x402-business-agents

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Silver level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 17/17 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    AI agents pay supplier invoices; above their limit the CFO signs the exact payment terms with a passkey, so one changed cent is refused. Test money only (Airwallex sandbox, Alta testnet).

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

    Hackathon project (Airwallex Agentic Banking Hackathon). Runs on test money only: Airwallex sandbox and Alta (formerly Metal) testnet.

  • Prerequisites


    The project MUST achieve a passing level badge. [achieve_passing]

  • Basic project website content


    The information on how to contribute MUST include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md
    It lists what every pull request must pass before review: npm run typecheck (strict TypeScript), npm run lint (ESLint), npm test (the full vitest suite, run without network or keys, partners faked in test/fakes/) and npm run judge -- --check. It also states the rules every change must keep: nothing claimed that did not run, no secrets anywhere (gitleaks on every push), no real money (sandbox/testnet only, each live run recorded under docs/runs/), and no change that lets a model approve or weakens the passkey signature over the exact terms. CI enforces these checks on every pull request.


  • Project oversight


    The project SHOULD have a legal mechanism where all developers of non-trivial amounts of project software assert that they are legally authorized to make these contributions. The most common and easily-implemented approach for doing this is by using a Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO), where users add "signed-off-by" in their commits and the project links to the DCO website. However, this MAY be implemented as a Contributor License Agreement (CLA), or other legal mechanism. (URL required) [dco]
    The DCO is the recommended mechanism because it's easy to implement, tracked in the source code, and git directly supports a "signed-off" feature using "commit -s". To be most effective it is best if the project documentation explains what "signed-off" means for that project. A CLA is a legal agreement that defines the terms under which intellectual works have been licensed to an organization or project. A contributor assignment agreement (CAA) is a legal agreement that transfers rights in an intellectual work to another party; projects are not required to have CAAs, since having CAA increases the risk that potential contributors will not contribute, especially if the receiver is a for-profit organization. The Apache Software Foundation CLAs (the individual contributor license and the corporate CLA) are examples of CLAs, for projects which determine that the risks of these kinds of CLAs to the project are less than their benefits.

    Contributors sign off every commit with the Developer Certificate of Origin 1.1 (https://developercertificate.org/), as https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#sign-off-developer-certificate-of-origin explains (git commit -s). https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/.github/workflows/dco.yml lists unsigned commits on every pull request; it warns rather than fails for now, because the history before 19 November 2026 has no sign-offs (it comes from the maintainer's own account, the AI coding assistant he directs and automated dependency updates); it becomes a required check with the ruleset on main (https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#legal-the-developer-certificate-of-origin).



    The project MUST clearly define and document its project governance model (the way it makes decisions, including key roles). (URL required) [governance]
    There needs to be some well-established documented way to make decisions and resolve disputes. In small projects, this may be as simple as "the project owner and lead makes all final decisions". There are various governance models, including benevolent dictator and formal meritocracy; for more details, see Governance models. Both centralized (e.g., single-maintainer) and decentralized (e.g., group maintainers) approaches have been successfully used in projects. The governance information does not need to document the possibility of creating a project fork, since that is always possible for FLOSS projects.

    https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md: a single-maintainer model (the repository owner makes final decisions), how changes are proposed, reviewed and merged, how disagreements are decided, how releases are made, and how a second maintainer joins.



    The project MUST adopt a code of conduct and post it in a standard location. (URL required) [code_of_conduct]
    Projects may be able to improve the civility of their community and to set expectations about acceptable conduct by adopting a code of conduct. This can help avoid problems before they occur and make the project a more welcoming place to encourage contributions. This should focus only on behavior within the community/workplace of the project. Example codes of conduct are the Linux kernel code of conduct, the Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct, the Debian Code of Conduct, the Ubuntu Code of Conduct, the Fedora Code of Conduct, the GNOME Code Of Conduct, the KDE Community Code of Conduct, the Python Community Code of Conduct, The Ruby Community Conduct Guideline, and The Rust Code of Conduct.

    Contributor Covenant 2.1 in the standard location: https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md, linked from CONTRIBUTING.md.



