Stackyard

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Baseline Level 3 criteria. These are criteria version v2026.08.28.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    A self-hosted homelab dashboard you actually want to look at. Calm, live activity badges from any API, single container, zero dependencies.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

    Single-container self-hosted dashboard. Node API plus a vanilla HTML/CSS/JS frontend, no runtime npm dependencies. Released images are signed with cosign keyless signing and carry an SBOM attestation.

 Controls 19/21

  • Controls


    When a job is assigned permissions in a CI/CD pipeline, the source code or configuration MUST only assign the minimum privileges necessary for the corresponding activity. [OSPS-AC-04.02]
    Configure the project's CI/CD pipelines to assign the lowest available permissions to users and services by default, elevating permissions only when necessary for specific tasks. In some version control systems, this may be possible at the organizational or repository level. If not, set permissions at the top level of the pipeline.

    Every workflow declares permissions explicitly, most as contents: read or an empty set, and the release workflow grants packages: write and id-token: write only to the job that publishes and signs: https://github.com/SandObserver/Stackyard/tree/main/.github/workflows



    CI/CD pipelines which accept trusted collaborator input MUST sanitize and validate that input prior to use in the pipeline. [OSPS-BR-01.04]
    CI/CD pipelines should sanitize (quote, escape or exit on expected values) all collaborator inputs on explicit workflow executions. While collaborators are generally trusted, manual inputs to a workflow cannot be reviewed and could be abused by an account takeover or insider threat.

    The only manual input is the version string given to the release prep workflow. It is passed through an env variable and quoted at every use, never interpolated into a shell command, and the changelog gate rejects a version that is not newer than the last release or that has no dated section: https://github.com/SandObserver/Stackyard/blob/main/.github/workflows/release-prep.yml



    When an official release is created, all assets within that release MUST be clearly associated with the release identifier or another unique identifier for the asset. [OSPS-BR-02.02]
    Assign a unique version identifier to each software asset produced by the project, following a consistent naming convention or numbering scheme. Examples include SemVer, CalVer, or git commit id.

    The release publishes no separate binary assets. What it produces is the container image, tagged with the release version and addressed by digest, with the cosign signature and the SBOM attestation both bound to that digest, plus the source archives GitHub attaches under the same vX.Y.Z tag.



    The project MUST define a policy for managing secrets and credentials used by the project. The policy should include guidelines for storing, accessing, and rotating secrets and credentials. [OSPS-BR-07.02]
    Document how secrets and credentials are managed and used within the project. This should include details on how secrets are stored (e.g., using a secrets management tool), how access is controlled, and how secrets are rotated or updated. Ensure that sensitive information is not hard-coded in the source code or stored in version control systems.

    SECURITY.md documents the policy for the project's own credentials: CI secrets are GitHub Actions secrets readable only by a maintainer, release writes use a short-lived GitHub App token, signing is keyless so no signing key exists to store, secret scanning and push protection are enabled, and rotation happens on maintainer change or suspected exposure. https://github.com/SandObserver/Stackyard/blob/main/SECURITY.md



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the integrity and authenticity of the release assets. [OSPS-DO-03.01]
    Instructions in the project should contain information about the technology used, the commands to run, and the expected output. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    docs/security.md gives the exact cosign command, the expected certificate identity and OIDC issuer: https://github.com/SandObserver/Stackyard/blob/main/docs/security.md#verifying-a-release-image



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the expected identity of the person or process authoring the software release. [OSPS-DO-03.02]
    The expected identity may be in the form of key IDs used to sign, issuer and identity from a sigstore certificate, or other similar forms. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    The documented verification pins the signing identity to the project's own GitHub Actions workflow with --certificate-identity-regexp and --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com , so a signature made by anything else fails: https://github.com/SandObserver/Stackyard/blob/main/docs/security.md#verifying-a-release-image



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include a descriptive statement about the scope and duration of support for each release. [OSPS-DO-04.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for the project's released software assets, the project should have a SUPPORT.md file, a "Support" section in SECURITY.md, or other documentation explaining the support lifecycle, including the expected duration of support for each release, the types of support provided (e.g., bug fixes, security updates), and any relevant policies or procedures for obtaining support.

    SECURITY.md states the support model: the project is released from main, fixes land there and ship in the next tagged release, and reporters are asked to run a recent release. Older releases receive no backports: https://github.com/SandObserver/Stackyard/blob/main/SECURITY.md



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST provide a descriptive statement when releases or versions will no longer receive security updates. [OSPS-DO-05.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for security fixes, the project should have a SUPPORT.md or other documentation explaining the project's policy for security updates.

    SECURITY.md states that security fixes land on main and ship in the next tagged release, so a release stops receiving security updates once a newer release exists. There is no parallel maintenance branch: https://github.com/SandObserver/Stackyard/blob/main/SECURITY.md



    The project documentation MUST have a policy that code collaborators are reviewed prior to granting escalated permissions to sensitive resources. [OSPS-GV-04.01]
    Publish an enforceable policy in the project documentation that requires code collaborators to be reviewed and approved before being granted escalated permissions to sensitive resources, such as merge approval or access to secrets. It is recommended that vetting includes establishing a justifiable lineage of identity such as confirming the contributor's association with a known trusted organization.

    GOVERNANCE.md publishes the policy: write access is granted only by the maintainer, only to someone with a record of merged contributions to this repository, and in stages, with access to secrets, the registry accounts and the release path as a separate later decision. Access is removed when someone stops maintaining the project. https://github.com/SandObserver/Stackyard/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md



    When the project has made a release, all compiled released software assets MUST be delivered with a software bill of materials. [OSPS-QA-02.02]
    It is recommended to auto-generate SBOMs at build time using a tool that has been vetted for accuracy. This enables users to ingest this data in a standardized approach alongside other projects in their environment.

