repoforge

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Baseline Level 3 criteria. These are criteria version v2026.08.28.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Declarative repository policy, a Go CLI that enforces it, and a generated starter repository. RepoForge: validate, doctor, bootstrap, template, wiki.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

    Control-by-control OpenSSF Baseline conformance with evidence pointers: docs/security/osps-baseline.md.

 Controls 21/21 ●

  • Controls


    When a job is assigned permissions in a CI/CD pipeline, the source code or configuration MUST only assign the minimum privileges necessary for the corresponding activity. [OSPS-AC-04.02]
    Configure the project's CI/CD pipelines to assign the lowest available permissions to users and services by default, elevating permissions only when necessary for specific tasks. In some version control systems, this may be possible at the organizational or repository level. If not, set permissions at the top level of the pipeline.

    Every workflow declares top-level permissions: {} and each job declares only what it needs. The least-privilege baseline is machine-checked by TestWorkflowPermissionsBaseline, which allowlists every write grant with its justification. Only the Scorecard SARIF upload, the release job, and the publication/preflight App-token mints hold write grants.



    CI/CD pipelines which accept trusted collaborator input MUST sanitize and validate that input prior to use in the pipeline. [OSPS-BR-01.04]
    CI/CD pipelines should sanitize (quote, escape or exit on expected values) all collaborator inputs on explicit workflow executions. While collaborators are generally trusted, manual inputs to a workflow cannot be reviewed and could be abused by an account takeover or insider threat.

    Manual workflow inputs are validated before use and passed to scripts through the environment, never interpolated into shell. The publication tag input is shape-checked (vMAJOR.MINOR.PATCH) before any command runs, and the composite action validates its inputs against an allowlist before any git command (TestCompositeActionValidatesItsInputs).



    When an official release is created, all assets within that release MUST be clearly associated with the release identifier or another unique identifier for the asset. [OSPS-BR-02.02]
    Assign a unique version identifier to each software asset produced by the project, following a consistent naming convention or numbering scheme. Examples include SemVer, CalVer, or git commit id.

    Semantic Versioning; scripts/release-check.sh enforces tag shape, annotation, and changelog presence for every release. [version_unique]



    The project MUST define a policy for managing secrets and credentials used by the project. The policy should include guidelines for storing, accessing, and rotating secrets and credentials. [OSPS-BR-07.02]
    Document how secrets and credentials are managed and used within the project. This should include details on how secrets are stored (e.g., using a secrets management tool), how access is controlled, and how secrets are rotated or updated. Ensure that sensitive information is not hard-coded in the source code or stored in version control systems.

    SECURITY.md documents the two repository secrets, that they live only in GitHub Actions secrets, who can reach them (one step in one job of one workflow), how they are rotated (docs/operations/template-publication.md), and their scope. repoforge validate rejects token- and key-shaped material; secret scanning with push protection is enabled.



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the integrity and authenticity of the release assets. [OSPS-DO-03.01]
    Instructions in the project should contain information about the technology used, the commands to run, and the expected output. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    docs/security/release-integrity.md documents the commands and expected output for verifying release assets, including the checksums.txt signature check and the annotated-tag and same-commit gates enforced by scripts/release-check.sh.



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the expected identity of the person or process authoring the software release. [OSPS-DO-03.02]
    The expected identity may be in the form of key IDs used to sign, issuer and identity from a sigstore certificate, or other similar forms. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    The release job holds attestations: write and mints GitHub build-provenance attestations for every archive (actions/attest; the v0.1.0 release run recorded 'Attestation created for 10 subjects'), verifiable with gh attestation verify and documented in docs/security/release-integrity.md.



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include a descriptive statement about the scope and duration of support for each release. [OSPS-DO-04.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for the project's released software assets, the project should have a SUPPORT.md file, a "Support" section in SECURITY.md, or other documentation explaining the support lifecycle, including the expected duration of support for each release, the types of support provided (e.g., bug fixes, security updates), and any relevant policies or procedures for obtaining support.

    SUPPORT.md and the Supported versions section of SECURITY.md state the scope and duration: pre-1.0, only the latest release receives fixes; best-effort maintenance with no SLA.



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST provide a descriptive statement when releases or versions will no longer receive security updates. [OSPS-DO-05.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for security fixes, the project should have a SUPPORT.md or other documentation explaining the project's policy for security updates.

    SECURITY.md states that only the latest release receives security fixes, that vulnerabilities are reported privately, and that disclosure is coordinated; the documented expectation covers both time-to-fix and disclosure.



    The project documentation MUST have a policy that code collaborators are reviewed prior to granting escalated permissions to sensitive resources. [OSPS-GV-04.01]
    Publish an enforceable policy in the project documentation that requires code collaborators to be reviewed and approved before being granted escalated permissions to sensitive resources, such as merge approval or access to secrets. It is recommended that vetting includes establishing a justifiable lineage of identity such as confirming the contributor's association with a known trusted organization.

    SECURITY.md (Collaborator access) requires a reviewed, linked issue stating the role and minimum access before any collaborator invitation; invited collaborators receive the minimum role, never administration; removal follows the same reviewed path.



    When the project has made a release, all compiled released software assets MUST be delivered with a software bill of materials. [OSPS-QA-02.02]
    It is recommended to auto-generate SBOMs at build time using a tool that has been vetted for accuracy. This enables users to ingest this data in a standardized approach alongside other projects in their environment.