    The project MUST clearly define and publicly document the key roles in the project and their responsibilities, including any tasks those roles must perform. It MUST be clear who has which role(s), though this might not be documented in the same way. (URL required) [roles_responsibilities]
    The documentation for governance and roles and responsibilities may be in one place.

    https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#roles-and-responsibilities lists each role (maintainer, security response, release manager, contributor, AI coding assistant, second maintainer), its tasks, and who holds it today: @agamemnon-coder holds every maintainer role; the second-maintainer role is vacant.



    The project MUST be able to continue with minimal interruption if any one person dies, is incapacitated, or is otherwise unable or unwilling to continue support of the project. In particular, the project MUST be able to create and close issues, accept proposed changes, and release versions of software, within a week of confirmation of the loss of support from any one individual. This MAY be done by ensuring someone else has any necessary keys, passwords, and legal rights to continue the project. Individuals who run a FLOSS project MAY do this by providing keys in a lockbox and a will providing any needed legal rights (e.g., for DNS names). (URL required) [access_continuity]

    If the maintainer is gone, a trusted person can take over within a week: a sealed recovery note in a password manager's emergency access, with a waiting period the owner can deny while able, holds the GitHub account's recovery codes and the Cloudflare account, with a written statement that the successor may run the project. In place since 19 November 2026. The plan: https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#continuity-if-the-maintainer-is-gone. No live key is needed to continue: all runs use sandboxes and testnets.



    The project SHOULD have a "bus factor" of 2 or more. (URL required) [bus_factor]
    A "bus factor" (aka "truck factor") is the minimum number of project members that have to suddenly disappear from a project ("hit by a bus") before the project stalls due to lack of knowledgeable or competent personnel. The truck-factor tool can estimate this for projects on GitHub. For more information, see Assessing the Bus Factor of Git Repositories by Cosentino et al.

    The bus factor is 1: one maintainer (@agamemnon-coder) writes, reviews, merges and releases, with AI coding assistants he directs. We do not claim otherwise. https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#how-a-second-maintainer-joins says how a second maintainer joins, and the continuity plan covers the gap meanwhile.


  • Documentation


    The project MUST have a documented roadmap that describes what the project intends to do and not do for at least the next year. (URL required) [documentation_roadmap]
    The project might not achieve the roadmap, and that's fine; the purpose of the roadmap is to help potential users and contributors understand the intended direction of the project. It need not be detailed.

    The project MUST include documentation of the architecture (aka high-level design) of the software produced by the project. If the project does not produce software, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [documentation_architecture]
    A software architecture explains a program's fundamental structures, i.e., the program's major components, the relationships among them, and the key properties of these components and relationships.

    The project MUST document what the user can and cannot expect in terms of security from the software produced by the project (its "security requirements"). (URL required) [documentation_security]
    These are the security requirements that the software is intended to meet.

    https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/security/requirements.md: what a user can expect (eight security requirements, each with its code and tests) and cannot expect (no real money, no outside audit, no protection from a compromised runner host), and the assumptions; the threat model is https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/security.md.



    The project MUST provide a "quick start" guide for new users to help them quickly do something with the software. (URL required) [documentation_quick_start]
    The idea is to show users how to get started and make the software do anything at all. This is critically important for potential users to get started.

    https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/install.md#quick-start-no-keys-offline: clone, npm ci, npm run judge, then the hands-on /try in five minutes, with no keys and no network beyond npm.



    The project MUST make an effort to keep the documentation consistent with the current version of the project results (including software produced by the project). Any known documentation defects making it inconsistent MUST be fixed. If the documentation is generally current, but erroneously includes some older information that is no longer true, just treat that as a defect, then track and fix as usual. [documentation_current]
    The documentation MAY include information about differences or changes between versions of the software and/or link to older versions of the documentation. The intent of this criterion is that an effort is made to keep the documentation consistent, not that the documentation must be perfect.

    Documentation is kept current by tests that read it: figures in the READMEs are checked against their run records (test/readme-headers.test.ts), every link and function named in the assurance case must exist (test/assurance.test.ts), ids on public pages must be in a run record (test/link-records.test.ts), and generated documents (changelog, zero-trust report, tamper matrix) fail CI when they differ from the code. A known documentation defect is a bug, fixed as any other (https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md). Pages that are dated records say so.



