btclib-node

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Gold level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Silver level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 3/5 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    A full node bitcoin implementation written in Python and based on btclib.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.
  • Prerequisites


    The project MUST achieve a silver level badge. [achieve_silver]

  • Project oversight


    The project MUST have a "bus factor" of 2 or more. (URL required) [bus_factor]
    A "bus factor" (aka "truck factor") is the minimum number of project members that have to suddenly disappear from a project ("hit by a bus") before the project stalls due to lack of knowledgeable or competent personnel. The truck-factor tool can estimate this for projects on GitHub. For more information, see Assessing the Bus Factor of Git Repositories by Cosentino et al.

    fametrano wrote almost all of the code and is the only person who knows it in depth. The claude account in the contributors graph comes from the Co-Authored-By trailer on AI-assisted commits, almost all of them fametrano's. pmazzocchi, an organization owner, did the 2026-09-30 security review and has since made ten commits, from 2026-10-15 to 2026-10-26. In the last year, outside contributors have made only small changes. giacomocaironi, also an organization owner, wrote early parts of the code but has made no commit since 2023. The organization owners administer every repository. Knowledge of the code rests on fametrano alone. https://github.com/btclib-org/.github/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#continuity https://github.com/btclib-org/btclib-node/graphs/contributors



    The project MUST have at least two unassociated significant contributors. (URL required) [contributors_unassociated]
    Contributors are associated if they are paid to work by the same organization (as an employee or contractor) and the organization stands to benefit from the project's results. Financial grants do not count as being from the same organization if they pass through other organizations (e.g., science grants paid to different organizations from a common government or NGO source do not cause contributors to be associated). Someone is a significant contributor if they have made non-trivial contributions to the project in the past year. Examples of good indicators of a significant contributor are: written at least 1,000 lines of code, contributed 50 commits, or contributed at least 20 pages of documentation.

    fametrano is the only significant contributor. In the last year, outside contributors have made only small changes. pmazzocchi, an organization owner, has made ten commits, from 2026-10-15 to 2026-10-26; pmazzocchi and fametrano are associated: both are CheckSig co-founders, as their GitHub profiles state. giacomocaironi, also an organization owner, wrote early parts of the code but has made no commit since 2023. https://github.com/fametrano https://github.com/pmazzocchi


  • Other


    The project MUST include a license statement in each source file. This MAY be done by including the following inside a comment near the beginning of each file: SPDX-License-Identifier: [SPDX license expression for project]. [license_per_file]
    This MAY also be done by including a statement in natural language identifying the license. The project MAY also include a stable URL pointing to the license text, or the full license text. Note that the criterion license_location requires the project license be in a standard location. See this SPDX tutorial for more information about SPDX license expressions. Note the relationship with copyright_per_file, whose content would typically precede the license information.

    Every source file under src/ states "Distributed under the MIT software license", e.g. https://github.com/btclib-org/btclib-node/blob/main/src/btclib_node/__init__.py


 Change Control 4/4 ●

  • Public version-controlled source repository


    The project's source repository MUST use a common distributed version control software (e.g., git or mercurial). [repo_distributed]
    Git is not specifically required and projects can use centralized version control software (such as subversion) with justification.

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.



    The project MUST clearly identify small tasks that can be performed by new or casual contributors. (URL required) [small_tasks]
    This identification is typically done by marking selected issues in an issue tracker with one or more tags the project uses for the purpose, e.g., up-for-grabs, first-timers-only, "Small fix", microtask, or IdealFirstBug. These new tasks need not involve adding functionality; they can be improving documentation, adding test cases, or anything else that aids the project and helps the contributor understand more about the project.

