signerreach

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 16921 is passing Here is how to embed it:
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These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 13/13 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Offline checker for changes to Stellar classic-account signers and thresholds

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

    Offline checker for changes to the signers and thresholds of a Stellar classic account. Early-stage (v0.1.x), single maintainer, not audited. See SECURITY.md for how to report problems.

  • Basic project website content


    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]
    This MUST be in language that potential users can understand (e.g., it uses minimal jargon).

    README.md opens with a description: an offline checker for changes to Stellar classic-account signers and thresholds that tells you, before you submit a change, whether the account can still be administered afterwards. Its "The problem" section explains how a valid change can leave an account that can never be changed again.



    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    CONTRIBUTING.md sets the requirements for an acceptable contribution: six ground rules (when unsure say INCONCLUSIVE; the Rust core does no input or output; protect secrets; the same input gives the same output; no unsafe code; no claims you cannot back), the order of work (spec first, then fixtures, then code), the commit and pull request style (one logical change per commit, conventional commit messages, focused pull requests), and three commands that must pass before a pull request is opened: cargo fmt --all -- --check, cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets --locked -- -D warnings and cargo test --workspace --locked. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md



    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]
    We presume that projects on GitHub use issues and pull requests unless otherwise noted. This information can be short, e.g., stating that the project uses pull requests, an issue tracker, or posts to a mailing list (which one?)

    Non-trivial contribution file in repository: https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md.



    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    CONTRIBUTING.md sets the requirements for an acceptable contribution: the ground rules (when unsure say INCONCLUSIVE, no I/O in the core, no unsafe code, same input gives same output, no unbacked claims), the order of work (spec, then fixtures, then code), the commit and pull request style, and three checks that must pass before review: cargo fmt --check, cargo clippy -D warnings and cargo test. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • FLOSS license


    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]
    FLOSS is software released in a way that meets the Open Source Definition or Free Software Definition. Examples of such licenses include the CC0, MIT, BSD 2-clause, BSD 3-clause revised, Apache 2.0, Lesser GNU General Public License (LGPL), and the GNU General Public License (GPL). For our purposes, this means that the license MUST be: The software MAY also be licensed other ways (e.g., "GPLv2 or proprietary" is acceptable).

    The Apache-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]
    The OSI uses a rigorous approval process to determine which licenses are OSS.

    The Apache-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]
    One convention is posting the license as a top-level file named LICENSE or COPYING, which MAY be followed by an extension such as ".txt" or ".md". An alternative convention is to have a directory named LICENSES containing license file(s); these files are typically named as their SPDX license identifier followed by an appropriate file extension, as described in the REUSE Specification. Note that this criterion is only a requirement on the source repository. You do NOT need to include the license file when generating something from the source code (such as an executable, package, or container). For example, when generating an R package for the Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN), follow standard CRAN practice: if the license is a standard license, use the standard short license specification (to avoid installing yet another copy of the text) and list the LICENSE file in an exclusion file such as .Rbuildignore. Similarly, when creating a Debian package, you may put a link in the copyright file to the license text in /usr/share/common-licenses, and exclude the license file from the created package (e.g., by deleting the file after calling dh_auto_install). We encourage including machine-readable license information in generated formats where practical.

    Non-trivial license location file in repository: https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/LICENSE.


  • Documentation


    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]
    This documentation must be in some media (such as text or video) that includes: how to install it, how to start it, how to use it (possibly with a tutorial using examples), and how to use it securely (e.g., what to do and what not to do) if that is an appropriate topic for the software. The security documentation need not be long. The project MAY use hypertext links to non-project material as documentation. If the project does not produce software, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    Some documentation basics file contents found.



