ParticleVE

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These are the Baseline Level 3 criteria. These are criteria version v2026.08.28.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    ⸭ An image-based, secure hypervisor, built on top of Fedora Linux.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

    ParticleVE is a ParticleOS-derived, image-based Fedora virtualization host. This repository contains its first-party source code, native package recipes, CI and documentation. Upstream dependencies and the public OBS build/signing configuration are linked from README.md and Documentation/Build.md.

 Controls 9/21 ●

  • Controls


    When a job is assigned permissions in a CI/CD pipeline, the source code or configuration MUST only assign the minimum privileges necessary for the corresponding activity. [OSPS-AC-04.02]
    Configure the project's CI/CD pipelines to assign the lowest available permissions to users and services by default, elevating permissions only when necessary for specific tasks. In some version control systems, this may be possible at the organizational or repository level. If not, set permissions at the top level of the pipeline.

    The published source-check workflow defaults to contents: read; the main-only release/build-ref job requests only contents: write. Checkout does not persist credentials. OBS signing keys remain outside source checkouts and deployed hosts, and source-service tokens are package-scoped. Evidence: https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/blob/main/.github/workflows/check.yml and https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/blob/main/Documentation/Build.md



    CI/CD pipelines which accept trusted collaborator input MUST sanitize and validate that input prior to use in the pipeline. [OSPS-BR-01.04]
    CI/CD pipelines should sanitize (quote, escape or exit on expected values) all collaborator inputs on explicit workflow executions. While collaborators are generally trusted, manual inputs to a workflow cannot be reviewed and could be abused by an account takeover or insider threat.

    Trusted pipeline metadata is quoted as environment variables and passed as subprocess arguments. The release planner validates the owner/repository identifier and canonical monotonic versions; build selection resolves exact commits and rejects divergent ancestry. Source locks/recipes and generated inputs have native verification. Evidence: https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/blob/main/Tools/source_releases.py and https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/blob/main/Tools/build_source.py



    When an official release is created, all assets within that release MUST be clearly associated with the release identifier or another unique identifier for the asset. [OSPS-BR-02.02]
    Assign a unique version identifier to each software asset produced by the project, following a consistent naming convention or numbering scheme. Examples include SemVer, CalVer, or git commit id.

    Image filenames and signed manifests carry the full source version plus OBS check-in/build counters. Each indexed asset has a cryptographic hash; RPMs carry native EVRs and package identities, and GitHub source archives are associated with their version tag. Evidence: https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/blob/main/Documentation/Build.md and https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/releases



    The project MUST define a policy for managing secrets and credentials used by the project. The policy should include guidelines for storing, accessing, and rotating secrets and credentials. [OSPS-BR-07.02]
    Document how secrets and credentials are managed and used within the project. This should include details on how secrets are stored (e.g., using a secrets management tool), how access is controlled, and how secrets are rotated or updated. Ensure that sensitive information is not hard-coded in the source code or stored in version control systems.

    Build.md, Development.md and Hardening.md define private signing material outside Git/deployed hosts, private mode-0600 OBS credential files, authenticated non-redirecting uploads, package-scoped automation credentials and owner-only publication access. Trust introduction/rotation/retirement requires an explicit reviewed overlap and recovery evidence. Evidence: https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/blob/main/Documentation/Build.md and https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/blob/main/Documentation/Hardening.md#trust-rotation-and-old-image-retirement



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the integrity and authenticity of the release assets. [OSPS-DO-03.01]
    Instructions in the project should contain information about the technology used, the commands to run, and the expected output. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    Partially documented. Build.md and ReleaseDiagnostics.md describe verification of the signed OBS feed, hashes and PE/verity assets using the authenticated release client. The GitHub automatic source archives do not have a documented complete archive-authentication procedure with corresponding archive signatures/signed hashes, so coverage of every release channel is incomplete. Evidence: https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/blob/main/Documentation/Build.md



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the expected identity of the person or process authoring the software release. [OSPS-DO-03.02]
    The expected identity may be in the form of key IDs used to sign, issuer and identity from a sigstore certificate, or other similar forms. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    Build.md publishes the expected OBS project, producer trust boundary, release-signing GPG fingerprint and EFI certificate fingerprint. The documented release client verifies these trust roots, and publication observation checks the declared owner-only maintainer identity. These are producer-authenticated claims, explicitly distinguished from independent attestation. Evidence: https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/blob/main/Documentation/Build.md#public-signing-trust



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include a descriptive statement about the scope and duration of support for each release. [OSPS-DO-04.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for the project's released software assets, the project should have a SUPPORT.md file, a "Support" section in SECURITY.md, or other documentation explaining the support lifecycle, including the expected duration of support for each release, the types of support provided (e.g., bug fixes, security updates), and any relevant policies or procedures for obtaining support.