    The project repository front page and/or website MUST identify and hyperlink to any achievements, including this best practices badge, within 48 hours of public recognition that the achievement has been attained. (URL required) [documentation_achievements]
    An achievement is any set of external criteria that the project has specifically worked to meet, including some badges. This information does not need to be on the project website front page. A project using GitHub can put achievements on the repository front page by adding them to the README file.
  • Accessibility and internationalization


    The project (both project sites and project results) SHOULD follow accessibility best practices so that persons with disabilities can still participate in the project and use the project results where it is reasonable to do so. [accessibility_best_practices]
    For web applications, see the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG 2.0) and its supporting document Understanding WCAG 2.0; see also W3C accessibility information. For GUI applications, consider using the environment-specific accessibility guidelines (such as Gnome, KDE, XFCE, Android, iOS, Mac, and Windows). Some TUI applications (e.g. `ncurses` programs) can do certain things to make themselves more accessible (such as `alpine`'s `force-arrow-cursor` setting). Most command-line applications are fairly accessible as-is. This criterion is often N/A, e.g., for program libraries. Here are some examples of actions to take or issues to consider:
    • Provide text alternatives for any non-text content so that it can be changed into other forms people need, such as large print, braille, speech, symbols or simpler language ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.1)
    • Color is not used as the only visual means of conveying information, indicating an action, prompting a response, or distinguishing a visual element. ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.1)
    • The visual presentation of text and images of text has a contrast ratio of at least 4.5:1, except for large text, incidental text, and logotypes ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.3)
    • Make all functionality available from a keyboard (WCAG guideline 2.1)
    • A GUI or web-based project SHOULD test with at least one screen-reader on the target platform(s) (e.g. NVDA, Jaws, or WindowEyes on Windows; VoiceOver on Mac & iOS; Orca on Linux/BSD; TalkBack on Android). TUI programs MAY work to reduce overdraw to prevent redundant reading by screen-readers.

    https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/accessibility.md: the target is WCAG 2.1 AA; CI's browser checks fail on a page without a language, without exactly one h1, with a link or button without a name, an image without alt text, a page wider than a phone, and drive the navigation by keyboard; touch targets of 44 px; reduced motion honoured; light and dark themes. Not yet done, and said there: an axe-core run in CI, page-wide contrast checks, a recorded screen-reader session.



    The software produced by the project SHOULD be internationalized to enable easy localization for the target audience's culture, region, or language. If internationalization (i18n) does not apply (e.g., the software doesn't generate text intended for end-users and doesn't sort human-readable text), select "not applicable" (N/A). [internationalization]
    Localization "refers to the adaptation of a product, application or document content to meet the language, cultural and other requirements of a specific target market (a locale)." Internationalization is the "design and development of a product, application or document content that enables easy localization for target audiences that vary in culture, region, or language." (See W3C's "Localization vs. Internationalization".) Software meets this criterion simply by being internationalized. No localization for another specific language is required, since once software has been internationalized it's possible for others to work on localization.

    The product's pages (the payables and transactions pages, the CFO's phone pages, Purser Cloud's console) read every word from one message catalogue in Dutch and English (https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/src/ui/i18n.ts); tests hold that every key exists in both and that a Dutch page has no English left (test/i18n.test.ts, test/i18n-keys-used.test.ts); amounts and dates are formatted per language; a person, or the company, picks the language. The hackathon site and the CLIs stay English. Details: https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/accessibility.md#internationalisation.


  • Other


    If the project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) store passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). If the project sites do not store passwords for this purpose, select "not applicable" (N/A). [sites_password_security]
    Note that the use of GitHub meets this criterion. This criterion only applies to passwords used for authentication of external users into the project sites (aka inbound authentication). If the project sites must log in to other sites (aka outbound authentication), they may need to store authorization tokens for that purpose differently (since storing a hash would be useless). This applies criterion crypto_password_storage to the project sites, similar to sites_https.

    The project sites store no passwords of their own for external users: the repository, issues and downloads are on GitHub (which, as this criterion's details say, meets it), and the project's website and Purser Cloud sign people in with passkeys (WebAuthn) only, storing public keys; API keys it issues are stored as SHA-256 hashes.


 Change Control 1/1 ●

  • Previous versions


    The project MUST maintain the most often used older versions of the product or provide an upgrade path to newer versions. If the upgrade path is difficult, the project MUST document how to perform the upgrade (e.g., the interfaces that have changed and detailed suggested steps to help upgrade). [maintenance_or_update]

    An upgrade path, documented in https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/releasing.md#supported-versions-and-upgrading: only main and the latest release are supported; upgrading is checkout of the new tag and npm ci, the ledger's schema migrates in place on open (with shape checks and a foreign-key check), Purser Cloud's database by numbered migrations, and a MAJOR release lists every changed interface.