    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]
    The documentation of an external interface explains to an end-user or developer how to use it. This would include its application program interface (API) if the software has one. If it is a library, document the major classes/types and methods/functions that can be called. If it is a web application, define its URL interface (often its REST interface). If it is a command-line interface, document the parameters and options it supports. In many cases it's best if most of this documentation is automatically generated, so that this documentation stays synchronized with the software as it changes, but this isn't required. The project MAY use hypertext links to non-project material as documentation. Documentation MAY be automatically generated (where practical this is often the best way to do so). Documentation of a REST interface may be generated using Swagger/OpenAPI. Code interface documentation MAY be generated using tools such as JSDoc (JavaScript), ESDoc (JavaScript), pydoc (Python), devtools (R), pkgdown (R), and Doxygen (many). Merely having comments in implementation code is not sufficient to satisfy this criterion; there needs to be an easy way to see the information without reading through all the source code. If the project does not produce software, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    The CLI reference (book/src/cli.md) documents both commands, their options, the output formats (text and json) and every exit code. The exact input layouts (snapshot, plan, availability, section 5), the diagnostic codes (section 7) and the report output (section 8) are in the specification: https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/docs/SPEC.md


  • Other


    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]
    This requires that the project home page URL and the version control repository URL begin with "https:", not "http:". You can get free certificates from Let's Encrypt. Projects MAY implement this criterion using (for example) GitHub pages, GitLab pages, or SourceForge project pages. If you support HTTP, we urge you to redirect the HTTP traffic to HTTPS.

    Given only https: URLs.



    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]
    Examples of acceptable mechanisms include archived mailing list(s), GitHub issue and pull request discussions, Bugzilla, Mantis, and Trac. Asynchronous discussion mechanisms (like IRC) are acceptable if they meet these criteria; make sure there is a URL-addressable archiving mechanism. Proprietary JavaScript, while discouraged, is permitted.

    GitHub supports discussions on issues and pull requests.



    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]
    English is currently the lingua franca of computer technology; supporting English increases the number of different potential developers and reviewers worldwide. A project can meet this criterion even if its core developers' primary language is not English.

    All documentation is written in English: the README, CONTRIBUTING.md, SECURITY.md, the specification (docs/SPEC.md) and the documentation book. The issue tracker, issue templates and pull request template are in English, and CONTRIBUTING.md asks for bug reports and comments in the same language. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md



    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]
    As a minimum, the project should attempt to respond to significant problem and vulnerability reports. A project that is actively pursuing a badge is probably maintained. All projects and people have limited resources, and typical projects must reject some proposed changes, so limited resources and proposal rejections do not by themselves indicate an unmaintained project.

    When a project knows that it will no longer be maintained, it should set this criterion to "Unmet" and use the appropriate mechanism(s) to indicate to others that it is not being maintained. For example, use “DEPRECATED” as the first heading of its README, add “DEPRECATED” near the beginning of its home page, add “DEPRECATED” to the beginning of its code repository project description, add a no-maintenance-intended badge in its README and/or home page, mark it as deprecated in any package repositories (e.g., npm deprecate), and/or use the code repository's marking system to archive it (e.g., GitHub's "archive" setting, GitLab’s "archived" marking, Gerrit's "readonly" status, or SourceForge’s "abandoned" project status). Additional discussion can be found here.

    The project is actively maintained. As of 2026-11-19, 36 pull requests (including dependency updates) have been merged since 2026-10-20, the latest on 2026-11-19. v0.1.1 was released on 2026-11-04. CI, a RustSec advisory check, CodeQL, fuzzing and Dependabot run automatically. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/commits/main


 Change Control 9/9 ●

  • Public version-controlled source repository


    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]
    The URL MAY be the same as the project URL. The project MAY use private (non-public) branches in specific cases while the change is not publicly released (e.g., for fixing a vulnerability before it is revealed to the public).

    Repository on GitHub, which provides public git repositories with URLs.



    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    The repository is a public Git repository on GitHub. Every commit records who made the change, when, and what changed, and the full history is visible. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/commits/main



    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]
    Projects MAY choose to omit specific interim versions from their public source repositories (e.g., ones that fix specific non-public security vulnerabilities, may never be publicly released, or include material that cannot be legally posted and are not in the final release).

    Work lands on main through public pull requests between releases, not only as final releases. 29 commits have been added to main since the v0.1.1 release, each visible and reviewable in its pull request. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/pulls?q=is%3Apr



    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]
    Git is not specifically required and projects can use centralized version control software (such as subversion) with justification.

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • Unique version numbering


    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]
    This MAY be met in a variety of ways including a commit IDs (such as git commit id or mercurial changeset id) or a version number (including version numbers that use semantic versioning or date-based schemes like YYYYMMDD).

