portanode

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Baseline Level 3 criteria. These are criteria version v2026.08.28.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Portable (external disk) cross-platform Bitcoin full node.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

 Controls 14/21 ●

  • Controls


    Enough for a badge!

    When a job is assigned permissions in a CI/CD pipeline, the source code or configuration MUST only assign the minimum privileges necessary for the corresponding activity. [OSPS-AC-04.02]
    Configure the project's CI/CD pipelines to assign the lowest available permissions to users and services by default, elevating permissions only when necessary for specific tasks. In some version control systems, this may be possible at the organizational or repository level. If not, set permissions at the top level of the pipeline.

    Every workflow sets permissions: contents: read at the top. Only the claude-review job adds scopes, pull-requests: write and id-token: write, which it uses. zizmor's excessive-permissions audit runs in the required Lint check. https://github.com/btclib-org/portanode/blob/main/.github/workflows/claude-review.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    CI/CD pipelines which accept trusted collaborator input MUST sanitize and validate that input prior to use in the pipeline. [OSPS-BR-01.04]
    CI/CD pipelines should sanitize (quote, escape or exit on expected values) all collaborator inputs on explicit workflow executions. While collaborators are generally trusted, manual inputs to a workflow cannot be reviewed and could be abused by an account takeover or insider threat.

    Only verified-signatures.yml takes workflow_dispatch inputs, before and after. They reach the script through env:, and the script refuses any value that is not a hex commit sha. https://github.com/btclib-org/.github/blob/main/.github/workflows/reusable-verified-signatures.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    When an official release is created, all assets within that release MUST be clearly associated with the release identifier or another unique identifier for the asset. [OSPS-BR-02.02]
    Assign a unique version identifier to each software asset produced by the project, following a consistent naming convention or numbering scheme. Examples include SemVer, CalVer, or git commit id.

    The only asset of a release is GitHub's source archive, named after the tag: portanode-2026.10.17.zip for v2026.10.17. https://github.com/btclib-org/portanode/releases/latest


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST define a policy for managing secrets and credentials used by the project. The policy should include guidelines for storing, accessing, and rotating secrets and credentials. [OSPS-BR-07.02]
    Document how secrets and credentials are managed and used within the project. This should include details on how secrets are stored (e.g., using a secrets management tool), how access is controlled, and how secrets are rotated or updated. Ensure that sensitive information is not hard-coded in the source code or stored in version control systems.

    A secret is an environment secret that only the owners reach. A secret kept in any other store is recorded in the REPOSITORY.md of the repository that uses it, and btclib-org/.github's tests/secrets_test.py refuses an unrecorded one. A secret is rotated when an owner changes or an exposure is suspected. The secrets kept outside an environment are rotated before they are a year old, and the list is reviewed yearly. This repository holds no secret of its own. https://github.com/btclib-org/.github/blob/main/README.md#tokens-publishing-scanning https://github.com/btclib-org/portanode/blob/main/REPOSITORY.md#secrets


    Not enough for a badge.

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the integrity and authenticity of the release assets. [OSPS-DO-03.01]
    Instructions in the project should contain information about the technology used, the commands to run, and the expected output. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    No document tells a user how to verify a release: RELEASING.md reads the tag's signature back through the API for the maintainer, and nothing explains git verify-tag or where the signing key is. https://github.com/btclib-org/portanode/blob/main/RELEASING.md


    Not enough for a badge.

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the expected identity of the person or process authoring the software release. [OSPS-DO-03.02]
    The expected identity may be in the form of key IDs used to sign, issuer and identity from a sigstore certificate, or other similar forms. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    No document names the identity a release tag is expected to be signed by, such as the key fingerprint or the account. https://github.com/btclib-org/portanode/blob/main/RELEASING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include a descriptive statement about the scope and duration of support for each release. [OSPS-DO-04.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for the project's released software assets, the project should have a SUPPORT.md file, a "Support" section in SECURITY.md, or other documentation explaining the support lifecycle, including the expected duration of support for each release, the types of support provided (e.g., bug fixes, security updates), and any relevant policies or procedures for obtaining support.

    The security policy's Supported versions says that only the latest release is supported, nothing is backported, and a fix is a new release. https://github.com/btclib-org/.github/blob/main/SECURITY.md#supported-versions


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST provide a descriptive statement when releases or versions will no longer receive security updates. [OSPS-DO-05.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for security fixes, the project should have a SUPPORT.md or other documentation explaining the project's policy for security updates.

    The security policy: only the latest release is supported, so a release stops receiving security updates when the next one is published. https://github.com/btclib-org/.github/blob/main/SECURITY.md#supported-versions


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST have a policy that code collaborators are reviewed prior to granting escalated permissions to sensitive resources. [OSPS-GV-04.01]
    Publish an enforceable policy in the project documentation that requires code collaborators to be reviewed and approved before being granted escalated permissions to sensitive resources, such as merge approval or access to secrets. It is recommended that vetting includes establishing a justifiable lineage of identity such as confirming the contributor's association with a known trusted organization.

    A grant of write or admin, to any repository of the organization, is an issue in btclib-org/.github that states the reason, and an owner other than the one asking approves it there. https://github.com/btclib-org/.github/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#how-a-decision-is-made


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, all compiled released software assets MUST be delivered with a software bill of materials. [OSPS-QA-02.02]
    It is recommended to auto-generate SBOMs at build time using a tool that has been vetted for accuracy. This enables users to ingest this data in a standardized approach alongside other projects in their environment.

