dlus

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Gold level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Silver level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 5/5 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Downloads, streams and controls your LG TV from your Mac. A resumable download manager with a 4K HDR TV player, subtitle auto-sync, a remote and a network router for your TV.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.
  • Prerequisites


    The project MUST achieve a silver level badge. [achieve_silver]

  • Project oversight


    The project MUST have a "bus factor" of 2 or more. (URL required) [bus_factor]
    A "bus factor" (aka "truck factor") is the minimum number of project members that have to suddenly disappear from a project ("hit by a bus") before the project stalls due to lack of knowledgeable or competent personnel. The truck-factor tool can estimate this for projects on GitHub. For more information, see Assessing the Bus Factor of Git Repositories by Cosentino et al.

    https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#-roles - currently one maintainer (bus factor 1). Mitigations: a named GitHub account successor, releases built and signed by GitHub Actions without personal keys, and full documentation in the repository (https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#-continuity). Adding a second maintainer is on the roadmap: https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/docs/ROADMAP.md



    The project MUST have at least two unassociated significant contributors. (URL required) [contributors_unassociated]
    Contributors are associated if they are paid to work by the same organization (as an employee or contractor) and the organization stands to benefit from the project's results. Financial grants do not count as being from the same organization if they pass through other organizations (e.g., science grants paid to different organizations from a common government or NGO source do not cause contributors to be associated). Someone is a significant contributor if they have made non-trivial contributions to the project in the past year. Examples of good indicators of a significant contributor are: written at least 1,000 lines of code, contributed 50 commits, or contributed at least 20 pages of documentation.

    https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/graphs/contributors - currently one significant contributor (the maintainer). Contributions are welcome (https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md); finding a second, independent maintainer is on the roadmap (https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/docs/ROADMAP.md).


  • Other


    The project MUST include a license statement in each source file. This MAY be done by including the following inside a comment near the beginning of each file: SPDX-License-Identifier: [SPDX license expression for project]. [license_per_file]
    This MAY also be done by including a statement in natural language identifying the license. The project MAY also include a stable URL pointing to the license text, or the full license text. Note that the criterion license_location requires the project license be in a standard location. See this SPDX tutorial for more information about SPDX license expressions. Note the relationship with copyright_per_file, whose content would typically precede the license information.

    Every source file starts with "SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT" in a comment, e.g. https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/dlus.py and https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/gateway/dlus-gw. A test checks every file on each change: https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/tests/test_security.py


 Change Control 4/4 ●

  • Public version-controlled source repository


    The project's source repository MUST use a common distributed version control software (e.g., git or mercurial). [repo_distributed]
    Git is not specifically required and projects can use centralized version control software (such as subversion) with justification.

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.



    The project MUST clearly identify small tasks that can be performed by new or casual contributors. (URL required) [small_tasks]
    This identification is typically done by marking selected issues in an issue tracker with one or more tags the project uses for the purpose, e.g., up-for-grabs, first-timers-only, "Small fix", microtask, or IdealFirstBug. These new tasks need not involve adding functionality; they can be improving documentation, adding test cases, or anything else that aids the project and helps the contributor understand more about the project.

    https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/labels/good%20first%20issue - small, self-contained tasks for new contributors are labelled "good first issue" (e.g. accessibility labels, a make target, documentation and test additions), each with what to do and when it is done. The contribution process is in https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md



    The project MUST require two-factor authentication (2FA) for developers for changing a central repository or accessing sensitive data (such as private vulnerability reports). This 2FA mechanism MAY use mechanisms without cryptographic mechanisms such as SMS, though that is not recommended. [require_2FA]

    GitHub requires 2FA as of March 2023. [osps_ac_01_01]



    The project's two-factor authentication (2FA) SHOULD use cryptographic mechanisms to prevent impersonation. Short Message Service (SMS) based 2FA, by itself, does NOT meet this criterion, since it is not encrypted. [secure_2FA]
    A 2FA mechanism that meets this criterion would be a Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP) application that automatically generates an authentication code that changes after a certain period of time. Note that GitHub supports TOTP.

    The only person with write access (the maintainer) uses GitHub two-factor authentication with an authenticator app (TOTP) / passkey, both cryptographic; SMS is not used. All changes and releases go through GitHub.


 Quality 7/7 ●

  • Coding standards


    The project MUST document its code review requirements, including how code review is conducted, what must be checked, and what is required to be acceptable. (URL required) [code_review_standards]
    See also two_person_review and contribution_requirements.