    Each release has a unique version identifier: 0.1.0 and 0.1.1. The version is set in Cargo.toml and matches the release tag (v0.1.0, v0.1.1).



    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]
    Projects should generally prefer whatever format is expected by their users, e.g., because it is the normal format used by their ecosystem. Many ecosystems prefer SemVer, and SemVer is generally preferred for application programmer interfaces (APIs) and software development kits (SDKs). CalVer tends to be used by projects that are large, have an unusually large number of independently-developed dependencies, have a constantly-changing scope, or are time-sensitive. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value, because including a micro level supports simultaneously-maintained branches whenever that becomes necessary. Other version numbering formats may be used as version numbers, including git commit IDs or mercurial changeset IDs, as long as they uniquely identify versions. However, some alternatives (such as git commit IDs) can cause problems as release identifiers, because users may not be able to easily determine if they are up-to-date. The version ID format may be unimportant for identifying software releases if all recipients only run the latest version (e.g., it is the code for a single website or internet service that is constantly updated via continuous delivery).


    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

    Each release is identified by an annotated git tag: v0.1.0 and v0.1.1. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/tags


  • Release notes


    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]
    The release notes MAY be implemented in a variety of ways. Many projects provide them in a file named "NEWS", "CHANGELOG", or "ChangeLog", optionally with extensions such as ".txt", ".md", or ".html". Historically the term "change log" meant a log of every change, but to meet these criteria what is needed is a human-readable summary. The release notes MAY instead be provided by version control system mechanisms such as the GitHub Releases workflow.

    Each release has human-written release notes on its GitHub release page. The v0.1.1 notes have a "What changed since v0.1.0" section and an "Included" section describing what users get and what the upgrade changes (Protocol 30 support). They are not a raw commit log. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/releases/tag/v0.1.1



    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]
    This criterion helps users determine if a given update will fix a vulnerability that is publicly known, to help users make an informed decision about updating. If users typically cannot practically update the software themselves on their computers, but must instead depend on one or more intermediaries to perform the update (as is often the case for a kernel and low-level software that is intertwined with a kernel), the project may choose "not applicable" (N/A) instead, since this additional information will not be helpful to those users. Similarly, a project may choose N/A if all recipients only run the latest version (e.g., it is the code for a single website or internet service that is constantly updated via continuous delivery). This criterion only applies to the project results, not its dependencies. Listing the vulnerabilities of all transitive dependencies of a project becomes unwieldy as dependencies increase and vary, and is unnecessary since tools that examine and track dependencies can do this in a more scalable way.

    No publicly known vulnerability in SignerReach itself (no CVE and no security advisory) has been fixed in v0.1.0 or v0.1.1. The repository has no published security advisories. This criterion does not apply to dependencies.


 Reporting 8/8 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    Bug reports are submitted through the GitHub issue tracker. CONTRIBUTING.md ("Reporting problems") says what to include: the three input files with no secrets, the output, and what was expected. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#reporting-problems



    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    The project uses the GitHub issue tracker to track individual issues. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/issues



    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    No bug reports have been submitted to the project in the last 12 months, so there is no report left unacknowledged. The tracker holds five issues: three opened by the maintainer, and two requests from other people (issues 4 and 7). https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/issues?q=is%3Aissue



    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]
    The response MAY be 'no' or a discussion about its merits. The goal is simply that there be some response to some requests, which indicates that the project is still alive. For purposes of this criterion, projects need not count fake requests (e.g., from spammers or automated systems). If a project is no longer making enhancements, please select "unmet" and include the URL that makes this situation clear to users. If a project tends to be overwhelmed by the number of enhancement requests, please select "unmet" and explain.

    Two near-identical requests from other people asked for Protocol 30 verification (issues 4 and 7). Issue 7 received a written maintainer response with the findings and was closed as completed on 2026-11-04, the day v0.1.1 added Protocol 30 support. Issue 4, the duplicate, was closed by its author. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/issues/7



    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]

    Reports and responses are kept in the public GitHub issue tracker, which is searchable and includes closed issues. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/issues?q=is%3Aissue


  • Vulnerability report process


    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]
    Projects hosted on GitHub SHOULD consider enabling privately reporting a security vulnerability. Projects on GitLab SHOULD consider using its ability for privately reporting a vulnerability. Projects MAY identify a mailing address on https://PROJECTSITE/security, often in the form security@example.org. This vulnerability reporting process MAY be the same as its bug reporting process. Vulnerability reports MAY always be public, but many projects have a private vulnerability reporting mechanism.

