication (2FA) SHOULD use cryptographic mechanisms to prevent impersonation. Short Message Service (SMS) based 2FA, by itself, does NOT meet this criterion, since it is not encrypted. [secure_2FA]
    A 2FA mechanism that meets this criterion would be a Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP) application that automatically generates an authentication code that changes after a certain period of time. Note that GitHub supports TOTP.

    Two-factor authentication on the account that controls the repository, the deployment path and the npm publish workflow uses a TOTP authenticator application, not SMS. TOTP is a cryptographic mechanism and is the example this criterion names as meeting it; GitHub supports it directly. SMS was in use previously and was recorded here as unmet until it was replaced, because SMS is not encrypted and can be taken by SIM swap without access to any device the holder owns. That mattered more than the criterion: npm releases are signed with SLSA provenance generated by a workflow in this repository, so an attacker holding the account could have shipped artifacts carrying genuine, verifiable provenance.


 Quality 6/7

  • Coding standards


    The project MUST document its code review requirements, including how code review is conducted, what must be checked, and what is required to be acceptable. (URL required) [code_review_standards]
    See also two_person_review and contribution_requirements.

    https://github.com/thearchitect0x-glitch/ratchet/blob/main/docs/CODE_REVIEW.md documents what is checked automatically (full suite, property-based fuzzing, production dependency audit, CodeQL), what is checked by reading against the project contract in CLAUDE.md, what makes a change unacceptable, and the rule that a test must be broken on purpose and watched to fail before it is trusted. It also states plainly that review here is not two people agreeing, and why - see two_person_review, recorded unmet.



    The project MUST have at least 50% of all proposed modifications reviewed before release by a person other than the author, to determine if it is a worthwhile modification and free of known issues which would argue against its inclusion [two_person_review]

    Enforced, not intended. main carries a repository ruleset with no bypass actors: a change reaches it only through a pull request carrying an approving review from somebody other than the last pusher (require_last_push_approval is on). It binds the maintainer too, which was confirmed by attempting a direct push and being refused rather than read off a settings page. What a reviewer checks: https://github.com/thearchitect0x-glitch/ratchet/blob/main/docs/CODE_REVIEW.md . The first change to go through the rule is the change that documents it: https://github.com/thearchitect0x-glitch/ratchet/pull/14 . Instituted 2026-09-05, so the proportion is 100% of proposed modifications from that date; the prior history of 3 reviewed of 247 commits is stated rather than claimed.


  • Working build system


    The project MUST have a reproducible build. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [build_reproducible]
    A reproducible build means that multiple parties can independently redo the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. In some cases, this can be resolved by forcing some sort order. JavaScript developers may consider using npm shrinkwrap and webpack OccurrenceOrderPlugin. GCC and clang users may find the -frandom-seed option useful. The build environment (including the toolset) can often be defined for external parties by specifying the cryptographic hash of a specific container or virtual machine that they can use for rebuilding. The reproducible builds project has documentation on how to do this.

    Two clean builds produce byte-identical output - 183 files, same manifest - and the output carries nothing specific to the machine that produced it. Source maps reference sources relatively with an empty sourceRoot, no file in dist contains the checkout's absolute path, TypeScript is pinned to an exact version, every Docker base image is pinned by digest, and npm ci resolves from a committed lockfile. Verified by a command rather than asserted: npm run verify:build, which runs in CI on every push and exits non-zero if two builds differ or if a source map references an absolute path. https://github.com/thearchitect0x-glitch/ratchet/blob/main/scripts/verify-reproducible.sh


  • Automated test suite


    A test suite MUST be invocable in a standard way for that language. (URL required) [test_invocation]
    For example, "make check", "mvn test", or "rake test" (Ruby).

    A single documented command: npm test

    Warning: URL required, but no URL found.



    The project MUST implement continuous integration, where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result. (URL required) [test_continuous_integration]
    In most cases this means that each developer who works full-time on the project integrates at least daily.

    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 90% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage90]

    90.87% statement coverage of src/, measured with c8 (FLOSS) across all three automated suites - unit, integration and end-to-end - against a disposable PostgreSQL database. npm run coverage reproduces it and fails below 90% statements, so the figure cannot drift beneath this claim without the build going red. Two earlier figures in this answer were wrong in opposite directions and both are worth stating: 85.68% counted the test files themselves in the denominator, and 80.01% then measured only unit and integration, leaving out the suite that covers the MCP handlers and the OAuth routes almost entirely.



    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% branch coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_branch_coverage80]

    81.56% branch coverage of src/, measured with c8 (FLOSS) across the unit, integration and end-to-end suites against a disposable PostgreSQL database. npm run coverage reproduces it and fails below 78% branches. Full measurement: 90.87% statements, 81.56% branches, 91.75% functions, 90.87% lines.


