AIGovern-Cyber-POC007

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Baseline Level 1 criteria. These are criteria version v2026.08.28.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    A standalone Apache-2.0 Rust research capsule derived from ESS-MAI: scoped obligations, promise fulfilment, failure evidence and exact positive/negative comparison, with reproducible fixtures and disclosed counterexamples.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

    ASSESSMENT SCOPE: the standalone public POC007 capsule only; the full private AIGovern-Cyber runtime is excluded. This is a maintainer self-assessment, not an independent security audit or certification. Assessment basis: bf34c7b9478d4dd152798a7e8f1a43d8f24ac33f and frozen poc007-public-v0.1.2; later documentation does not change the executable code. Twelve published author-reported tests, including tool-assisted runs, are bounded fixture evidence.

    ESS-MAI is the originating architectural method, authored by Bledar Gjata / Gjata Legacy. It separates applicable law, bounded authority, evidence, traceability and the final right to commit. The public family covers POC003 cold-start reachability, POC004 GCL/Law-0 continuity, POC005 FFI authority nonduplication, POC006 verified negative-knowledge re-entry, and POC007 obligation/promise/scoped comparison. Linking these predecessor artifacts does not extend this assessment to them.

    The technical brief maps the proposed roles of D-BAB (witness), 0-NOI (trigger), negative knowledge, PD/Vault references and iZ clarification to available evidence and limits. It preserves semantic-reissuance, restart, caller-trust and rollback limitations rather than treating test counts as universal proof. Reviewers are invited to reproduce one obligation and report a counterexample.
    https://github.com/gjatalegacy-create/AIGovern-Cyber-POC007/blob/main/ESS_MAI_RESEARCH_CASE.md

    Parent method and POC003-006: https://github.com/gjatalegacy-create/ESS-MAI
    POC007 software DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23596907
    Author ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0003-7854-266X
    AI-assisted implementation, author-reported shell inspection and evidence categories: https://github.com/gjatalegacy-create/AIGovern-Cyber-POC007/blob/main/WORKING_METHOD.md

    No public-sector deployment, institutional endorsement, worldwide novelty or complete hardware-control validation is asserted. The larger product source and operational histories remain private.

 Controls 18/24 ●

  • Controls


    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    When a user attempts to read or modify a sensitive resource in the project's authoritative repository, the system MUST require the user to complete a multi-factor authentication process. [OSPS-AC-01.01]
    Enforce multi-factor authentication for the project's version control system, requiring collaborators to provide a second form of authentication when accessing sensitive data or modifying repository settings. Passkeys are acceptable for this control.

    Not independently verified: the default GitHub automation is insufficient to establish MFA enforcement for every collaborator on this repository. No security setting was changed for this assessment.


    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    When a new collaborator is added, the version control system MUST require manual permission assignment, or restrict the collaborator permissions to the lowest available privileges by default. [OSPS-AC-02.01]
    Most public version control systems are configured in this manner. Ensure the project's version control system always assigns the lowest available permissions to collaborators by default when added, granting additional permissions only when necessary.

    Not enough for a badge.

    When a direct commit is attempted on the project's primary branch, an enforcement mechanism MUST prevent the change from being applied. [OSPS-AC-03.01]
    If the VCS is centralized, set branch protection on the primary branch in the project's VCS. Alternatively, use a decentralized approach, like the Linux kernel's, where changes are first proposed in another repository, and merging changes into the primary repository requires a specific separate act.

    Not met at assessment time. GitHub reports main protected=false; branch protection enforcement is off and no required status-check contexts are configured. The existing CI workflow does not itself block direct pushes. Read-only check on 2026-10-23; no repository settings changed.


    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    When an attempt is made to delete the project's primary branch, the version control system MUST treat this as a sensitive activity and require explicit confirmation of intent. [OSPS-AC-03.02]
    Set branch protection on the primary branch in the project's version control system to prevent deletion.

    Enough for a badge!

    When a CI/CD pipeline operates on untrusted metadata, those parameters MUST be sanitized and validated prior to use in the pipeline. [OSPS-BR-01.01]
    CI/CD pipelines should sanitize (quote, escape or exit on expected values) all metadata inputs which correspond to untrusted sources. This includes data such as branch names, commit messages, tags, pull request titles, and author information.

    The current pipeline does not interpolate or otherwise operate on untrusted event metadata. It runs fixed commands against the checked-out code snapshot; there are no workflow dispatch inputs or GitHub event expressions in the commands. https://github.com/gjatalegacy-create/AIGovern-Cyber-POC007/blob/bf34c7b9478d4dd152798a7e8f1a43d8f24ac33f/.github/workflows/poc007.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    When a CI/CD pipeline operates on untrusted code snapshots, it MUST prevent access to privileged CI/CD credentials and assets. [OSPS-BR-01.03]
    CI/CD pipelines should isolate untrusted code snapshots from privileged credentials and assets. In particular, projects should be careful to ensure that workflows which build or execute code prior to review by a collaborator do not have access to CI/CD credentials.