    Small tasks for new contributors carry the label "good first issue", which CONTRIBUTING.md sets aside for a first contribution; gh issue list -R btclib-org/btclib-node --label "good first issue" --state open lists them. https://github.com/btclib-org/btclib-node/issues?q=label%3A%22good+first+issue%22



    The project MUST require two-factor authentication (2FA) for developers for changing a central repository or accessing sensitive data (such as private vulnerability reports). This 2FA mechanism MAY use mechanisms without cryptographic mechanisms such as SMS, though that is not recommended. [require_2FA]

    The btclib-org organization requires two-factor authentication of every member. https://github.com/btclib-org



    The project's two-factor authentication (2FA) SHOULD use cryptographic mechanisms to prevent impersonation. Short Message Service (SMS) based 2FA, by itself, does NOT meet this criterion, since it is not encrypted. [secure_2FA]
    A 2FA mechanism that meets this criterion would be a Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP) application that automatically generates an authentication code that changes after a certain period of time. Note that GitHub supports TOTP.

    The btclib-org organization requires two-factor authentication and allows only secure methods: TOTP apps, security keys or passkeys, and GitHub Mobile, not SMS. https://github.com/btclib-org/.github/issues/1362#issuecomment-5903994882


 Quality 6/7 ●

  • Coding standards


    The project MUST document its code review requirements, including how code review is conducted, what must be checked, and what is required to be acceptable. (URL required) [code_review_standards]
    See also two_person_review and contribution_requirements.

    REVIEWING.md states what a review checks, how a finding is written and what clears a pull request; the part shared by every repository is followed by what this tree checks in particular. https://github.com/btclib-org/btclib-node/blob/main/REVIEWING.md



    The project MUST have at least 50% of all proposed modifications reviewed before release by a person other than the author, to determine if it is a worthwhile modification and free of known issues which would argue against its inclusion [two_person_review]

    Over v2026.11.12 and v2026.11.14, 5 of 42 pull requests were approved by somebody other than the author, 12%, below the 50% the criterion asks (v2026.11.14 3 of 35, v2026.11.12 2 of 7); fametrano gave every one of those approvals. Counted by merge time between release publications, over the same two-release window on every btclib-org project, with gh pr list -R btclib-org/btclib-node -s merged -L 500 -S 'merged:2026-11-12T08:36:23Z..2026-11-14T20:17:09Z' --json author,reviews,mergedAt -q '[.[] | .author.login as $a | .mergedAt as $m | [.reviews[] | select(.state == "APPROVED" and .author.login != $a and .submittedAt < $m) | .author.login] | unique] | {merged: length, approved: map(select(length > 0)) | length, approvers: (add | unique)}' for v2026.11.14, and the same command over merged:2026-11-12T00:28:10Z..2026-11-12T08:36:22Z for v2026.11.12. An approval counts only where it was submitted before the pull request merged. Each window ends at its release's publication and starts a second after the one before, read with gh release list -R btclib-org/btclib-node -L 3 --json tagName,publishedAt. main's main-self-merge ruleset requires one approving review from somebody other than the author, and fametrano holds a pull_request-mode bypass of it. Read with gh api repos/btclib-org/btclib-node/rulesets/20736359 --jq '{name, bypass: [.bypass_actors[] | {actor_id, bypass_mode}], reviews: (.rules[] | select(.type == "pull_request") | .parameters | {required_approving_review_count, dismiss_stale_reviews_on_push})}', with admin rights, on 2026-11-15; actor 3296421 is fametrano (gh api users/fametrano --jq .id). https://github.com/btclib-org/.github/issues/2021


  • Working build system


    The project MUST have a reproducible build. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [build_reproducible]
    A reproducible build means that multiple parties can independently redo the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. In some cases, this can be resolved by forcing some sort order. JavaScript developers may consider using npm shrinkwrap and webpack OccurrenceOrderPlugin. GCC and clang users may find the -frandom-seed option useful. The build environment (including the toolset) can often be defined for external parties by specifying the cryptographic hash of a specific container or virtual machine that they can use for rebuilding. The reproducible builds project has documentation on how to do this.