 Reporting 3/3 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    The project MUST use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]
  • Vulnerability report process


    The project MUST give credit to the reporter(s) of all vulnerability reports resolved in the last 12 months, except for the reporter(s) who request anonymity. If there have been no vulnerabilities resolved in the last 12 months, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [vulnerability_report_credit]

    No vulnerability has been reported through the project's process (private GitHub advisories, https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/SECURITY.md) in the last 12 months; the repository has no published advisories. SECURITY.md#credit commits to credit every reporter by name in the advisory and the release notes unless they ask to stay anonymous, and lists resolved reports. The security reviews the project ran itself are in docs/security.md.



    The project MUST have a documented process for responding to vulnerability reports. (URL required) [vulnerability_response_process]
    This is strongly related to vulnerability_report_process, which requires that there be a documented way to report vulnerabilities. It also related to vulnerability_report_response, which requires response to vulnerability reports within a certain time frame.

    https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/SECURITY.md#how-a-report-is-handled: acknowledge within 3 working days, assess with the reporter, fix in the advisory's private fork with a regression test, release a PATCH version, publish the advisory (with a CVE when users are affected) and credit the reporter.


 Quality 19/19 ●

  • Coding standards


    The project MUST identify the specific coding style guides for the primary languages it uses, and require that contributions generally comply with it. (URL required) [coding_standards]
    In most cases this is done by referring to some existing style guide(s), possibly listing differences. These style guides can include ways to improve readability and ways to reduce the likelihood of defects (including vulnerabilities). Many programming languages have one or more widely-used style guides. Examples of style guides include Google's style guides and SEI CERT Coding Standards.

    https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#coding-style: TypeScript's strict mode (with noUncheckedIndexedAccess), ESLint's and typescript-eslint's recommended rules with no any, and the project's conventions (integer cents for money, zod or strict parsers at every boundary); the three Solidity contracts follow the Solidity style guide.



    The project MUST automatically enforce its selected coding style(s) if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can do so in the selected language(s). [coding_standards_enforced]
    This MAY be implemented using static analysis tool(s) and/or by forcing the code through code reformatters. In many cases the tool configuration is included in the project's repository (since different projects may choose different configurations). Projects MAY allow style exceptions (and typically will); where exceptions occur, they MUST be rare and documented in the code at their locations, so that these exceptions can be reviewed and so that tools can automatically handle them in the future. Examples of such tools include ESLint (JavaScript), Rubocop (Ruby), and devtools check (R).

    npm run typecheck (tsc, strict) and npm run lint (ESLint, https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/eslint.config.js) run in CI on every push to main and every pull request and fail it on any error (https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml). Exceptions to a lint rule are rare (eight in the product code) and written at their line. Not linted: the three small Solidity contracts in contracts/, which are compiled with a pinned solc in the tests.


  • Working build system


    Build systems for native binaries MUST honor the relevant compiler and linker (environment) variables passed in to them (e.g., CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS, and LDFLAGS) and pass them to compiler and linker invocations. A build system MAY extend them with additional flags; it MUST NOT simply replace provided values with its own. If no native binaries are being generated, select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_standard_variables]
    It should be easy to enable special build features like Address Sanitizer (ASAN), or to comply with distribution hardening best practices (e.g., by easily turning on compiler flags to do so).

    No native binaries are built: the project is TypeScript (run by Node.js and Cloudflare Workers) and three Solidity contracts compiled to EVM bytecode.



    The build and installation system SHOULD preserve debugging information if they are requested in the relevant flags (e.g., "install -s" is not used). If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_preserve_debug]
    E.G., setting CFLAGS (C) or CXXFLAGS (C++) should create the relevant debugging information if those languages are used, and they should not be stripped during installation. Debugging information is needed for support and analysis, and also useful for measuring the presence of hardening features in the compiled binaries.

    No build or installation system that could strip debugging information: TypeScript runs from source (tsx), the Workers are bundled by wrangler (esbuild), and nothing is installed system-wide.