    Not met. Documentation identifies the current Fedora/toolchain baseline and platform requirements, but does not state a support scope and support duration for each ParticleVE release. Evidence reviewed: SECURITY.md and Documentation/Toolchain.md.



    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST provide a descriptive statement when releases or versions will no longer receive security updates. [OSPS-DO-05.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for security fixes, the project should have a SUPPORT.md or other documentation explaining the project's policy for security updates.

    Not met. There is no documented per-version security-update end-of-life policy or schedule. Targeting the current Fedora/toolchain baseline is not a statement of when ParticleVE releases stop receiving security updates. Evidence: https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/blob/main/SECURITY.md



    The project documentation MUST have a policy that code collaborators are reviewed prior to granting escalated permissions to sensitive resources. [OSPS-GV-04.01]
    Publish an enforceable policy in the project documentation that requires code collaborators to be reviewed and approved before being granted escalated permissions to sensitive resources, such as merge approval or access to secrets. It is recommended that vetting includes establishing a justifiable lineage of identity such as confirming the contributor's association with a known trusted organization.

    The documentation calls for strong authentication and reviewed minimal access, but does not define a collaborator-vetting/review policy before granting escalated sensitive-resource permissions. Evidence: https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/blob/main/Documentation/Hardening.md and https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md



    When the project has made a release, all compiled released software assets MUST be delivered with a software bill of materials. [OSPS-QA-02.02]
    It is recommended to auto-generate SBOMs at build time using a tool that has been vetted for accuracy. This enables users to ingest this data in a standardized approach alongside other projects in their environment.

    Partial inventory exists: mkosi emits JSON package manifests and fwupd-efi includes an embedded SBOM. Complete delivered SBOM coverage for all released image and RPM assets has not been established. Package provenance/identity records alone are not a verified comprehensive SBOM delivery contract. Evidence: https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/blob/main/mkosi.conf and https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/blob/main/Documentation/Toolchain.md



    When the project has made a release comprising multiple source code repositories, all subprojects MUST enforce security requirements that are as strict or stricter than the primary codebase. [OSPS-QA-04.02]
    Any additional subproject code repositories produced by the project and compiled into a release must enforce security requirements as applicable to the status and intent of the respective codebase. In addition to following the corresponding OSPS Baseline requirements, this may include requiring a security review, ensuring that it is free of vulnerabilities, and ensuring that it is free of known security issues.

    Not applicable to project-owned subprojects: ParticleVE code and release recipes are maintained in one repository. Separately developed Fedora, ParticleOS, systemd, mkosi and fwupd components are upstream dependencies, rather than ParticleVE subproject repositories. Their origins, pins and downstream package verification are documented separately.



    The project documentation MUST clearly document when and how tests are run. [OSPS-QA-06.02]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains how to run the tests locally and how to run the tests in the CI/CD pipeline. The documentation should explain what the tests are testing and how to interpret the results.

    CONTRIBUTING.md defines change-specific required verification. Development.md documents make check and targeted probes; ReleaseDiagnostics.md documents source, signed-image, native lifecycle/recovery and hardware acceptance execution and evidence. Evidence: https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#required-verification and https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/blob/main/Documentation/ReleaseDiagnostics.md



    The project documentation MUST include a policy that all major changes to the software produced by the project should add or update tests of the functionality in an automated test suite. [OSPS-QA-06.03]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains the policy for adding or updating tests. The policy should explain what constitutes a major change and what tests should be added or updated.