    The sdist is built with SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH from the commit. sdist-rebuild.yml rebuilds the latest release's sdist from its tag and verifies it against the release's attestation, and RELEASING.md gives the same check. https://github.com/btclib-org/btclib-node/blob/main/.github/workflows/sdist-rebuild.yml


  • Automated test suite


    A test suite MUST be invocable in a standard way for that language. (URL required) [test_invocation]
    For example, "make check", "mvn test", or "rake test" (Ruby).

    The project MUST implement continuous integration, where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result. (URL required) [test_continuous_integration]
    In most cases this means that each developer who works full-time on the project integrates at least daily.

    Every push to main starts test.yml's suite under coverage, and so does every pull request that is ready for review and changes more than the files test.yml's prose-pattern names. Each push to main gets a run of its own, which no later push cancels (section 10 of the organization's standard). A pull request changing only those reports the skip as a pass. Its aggregate job, test: every job passed, is a required check on main. enforce_admins is off, so an administrator's merge bypasses that check. https://github.com/btclib-org/btclib-node/blob/main/.github/workflows/test.yml



    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 90% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage90]

    pyproject.toml sets [tool.coverage.report] fail_under = 100, enforced by test.yml, which starts on every push to main and on every pull request that is ready for review and changes more than the files test.yml's prose-pattern names. enforce_admins is off, so an administrator's merge bypasses test.yml. Each push to main gets a run of its own, which no later push cancels (section 10 of the organization's standard). https://github.com/btclib-org/btclib-node/blob/main/pyproject.toml



    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% branch coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_branch_coverage80]

    pyproject.toml sets branch = true in the coverage configuration, so the 100% gate counts branches. enforce_admins is off, so an administrator's merge bypasses that gate. https://github.com/btclib-org/btclib-node/blob/main/pyproject.toml


 Security 3/5 ●

  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    The software produced by the project MUST support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 MUST be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    Peer traffic uses BIP324's encrypted v2 transport by default. Plaintext v1 is on only when started with -v1transport=1 or -v2transport=0. The JSON-RPC listener speaks plain HTTP only, with no TLS option. It binds loopback by default. Peers are found through DNS seeds over plain DNS, as in Bitcoin Core. https://github.com/btclib-org/btclib-node/blob/main/SECURITY.md#where-this-node-departs-from-bitcoin-core https://github.com/btclib-org/btclib-node/blob/main/SECURITY.md#limitations-not-vulnerabilities



    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    btclib-node's p2p transport is not TLS-based (Bitcoin's wire protocol has no TLS layer), so there is no TLS support for this criterion to apply to. https://github.com/btclib-org/btclib-node/blob/main/ARCHITECTURE.md


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    The project website, repository (if accessible via the web), and download site (if separate) MUST include key hardening headers with nonpermissive values. (URL required) [hardened_site]
    Note that GitHub and GitLab are known to meet this. Sites such as https://securityheaders.com/ can quickly check this. The key hardening headers are: Content Security Policy (CSP), HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS), X-Content-Type-Options (as "nosniff"), and X-Frame-Options. Fully static web sites with no ability to log in via the web pages could omit some hardening headers with less risk, but there's no reliable way to detect such sites, so we require these headers even if they are fully static sites.

    PyPI, the index pip installs the package from, sends no Content-Security-Policy on its project page, one of the headers the criterion requires of the download site. Measured with curl -sIL on 2026-11-14: https://btclib.org/btclib-node/ sends Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff and X-Frame-Options: DENY. The repository and its releases page on github.com send all four. https://pypi.org/project/btclib-node/ sends all but Content-Security-Policy, and PyPI sets the headers of its own site.