    The build system for the software produced by the project MUST NOT recursively build subdirectories if there are cross-dependencies in the subdirectories. If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_non_recursive]
    The project build system's internal dependency information needs to be accurate, otherwise, changes to the project may not build correctly. Incorrect builds can lead to defects (including vulnerabilities). A common mistake in large build systems is to use a "recursive build" or "recursive make", that is, a hierarchy of subdirectories containing source files, where each subdirectory is independently built. Unless each subdirectory is fully independent, this is a mistake, because the dependency information is incorrect.

    No recursive build: there is no make-style build of subdirectories. TypeScript runs from source, and each Worker is bundled by esbuild from one import graph that it resolves as a whole.



    The project MUST be able to repeat the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_repeatable]
    GCC and clang users may find the -frandom-seed option useful; in some cases, this can be resolved by forcing some sort order. More suggestions can be found at the reproducible build site.

    What is generated from source is generated the same way every time: the release tarball is a git archive of the tag (two runs give the same SHA-256, https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/security/README.md#verify-a-release); the Solidity artifacts are compiled again in the tests and must match the committed bytecode (test/tokenize.test.ts, test/compliance-contract.test.ts); generated documents and pages have --check modes that fail when the committed copy differs.


  • Installation system


    The project MUST provide a way to easily install and uninstall the software produced by the project using a commonly-used convention. [installation_common]
    Examples include using a package manager (at the system or language level), "make install/uninstall" (supporting DESTDIR), a container in a standard format, or a virtual machine image in a standard format. The installation and uninstallation process (e.g., its packaging) MAY be implemented by a third party as long as it is FLOSS.

    https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/install.md: the code installs with git clone and npm ci and uninstalls by deleting the folder (plus any keys or ledger folder the user set elsewhere); the MCP connector is added and removed in the AI client (claude mcp add / claude mcp remove); the Claude Code plugin with /plugin install and /plugin uninstall.



    The installation system for end-users MUST honor standard conventions for selecting the location where built artifacts are written to at installation time. For example, if it installs files on a POSIX system it MUST honor the DESTDIR environment variable. If there is no installation system or no standard convention, select "not applicable" (N/A). [installation_standard_variables]

    No installation system that writes to system locations: npm installs into the clone's node_modules, and the runtime writes only to the paths the user sets with KIT11_DB and KIT11_KEYS_DIR (https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/install.md#where-purser-writes).



    The project MUST provide a way for potential developers to quickly install all the project results and support environment necessary to make changes, including the tests and test environment. This MUST be performed with a commonly-used convention. [installation_development_quick]
    This MAY be implemented using a generated container and/or installation script(s). External dependencies would typically be installed by invoking system and/or language package manager(s), per external_dependencies.

    https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/install.md#the-development-environment: npm ci installs everything, and npm run typecheck, npm run lint and npm test run the whole suite with no keys and no network (partners are faked in test/fakes/).


  • Externally-maintained components


    The project MUST list external dependencies in a computer-processable way. (URL required) [external_dependencies]
    Typically this is done using the conventions of package manager and/or build system. Note that this helps implement installation_development_quick.

    Dependencies are listed in https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/package.json with exact versions and locked with integrity hashes in https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/package-lock.json (the relay Worker in worker/package-lock.json); each release carries a CycloneDX bill of materials (https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/security/sbom.cdx.json).



    Projects MUST monitor or periodically check their external dependencies (including convenience copies) to detect known vulnerabilities, and fix exploitable vulnerabilities or verify them as unexploitable. [dependency_monitoring]
    This can be done using an origin analyzer / dependency checking tool / software composition analysis tool such as OWASP's Dependency-Check, Sonatype's Nexus Auditor, Synopsys' Black Duck Software Composition Analysis, and Bundler-audit (for Ruby). Some package managers include mechanisms to do this. It is acceptable if the components' vulnerability cannot be exploited, but this analysis is difficult and it is sometimes easier to simply update or fix the part.

    npm audit runs in CI on every push and pull request for the root and worker/ and fails on any advisory not accepted, with an expiry, in .audit-allow.json; Dependabot opens weekly update pull requests for npm and the GitHub Actions (https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/.github/dependabot.yml); OpenSSF Scorecard runs weekly. See https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/security/README.md.



