vfhe

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Baseline Level 3 criteria. These are criteria version v2026.08.28.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    A library for Zero-Knowledge Proofs, (verifiable) Fully Homomorphic Encryption, and related techniques.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

 Controls 21/21 ●

  • Controls


    Enough for a badge!

    When a job is assigned permissions in a CI/CD pipeline, the source code or configuration MUST only assign the minimum privileges necessary for the corresponding activity. [OSPS-AC-04.02]
    Configure the project's CI/CD pipelines to assign the lowest available permissions to users and services by default, elevating permissions only when necessary for specific tasks. In some version control systems, this may be possible at the organizational or repository level. If not, set permissions at the top level of the pipeline.

    Every workflow declares an explicit permissions: block; the top-level default is minimal (contents: read) and individual jobs elevate only what they need — id-token: write for Trusted Publishing, attestations: write for provenance, pull-requests: write for the coverage comment. No job runs with broader scope than its task requires.


    Enough for a badge!

    CI/CD pipelines which accept trusted collaborator input MUST sanitize and validate that input prior to use in the pipeline. [OSPS-BR-01.04]
    CI/CD pipelines should sanitize (quote, escape or exit on expected values) all collaborator inputs on explicit workflow executions. While collaborators are generally trusted, manual inputs to a workflow cannot be reviewed and could be abused by an account takeover or insider threat.

    The release workflow's manual inputs are validated before use: target is a fixed choice list, and a dedicated first step exits non-zero unless the pypi target runs from a tag and the testpypi target supplies a version. All collaborator inputs enter shell steps only as quoted environment variables, never interpolated into the script body.


    Enough for a badge!

    When an official release is created, all assets within that release MUST be clearly associated with the release identifier or another unique identifier for the asset. [OSPS-BR-02.02]
    Assign a unique version identifier to each software asset produced by the project, following a consistent naming convention or numbering scheme. Examples include SemVer, CalVer, or git commit id.

    Every release asset is associated with the version identifier: the sdist filename embeds it, the immutable git tag and PyPI version fix it, and the SBOM and Sigstore provenance are attached to that tagged GitHub release. The version is derived from the tag by setuptools-scm, so all assets of a release share one identifier.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST define a policy for managing secrets and credentials used by the project. The policy should include guidelines for storing, accessing, and rotating secrets and credentials. [OSPS-BR-07.02]
    Document how secrets and credentials are managed and used within the project. This should include details on how secrets are stored (e.g., using a secrets management tool), how access is controlled, and how secrets are rotated or updated. Ensure that sensitive information is not hard-coded in the source code or stored in version control systems.

    The secrets policy is documented in SECURITY.md ("Secrets and credentials"). The project stores no long-lived secrets: PyPI publishing uses Trusted Publishing (short-lived OIDC tokens minted per run) and releases are signed with Sigstore's ephemeral keys, so there is nothing to rotate. GitHub Actions runs with a read-only default token, elevated per job only where needed; a detect-private-key pre-commit hook and GitHub push protection block accidental credential commits; nothing sensitive is hard-coded.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the integrity and authenticity of the release assets. [OSPS-DO-03.01]
    Instructions in the project should contain information about the technology used, the commands to run, and the expected output. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    README ("Verifying a release") gives the technology, exact commands, and expected output to verify integrity and authenticity: download the sdist and run gh attestation verify <sdist> --repo vfhe/vfhe, which validates the Sigstore build provenance against the artifact's digest. PyPI additionally records these attestations on the project files page.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the expected identity of the person or process authoring the software release. [OSPS-DO-03.02]
    The expected identity may be in the form of key IDs used to sign, issuer and identity from a sigstore certificate, or other similar forms. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    The same README section documents the expected authoring identity: successful verification shows the signer as the .github/workflows/release.yml workflow of vfhe/vfhe, issued through GitHub Actions' OIDC (https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com). A mismatched or absent identity indicates the artifact is not a genuine release.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include a descriptive statement about the scope and duration of support for each release. [OSPS-DO-04.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for the project's released software assets, the project should have a SUPPORT.md file, a "Support" section in SECURITY.md, or other documentation explaining the support lifecycle, including the expected duration of support for each release, the types of support provided (e.g., bug fixes, security updates), and any relevant policies or procedures for obtaining support.