    The standard Python test runner: python3 -m unittest discover -s tests (also make test, which runs it with the other checks). See https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#-pull-requests and https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/Makefile



    The project MUST have at least 50% of all proposed modifications reviewed before release by a person other than the author, to determine if it is a worthwhile modification and free of known issues which would argue against its inclusion [two_person_review]

    Every push and pull request to the central repository runs the full automated test suite (170 tests incl. downloads, both servers, media, a fake TV and the proxy), the security scanners, CodeQL and a repeatable-build check on GitHub Actions: https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/actions (workflows: https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml). Changes are integrated into main several times a day.


  • Working build system


    The project MUST have a reproducible build. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [build_reproducible]
    A reproducible build means that multiple parties can independently redo the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. In some cases, this can be resolved by forcing some sort order. JavaScript developers may consider using npm shrinkwrap and webpack OccurrenceOrderPlugin. GCC and clang users may find the -frandom-seed option useful. The build environment (including the toolset) can often be defined for external parties by specifying the cryptographic hash of a specific container or virtual machine that they can use for rebuilding. The reproducible builds project has documentation on how to do this.

    84% branch coverage of dlus.py (1,799 of 2,138 branches), measured with coverage.py --branch (FLOSS) over the automated test suite https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/tree/main/tests; locally: python3 -m coverage run --branch --include=dlus.py -m unittest discover -s tests && python3 -m coverage report


  • Automated test suite


    A test suite MUST be invocable in a standard way for that language. (URL required) [test_invocation]
    For example, "make check", "mvn test", or "rake test" (Ruby).

    The standard Python test runner: python3 -m unittest discover -s tests (also make test, which runs it with the other checks). See https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#-pull-requests and https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/Makefile



    The project MUST implement continuous integration, where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result. (URL required) [test_continuous_integration]
    In most cases this means that each developer who works full-time on the project integrates at least daily.

    Every push and pull request to the central repository runs the full automated test suite (170 tests incl. downloads, both servers, media, a fake TV and the proxy), the security scanners, CodeQL and a repeatable-build check on GitHub Actions: https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/actions (workflows: https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml). Changes are integrated into main several times a day.



    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 90% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage90]

    90.2% statement coverage of dlus.py, measured by coverage.py (FLOSS) in CI on every push and shown as a badge in the README (https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus#readme). The automated test suite (https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/tree/main/tests) runs real downloads against a local server, both web servers, media with ffmpeg, a fake LG TV, a fake DLNA TV, fake VPN-app proxies, the router with a fake helper, failure cases (damaged pieces, full disk, refused commands) and fuzzing; locally: make coverage.



    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% branch coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_branch_coverage80]

    90% statement coverage of dlus.py, measured by coverage.py (FLOSS) in CI on every push and shown as a badge in the README (https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus#readme). The automated test suite (https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/tree/main/tests) runs real downloads against a local server, both web servers, media with ffmpeg, a fake LG TV, a fake DLNA TV, fake VPN-app proxies, the router with a fake helper, failure cases (damaged pieces, full disk, refused commands) and fuzzing; locally: make coverage.


 Security 5/5 ●

  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    The software produced by the project MUST support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 MUST be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    Every insecure protocol is off by default and only used when the user turns it on: home-network sharing, DLNA and the proxy (plain HTTP, because TV browsers and DLNA players cannot do local HTTPS) start disabled and every device must also be approved; the unencrypted LG remote-control port (only for TVs before ~2018) is a separate setting, off by default. The TV channel otherwise uses TLS 1.2+ with a pinned certificate and never downgrades; https download links never downgrade to http, and dlus's own internet requests (subtitles, fonts, checksums) use HTTPS. http/ftp downloads happen only when the user pastes such a link. https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/SECURITY.md



    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    All TLS in dlus supports and requires TLS 1.2 or newer: the LG TV connection sets ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2 as the minimum (checked by a test, https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/tests/test_regressions.py), and HTTPS downloads and dlus's own requests use macOS curl and Python's default TLS context, which support TLS 1.2 and 1.3 and refuse SSL and TLS 1.0/1.1.


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    The project website, repository (if accessible via the web), and download site (if separate) MUST include key hardening headers with nonpermissive values. (URL required) [hardened_site]
    Note that GitHub and GitLab are known to meet this. Sites such as https://securityheaders.com/ can quickly check this. The key hardening headers are: Content Security Policy (CSP), HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS), X-Content-Type-Options (as "nosniff"), and X-Frame-Options. Fully static web sites with no ability to log in via the web pages could omit some hardening headers with less risk, but there's no reliable way to detect such sites, so we require these headers even if they are fully static sites.

    https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/docs/SECURITY-REVIEW.md - full security review in November 2026 (releases 7.23-7.30) against the security requirements R1-R6 and every trust boundary of the assurance case (https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/docs/ASSURANCE-CASE.md): manual review of every boundary-crossing input, attack cases turned into automated tests, CodeQL/Bandit/Semgrep/Gitleaks/ShellCheck/fuzzing. It lists every finding with its severity and the release that fixed it, plus the accepted remaining risks; next review due by November 2027.