    The project MUST either:
    1. make it easy to identify and update reused externally-maintained components; or
    2. use the standard components provided by the system or programming language.
    Then, if a vulnerability is found in a reused component, it will be easy to update that component. [updateable_reused_components]
    A typical way to meet this criterion is to use system and programming language package management systems. Many FLOSS programs are distributed with "convenience libraries" that are local copies of standard libraries (possibly forked). By itself, that's fine. However, if the program *must* use these local (forked) copies, then updating the "standard" libraries as a security update will leave these additional copies still vulnerable. This is especially an issue for cloud-based systems; if the cloud provider updates their "standard" libraries but the program won't use them, then the updates don't actually help. See, e.g., "Chromium: Why it isn't in Fedora yet as a proper package" by Tom Callaway.

    Every reused component comes from npm through package.json and the lockfile and is updated there (Dependabot does so weekly); no library is vendored into the repository. The one copied file, pdf.js for Purser Cloud's static assets, is copied at deploy time from the pinned npm package by npm run cloud:pdfjs and is not in git.



    The project SHOULD avoid using deprecated or obsolete functions and APIs where FLOSS alternatives are available in the set of technology it uses (its "technology stack") and to a supermajority of the users the project supports (so that users have ready access to the alternative). [interfaces_current]

    Current interfaces throughout: Node.js 22 LTS, ES modules, WebCrypto and fetch, WebAuthn through a maintained library, GitHub Actions pinned to current releases by SHA. When a dependency deprecates an interface we move off it: for example the release workflow uses actions/attest because attest-sbom is deprecated (https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/.github/workflows/release.yml). Dependabot and TypeScript's type checks surface removed and changed APIs.


  • Automated test suite


    An automated test suite MUST be applied on each check-in to a shared repository for at least one branch. This test suite MUST produce a report on test success or failure. [automated_integration_testing]
    This requirement can be viewed as a subset of test_continuous_integration, but focused on just testing, without requiring continuous integration.

    CI (https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml) runs the full test suite (over 7,000 tests, with coverage per area), the browser checks, npm audit, Semgrep and gitleaks on every push to main and every pull request, and reports success or failure on the commit and the pull request.



    The project MUST add regression tests to an automated test suite for at least 50% of the bugs fixed within the last six months. [regression_tests_added50]

    https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/evidence/regression-tests.md: of the 46 merged pull requests since the project began (2 November 2026) whose title names a fix, 43 (93%) changed or added test files, 20 added a new test file; every one is listed with its test files, and the limits of that measure are stated. The test policy now requires a regression test with every fix (https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#tests-come-with-the-change).



    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage80]
    Many FLOSS tools are available to measure test coverage, including gcov/lcov, Blanket.js, Istanbul, JCov, and covr (R). Note that meeting this criterion is not a guarantee that the test suite is thorough, instead, failing to meet this criterion is a strong indicator of a poor test suite.

    The FLOSS suite (vitest with V8 coverage, run in CI on every push and pull request) covers 88.8% of statements (54,705 of 61,603) and 78.0% of branches of the product: every TypeScript file under src/, cloud/src/ and worker/src/, files no test loads included, without the command-line entry points (src/cli, thin wrappers and live-run recorders started as separate processes) and generated files; measured on 19 November 2026 and held by a floor of 85% in https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/vitest.config.ts. Stated plainly: with the CLI entry points included the figure is 76.8% (55,130 of 71,738). Scope, both figures, per area and the reasons: https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/evidence/coverage.md


  • New functionality testing


    The project MUST have a formal written policy that as major new functionality is added, tests for the new functionality MUST be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy_mandated]

    The written test policy, https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#tests-come-with-the-change: new functionality comes with tests in the automated suite (including tests of what it must refuse), a bug fix with a regression test, and coverage per area must not drop below 90% of lines; a pull request that does not keep it is not merged.



    The project MUST include, in its documented instructions for change proposals, the policy that tests are to be added for major new functionality. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    The policy is documented in CONTRIBUTING.md and in the pull request template, which asks for the "Tests and checks run": https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/.github/pull_request_template.md


  • Warning flags


    Projects MUST be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    Maximally strict where practical: TypeScript "strict": true, and ESLint rules that forbid any in the money and policy code.