    SUPPORT.md describes the support scope and duration: as pre-release (0.x) software, only the latest PyPI release is supported and receives bug fixes and security updates; there are no back-branches or long-term support, and every 0.x release may contain breaking changes. The types of support and channels (Zulip, issues, private security reporting) are stated, and the policy will be revised at 1.0.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST provide a descriptive statement when releases or versions will no longer receive security updates. [OSPS-DO-05.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for security fixes, the project should have a SUPPORT.md or other documentation explaining the project's policy for security updates.

    SUPPORT.md (and SECURITY.md "Supported versions") states that a release stops receiving security updates as soon as a newer release supersedes it; upgrading to the latest release is the supported remediation path for any fixed issue.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST have a policy that code collaborators are reviewed prior to granting escalated permissions to sensitive resources. [OSPS-GV-04.01]
    Publish an enforceable policy in the project documentation that requires code collaborators to be reviewed and approved before being granted escalated permissions to sensitive resources, such as merge approval or access to secrets. It is recommended that vetting includes establishing a justifiable lineage of identity such as confirming the contributor's association with a known trusted organization.

    AUTHORS.md documents the policy: escalated permissions (merge rights and access to the GitHub organization, the PyPI project, or the release pipeline) are granted only after review and approval by the existing maintainers, only to contributors with an established, identifiable track record on the project, scoped to what the role requires and revoked when no longer needed.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, all compiled released software assets MUST be delivered with a software bill of materials. [OSPS-QA-02.02]
    It is recommended to auto-generate SBOMs at build time using a tool that has been vetted for accuracy. This enables users to ingest this data in a standardized approach alongside other projects in their environment.

    Each release ships a CycloneDX SBOM, auto-generated at build time by cyclonedx-py (the OWASP CycloneDX project's Python tool) from the installed package environment, and attached to the GitHub release. Reproducible output is enabled for deterministic SBOMs.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release comprising multiple source code repositories, all subprojects MUST enforce security requirements that are as strict or stricter than the primary codebase. [OSPS-QA-04.02]
    Any additional subproject code repositories produced by the project and compiled into a release must enforce security requirements as applicable to the status and intent of the respective codebase. In addition to following the corresponding OSPS Baseline requirements, this may include requiring a security review, ensuring that it is free of vulnerabilities, and ensuring that it is free of known security issues.

    The project is a single source-code repository. Third-party components are vendored as declared git submodules pinned to specific commits, not additional project subprojects, so there are no subproject repositories to which this requirement applies.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST clearly document when and how tests are run. [OSPS-QA-06.02]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains how to run the tests locally and how to run the tests in the CI/CD pipeline. The documentation should explain what the tests are testing and how to interpret the results.

    CONTRIBUTING.md and docs/DEVELOPMENT.md (p.6) document when and how tests run: locally via make test (complete) and make test-fast, and in CI on every pull request across Linux and macOS on Python 3.10–3.14. The docs explain what the suites cover (C unit tests, the Python suite including heavy FHE bootstraps, sdist install-and-smoke) and how to read the result, the single CI OK gate.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include a policy that all major changes to the software produced by the project should add or update tests of the functionality in an automated test suite. [OSPS-QA-06.03]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains the policy for adding or updating tests. The policy should explain what constitutes a major change and what tests should be added or updated.

    CONTRIBUTING.md ("Testing policy") states that any change adding or altering functionality MUST add or update automated tests covering it, a new kernel, a new Python API, a bug fix (a test that fails before and passes after), or a behavioural change, while pure refactors, documentation, and CI changes are exempt. Reviewers hold pull requests to this.


    Enough for a badge!

    When a commit is made to the primary branch, the project's version control system MUST require at least one non-author human approval of the changes before merging. [OSPS-QA-07.01]
    Configure the project's version control system to require at least one non-author human approval of changes before merging into the release or primary branch. This can be achieved by requiring a pull request to be reviewed and approved by at least one other collaborator before it can be merged.

