hostmic

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Baseline Level 1 criteria. These are criteria version v2026.08.28.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Open-source Windows virtual microphone driver fed by a user-mode host, in Rust (experimental)The README explains what hostmic is (a Windows virtual microphone driver fed by a user-mode host) and the problem it solves (the latency and dropouts of virtual audio cables).

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

    hostmic is an experimental Windows kernel-mode driver (PortCls/WaveRT) written in Rust: a virtual microphone whose audio will be supplied by a user-mode host application through a shared ring buffer. It is developed milestone by milestone (see PLAN.md); as of November 2026 the driver exposes a working capture endpoint that plays a built-in test tone, verified in a test VM. There is no release yet, and the driver is unsigned: it can only be loaded with test signing enabled, in a virtual machine. Kernel code that cannot run in host unit tests is tested in a Hyper-V VM following docs/test-vm.md; logic without kernel calls is kept in host-testable crates.

 Controls 24/24 ●

  • Controls


    Enough for a badge!

    When a user attempts to read or modify a sensitive resource in the project's authoritative repository, the system MUST require the user to complete a multi-factor authentication process. [OSPS-AC-01.01]
    Enforce multi-factor authentication for the project's version control system, requiring collaborators to provide a second form of authentication when accessing sensitive data or modifying repository settings. Passkeys are acceptable for this control.

    GitHub requires 2FA as of March 2023.


    Enough for a badge!

    When a new collaborator is added, the version control system MUST require manual permission assignment, or restrict the collaborator permissions to the lowest available privileges by default. [OSPS-AC-02.01]
    Most public version control systems are configured in this manner. Ensure the project's version control system always assigns the lowest available permissions to collaborators by default when added, granting additional permissions only when necessary.

    The repository belongs to a personal GitHub account: a collaborator can only be added through an explicit invitation by the owner, which the invitee must accept, so every permission grant is manual. Today the only account with access is the owner's (no collaborators, no pending invitations). Even for a collaborator, the "Protect main" ruleset requires a pull request with code-owner review and passing checks to change main, and the "Protect tags" ruleset forbids moving or deleting v* tags.


    Enough for a badge!

    When a direct commit is attempted on the project's primary branch, an enforcement mechanism MUST prevent the change from being applied. [OSPS-AC-03.01]
    If the VCS is centralized, set branch protection on the primary branch in the project's VCS. Alternatively, use a decentralized approach, like the Linux kernel's, where changes are first proposed in another repository, and merging changes into the primary repository requires a specific separate act.

    The "Protect main" repository ruleset is active on the default branch (main). It requires every change to go through a pull request (squash merge only, code-owner review, review threads resolved) with the required status checks zizmor, secrets and driver passing on an up-to-date branch, and it blocks force pushes and branch deletion. The only bypass is for the admin role, in "pull request" mode: even the owner cannot push directly to main and must merge through a pull request.


    Enough for a badge!

    When an attempt is made to delete the project's primary branch, the version control system MUST treat this as a sensitive activity and require explicit confirmation of intent. [OSPS-AC-03.02]
    Set branch protection on the primary branch in the project's version control system to prevent deletion.

    The "Protect main" repository ruleset, active on the default branch (main), includes the "Restrict deletions" rule: main cannot be deleted at all, by anyone. Deleting it would first require editing or disabling the ruleset, an administrative action that requires GitHub sudo-mode re-authentication. The same ruleset also blocks force pushes.


    Enough for a badge!

    When a CI/CD pipeline operates on untrusted metadata, those parameters MUST be sanitized and validated prior to use in the pipeline. [OSPS-BR-01.01]
    CI/CD pipelines should sanitize (quote, escape or exit on expected values) all metadata inputs which correspond to untrusted sources. This includes data such as branch names, commit messages, tags, pull request titles, and author information.

    No workflow passes untrusted metadata (branch names, tags, commit messages, pull request titles, author information) to a shell or script: the only expressions in run steps are matrix values defined in the workflow itself, and github.event_name comparisons. The only other use of event data is the concurrency group key, which is never executed. zizmor, a static analyzer for GitHub Actions that detects template injection, runs on every pull request, on main and weekly, as a required check; workflows run on pull_request (never pull_request_target or workflow_run) with read-only tokens.


    Enough for a badge!

    When a CI/CD pipeline operates on untrusted code snapshots, it MUST prevent access to privileged CI/CD credentials and assets. [OSPS-BR-01.03]
    CI/CD pipelines should isolate untrusted code snapshots from privileged credentials and assets. In particular, projects should be careful to ensure that workflows which build or execute code prior to review by a collaborator do not have access to CI/CD credentials.