 Security 13/13 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


    The project MUST implement secure design principles (from "know_secure_design"), where applicable. If the project is not producing software, select "not applicable" (N/A). [implement_secure_design]
    For example, the project results should have fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default). They should also have complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable). Note that in some cases principles will conflict, in which case a choice must be made (e.g., many mechanisms can make things more complex, contravening "economy of mechanism" / keep it simple).

    https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/security/requirements.md#secure-design-principles-applied maps each of Saltzer and Schroeder's principles to the code: fail-safe defaults (a payment above the limits waits and expires unsigned; risky features off by default; the Airwallex client refuses any non-sandbox URL), complete mediation (the terms' hash is recomputed before every payment), least privilege (one mandate per agent; no agent can use the owner key), separation of privilege (three layers that do not trust each other), open design (anyone can verify a signed approval offline).


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    No algorithm or mode with a known serious weakness: SHA-256, ECDSA P-256 (ES256) and RS256 for passkeys, HMAC-SHA256, AES-256-GCM; no MD5, SHA-1 or CBC anywhere (https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/security/requirements.md#cryptography).



    The project SHOULD support multiple cryptographic algorithms, so users can quickly switch if one is broken. Common symmetric key algorithms include AES, Twofish, and Serpent. Common cryptographic hash algorithm alternatives include SHA-2 (including SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 AND SHA-512) and SHA-3. [crypto_algorithm_agility]

    Passkey verification accepts two signature algorithms (ES256 and RS256); the approval terms carry a schema version and sealed tokens a version prefix, so a hash or cipher can be replaced by a new version beside the old one. Stated as a limit: the approval hash is SHA-256 only and the token cipher AES-256-GCM only, and changing either is a code change, not a setting (https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/security/requirements.md#cryptography).



    The project MUST support storing authentication credentials (such as passwords and dynamic tokens) and private cryptographic keys in files that are separate from other information (such as configuration files, databases, and logs), and permit users to update and replace them without code recompilation. If the project never processes authentication credentials and private cryptographic keys, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_credential_agility]

    Keys and credentials are kept apart from code, configuration, data and logs and replaced without recompiling: the runner's keys are files in KIT11_KEYS_DIR outside the repository, API credentials are environment variables or Worker secrets, Purser Cloud's token-sealing key is a Worker secret (never in the database it protects), and every credential has a rotation procedure (https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/security/requirements.md#cryptography, https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/runbook.md).



    The software produced by the project SHOULD support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 SHOULD be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    Every call to a partner is HTTPS; the hosted pages are served over HTTPS with HSTS. The only plain-HTTP servers are the runner's local pages, which answer loopback addresses only (https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/security/requirements.md#cryptography).



    The software produced by the project SHOULD, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    Outgoing TLS uses Node.js's and the Cloudflare Workers runtime's TLS clients, which offer TLS 1.2 and 1.3 by default; nothing lowers the minimum version.



    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform TLS certificate verification by default when using TLS, including on subresources. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_certificate_verification]

    All TLS connections use Node.js's or the Workers runtime's fetch, which verify the certificate chain and host name by default; no code disables it (no rejectUnauthorized: false, no NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED), and Purser offers no option to.



    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform certificate verification before sending HTTP headers with private information (such as secure cookies). If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_verification_private]

    The certificate is verified during the TLS handshake, before any HTTP request is sent, so API keys and bearer tokens in request headers go only to a verified server; the relay's session cookie is HttpOnly, Secure and SameSite=Strict.


  • Secure release


    The project MUST cryptographically sign releases of the project results intended for widespread use, and there MUST be a documented process explaining to users how they can obtain the public signing keys and verify the signature(s). The private key for these signature(s) MUST NOT be on site(s) used to directly distribute the software to the public. If releases are not intended for widespread use, select "not applicable" (N/A). [signed_releases]
    The project results include both source code and any generated deliverables where applicable (e.g., executables, packages, and containers). Generated deliverables MAY be signed separately from source code. These MAY be implemented as signed git tags (using cryptographic digital signatures). Projects MAY provide generated results separately from tools like git, but in those cases, the separate results MUST be separately signed.