    The contributor verification matrix requires affected behavioral and failure-path checks for functional, privileged, storage, boot, parser and publication changes. CodingStandards.md requires the existing unittest framework and focused tests for changed boundaries, interruption, malformed input, races and partial completion; major functional changes must maintain that coverage. Evidence: https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md and https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/blob/main/Documentation/CodingStandards.md#performance-and-testing



    When a commit is made to the primary branch, the project's version control system MUST require at least one non-author human approval of the changes before merging. [OSPS-QA-07.01]
    Configure the project's version control system to require at least one non-author human approval of changes before merging into the release or primary branch. This can be achieved by requiring a pull request to be reviewed and approved by at least one other collaborator before it can be merged.

    Not met. The active ruleset requires signed commits and prevents deletion/non-fast-forward updates, but does not require pull requests or non-author human approval before main changes are accepted. Evidence: https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/rules/26840403



    When the project has made a release, the project MUST perform a threat modeling and attack surface analysis to understand and protect against attacks on critical code paths, functions, and interactions within the system. [OSPS-SA-03.02]
    Threat modeling is an activity where the project looks at the codebase, associated processes and infrastructure, interfaces, key components and "thinks like a hacker" and brainstorms how the system be be broken or compromised. Each identified threat is listed out so the project can then think about how to proactively avoid or close off any gaps/vulnerabilities that could arise. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    Architecture.md and Hardening.md provide project-maintained manual threat/attack-surface analysis: assets and trusted actors, hostile guests and network/artifact inputs, writable startup paths, bootloader trials, mirror admission, update/signing authority and guest/device confinement. They map critical interactions to defenses, residual risks and native positive/negative evidence; contributor policy requires updating affected contracts and checks with changes. This is not an independent audit claim. Evidence: https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/blob/main/Documentation/Architecture.md and https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/blob/main/Documentation/Hardening.md



    Any vulnerabilities in the software components not affecting the project MUST be accounted for in a VEX document, augmenting the vulnerability report with non-exploitability details. [OSPS-VM-04.02]
    Establish a VEX feed communicating the exploitability status of known vulnerabilities, including assessment details or any mitigations in place preventing vulnerable code from being executed.

    Not met. The repository does not contain or document a VEX publication process or VEX records identifying component vulnerabilities judged non-exploitable in ParticleVE. Dependency/source identity verification does not replace VEX non-exploitability records.



    The project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. [OSPS-VM-05.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    Not met. Dependency pins, package provenance and update mechanisms are documented, but no SCA policy defines remediation thresholds for vulnerability and license findings. Evidence reviewed: SECURITY.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, Documentation/Build.md and .github/workflows/check.yml.



    The project documentation MUST include a policy to address SCA violations prior to any release. [OSPS-VM-05.02]
    Document a policy in the project to address applicable Software Composition Analysis results before any release, and add status checks that verify compliance with that policy prior to release.

    Not met. There is no documented pre-release requirement to resolve SCA vulnerability/license policy violations or record approved exceptions. Existing package-origin, source-pin and payload checks serve different purposes.



    All changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for malicious dependencies and known vulnerabilities in dependencies, then blocked in the event of violations, except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-05.03]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Software Composition Analysis tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    Not met. CI verifies immutable upstream pins/patches, lint, tests and image configuration, but does not automatically evaluate every change against a malicious-dependency/known-vulnerability policy and block acceptance on violations. The active ruleset also lacks required checks. Renovate update PRs alone do not establish this control. Evidence: https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/blob/main/.github/workflows/check.yml



    The project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SAST findings. [OSPS-VM-06.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of Static Application Security Testing (SAST) findings. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    Not met. CodingStandards.md treats warnings as errors for configured diagnostics, but the documentation does not define a security-specific SAST findings/remediation policy and threshold. The current source workflow uses Ruff lint and tests; Scorecard assesses repository practices rather than application-code security weaknesses.



    All changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for security weaknesses and blocked in the event of violations except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-06.02]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    Not met. The repository does not enforce an automatic application-security weakness scan and documented exception policy on every accepted change. Ruff/tests are present, but no mandatory security-specific SAST acceptance gate is configured, and required branch checks are absent. Evidence: https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/blob/main/.github/workflows/check.yml and https://github.com/thefutureisprivate/ParticleVE/rules/26840403



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Entry created on 2026-11-09 10:51:34 UTC, last updated on 2026-11-09 11:59:01 UTC.