    SECURITY.md publishes the process: what to report privately, how to report it (GitHub private vulnerability reporting), what to include, and what to expect. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/SECURITY.md



    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]
    Examples include a private defect report submitted on the web using HTTPS (TLS) or an email encrypted using OpenPGP. If vulnerability reports are always public (so there are never private vulnerability reports), choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    SECURITY.md tells reporters to use GitHub private vulnerability reporting (Security tab, "Report a vulnerability"), which keeps the report private to the maintainers, and not to open a public issue. Private vulnerability reporting is enabled on the repository. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/SECURITY.md



    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]
    If there have been no vulnerabilities reported in the last 6 months, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    No vulnerability report has been received in the last 6 months.


 Quality 13/13 ●

  • Working build system


    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]
    A build system determines what actions need to occur to rebuild the software (and in what order), and then performs those steps. For example, it can invoke a compiler to compile the source code. If an executable is created from source code, it must be possible to modify the project's source code and then generate an updated executable with those modifications. If the software produced by the project depends on external libraries, the build system does not need to build those external libraries. If there is no need to build anything to use the software after its source code is modified, select "not applicable" (N/A).

    The software is built with Cargo. README.md ("Build from source") says to use Rust 1.87 or later and run cargo build --release; CONTRIBUTING.md says cargo build. CI rebuilds it from source on every pull request on Linux, Windows and macOS, and also on the minimum supported Rust version, 1.87.0, using the committed Cargo.lock. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/README.md



    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]
    For example, Maven, Ant, cmake, the autotools, make, rake (Ruby), or devtools (R).

    The build uses Cargo, the standard build tool for Rust.



    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    The project builds with the Rust compiler and Cargo, both free/libre/open source software. The README states that Rust 1.87 or later is all that is needed.


  • Automated test suite


    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]
    The project MAY use multiple automated test suites (e.g., one that runs quickly, vs. another that is more thorough but requires special equipment). There are many test frameworks and test support systems available, including Selenium (web browser automation), Junit (JVM, Java), RUnit (R), testthat (R).

    The automated test suite is part of the repository (Apache-2.0): unit tests next to the code, fixture tests that run the real binary against hand-written expected results (fixtures/), and tests that run the fetch command against a fake server on the local machine. As of 2026-11-19 cargo test --workspace runs 287 tests. CONTRIBUTING.md documents how to run it (cargo test --workspace --locked), and CI runs it on every pull request. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md



    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]
    For example, "make check", "mvn test", or "rake test" (Ruby).

    The suite is invoked with the standard Rust command, cargo test --workspace --locked.



    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    Test coverage has not been measured, so the project does not claim that the tests cover most branches. The behaviour rules are covered by fixtures and unit tests, and the input readers also run under fuzzing, but no coverage figure exists.



    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    CI runs on every pull request and on every push to main, building and testing on Linux, Windows and macOS, plus a minimum-Rust-version job, formatting and lint checks, and a documentation build. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml


  • New functionality testing


    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]
    As long as a policy is in place, even by word of mouth, that says developers should add tests to the automated test suite for major new functionality, select "Met."

    CONTRIBUTING.md ("Changing behaviour") requires that a change to what the tool says comes with a fixture, written by hand from the specification, and with unit tests next to the code. "Commits and pull requests" asks for one logical change per commit, with its tests. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md



    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]
    Major functionality would typically be mentioned in the release notes. Perfection is not required, merely evidence that tests are typically being added in practice to the automated test suite when new major functionality is added to the software produced by the project.