    An SBOM is generated at build time and attested to the released image digest with cosign, so it is retrievable from the registry for any released version: https://github.com/SandObserver/Stackyard/blob/main/.github/workflows/release.yml



    When the project has made a release comprising multiple source code repositories, all subprojects MUST enforce security requirements that are as strict or stricter than the primary codebase. [OSPS-QA-04.02]
    Any additional subproject code repositories produced by the project and compiled into a release must enforce security requirements as applicable to the status and intent of the respective codebase. In addition to following the corresponding OSPS Baseline requirements, this may include requiring a security review, ensuring that it is free of vulnerabilities, and ensuring that it is free of known security issues.

    The release is built from a single repository. No subproject repository is compiled into a released asset.



    The project documentation MUST clearly document when and how tests are run. [OSPS-QA-06.02]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains how to run the tests locally and how to run the tests in the CI/CD pipeline. The documentation should explain what the tests are testing and how to interpret the results.

    CONTRIBUTING.md lists the checks in the order CI runs them, with the commands to run each locally, and states that the same list is defined once in .github/actions/checks so the local and CI runs cannot drift: https://github.com/SandObserver/Stackyard/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md



    The project documentation MUST include a policy that all major changes to the software produced by the project should add or update tests of the functionality in an automated test suite. [OSPS-QA-06.03]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains the policy for adding or updating tests. The policy should explain what constitutes a major change and what tests should be added or updated.

    CONTRIBUTING.md states the policy: a change to behaviour lands with its tests in the same pull request, new functionality needs tests for that functionality, a bug fix needs a test that fails without it, and the coverage floor enforces part of that rule rather than all of it. https://github.com/SandObserver/Stackyard/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md



    When a commit is made to the primary branch, the project's version control system MUST require at least one non-author human approval of the changes before merging. [OSPS-QA-07.01]
    Configure the project's version control system to require at least one non-author human approval of changes before merging into the release or primary branch. This can be achieved by requiring a pull request to be reviewed and approved by at least one other collaborator before it can be merged.

    The project has a single maintainer, so no second person is available to approve. Every change still goes through a pull request with three required status checks, and direct pushes to main are blocked. This will be met if the project gains a second maintainer.



    When the project has made a release, the project MUST perform a threat modeling and attack surface analysis to understand and protect against attacks on critical code paths, functions, and interactions within the system. [OSPS-SA-03.02]
    Threat modeling is an activity where the project looks at the codebase, associated processes and infrastructure, interfaces, key components and "thinks like a hacker" and brainstorms how the system be be broken or compromised. Each identified threat is listed out so the project can then think about how to proactively avoid or close off any gaps/vulnerabilities that could arise. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    docs/security.md states the threat model explicitly, including what the outbound-request guard defends against and what it does not, the trust position of an administrator, the first-run window before a password is set, and the reasoning behind the secret-restore rule that stops an imported config from redirecting a stored credential: https://github.com/SandObserver/Stackyard/blob/main/docs/security.md



    Any vulnerabilities in the software components not affecting the project MUST be accounted for in a VEX document, augmenting the vulnerability report with non-exploitability details. [OSPS-VM-04.02]
    Establish a VEX feed communicating the exploitability status of known vulnerabilities, including assessment details or any mitigations in place preventing vulnerable code from being executed.

    The project publishes no VEX feed. Findings that do not affect the shipped image are handled by the scan configuration, which ignores unfixed findings and gates on fixable HIGH and CRITICAL results, rather than by a published exploitability statement.



    The project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. [OSPS-VM-05.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    SECURITY.md publishes the threshold: a HIGH or CRITICAL finding with a fix available fails the run, findings with no fix available do not block and are picked up by the weekly scan once a fix exists, and any dependency added must be under an OSI-approved license compatible with Apache-2.0. https://github.com/SandObserver/Stackyard/blob/main/SECURITY.md



    The project documentation MUST include a policy to address SCA violations prior to any release. [OSPS-VM-05.02]
    Document a policy in the project to address applicable Software Composition Analysis results before any release, and add status checks that verify compliance with that policy prior to release.

    The same published threshold gates the release build for both platforms, so a fixable HIGH or CRITICAL finding blocks publication. Policy in SECURITY.md, enforcement in the release workflow: https://github.com/SandObserver/Stackyard/blob/main/SECURITY.md



    All changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for malicious dependencies and known vulnerabilities in dependencies, then blocked in the event of violations, except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-05.03]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Software Composition Analysis tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    Trivy scans the image the pull request produces, inside the required checks action, with the same severity and ignore-unfixed settings as the release gate. A fixable HIGH or CRITICAL finding fails the check and blocks the merge: https://github.com/SandObserver/Stackyard/blob/main/.github/actions/checks/action.yml



    The project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SAST findings. [OSPS-VM-06.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of Static Application Security Testing (SAST) findings. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    CONTRIBUTING.md sets the threshold at every finding: CodeQL runs on every pull request and a finding it reports has to be resolved before merge. Lint warnings are treated the same way, with a warning failing the run: https://github.com/SandObserver/Stackyard/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md



    All changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for security weaknesses and blocked in the event of violations except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-06.02]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    CodeQL analysis is a required status check on main, so a pull request cannot merge while it fails: https://github.com/SandObserver/Stackyard/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml



You can use tools and AI systems to propose changes via a simple URL, such as https://www.bestpractices.dev/en/projects/14462/choose/edit?osps_ac_01_01_status=Met&osps_ac_01_01_justification=GitHub+enforced. See our automation proposals system for how to do that. This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit SandObserver and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: SandObserver.
Entry created on 2026-09-06 03:19:23 UTC, last updated on 2026-09-06 15:26:29 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-09-06 04:26:37 UTC.