    Workflows that build or analyse pull request code run on the pull_request event, never pull_request_target or workflow_run: for pull requests from forks, GitHub gives them a read-only token and no secrets. The workflows use no repository secrets at all; the default GITHUB_TOKEN permission is read-only, each job sets least-privilege permissions, and every checkout uses persist-credentials: false. The only job with an OIDC token (Scorecard) runs only on pushes to main, on a schedule and on branch-protection changes. Workflows from all external contributors need approval before they run; only selected actions are allowed, pinned by full commit SHA.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project lists a URI as an official project channel, that URI MUST be exclusively delivered using encrypted channels. [OSPS-BR-03.01]
    Configure the project's websites and version control systems to use encrypted channels such as SSH or HTTPS for data transmission. Ensure all tools and domains referenced in project documentation can only be accessed via encrypted channels.

    Project URLs use HTTPS exclusively.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project lists a URI as an official distribution channel, that channel MUST be protected from adversary-in-the-middle attacks using cryptographically authenticated channels. [OSPS-BR-03.02]
    Artifacts distributed by the project should be distributed through channels which ensure integrity and authenticity. Use of HTTPS for downloads, signed releases, or distribution through trusted package managers are all acceptable methods to protect against adversary-in-the-middle attacks.

    Distribution channels use HTTPS exclusively.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST prevent the unintentional storage of unencrypted sensitive data, such as secrets and credentials, in the version control system. [OSPS-BR-07.01]
    Configure .gitignore or equivalent to exclude files that may contain sensitive information. Use pre-commit hooks and automated scanning tools to detect and prevent the inclusion of sensitive data in commits.

    Four layers prevent secrets from being committed:

    1. .gitignore excludes keys, certificates and environment files (*.pem, *.key, *.p12, *.pfx, *.cer, *.pvk, .spc, .env, .env.); the driver's test-signing certificate is generated at build time and never committed.
    2. A pre-commit hook (.pre-commit-config.yaml) runs betterleaks, pinned by commit, on every commit.
    3. The CI job "secrets" (security workflow) scans the full git history with betterleaks (checksum-verified download) on every pull request, on main and weekly; it is a required check to merge.
    4. GitHub secret scanning and push protection are enabled on the repository.

    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include user guides for all basic functionality. [OSPS-DO-01.01]
    Create user guides or documentation for all basic functionality of the project, explaining how to install, configure, and use the project's features. If there are any known dangerous or destructive actions available, include highly-visible warnings.

    No release has been made yet. Current documentation covers installing and testing the experimental driver in a virtual machine (docs/test-vm.md); a user guide will accompany the first release.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include a guide for reporting defects. [OSPS-DO-02.01]
    It is recommended that projects use their VCS default issue tracker. If an external source is used, ensure that the project documentation and contributing guide clearly and visibly explain how to use the reporting system. It is recommended that project documentation also sets expectations for how defects will be triaged and resolved.

    No release has been made yet. Defects can already be reported through GitHub issues, with a bug-report form, and vulnerabilities privately as described in SECURITY.md.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for public discussions about proposed changes and usage obstacles. [OSPS-GV-02.01]
    Establish one or more mechanisms for public discussions within the project, such as mailing lists, instant messaging, or issue trackers, to facilitate open communication and feedback.

    GitHub supports public discussions on proposed changes (via pull requests) and usage obstacles (via issues).


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include an explanation of the contribution process, or clearly state that public contributions are not accepted [OSPS-GV-03.01]
    Create a CONTRIBUTING.md or CONTRIBUTING/ directory to outline the contribution process including the steps for submitting changes, and engaging with the project maintainers.

    CONTRIBUTING.md explains the process: discuss in an issue, fork, open a pull request against main, required checks, review, squash merge by the maintainer; it also states the coding rules. https://github.com/Nopitch/hostmic/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The license for the source code MUST meet the OSI Open Source Definition or the FSF Free Software Definition. [OSPS-LE-02.01]
    Add a LICENSE file to the project's repo with a license that is an approved license by the Open Source Initiative (OSI), or a free license as approved by the Free Software Foundation (FSF). Examples of such licenses include the MIT, BSD 2-clause, BSD 3-clause revised, Apache 2.0, Lesser GNU General Public License (LGPL), and the GNU General Public License (GPL). Releasing to the public domain meets this control if there are no other encumbrances such as patents.

    The driver is under the Microsoft Public License (MS-PL); the bindings, tools and host library are under MIT OR Apache-2.0. All three are OSI-approved.


    Enough for a badge!

    The license for the released software assets MUST meet the OSI Open Source Definition or the FSF Free Software Definition. [OSPS-LE-02.02]
    If a different license is included with released software assets, ensure it is an approved license by the Open Source Initiative (OSI), or a free license as approved by the Free Software Foundation (FSF). Examples of such licenses include the MIT, BSD 2-clause, BSD 3-clause revised, Apache 2.0, Lesser GNU General Public License (LGPL), and the GNU General Public License (GPL). Note that the license for the released software assets may be different than the source code.

    No release has been made yet; released assets will carry the same OSI-approved licenses as the source (MS-PL for the driver, MIT OR Apache-2.0 for the rest).


    Enough for a badge!