    The most recent changes followed this policy. Pull request 40 fixed four cases in the Horizon mapping and added five tests with it, including one that fails if the fix is removed. Pull request 41 added four fuzz targets that run in CI. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/pull/40



    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    The policy is in the instructions for change proposals: CONTRIBUTING.md ("Changing behaviour") and the pull request template, whose checklist asks for the formatting, lint and test commands to pass and, when behaviour changes, for the specification to be updated and a hand-written fixture. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md


  • Warning flags


    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]
    Examples of compiler warning flags include gcc/clang "-Wall". Examples of a "safe" language mode include JavaScript "use strict" and perl5's "use warnings". A separate "linter" tool is simply a tool that examines the source code to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes. These are typically enabled within the source code or build instructions.

    The code is checked with the Rust compiler's warnings and the clippy linter (all default lint groups enabled in the workspace), and unsafe code is forbidden for the whole workspace by a compiler lint (unsafe_code = "forbid"). https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/Cargo.toml



    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]
    These are the warnings identified by the implementation of the warnings criterion. The project should fix warnings or mark them in the source code as false positives. Ideally there would be no warnings, but a project MAY accept some warnings (typically less than 1 warning per 100 lines or less than 10 warnings).

    CI runs cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets --locked -- -D warnings, so any warning fails the build and cannot be merged unaddressed. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml



    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    All warnings are treated as errors in CI (-D warnings) across all targets, clippy's default lint groups are enabled, and unsafe code is forbidden for the whole workspace. The stricter optional clippy groups (pedantic, nursery) are not enabled.


 Security 16/16 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]
    This requires understanding the following design principles, including the 8 principles from Saltzer and Schroeder:
    • economy of mechanism (keep the design as simple and small as practical, e.g., by adopting sweeping simplifications)
    • fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default)
    • complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable)
    • open design (security mechanisms should not depend on attacker ignorance of its design, but instead on more easily protected and changed information like keys and passwords)
    • separation of privilege (ideally, access to important objects should depend on more than one condition, so that defeating one protection system won't enable complete access. E.G., multi-factor authentication, such as requiring both a password and a hardware token, is stronger than single-factor authentication)
    • least privilege (processes should operate with the least privilege necessary)
    • least common mechanism (the design should minimize the mechanisms common to more than one user and depended on by all users, e.g., directories for temporary files)
    • psychological acceptability (the human interface must be designed for ease of use - designing for "least astonishment" can help)
    • limited attack surface (the attack surface - the set of the different points where an attacker can try to enter or extract data - should be limited)
    • input validation with allowlists (inputs should typically be checked to determine if they are valid before they are accepted; this validation should use allowlists (which only accept known-good values), not denylists (which attempt to list known-bad values)).
    A "primary developer" in a project is anyone who is familiar with the project's code base, is comfortable making changes to it, and is acknowledged as such by most other participants in the project. A primary developer would typically make a number of contributions over the past year (via code, documentation, or answering questions). Developers would typically be considered primary developers if they initiated the project (and have not left the project more than three years ago), have the option of receiving information on a private vulnerability reporting channel (if there is one), can accept commits on behalf of the project, or perform final releases of the project software. If there is only one developer, that individual is the primary developer. Many books and courses are available to help you understand how to develop more secure software and discuss design. For example, the Secure Software Development Fundamentals course is a free set of three courses that explain how to develop more secure software (it's free if you audit it; for an extra fee you can earn a certificate to prove you learned the material).

    The primary developer understands the secure design principles and applies them in this project. Fail-safe defaults: anything the tool does not model gives INCONCLUSIVE, never SAFE, and unknown or duplicate input keys are refused. Economy of mechanism and least common mechanism: a small tool with one job, whose core (signerreach-core) does no input or output; only signerreach-cli touches files and only signerreach-stellar opens a network connection. Least privilege: the CLI never holds or asks for a private key and never signs; fetch sends only GET requests, follows no redirect, uses no proxy and sends no credential; CI jobs run with contents: read. Complete mediation: all input passes through strict bounded parsers (1 MiB limit) and every field of a Horizon record is validated before a snapshot is written. Open design: the specification, rules and evidence are public. See docs/security-review.md and SECURITY.md. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/docs/security-review.md



    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]
    Examples (depending on the type of software) include SQL injection, OS injection, classic buffer overflow, cross-site scripting, missing authentication, and missing authorization. See the CWE/SANS top 25 or OWASP Top 10 for commonly used lists. Many books and courses are available to help you understand how to develop more secure software and discuss common implementation errors that lead to vulnerabilities. For example, the Secure Software Development Fundamentals course is a free set of three courses that explain how to develop more secure software (it's free if you audit it; for an extra fee you can earn a certificate to prove you learned the material).