    The public workflow uses pull_request, GitHub-hosted ubuntu-latest runners, contents: read and checkout persist-credentials: false. It supplies no project secrets or deployment environments to test/build steps. Evidence: https://github.com/gjatalegacy-create/AIGovern-Cyber-POC007/blob/bf34c7b9478d4dd152798a7e8f1a43d8f24ac33f/.github/workflows/poc007.yml#L1-L26


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project lists a URI as an official project channel, that URI MUST be exclusively delivered using encrypted channels. [OSPS-BR-03.01]
    Configure the project's websites and version control systems to use encrypted channels such as SSH or HTTPS for data transmission. Ensure all tools and domains referenced in project documentation can only be accessed via encrypted channels.

    Project URLs use HTTPS exclusively.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project lists a URI as an official distribution channel, that channel MUST be protected from adversary-in-the-middle attacks using cryptographically authenticated channels. [OSPS-BR-03.02]
    Artifacts distributed by the project should be distributed through channels which ensure integrity and authenticity. Use of HTTPS for downloads, signed releases, or distribution through trusted package managers are all acceptable methods to protect against adversary-in-the-middle attacks.

    Distribution channels use HTTPS exclusively.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST prevent the unintentional storage of unencrypted sensitive data, such as secrets and credentials, in the version control system. [OSPS-BR-07.01]
    Configure .gitignore or equivalent to exclude files that may contain sensitive information. Use pre-commit hooks and automated scanning tools to detect and prevent the inclusion of sensitive data in commits.

    GitHub reports secret_scanning=enabled and secret_scanning_push_protection=enabled for this public repository, checked read-only on 2026-10-23. This prevents pushes containing supported detectable secrets; it does not prove detection of every secret format or absence of all sensitive data.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include user guides for all basic functionality. [OSPS-DO-01.01]
    Create user guides or documentation for all basic functionality of the project, explaining how to install, configure, and use the project's features. If there are any known dangerous or destructive actions available, include highly-visible warnings.

    REPRODUCIBILITY.md documents toolchain requirements, test/build/run commands, expected outputs and limits for the standalone public capsule. https://github.com/gjatalegacy-create/AIGovern-Cyber-POC007/blob/bf34c7b9478d4dd152798a7e8f1a43d8f24ac33f/REPRODUCIBILITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include a guide for reporting defects. [OSPS-DO-02.01]
    It is recommended that projects use their VCS default issue tracker. If an external source is used, ensure that the project documentation and contributing guide clearly and visibly explain how to use the reporting system. It is recommended that project documentation also sets expectations for how defects will be triaged and resolved.

    REVIEW_PROTOCOL.md describes how to report findings; the issue template requests revision, environment, expected/actual behavior, evidence and disclosure. GitHub Issues is enabled. https://github.com/gjatalegacy-create/AIGovern-Cyber-POC007/blob/bf34c7b9478d4dd152798a7e8f1a43d8f24ac33f/REVIEW_PROTOCOL.md#L5-L17


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for public discussions about proposed changes and usage obstacles. [OSPS-GV-02.01]
    Establish one or more mechanisms for public discussions within the project, such as mailing lists, instant messaging, or issue trackers, to facilitate open communication and feedback.

    GitHub Issues is enabled and pull requests provide public discussion for proposed changes. REVIEW_PROTOCOL.md links the findings channel. GitHub Discussions is not enabled; this answer relies on Issues and PRs. https://github.com/gjatalegacy-create/AIGovern-Cyber-POC007/issues


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project documentation MUST include an explanation of the contribution process, or clearly state that public contributions are not accepted [OSPS-GV-03.01]
    Create a CONTRIBUTING.md or CONTRIBUTING/ directory to outline the contribution process including the steps for submitting changes, and engaging with the project maintainers.

    Not yet met. CONTRIBUTIONS.md explains attribution and prior-art boundaries; REVIEW_PROTOCOL.md describes review reports. The assessed documentation does not yet explain code contribution/PR handling or state that code contributions are closed.


    Enough for a badge!

    The license for the source code MUST meet the OSI Open Source Definition or the FSF Free Software Definition. [OSPS-LE-02.01]
    Add a LICENSE file to the project's repo with a license that is an approved license by the Open Source Initiative (OSI), or a free license as approved by the Free Software Foundation (FSF). Examples of such licenses include the MIT, BSD 2-clause, BSD 3-clause revised, Apache 2.0, Lesser GNU General Public License (LGPL), and the GNU General Public License (GPL). Releasing to the public domain meets this control if there are no other encumbrances such as patents.

    The Apache-2.0 license for the repository contents is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).


    Enough for a badge!

    The license for the released software assets MUST meet the OSI Open Source Definition or the FSF Free Software Definition. [OSPS-LE-02.02]
    If a different license is included with released software assets, ensure it is an approved license by the Open Source Initiative (OSI), or a free license as approved by the Free Software Foundation (FSF). Examples of such licenses include the MIT, BSD 2-clause, BSD 3-clause revised, Apache 2.0, Lesser GNU General Public License (LGPL), and the GNU General Public License (GPL). Note that the license for the released software assets may be different than the source code.

    The Apache-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license]


    Enough for a badge!