    The license for the source code MUST be maintained in the corresponding repository's LICENSE file, COPYING file, LICENSES/ directory, or LICENSE/ directory. [OSPS-LE-03.01]
    Include the project's source code license in the project's LICENSE file, COPYING file, LICENSES/ directory, or LICENSE/ directory to provide visibility and clarity on the licensing terms. The filename MAY have an extension. If the project has multiple repositories, ensure that each repository includes the license file.

    The license texts are in the LICENSES/ directory at the repository root, named by their SPDX identifiers (REUSE layout): LICENSES/MS-PL.txt for the driver, LICENSES/MIT.txt and LICENSES/Apache-2.0.txt for the other crates; each crate's Cargo.toml declares its SPDX license expression.


    Enough for a badge!

    The license for the released software assets MUST be included in the released source code, or in a LICENSE file, COPYING file, or LICENSE/ directory alongside the corresponding release assets. [OSPS-LE-03.02]
    Include the project's released software assets license in the released source code, or in a LICENSE file, COPYING file, or LICENSE/ directory alongside the corresponding release assets to provide visibility and clarity on the licensing terms. The filename MAY have an extension. If the project has multiple repositories, ensure that each repository includes the license file.

    No release has been made yet. A release will be a GitHub release of a v* tag; its source archives contain the whole repository, including the LICENSES/ directory, and the release workflow planned in PLAN.md (M7) will attach the license files next to the binary assets.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's source code repository MUST be publicly readable at a static URL. [OSPS-QA-01.01]
    Use a common VCS such as GitHub, GitLab, or Bitbucket. Ensure the repository is publicly readable. Avoid duplication or mirroring of repositories unless highly visible documentation clarifies the primary source. Avoid frequent changes to the repository that would impact the repository URL. Ensure the repository is public.

    Repository is publicly available on GitHub.


    Enough for a badge!

    The version control system MUST contain a publicly readable record of all changes made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [OSPS-QA-01.02]
    Use a common VCS such as GitHub, GitLab, or Bitbucket to maintain a publicly readable commit history. Avoid squashing or rewriting commits in a way that would obscure the author of any commits.

    Repository git metadata is publicly available on GitHub.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the package management system supports it, the source code repository MUST contain a dependency list that accounts for the direct language dependencies. [OSPS-QA-02.01]
    This may take the form of a package manager or language dependency file that enumerates all direct dependencies such as package.json, Gemfile, or go.mod.

    The project is a Cargo workspace: each crate's Cargo.toml lists its direct dependencies, with versions centralized in the workspace manifest, and the committed Cargo.lock pins the full dependency tree. CI builds with --locked. Dependabot watches the Cargo and GitHub Actions dependencies weekly.


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects with multiple repositories MUST document a list of codebases that are part of the project. [OSPS-QA-04.01]
    Document any additional subproject code repositories produced by the project and compiled into a release. This documentation should include the status and intent of the respective codebase.

    The project is a single repository, https://github.com/Nopitch/hostmic, a Cargo workspace (driver, driver-core, hostmic-sys, tools/capture-check). No other repository is compiled into a release.


    Enough for a badge!

    The version control system MUST NOT contain generated executable artifacts. [OSPS-QA-05.01]
    Remove generated executable artifacts in the project's version control system. It is recommended that any scenario where a generated executable artifact appears critical to a process such as testing, it should be instead be generated at build time or stored separately and fetched during a specific well-documented pipeline step.

    The repository contains no generated executable artifacts: all tracked files are text. Build outputs are ignored (.gitignore: /target/, *.pdb); the driver package and the test-signing certificate are generated by cargo wdk build, locally and in CI. Tools used in the test VM (devcon, DebugView) are fetched separately, as documented in docs/test-vm.md, and never committed.


    Enough for a badge!

    The version control system MUST NOT contain unreviewable binary artifacts. [OSPS-QA-05.02]
    Do not add any unreviewable binary artifacts to the project's version control system. This includes executable application binaries, library files, and similar artifacts. It does not include assets such as graphical images, sound or music files, and similar content typically stored in a binary format.

    The repository contains no binary artifacts at all: all tracked files are text (checked with git's binary detection), so every change is reviewable in a pull request diff. Compiled binaries are produced by the build and CI and ignored by .gitignore; WDK tools and libraries come from the Windows Driver Kit and are never committed.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST contain security contacts. [OSPS-VM-02.01]
    Create a security.md (or similarly-named) file that contains security contacts for the project.

    SECURITY.md, at the repository root, gives the security contact: GitHub private vulnerability reporting for this repository (https://github.com/Nopitch/hostmic/security/advisories/new), which reaches the maintainer privately. It explains what to include, the expected acknowledgement time (within a week) and the scope; the issue forms link to it and ask not to report vulnerabilities publicly.



You can use tools and AI systems to propose changes via a simple URL, such as https://www.bestpractices.dev/en/projects/16465/choose/edit?osps_ac_01_01_status=Met&osps_ac_01_01_justification=GitHub+enforced. See our automation proposals system for how to do that. This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Nopitch and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Nopitch.
Entry created on 2026-11-08 21:01:59 UTC, last updated on 2026-11-08 23:31:07 UTC.