    The primary developer knows the common errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software (a Rust command-line tool that parses untrusted JSON and makes read-only HTTPS requests) and counters each one. Unbounded or malformed input and panics on crafted data: 1 MiB size limit, strict parsers that refuse unknown and duplicate keys, and four fuzz targets in CI. Request forgery and redirects: only two URLs are ever built, the account is validated first, redirects are never followed, and plain http is accepted only for localhost. Secrets in output or errors: the CLI never handles a secret, and error messages never repeat an input value (tested). Memory-safety errors: unsafe code is forbidden for the whole workspace. Vulnerable dependencies and workflow weaknesses: a RustSec check, Dependabot, CodeQL, pinned actions and least-privilege workflow tokens.


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]
    These cryptographic criteria do not always apply because some software has no need to directly use cryptographic capabilities.

    SignerReach implements no cryptographic algorithm or protocol of its own. Its only use of cryptography is TLS in the fetch command, provided by the rustls library (version 0.23.46 in Cargo.lock, using ring), which offers only published, expert-reviewed protocols (TLS 1.2 and 1.3).



    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    The fetch command calls the rustls library (through the ureq crate) for TLS and does not re-implement any cryptographic function. The core and the checker use no cryptography.



    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]

    The only cryptographic functionality, TLS in the fetch command, comes from open-source libraries (rustls, ring, webpki-roots), all of which are FLOSS and are built from source by Cargo.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]
    These minimum bitlengths are: symmetric key 112, factoring modulus 2048, discrete logarithm key 224, discrete logarithmic group 2048, elliptic curve 224, and hash 224 (password hashing is not covered by this bitlength, more information on password hashing can be found in the crypto_password_storage criterion). See https://www.keylength.com for a comparison of keylength recommendations from various organizations. The software MAY allow smaller keylengths in some configurations (ideally it would not, since this allows downgrade attacks, but shorter keylengths are sometimes necessary for interoperability).

    SignerReach does not generate keys, choose key lengths or configure key sizes. TLS is delegated to the rustls library, and the project adds no settings of its own.



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]
    ECB mode is almost never appropriate because it reveals identical blocks within the ciphertext as demonstrated by the ECB penguin, and CTR mode is often inappropriate because it does not perform authentication and causes duplicates if the input state is repeated. In many cases it's best to choose a block cipher algorithm mode designed to combine secrecy and authentication, e.g., Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and EAX. Projects MAY allow users to enable broken mechanisms (e.g., during configuration) where necessary for compatibility, but then users know they're doing it.

    SignerReach's own code uses no hash or cipher, and Cargo.lock contains no md5, md-5 or sha1 crate. TLS comes from rustls, which documents that it does not and will not support SSL or TLS 1.0/1.1, RC4, DES or triple DES, or EXPORT ciphersuites. https://github.com/rustls/rustls/blob/main/rustls/src/manual/features.rs



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    The default TLS mechanisms come from rustls, which documents that it does not support MAC-then-encrypt (CBC) ciphersuites or ciphersuites without forward secrecy. SignerReach selects no algorithm of its own. https://github.com/rustls/rustls/blob/main/rustls/src/manual/features.rs



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]

    Key agreement in the fetch command is TLS provided by rustls, which provides forward secrecy using ECDHE and documents that it does not support ciphersuites without forward secrecy. https://github.com/rustls/rustls/blob/main/rustls/src/manual/features.rs



    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]
    This criterion applies only when the software is enforcing authentication of users using passwords for external users (aka inbound authentication), such as server-side web applications. It does not apply in cases where the software stores passwords for authenticating into other systems (aka outbound authentication, e.g., the software implements a client for some other system), since at least parts of that software must have often access to the unhashed password.

    SignerReach does not store passwords or authenticate users.



