CVE Lite CLI

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Baseline Level 3 criteria. These criteria are from baseline version v2025.10.10 with updated criteria text from version v2026.02.19. Criteria that are new in version v2026.02.19 are labeled "future" and will begin to be enforced starting 2026-06-01. Please provide answers to the "future" criteria before that date.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Fast, developer-friendly JS/TS dependency vulnerability scanner with local lockfile scanning, OSV matching, direct vs transitive visibility, --fix, JSON output, and practical remediation guidance.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

 Controls 21/21 ●

  • Controls


    Enough for a badge!

    When a job is assigned permissions in a CI/CD pipeline, the source code or configuration MUST only assign the minimum privileges necessary for the corresponding activity. [OSPS-AC-04.02]
    Configure the project's CI/CD pipelines to assign the lowest available permissions to users and services by default, elevating permissions only when necessary for specific tasks. In some version control systems, this may be possible at the organizational or repository level. If not, set permissions at the top level of the pipeline.

    The project utilizes granular GitHub Actions permissions, explicitly defining contents: read at the job level to adhere to the principle of least privilege.


    Enough for a badge!

    (Future criterion) CI/CD pipelines which accept trusted collaborator input MUST sanitize and validate that input prior to use in the pipeline. [OSPS-BR-01.04]
    CI/CD pipelines should sanitize (quote, escape or exit on expected values) all collaborator inputs on explicit workflow executions. While collaborators are generally trusted, manual inputs to a workflow cannot be reviewed and could be abused by an account takeover or insider threat.

    Workflow dispatch triggers and manual inputs are subject to strict validation logic within the CI/CD configuration to prevent injection or misuse.


    Enough for a badge!

    When an official release is created, all assets within that release MUST be clearly associated with the release identifier or another unique identifier for the asset. [OSPS-BR-02.02]
    Assign a unique version identifier to each software asset produced by the project, following a consistent naming convention or numbering scheme. Examples include SemVer, CalVer, or git commit id.

    [version_unique]


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST define a policy for managing secrets and credentials used by the project. The policy should include guidelines for storing, accessing, and rotating secrets and credentials. [OSPS-BR-07.02]
    Document how secrets and credentials are managed and used within the project. This should include details on how secrets are stored (e.g., using a secrets management tool), how access is controlled, and how secrets are rotated or updated. Ensure that sensitive information is not hard-coded in the source code or stored in version control systems.

    The project maintains a formal policy of utilizing GitHub Secrets for encrypted storage, with zero hard-coded credentials allowed in the source or history.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the integrity and authenticity of the release assets. [OSPS-DO-03.01]
    Instructions in the project should contain information about the technology used, the commands to run, and the expected output. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    Met. Release tarballs are signed via GitHub Artifact Attestations using Sigstore's ephemeral OIDC-issued keys, generated per build — no long-lived private signing key exists on either GitHub or the npm registry, satisfying the requirement that the private key not live on the distribution site. Verified end-to-end against v1.12.1 using gh attestation verify cve-lite-cli-1.12.1.tgz --repo OWASP/cve-lite-cli. Verification process documented at https://github.com/OWASP/cve-lite-cli#security-and-verification. [signed_releases]


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the expected identity of the person or process authoring the software release. [OSPS-DO-03.02]
    The expected identity may be in the form of key IDs used to sign, issuer and identity from a sigstore certificate, or other similar forms. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    Met. Release tarballs are signed via GitHub Artifact Attestations using Sigstore's ephemeral OIDC-issued keys, generated per build — no long-lived private signing key exists on either GitHub or the npm registry, satisfying the requirement that the private key not live on the distribution site. Verified end-to-end against v1.12.1 using gh attestation verify cve-lite-cli-1.12.1.tgz --repo OWASP/cve-lite-cli. Verification process documented at https://github.com/OWASP/cve-lite-cli#security-and-verification. [signed_releases]


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include a descriptive statement about the scope and duration of support for each release. [OSPS-DO-04.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for the project's released software assets, the project should have a SUPPORT.md file, a "Support" section in SECURITY.md, or other documentation explaining the support lifecycle, including the expected duration of support for each release, the types of support provided (e.g., bug fixes, security updates), and any relevant policies or procedures for obtaining support.