    The branch ruleset on the default branch requires a pull request with at least one approving review from a non-author before merging; direct pushes are rejected.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project MUST perform a threat modeling and attack surface analysis to understand and protect against attacks on critical code paths, functions, and interactions within the system. [OSPS-SA-03.02]
    Threat modeling is an activity where the project looks at the codebase, associated processes and infrastructure, interfaces, key components and "thinks like a hacker" and brainstorms how the system be be broken or compromised. Each identified threat is listed out so the project can then think about how to proactively avoid or close off any gaps/vulnerabilities that could arise. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    docs/THREAT_MODEL.md provides the threat modeling and attack-surface analysis: it enumerates actors and trust boundaries (identifying the Python→C cffi boundary as primary), the assets, and each threat class (memory-safety bugs reachable from inputs, cryptographic incorrectness, weak randomness, engine-mode mismatch, malicious runtime compilation, supply-chain tampering) with its mitigations and residual gaps. It is maintained as features and breaking changes land.


    Enough for a badge!

    Any vulnerabilities in the software components not affecting the project MUST be accounted for in a VEX document, augmenting the vulnerability report with non-exploitability details. [OSPS-VM-04.02]
    Establish a VEX feed communicating the exploitability status of known vulnerabilities, including assessment details or any mitigations in place preventing vulnerable code from being executed.

    The project maintains an OpenVEX feed (docs/vex/vfhe.openvex.json) with a documented policy (docs/vex/README.md): when a scanner reports a vulnerability in a dependency that review finds VFHE does not execute, a not_affected statement with justification and impact statement is published there rather than treated as a release blocker. The feed is empty while no such vulnerability is outstanding.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. [OSPS-VM-05.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    SECURITY.md ("Dependency and static-analysis policy") defines the SCA remediation threshold: no dependency with a known high- or critical-severity vulnerability, and no dependency under a license incompatible with Apache-2.0, may be merged or released; lower-severity findings are triaged and tracked. Identification is via dependency-review and Dependabot; prioritization is by severity; remediation is by update or documented non-exploitability.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include a policy to address SCA violations prior to any release. [OSPS-VM-05.02]
    Document a policy in the project to address applicable Software Composition Analysis results before any release, and add status checks that verify compliance with that policy prior to release.

    The SECURITY.md policy states that a release is blocked while any unresolved high/critical dependency finding applies to the shipped code, and compliance is enforced by the dependency-review status check required on every pull request that reaches the default branch.


    Enough for a badge!

    All changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for malicious dependencies and known vulnerabilities in dependencies, then blocked in the event of violations, except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-05.03]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Software Composition Analysis tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    All changes are automatically evaluated by the dependency-review status check, which runs a Software Composition Analysis on every pull request and blocks merge when it detects a dependency with a known vulnerability or an incompatible license; non-exploitable findings are suppressed via the project's VEX feed. The check is required by the default-branch ruleset.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SAST findings. [OSPS-VM-06.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of Static Application Security Testing (SAST) findings. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    SECURITY.md ("Dependency and static-analysis policy") defines the SAST remediation threshold: no CodeQL alert of high severity or above may be merged unresolved; each is fixed, or, if a true false positive, dismissed with a written justification recorded in the alert. CodeQL analyses every pull request and the default branch.


    Enough for a badge!

    All changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for security weaknesses and blocked in the event of violations except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-06.02]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    All changes are automatically evaluated by CodeQL (SAST) on every pull request; the analysis blocks merge on unresolved high-or-above alerts, with non-exploitable results dismissed and justified in the alert. The CodeQL checks are required by the default-branch ruleset.



You can use tools and AI systems to propose changes via a simple URL, such as https://www.bestpractices.dev/en/projects/13712/choose/edit?osps_ac_01_01_status=Met&osps_ac_01_01_justification=GitHub+enforced. See our automation proposals system for how to do that. This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Alin-Petru Roșu and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Alin-Petru Roșu.
Entry created on 2026-07-21 12:32:30 UTC, last updated on 2026-07-23 13:20:44 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-07-23 13:20:44 UTC.