  • Other security issues


    The project MUST have performed a security review within the last 5 years. This review MUST consider the security requirements and security boundary. [security_review]
    This MAY be done by the project members and/or an independent evaluation. This evaluation MAY be supported by static and dynamic analysis tools, but there also must be human review to identify problems (particularly in design) that tools cannot detect.

    pmazzocchi, an owner other than the maintainer, reviewed the project on 2026-09-30. The review pins its scope to a commit, checks each claim of ASSURANCE_CASE.md, states what it did not cover and files each finding as an issue. https://github.com/btclib-org/btclib-node/issues/1559



    Hardening mechanisms MUST be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. (URL required) [hardening]
    Hardening mechanisms may include HTTP headers like Content Security Policy (CSP), compiler flags to mitigate attacks (such as -fstack-protector), or compiler flags to eliminate undefined behavior. For our purposes least privilege is not considered a hardening mechanism (least privilege is important, but separate).

    The fields that hold a credential are left out of repr, so a defect that renders their object in a log, a traceback or an error does not disclose it: a parsed RPC request's raw bytes and header fields, which hold the Authorization field (RequestHead, src/btclib_node/rpc/connection.py); an rpcauth entry's salt and HMAC (RpcAuthEntry, src/btclib_node/rpc/auth.py); and the configuration sources, which hold -rpcpassword (_Settings, src/btclib_node/cli.py). ruff's bandit S rules, strict mypy and CodeQL find defects before a release, which is not hardening. https://github.com/btclib-org/btclib-node/blob/main/src/btclib_node/rpc/connection.py


 Analysis 2/2 ●

  • Dynamic code analysis


    The project MUST apply at least one dynamic analysis tool to any proposed major production release of the software produced by the project before its release. [dynamic_analysis]
    A dynamic analysis tool examines the software by executing it with specific inputs. For example, the project MAY use a fuzzing tool (e.g., American Fuzzy Lop) or a web application scanner (e.g., OWASP ZAP or w3af). In some cases the OSS-Fuzz project may be willing to apply fuzz testing to your project. For purposes of this criterion the dynamic analysis tool needs to vary the inputs in some way to look for various kinds of problems or be an automated test suite with at least 80% branch coverage. The Wikipedia page on dynamic analysis and the OWASP page on fuzzing identify some dynamic analysis tools. The analysis tool(s) MAY be focused on looking for security vulnerabilities, but this is not required.

    Every release runs the test suite before it is published. release.yml calls test.yml, and the PyPI upload runs only if it passes. The suite fails below 100% coverage, branches included. Atheris fuzzing and cosmic-ray mutation testing also run every week. https://github.com/btclib-org/btclib-node/blob/main/.github/workflows/release.yml https://github.com/btclib-org/btclib-node/blob/main/.github/workflows/fuzz.yml



    The project SHOULD include many run-time assertions in the software it produces and check those assertions during dynamic analysis. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]
    This criterion does not suggest enabling assertions during production; that is entirely up to the project and its users to decide. This criterion's focus is instead to improve fault detection during dynamic analysis before deployment. Enabling assertions in production use is completely different from enabling assertions during dynamic analysis (such as testing). In some cases enabling assertions in production use is extremely unwise (especially in high-integrity components). There are many arguments against enabling assertions in production, e.g., libraries should not crash callers, their presence may cause rejection by app stores, and/or activating an assertion in production may expose private data such as private keys. Beware that in many Linux distributions NDEBUG is not defined, so C/C++ assert() will by default be enabled for production in those environments. It may be important to use a different assertion mechanism or defining NDEBUG for production in those environments.

    The suite and the fuzz harnesses run without -O, so the assert statements in src/ hold during them, but they are a handful, not the many assertions the criterion asks for: git grep -P '^\s*assert\b' -- src | wc -l counts them, and all but one assert only that a value is not None. https://github.com/btclib-org/btclib-node/blob/main/.github/workflows/fuzz.yml



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Project badge entry owned by: Ferdinando Ametrano.
Entry created on 2026-09-24 15:05:22 UTC, last updated on 2026-11-15 23:02:15 UTC. Last lost passing badge on 2026-10-04 18:41:43 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-10-04 18:47:20 UTC.