    A release ships no compiled asset: its only asset is GitHub's source archive of scripts and text. https://github.com/btclib-org/portanode/blob/main/RELEASING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release comprising multiple source code repositories, all subprojects MUST enforce security requirements that are as strict or stricter than the primary codebase. [OSPS-QA-04.02]
    Any additional subproject code repositories produced by the project and compiled into a release must enforce security requirements as applicable to the status and intent of the respective codebase. In addition to following the corresponding OSPS Baseline requirements, this may include requiring a security review, ensuring that it is free of vulnerabilities, and ensuring that it is free of known security issues.

    Each release is built from this single repository and from no subproject. https://github.com/btclib-org/portanode


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST clearly document when and how tests are run. [OSPS-QA-06.02]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains how to run the tests locally and how to run the tests in the CI/CD pipeline. The documentation should explain what the tests are testing and how to interpret the results.

    CONTRIBUTING.md's The environment and the gates gives the command that runs the gates, says lint.yml runs it on every pull request, and says the launchers are tested by hand on each platform, from a volume that is not the boot disk. lint.yml also runs on every push to main. https://github.com/btclib-org/portanode/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#the-environment-and-the-gates


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project documentation MUST include a policy that all major changes to the software produced by the project should add or update tests of the functionality in an automated test suite. [OSPS-QA-06.03]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains the policy for adding or updating tests. The policy should explain what constitutes a major change and what tests should be added or updated.

    No document asks a change to add or update tests in an automated suite, and the tree has none. https://github.com/btclib-org/portanode/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#the-environment-and-the-gates


    Not enough for a badge.

    When a commit is made to the primary branch, the project's version control system MUST require at least one non-author human approval of the changes before merging. [OSPS-QA-07.01]
    Configure the project's version control system to require at least one non-author human approval of changes before merging into the release or primary branch. This can be achieved by requiring a pull request to be reviewed and approved by at least one other collaborator before it can be merged.

    The main-self-merge ruleset requires one approving review from somebody other than the author, but the maintainer bypasses it in pull_request mode and can merge without one. https://github.com/btclib-org/portanode/blob/main/REPOSITORY.md#rulesets


    Not enough for a badge.

    When the project has made a release, the project MUST perform a threat modeling and attack surface analysis to understand and protect against attacks on critical code paths, functions, and interactions within the system. [OSPS-SA-03.02]
    Threat modeling is an activity where the project looks at the codebase, associated processes and infrastructure, interfaces, key components and "thinks like a hacker" and brainstorms how the system be be broken or compromised. Each identified threat is listed out so the project can then think about how to proactively avoid or close off any gaps/vulnerabilities that could arise. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    No threat model or attack-surface analysis exists. README.md's Limitations, not vulnerabilities lists known risks, but no document models the adversaries, the entry points or the trust boundaries. https://github.com/btclib-org/portanode/blob/main/README.md#limitations-not-vulnerabilities


    Enough for a badge!

    Any vulnerabilities in the software components not affecting the project MUST be accounted for in a VEX document, augmenting the vulnerability report with non-exploitability details. [OSPS-VM-04.02]
    Establish a VEX feed communicating the exploitability status of known vulnerabilities, including assessment details or any mitigations in place preventing vulnerable code from being executed.

    A release ships no third-party component: Bitcoin Core and Electrum are fetched from their publishers at update time and are not in the tree or the release. https://github.com/btclib-org/portanode/blob/main/AUTHORS.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. [OSPS-VM-05.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    The standard sets the threshold: actions/dependency-review-action fails a pull request that adds or changes a dependency with an advisory of moderate severity or above, or with a licence outside the allow-list. Its settings are btclib-org/.github's .github/dependency-review.yml. https://github.com/btclib-org/.github/blob/main/.github/dependency-review.yml


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project documentation MUST include a policy to address SCA violations prior to any release. [OSPS-VM-05.02]
    Document a policy in the project to address applicable Software Composition Analysis results before any release, and add status checks that verify compliance with that policy prior to release.

    RELEASING.md's steps gate the tree with pre-commit only. No step checks Dependabot alerts or another SCA result before the tag is cut. https://github.com/btclib-org/portanode/blob/main/RELEASING.md#cutting-one


    Enough for a badge!

    All changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for malicious dependencies and known vulnerabilities in dependencies, then blocked in the event of violations, except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-05.03]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Software Composition Analysis tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    The required Dependency review check runs on every pull request and blocks a change that adds a dependency with an advisory of moderate severity or above, or a licence outside the allow-list. The only dependencies it can see are the pinned actions. https://github.com/btclib-org/portanode/blob/main/.github/workflows/lint.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SAST findings. [OSPS-VM-06.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of Static Application Security Testing (SAST) findings. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    The threshold is zero: a finding of any hook in .pre-commit-config.yaml fails the required Lint check, and CONTRIBUTING.md's What gates a merge says a red Lint stops the merge. https://github.com/btclib-org/portanode/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#what-gates-a-merge-and-what-only-reports


    Not enough for a badge.

    All changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for security weaknesses and blocked in the event of violations except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-06.02]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    The required Lint check runs shellcheck on the .sh and .command scripts, zizmor and actionlint on the workflows, and detect-secrets on every file. No security analysis is run on the .bat and .ps1 scripts: Blinter and PSScriptAnalyzer are run by hand. https://github.com/btclib-org/portanode/blob/main/.pre-commit-config.yaml



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Project badge entry owned by: Ferdinando Ametrano.
Entry created on 2026-10-18 11:16:35 UTC, last updated on 2026-10-18 14:34:30 UTC.