 Security 3/5

  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    The software produced by the project MUST support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 MUST be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    All network communication uses TLS. HSTS is set with max-age=31536000 and includeSubDomains, and outbound webhook delivery is https-only with private, loopback, link-local, CGNAT and metadata ranges refused.



    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    TLS 1.2 or later, negotiated by the hosting platform; nothing older is offered.


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    The project website, repository (if accessible via the web), and download site (if separate) MUST include key hardening headers with nonpermissive values. (URL required) [hardened_site]
    Note that GitHub and GitLab are known to meet this. Sites such as https://securityheaders.com/ can quickly check this. The key hardening headers are: Content Security Policy (CSP), HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS), X-Content-Type-Options (as "nosniff"), and X-Frame-Options. Fully static web sites with no ability to log in via the web pages could omit some hardening headers with less risk, but there's no reliable way to detect such sites, so we require these headers even if they are fully static sites.

    Found all required security hardening headers.

    Warning: URL required, but no URL found.


  • Other security issues


    The project MUST have performed a security review within the last 5 years. This review MUST consider the security requirements and security boundary. [security_review]
    This MAY be done by the project members and/or an independent evaluation. This evaluation MAY be supported by static and dynamic analysis tools, but there also must be human review to identify problems (particularly in design) that tools cannot detect.

    A security review has been performed and written down rather than asserted: https://github.com/thearchitect0x-glitch/ratchet/blob/main/ASSURANCE_CASE.md . It states seven security requirements, the threat model including what is explicitly out of scope, the trust boundary and what crosses it, the secure design argument, and a table of common implementation weaknesses with the countermeasure and the test holding each one. The security boundary is the product's central claim: Ratchet performs no side effect itself, holds no vendor credential, and has no outbound access to customer systems. The review was performed by the maintainer - this criterion asks for a review considering the security requirements and boundary, not for an outside reviewer, and no outside reviewer is claimed.



    Hardening mechanisms MUST be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. (URL required) [hardening]
    Hardening mechanisms may include HTTP headers like Content Security Policy (CSP), compiler flags to mitigate attacks (such as -fstack-protector), or compiler flags to eliminate undefined behavior. For our purposes least privilege is not considered a hardening mechanism (least privilege is important, but separate).

    Content-Security-Policy default-src 'self' with base-uri 'none', form-action 'self' and frame-ancestors 'none'; plus X-Content-Type-Options nosniff, X-Frame-Options DENY, Referrer-Policy strict-origin-when-cross-origin, Permissions-Policy denying geolocation, microphone and camera, and HSTS. The container runs as a non-root user.

    Warning: URL required, but no URL found.


 Analysis 2/2

  • Dynamic code analysis


    The project MUST apply at least one dynamic analysis tool to any proposed major production release of the software produced by the project before its release. [dynamic_analysis]
    A dynamic analysis tool examines the software by executing it with specific inputs. For example, the project MAY use a fuzzing tool (e.g., American Fuzzy Lop) or a web application scanner (e.g., OWASP ZAP or w3af). In some cases the OSS-Fuzz project may be willing to apply fuzz testing to your project. For purposes of this criterion the dynamic analysis tool needs to vary the inputs in some way to look for various kinds of problems or be an automated test suite with at least 80% branch coverage. The Wikipedia page on dynamic analysis and the OWASP page on fuzzing identify some dynamic analysis tools. The analysis tool(s) MAY be focused on looking for security vulnerabilities, but this is not required.

    The end-to-end suite exercises the built application over real HTTP against a real PostgreSQL database, and the deploy gate additionally runs a smoke test against the running staging build before any production release — a build that fails it is refused rather than promoted.



    The project SHOULD include many run-time assertions in the software it produces and check those assertions during dynamic analysis. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]
    This criterion does not suggest enabling assertions during production; that is entirely up to the project and its users to decide. This criterion's focus is instead to improve fault detection during dynamic analysis before deployment. Enabling assertions in production use is completely different from enabling assertions during dynamic analysis (such as testing). In some cases enabling assertions in production use is extremely unwise (especially in high-integrity components). There are many arguments against enabling assertions in production, e.g., libraries should not crash callers, their presence may cause rejection by app stores, and/or activating an assertion in production may expose private data such as private keys. Beware that in many Linux distributions NDEBUG is not defined, so C/C++ assert() will by default be enabled for production in those environments. It may be important to use a different assertion mechanism or defining NDEBUG for production in those environments.

    Assertions are enabled throughout the test suites, which run the application rather than mocking it. TypeScript strict mode and runtime JSON Schema validation act as always-on assertions at the API boundary in production too.



You can use tools and AI systems to propose changes via a simple URL, such as https://www.bestpractices.dev/en/projects/14440/choose/edit?osps_ac_01_01_status=Met&osps_ac_01_01_justification=GitHub+enforced. See our automation proposals system for how to do that. This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit The Architect and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: The Architect .
Entry created on 2026-09-03 20:43:11 UTC, last updated on 2026-09-06 07:04:04 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-09-03 21:23:31 UTC.