    .goreleaser.yaml generates a CycloneDX SBOM for every archive; the v0.1.0 release published one .sbom.json per archive alongside checksums.txt.



    When the project has made a release comprising multiple source code repositories, all subprojects MUST enforce security requirements that are as strict or stricter than the primary codebase. [OSPS-QA-04.02]
    Any additional subproject code repositories produced by the project and compiled into a release must enforce security requirements as applicable to the status and intent of the respective codebase. In addition to following the corresponding OSPS Baseline requirements, this may include requiring a security review, ensuring that it is free of vulnerabilities, and ensuring that it is free of known security issues.

    The project ships two repositories (engine and generated template). The template is generated one-way from the engine with an immutable provenance manifest, and its CI rebuilds and verifies it byte-for-byte from the recorded source commit (TestTemplateCIProvenanceGateIsRepositoryScoped). Its ruleset requires the same review shape as the engine's.



    The project documentation MUST clearly document when and how tests are run. [OSPS-QA-06.02]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains how to run the tests locally and how to run the tests in the CI/CD pipeline. The documentation should explain what the tests are testing and how to interpret the results.

    The Go test suite (go test ./...) covers the CLI internals: config, template, validate, bootstrap, doctor, the GitHub client, and publication behavior. [test]



    The project documentation MUST include a policy that all major changes to the software produced by the project should add or update tests of the functionality in an automated test suite. [OSPS-QA-06.03]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains the policy for adding or updating tests. The policy should explain what constitutes a major change and what tests should be added or updated.

    CONTRIBUTING.md (Test policy) documents what constitutes a major change and what tests are expected. [tests_documented_added]



    When a commit is made to the primary branch, the project's version control system MUST require at least one non-author human approval of the changes before merging. [OSPS-QA-07.01]
    Configure the project's version control system to require at least one non-author human approval of changes before merging into the release or primary branch. This can be achieved by requiring a pull request to be reviewed and approved by at least one other collaborator before it can be merged.

    The main ruleset (repoforge:main, applied by repoforge bootstrap) requires one non-author approval, code-owner review, stale-review dismissal, and last-push approval. Every change reaches main through a reviewed pull request; a second maintainer holds the second seat.



    When the project has made a release, the project MUST perform a threat modeling and attack surface analysis to understand and protect against attacks on critical code paths, functions, and interactions within the system. [OSPS-SA-03.02]
    Threat modeling is an activity where the project looks at the codebase, associated processes and infrastructure, interfaces, key components and "thinks like a hacker" and brainstorms how the system be be broken or compromised. Each identified threat is listed out so the project can then think about how to proactively avoid or close off any gaps/vulnerabilities that could arise. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    docs/architecture/security.md (Threat model) enumerates assets, actors, and out-of-scope threats; spec.md 18 is the normative model. ADR-0014 shows the model in use: a code-scanning finding moved the publication trust boundary.



    Any vulnerabilities in the software components not affecting the project MUST be accounted for in a VEX document, augmenting the vulnerability report with non-exploitability details. [OSPS-VM-04.02]
    Establish a VEX feed communicating the exploitability status of known vulnerabilities, including assessment details or any mitigations in place preventing vulnerable code from being executed.

    No release has shipped a dependency vulnerability and no component the project uses currently has a known vulnerability, so no release note has needed a VEX statement. When the first affected release exists, its notes will state the exploitability status.



    The project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. [OSPS-VM-05.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    CONTRIBUTING.md (Dependency and scan policy): high and critical dependency vulnerabilities block merge and release; medium findings get a documented exception with an expiry; low findings are triaged monthly.



    The project documentation MUST include a policy to address SCA violations prior to any release. [OSPS-VM-05.02]
    Document a policy in the project to address applicable Software Composition Analysis results before any release, and add status checks that verify compliance with that policy prior to release.

    Dependency review runs on every pull request as a required status check, govulncheck scans the module graph in CI, and scripts/release-check.sh gates every tag on a green validation run, so a release cannot ship over a red check.



    All changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for malicious dependencies and known vulnerabilities in dependencies, then blocked in the event of violations, except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-05.03]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Software Composition Analysis tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    dependency-review is a required status check on the main ruleset; a failing dependency review blocks the merge.



    The project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SAST findings. [OSPS-VM-06.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of Static Application Security Testing (SAST) findings. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    Findings are fixed before merge; the error-severity findings on the publication workflow were fixed in PR #14 rather than suppressed. [static_analysis_fixed]



    All changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for security weaknesses and blocked in the event of violations except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-06.02]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    CodeQL default setup analyzes Go and GitHub Actions on every push and pull request, and govulncheck scans the module graph in CI; both analyses are required status checks on the main ruleset. [static_analysis]



You can use tools and AI systems to propose changes via a simple URL, such as https://www.bestpractices.dev/en/projects/15393/choose/edit?osps_ac_01_01_status=Met&osps_ac_01_01_justification=GitHub+enforced. See our automation proposals system for how to do that. This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Elizabeth Hayes and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Elizabeth Hayes.
Entry created on 2026-10-11 19:47:57 UTC, last updated on 2026-10-11 22:34:02 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-10-11 22:34:02 UTC.