    The license for the source code MUST be maintained in the corresponding repository's LICENSE file, COPYING file, LICENSES/ directory, or LICENSE/ directory. [OSPS-LE-03.01]
    Include the project's source code license in the project's LICENSE file, COPYING file, LICENSES/ directory, or LICENSE/ directory to provide visibility and clarity on the licensing terms. The filename MAY have an extension. If the project has multiple repositories, ensure that each repository includes the license file.

    License file found in repository.


    Enough for a badge!

    The license for the released software assets MUST be included in the released source code, or in a LICENSE file, COPYING file, or LICENSE/ directory alongside the corresponding release assets. [OSPS-LE-03.02]
    Include the project's released software assets license in the released source code, or in a LICENSE file, COPYING file, or LICENSE/ directory alongside the corresponding release assets to provide visibility and clarity on the licensing terms. The filename MAY have an extension. If the project has multiple repositories, ensure that each repository includes the license file.

    Non-trivial license location file in repository: https://github.com/gjatalegacy-create/AIGovern-Cyber-POC007/blob/main/LICENSE. [license_location]


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's source code repository MUST be publicly readable at a static URL. [OSPS-QA-01.01]
    Use a common VCS such as GitHub, GitLab, or Bitbucket. Ensure the repository is publicly readable. Avoid duplication or mirroring of repositories unless highly visible documentation clarifies the primary source. Avoid frequent changes to the repository that would impact the repository URL. Ensure the repository is public.

    Repository is publicly available on GitHub.


    Enough for a badge!

    The version control system MUST contain a publicly readable record of all changes made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [OSPS-QA-01.02]
    Use a common VCS such as GitHub, GitLab, or Bitbucket to maintain a publicly readable commit history. Avoid squashing or rewriting commits in a way that would obscure the author of any commits.

    Repository git metadata is publicly available on GitHub.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the package management system supports it, the source code repository MUST contain a dependency list that accounts for the direct language dependencies. [OSPS-QA-02.01]
    This may take the form of a package manager or language dependency file that enumerates all direct dependencies such as package.json, Gemfile, or go.mod.

    Cargo.toml lists the direct Rust dependencies (none) and Cargo.lock contains only the package. This does not mean the toolchain or CI actions have no dependencies. https://github.com/gjatalegacy-create/AIGovern-Cyber-POC007/blob/bf34c7b9478d4dd152798a7e8f1a43d8f24ac33f/Cargo.toml


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects with multiple repositories MUST document a list of codebases that are part of the project. [OSPS-QA-04.01]
    Document any additional subproject code repositories produced by the project and compiled into a release. This documentation should include the status and intent of the respective codebase.

    PUBLIC_NETWORK.md identifies the canonical POC007 code repository, identical public mirror, archive and parent lineage. This capsule is standalone; the separate private runtime is explicitly excluded in PUBLIC_PRIVATE_BOUNDARY.md. https://github.com/gjatalegacy-create/AIGovern-Cyber-POC007/blob/bf34c7b9478d4dd152798a7e8f1a43d8f24ac33f/PUBLIC_NETWORK.md#L13-L17


    Enough for a badge!

    The version control system MUST NOT contain generated executable artifacts. [OSPS-QA-05.01]
    Remove generated executable artifacts in the project's version control system. It is recommended that any scenario where a generated executable artifact appears critical to a process such as testing, it should be instead be generated at build time or stored separately and fetched during a specific well-documented pipeline step.

    The assessed tracked tree contains no generated executable artifacts. Cargo output and Python bytecode are excluded by .gitignore. Evidence: git ls-files at bf34c7b9478d4dd152798a7e8f1a43d8f24ac33f; https://github.com/gjatalegacy-create/AIGovern-Cyber-POC007/blob/bf34c7b9478d4dd152798a7e8f1a43d8f24ac33f/.gitignore


    Enough for a badge!

    The version control system MUST NOT contain unreviewable binary artifacts. [OSPS-QA-05.02]
    Do not add any unreviewable binary artifacts to the project's version control system. This includes executable application binaries, library files, and similar artifacts. It does not include assets such as graphical images, sound or music files, and similar content typically stored in a binary format.

    No unreviewable application or library binaries are tracked. The manuscript PDFs are documentation assets accompanied by public Markdown and bibliography source. This does not claim a byte-reproducible PDF build. https://github.com/gjatalegacy-create/AIGovern-Cyber-POC007/blob/bf34c7b9478d4dd152798a7e8f1a43d8f24ac33f/paper/ARXIV_SUBMISSION.md#L13


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project documentation MUST contain security contacts. [OSPS-VM-02.01]
    Create a security.md (or similarly-named) file that contains security contacts for the project.

    Not yet met. No designated security contact or security reporting procedure was found in the assessed public documentation. The general public review/issues channel is not a substitute for a security contact.



You can use tools and AI systems to propose changes via a simple URL, such as https://www.bestpractices.dev/en/projects/15834/choose/edit?osps_ac_01_01_status=Met&osps_ac_01_01_justification=GitHub+enforced. See our automation proposals system for how to do that. This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Bledar Gjata and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Bledar Gjata.
Entry created on 2026-10-23 17:51:00 UTC, last updated on 2026-10-23 18:11:55 UTC.