    Releases are signed by the release workflow (https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/.github/workflows/release.yml): the source tarball, its CycloneDX SBOM and SHA256SUMS carry Sigstore-signed SLSA build provenance and an SBOM attestation, bound to this repository's workflow identity; the short-lived signing key is never on the download site. Users verify with gh attestation verify, as https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/releasing.md#verifying-a-release and https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/security/README.md#verify-a-release document. First signed release: https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/releases/tag/v1.2.0



    It is SUGGESTED that in the version control system, each important version tag (a tag that is part of a major release, minor release, or fixes publicly noted vulnerabilities) be cryptographically signed and verifiable as described in signed_releases. [version_tags_signed]

    The version tags (v1.0-submission, v1.1-submission, v1.2.0) are not GPG- or SSH-signed: v1.2.0 was created with its GitHub release. The release files themselves are signed (see signed_releases). Future tags will be signed with the maintainer's key (git tag -s), as https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/releasing.md describes.


  • Other security issues


    The project results MUST check all inputs from potentially untrusted sources to ensure they are valid (an *allowlist*), and reject invalid inputs, if there are any restrictions on the data at all. [input_validation]
    Note that comparing input against a list of "bad formats" (aka a *denylist*) is normally not enough, because attackers can often work around a denylist. In particular, numbers are converted into internal formats and then checked if they are between their minimum and maximum (inclusive), and text strings are checked to ensure that they are valid text patterns (e.g., valid UTF-8, length, syntax, etc.). Some data may need to be "anything at all" (e.g., a file uploader), but these would typically be rare.

    https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/security/requirements.md#input-validation: every input from outside the runner is checked against what is allowed and refused otherwise: Purser Cloud's API bodies with size-capped zod schemas, model output and agent tool calls with zod, MCP tool arguments with zod, the relay Worker's bodies with byte limits, type checks and lists of known values, money as exact two-decimal strings, payees from an allowlist, webhooks by HMAC within five minutes, partner answers against their documented shapes.



    Hardening mechanisms SHOULD be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. [hardening]
    Hardening mechanisms may include HTTP headers like Content Security Policy (CSP), compiler flags to mitigate attacks (such as -fstack-protector), or compiler flags to eliminate undefined behavior. For our purposes least privilege is not considered a hardening mechanism (least privilege is important, but separate).

    https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/security/requirements.md#hardening: a strict CSP on every hosted page (default-src 'none', scripts by hash or nonce, never 'unsafe-inline', frame-ancestors 'none'; the one known gap, the runner's loopback-only approvals page, is named there), HSTS, X-Frame-Options DENY, nosniff, no-referrer, no-store, COOP same-origin and a narrow permissions policy, asserted in test/security-headers.test.ts; rate and size limits on every public endpoint; TypeScript strict as type-level hardening; timeouts and idempotency keys on every external call; least-privilege CI with pinned Actions.



    The project MUST provide an assurance case that justifies why its security requirements are met. The assurance case MUST include: a description of the threat model, clear identification of trust boundaries, an argument that secure design principles have been applied, and an argument that common implementation security weaknesses have been countered. (URL required) [assurance_case]
    An assurance case is "a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a specified set of critical claims regarding a system’s properties are adequately justified for a given application in a given environment" ("Software Assurance Using Structured Assurance Case Models", Thomas Rhodes et al, NIST Interagency Report 7608). Trust boundaries are boundaries where data or execution changes its level of trust, e.g., a server's boundaries in a typical web application. It's common to list secure design principles (such as Saltzer and Schroeer) and common implementation security weaknesses (such as the OWASP top 10 or CWE/SANS top 25), and show how each are countered. The BadgeApp assurance case may be a useful example. This is related to documentation_security, documentation_architecture, and implement_secure_design.

    https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/assurance.md: each money invariant, the function that enforces it, its tests, the CI job and the run record; with the threat model and trust boundaries (https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/security.md#trust-boundaries, a diagram), the argument that secure design principles are applied and common weaknesses (OWASP Top Ten) countered (https://github.com/agamemnon-coder/x402-business-agents/blob/main/docs/security/requirements.md), and the accepted risks.


 Analysis 2/2 ●

  • Static code analysis


    The project MUST use at least one static analysis tool with rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    CodeQL's security queries and Semgrep's security rules look for common vulnerabilities in TypeScript/JavaScript and GitHub Actions: injection, XSS, insecure crypto, unsafe workflow patterns and similar.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    If the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) MUST be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    The project is written in memory-safe languages (TypeScript/JavaScript and Solidity); no C or C++.



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Project badge entry owned by: Max.
Entry created on 2026-11-19 09:48:23 UTC, last updated on 2026-11-19 13:39:15 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-11-19 10:09:52 UTC.