  • Other security issues


    The project MUST have performed a security review within the last 5 years. This review MUST consider the security requirements and security boundary. [security_review]
    This MAY be done by the project members and/or an independent evaluation. This evaluation MAY be supported by static and dynamic analysis tools, but there also must be human review to identify problems (particularly in design) that tools cannot detect.

    https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/docs/SECURITY-REVIEW.md - full security review in November 2026 (releases 7.23-7.30) against the security requirements R1-R6 and every trust boundary of the assurance case (https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/docs/ASSURANCE-CASE.md): manual review of every boundary-crossing input, attack cases turned into automated tests, CodeQL/Bandit/Semgrep/Gitleaks/ShellCheck/fuzzing. It lists every finding with its severity and the release that fixed it, plus the accepted remaining risks; next review due by November 2027.



    Hardening mechanisms MUST be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. (URL required) [hardening]
    Hardening mechanisms may include HTTP headers like Content Security Policy (CSP), compiler flags to mitigate attacks (such as -fstack-protector), or compiler flags to eliminate undefined behavior. For our purposes least privilege is not considered a hardening mechanism (least privilege is important, but separate).

    https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/docs/ASSURANCE-CASE.md#-secure-design-principles-applied - the app is signed with the macOS hardened runtime; downloads carry the quarantine flag so Gatekeeper still checks them; the local UI sends X-Frame-Options, CSP frame-ancestors, nosniff and no-referrer and accepts only the 127.0.0.1 host with a key cookie (SameSite=Strict); least privilege (one small root helper with a fixed command set, sudo for that file only); files in ~/.dlus mode 700, secrets 600; every network file access goes through one checked path function; TLS 1.2 minimum and a pinned TV certificate; external programs only with argument lists, never a shell.


 Analysis 2/2 ●

  • Dynamic code analysis


    The project MUST apply at least one dynamic analysis tool to any proposed major production release of the software produced by the project before its release. [dynamic_analysis]
    A dynamic analysis tool examines the software by executing it with specific inputs. For example, the project MAY use a fuzzing tool (e.g., American Fuzzy Lop) or a web application scanner (e.g., OWASP ZAP or w3af). In some cases the OSS-Fuzz project may be willing to apply fuzz testing to your project. For purposes of this criterion the dynamic analysis tool needs to vary the inputs in some way to look for various kinds of problems or be an automated test suite with at least 80% branch coverage. The Wikipedia page on dynamic analysis and the OWASP page on fuzzing identify some dynamic analysis tools. The analysis tool(s) MAY be focused on looking for security vulnerabilities, but this is not required.

    Every change, and therefore every release, is checked dynamically before it is tagged: Atheris fuzzing (Google's coverage-guided fuzzer) runs the parsers of untrusted input on every push (https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/tree/main/fuzz, in https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/blob/main/.github/workflows/security.yml), and the test suite exercises the running program with real downloads, both web servers, media with ffmpeg, a fake TV and attack cases (path traversal, changed TV certificate, disguised playlists, damaged pieces). Releases are only tagged when these runs are green.



    The project SHOULD include many run-time assertions in the software it produces and check those assertions during dynamic analysis. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]
    This criterion does not suggest enabling assertions during production; that is entirely up to the project and its users to decide. This criterion's focus is instead to improve fault detection during dynamic analysis before deployment. Enabling assertions in production use is completely different from enabling assertions during dynamic analysis (such as testing). In some cases enabling assertions in production use is extremely unwise (especially in high-integrity components). There are many arguments against enabling assertions in production, e.g., libraries should not crash callers, their presence may cause rejection by app stores, and/or activating an assertion in production may expose private data such as private keys. Beware that in many Linux distributions NDEBUG is not defined, so C/C++ assert() will by default be enabled for production in those environments. It may be important to use a different assertion mechanism or defining NDEBUG for production in those environments.

    dlus checks its invariants at run time with explicit checks that are always on (91 places raise an error on invalid input or state, e.g. path outside a folder, unknown helper command, changed TV certificate, checksum mismatch) instead of Python assert, which is removed with -O. During dynamic analysis these run under the fuzzers, whose targets assert the security properties on every input (https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/tree/main/fuzz: no path escape, no control characters in names, valid hash lengths, no crash), and under the test suite (508 assertions, https://github.com/amahbadi/dlus/tree/main/tests).



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Project badge entry owned by: Ali Akbar Mahbadi.
Entry created on 2026-11-12 13:11:15 UTC, last updated on 2026-11-12 22:44:45 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-11-12 13:31:57 UTC.