    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]
    A cryptographically secure random number generator may be a hardware random number generator, or it may be a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG) using an algorithm such as Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG, Yarrow, or Fortuna. Examples of calls to secure random number generators include Java's java.security.SecureRandom and JavaScript's window.crypto.getRandomValues. Examples of calls to insecure random number generators include Java's java.util.Random and JavaScript's Math.random.

    SignerReach's own code generates no cryptographic keys or nonces (no random-number generator is used in the shipped crates). TLS key material is handled inside rustls and ring.


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]
    An even stronger mechanism is releasing the software with digitally signed packages, since that mitigates attacks on the distribution system, but this only works if the users can be confident that the public keys for signatures are correct and if the users will actually check the signature.

    Source and release archives are delivered over HTTPS from GitHub. The documentation site is served over HTTPS. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/releases/tag/v0.1.1



    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]
    These hashes can be modified in transit.

    Each release archive has a .sha256 checksum and a manifest on the same HTTPS release page, and the README links to them over HTTPS. No cryptographic hash is retrieved over plain http. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/releases/tag/v0.1.1


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]
    The vulnerability must be patched and released by the project itself (patches may be developed elsewhere). A vulnerability becomes publicly known (for this purpose) once it has a CVE with publicly released non-paywalled information (reported, for example, in the National Vulnerability Database) or when the project has been informed and the information has been released to the public (possibly by the project). A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known. Note: this means that users might be left vulnerable to all attackers worldwide for up to 60 days. This criterion is often much easier to meet than what Google recommends in Rebooting responsible disclosure, because Google recommends that the 60-day period start when the project is notified even if the report is not public. Also note that this badge criterion, like other criteria, applies to the individual project. Some projects are part of larger umbrella organizations or larger projects, possibly in multiple layers, and many projects feed their results to other organizations and projects as part of a potentially-complex supply chain. An individual project often cannot control the rest, but an individual project can work to release a vulnerability patch in a timely way. Therefore, we focus solely on the individual project's response time. Once a patch is available from the individual project, others can determine how to deal with the patch (e.g., they can update to the newer version or they can apply just the patch as a cherry-picked solution).

    As of 2026-11-19 there is no known unpatched vulnerability of medium or higher severity. The RustSec advisory check passes on main, with no advisory matching any of the 77 locked crates; the repository has 0 open Dependabot alerts; and code scanning has no open alerts (five CodeQL results were reviewed and dismissed as false positives, with the reasons recorded). The RustSec check runs on every dependency change and weekly, and Dependabot security updates are enabled. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/.github/workflows/rustsec.yml



    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    Critical advisories against dependencies are caught by the RustSec job (which fails on a known vulnerability) and by Dependabot security updates, and are fixed through a pull request. No critical vulnerability has been reported or is open.


  • Other security issues


    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]
    A project MAY leak "sample" credentials for testing and unimportant databases, as long as they are not intended to limit public access.

    Checked on 2026-11-19: the full git history of all branches contains no Stellar secret seed and no common token or private-key pattern. GitHub secret scanning and push protection are enabled on the repository. The shipped CLI never handles a secret; the development replay tool creates temporary Testnet keys in memory only and does not store them.


 Analysis 8/8 ●

  • Static code analysis


    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]
    A static code analysis tool examines the software code (as source code, intermediate code, or executable) without executing it with specific inputs. For purposes of this criterion, compiler warnings and "safe" language modes do not count as static code analysis tools (these typically avoid deep analysis because speed is vital). Some static analysis tools focus on detecting generic defects, others focus on finding specific kinds of defects (such as vulnerabilities), and some do a combination. Examples of such static code analysis tools include cppcheck (C, C++), clang static analyzer (C, C++), SpotBugs (Java), FindBugs (Java) (including FindSecurityBugs), PMD (Java), Brakeman (Ruby on Rails), lintr (R), goodpractice (R), Coverity Quality Analyzer, SonarQube, Codacy, and HP Enterprise Fortify Static Code Analyzer. Larger lists of tools can be found in places such as the Wikipedia list of tools for static code analysis, OWASP information on static code analysis, NIST list of source code security analyzers, and Wheeler's list of static analysis tools. If there are no FLOSS static analysis tools available for the implementation language(s) used, you may select 'N/A'.