    The project’s SUPPORT.md defines the lifecycle for major releases, confirming that security updates are prioritized for the current stable version.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST provide a descriptive statement when releases or versions will no longer receive security updates. [OSPS-DO-05.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for security fixes, the project should have a SUPPORT.md or other documentation explaining the project's policy for security updates.

    Justification: Documentation explicitly states that support for a version terminates upon the release of a subsequent major version that supersedes its architecture.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST have a policy that code collaborators are reviewed prior to granting escalated permissions to sensitive resources. [OSPS-GV-04.01]
    Publish an enforceable policy in the project documentation that requires code collaborators to be reviewed and approved before being granted escalated permissions to sensitive resources, such as merge approval or access to secrets. It is recommended that vetting includes establishing a justifiable lineage of identity such as confirming the contributor's association with a known trusted organization.

    Justification: Escalated permissions (e.g., maintainer status) require a formal review by the Project Lead to establish identity and technical trust before approval.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, all compiled released software assets MUST be delivered with a software bill of materials. [OSPS-QA-02.02]
    It is recommended to auto-generate SBOMs at build time using a tool that has been vetted for accuracy. This enables users to ingest this data in a standardized approach alongside other projects in their environment.

    Every release of the CLI is accompanied by an auto-generated SBOM (using GitHub's dependency graph or npm inventory) to ensure supply chain transparency.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release comprising multiple source code repositories, all subprojects MUST enforce security requirements that are as strict or stricter than the primary codebase. [OSPS-QA-04.02]
    Any additional subproject code repositories produced by the project and compiled into a release must enforce security requirements as applicable to the status and intent of the respective codebase. In addition to following the corresponding OSPS Baseline requirements, this may include requiring a security review, ensuring that it is free of vulnerabilities, and ensuring that it is free of known security issues.

    Every release of the CLI is accompanied by an auto-generated SBOM (using GitHub's dependency graph or npm inventory) to ensure supply chain transparency.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, project's documentation MUST clearly document when and how tests are run. [OSPS-QA-06.02]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains how to run the tests locally and how to run the tests in the CI/CD pipeline. The documentation should explain what the tests are testing and how to interpret the results.

    Yes, the software uses Jest to run unit tests. There are currently 178 unit tests and 15 suites. All tests are passing [test]


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project's documentation MUST include a policy that all major changes to the software produced by the project should add or update tests of the functionality in an automated test suite. [OSPS-QA-06.03]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains the policy for adding or updating tests. The policy should explain what constitutes a major change and what tests should be added or updated.

    I have established a formal policy that requires automated tests for all major new functionality added to the CVE Lite CLI. This mandate is documented in our project's contribution guidelines, where I specify that no pull request for new features will be merged unless accompanied by corresponding test suites. By enforcing this through my automated CI/CD pipeline, I ensure that our scanning engine maintains its high branch coverage and long-term technical integrity.

    URL: https://github.com/OWASP/cve-lite-cli/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#testing-policy [test_policy_mandated]


    Enough for a badge!

    When a commit is made to the primary branch, the project's version control system MUST require at least one non-author human approval of the changes before merging. [OSPS-QA-07.01]
    Configure the project's version control system to require at least one non-author human approval of changes before merging into the release or primary branch. This can be achieved by requiring a pull request to be reviewed and approved by at least one other collaborator before it can be merged.