    Static analysis runs on the code. The clippy linter (a separate tool, not compiler warnings) runs in CI on every pull request and push as the "Format and lint" job with warnings as errors, and the release workflow refuses to publish a release unless that job passed on the exact commit being released, so it was applied to v0.1.0 and v0.1.1 before release. CodeQL (Rust, GitHub Actions and JavaScript) was added on 2026-11-19 and runs on every push, pull request and weekly, so it applies to every future release. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml



    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    CodeQL runs its security queries for Rust, GitHub Actions workflows and JavaScript, which look for common vulnerability classes. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]
    A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known. Note that criterion vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days requires that all such vulnerabilities be fixed within 60 days of being made public.

    No confirmed medium or higher severity exploitable vulnerability has been found by static analysis. CodeQL's first run on 2026-11-19 reported five results, which were each read against the code and dismissed as false positives with a written reason: four cache-poisoning warnings in the release workflow (the workflow has no cache, and verifies the commit is the current head of main), and one cleartext-logging result that CodeQL labelled high, which is the fetch command writing public ledger data to standard output by design. The dismissals and reasons are visible in the Security tab. Clippy warnings fail CI and cannot be merged.



    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    Clippy runs on every pull request and every push to main. CodeQL runs on every push to main, every pull request and weekly. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml


  • Dynamic code analysis


    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]
    A dynamic analysis tool examines the software by executing it with specific inputs. For example, the project MAY use a fuzzing tool (e.g., American Fuzzy Lop) or a web application scanner (e.g., OWASP ZAP or w3af). In some cases the OSS-Fuzz project may be willing to apply fuzz testing to your project. For purposes of this criterion the dynamic analysis tool needs to vary the inputs in some way to look for various kinds of problems or be an automated test suite with at least 80% branch coverage. The Wikipedia page on dynamic analysis and the OWASP page on fuzzing identify some dynamic analysis tools. The analysis tool(s) MAY be focused on looking for security vulnerabilities, but this is not required.

    Four cargo-fuzz (libFuzzer) targets vary the inputs to the input readers, the whole check and the Horizon mapping, and run in CI on every pull request that touches the code and weekly. They were added on 2026-11-19, after v0.1.0 and v0.1.1, so they apply to every future release; no release has been proposed since. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/.github/workflows/fuzz.yml



    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    The project's software is written in Rust and forbids unsafe code for the whole workspace (unsafe_code = "forbid"), so it contains no memory-unsafe code of its own.



    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]
    This criterion does not suggest enabling assertions during production; that is entirely up to the project and its users to decide. This criterion's focus is instead to improve fault detection during dynamic analysis before deployment. Enabling assertions in production use is completely different from enabling assertions during dynamic analysis (such as testing). In some cases enabling assertions in production use is extremely unwise (especially in high-integrity components). There are many arguments against enabling assertions in production, e.g., libraries should not crash callers, their presence may cause rejection by app stores, and/or activating an assertion in production may expose private data such as private keys. Beware that in many Linux distributions NDEBUG is not defined, so C/C++ assert() will by default be enabled for production in those environments. It may be important to use a different assertion mechanism or defining NDEBUG for production in those environments.

    The fuzz targets check stated properties with assertions (no panic, the JSON report is valid and states the evaluation's verdict, the same input gives identical reports, an accepted address round-trips, and the mapping only writes snapshots the checker accepts). By default cargo-fuzz builds targets with debug assertions and overflow checks enabled, and with AddressSanitizer. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/blob/main/fuzz/README.md



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]
    If you are not running dynamic code analysis and thus have not found any vulnerabilities in this way, choose "not applicable" (N/A). A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known.

    Fuzzing found four defects in the Horizon record mapping (a signer key with a bad checksum, a weight-0 signer, a duplicated signer and more than 20 signers were copied into a snapshot that the checker then refused). None was an exploitable vulnerability: the checker failed closed and no wrong verdict was possible. All four were fixed in pull request 40, each with a regression test. https://github.com/signerreach/signerreach/pull/40



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Project badge entry owned by: Lanre Odesanya.
Entry created on 2026-11-19 08:06:48 UTC, last updated on 2026-11-19 09:18:21 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-11-19 09:18:21 UTC.