    Branch protection rules require at least one manual approval from a maintainer other than the author before any Pull Request can be merged.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project MUST perform a threat modeling and attack surface analysis to understand and protect against attacks on critical code paths, functions, and interactions within the system. [OSPS-SA-03.02]
    Threat modeling is an activity where the project looks at the codebase, associated processes and infrastructure, interfaces, key components and "thinks like a hacker" and brainstorms how the system be be broken or compromised. Each identified threat is listed out so the project can then think about how to proactively avoid or close off any gaps/vulnerabilities that could arise. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    Met. Assurance case published at https://owasp.org/cve-lite-cli/docs/security-assurance-case covering all four required elements: threat model (five threat-actor classes with reachable surfaces), trust boundaries (data-flow diagram and per-boundary trust treatment table), secure design principles applied (Saltzer and Schroeder mapped to concrete project behavior), and common implementation weaknesses countered (full OWASP Top 10 (2021) mapping). The page is reachable from the README "Security and verification" section and from the project's security policy at SECURITY.md. [assurance_case]


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, any vulnerabilities in the software components not affecting the project MUST be accounted for in a VEX document, augmenting the vulnerability report with non-exploitability details. [OSPS-VM-04.02]
    Establish a VEX feed communicating the exploitability status of known vulnerabilities, including assessment details or any mitigations in place preventing vulnerable code from being executed.

    Justification: The project publishes VEX-aligned assessments to clarify when standard CVEs are non-exploitable due to the CLI’s specific architectural design.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. [OSPS-VM-05.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    The scanner uses itself to scan for CVEs [dependency_monitoring]


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include a policy to address SCA violations prior to any release. [OSPS-VM-05.02]
    Document a policy in the project to address applicable Software Composition Analysis results before any release, and add status checks that verify compliance with that policy prior to release.

    The scanner uses itself to scan for CVEs [dependency_monitoring]


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, all changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for malicious dependencies and known vulnerabilities in dependencies, then blocked in the event of violations, except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-05.03]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Software Composition Analysis tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    The scanner uses itself to scan for CVEs [dependency_monitoring]


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SAST findings. [OSPS-VM-06.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of Static Application Security Testing (SAST) findings. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    I take confirmed vulnerabilities very seriously. Any medium or higher severity exploitable issues discovered by my static analysis tools-such as ESLint or GitHub CodeQL- are prioritized for immediate remediation. I have a strict policy that no major production release, including the recent v1.10.0 milestone, is published until all such confirmed vulnerabilities are resolved.

    My commitment to a "timely" fix typically means addressing these issues within the same development cycle they are identified. By integrating these checks directly into my automated CI/CD pipeline, I ensure that security remains a gatekeeper for the project's integrity. This proactive approach ensures that the global developer community using the CVE Lite CLI can trust the tool's own supply chain and technical foundation. [static_analysis_fixed]


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, all changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for security weaknesses and blocked in the event of violations except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-06.02]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    To fulfill the static code analysis requirement for the OSSF Best Practices Badge, I apply multiple FLOSS tools to every production release of the CVE Lite CLI, ensuring the codebase is scrutinized for security vulnerabilities and architectural flaws before it is made public. My foundational static analysis workflow utilizes ESLint, which I have configured to perform deep analysis of the source code. This process goes significantly beyond standard compiler warnings by identifying patterns that could lead to logic errors or maintainability issues. By making these checks a mandatory part of my local development and pre-release routine, I ensure that every contribution meets a high standard of technical health.

    In addition to this linting layer, I have integrated GitHub CodeQL into the project's automated CI/CD pipeline. CodeQL performs sophisticated semantic analysis and data-flow tracking, effectively treating the code as a database to identify complex security issues that traditional tools cannot detect. By running these scans on every pull request and major release-including the recent v1.10.0 milestone - I ensure that the "Secure by Design" philosophy I advocate for the industry is strictly applied to the tool’s own development. This process acts as a mandatory quality gate that must be passed before any code is merged into the main branch or released to the community. [static_analysis]



This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Sonu Kapoor and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Sonu Kapoor.
Entry created on 2026-05-02 14:54:56 UTC, last updated on 2026-05-03 17:19:03 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-05-03 16:57:54 UTC.