PerspectiveGraph

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 13828 is passing Here is how to embed it:
You can show your badge status by embedding this in your markdown file:
[![OpenSSF Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13828/badge)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13828)
or by embedding this in your HTML:
<a href="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13828"><img src="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13828/badge"></a>


These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 13/13 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Finds the reachable paths from internet exposure, through excessive privilege, to a sensitive asset, by correlating the scanners you already run into one live graph of your environment. Flags them in the pull request that opens them and ships the fix as a PR. Open source, Apache-2.0.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]
    This MUST be in language that potential users can understand (e.g., it uses minimal jargon).

    The README opens by stating the problem the software solves and how, before any feature list: security tools report what they found and almost never what they know nothing about, and a false negative is invisible — nobody opens a ticket for an attack path they were never shown. PerspectiveGraph correlates the output of the scanners a team already runs into a single graph of the environment and reports the few routes that lead from the internet to critical assets, turning the pull request that opens one red and offering the fix as a pull request of its own.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph#readme


    Enough for a badge!

    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    The README covers all three:

    Obtain: signed release binaries for linux/macOS/Windows, signed multi-arch container images on GHCR, and make demo to run the whole stack locally — https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph#see-the-whole-engine-in-90-seconds
    Feedback: GitHub Issues for bugs and enhancements; security reports go through a separate private channel — https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/issues and https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/SECURITY.md
    Contribute: CONTRIBUTING.md, linked from the README, plus issues labelled "good first issue" — https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]
    We presume that projects on GitHub use issues and pull requests unless otherwise noted. This information can be short, e.g., stating that the project uses pull requests, an issue tracker, or posts to a mailing list (which one?)

    Non-trivial contribution file in repository: https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md.


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    CONTRIBUTING.md has a "Conventions" section stating the requirements explicitly: Go code must be gofmt, go vet and gosec clean, with an inline justification for any unavoidable gosec finding rather than a blanket exclude; new logic needs tests, and parsers need a fuzz test; new dependencies must be pure-Go. Frontend changes must pass tsc, build and vitest, use the inline SVG icon set rather than emoji, and take colours from the CSS design tokens. Dependency updates must go through make lockfile. Every user-facing change must update the docs, .env.example and the Postman collection. A preceding section lists the exact CI commands to run locally before opening a pull request.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#conventions


  • FLOSS license


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]
    FLOSS is software released in a way that meets the Open Source Definition or Free Software Definition. Examples of such licenses include the CC0, MIT, BSD 2-clause, BSD 3-clause revised, Apache 2.0, Lesser GNU General Public License (LGPL), and the GNU General Public License (GPL). For our purposes, this means that the license MUST be: The software MAY also be licensed other ways (e.g., "GPLv2 or proprietary" is acceptable).

    The Apache-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]
    The OSI uses a rigorous approval process to determine which licenses are OSS.

    The Apache-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]
    One convention is posting the license as a top-level file named LICENSE or COPYING, which MAY be followed by an extension such as ".txt" or ".md". An alternative convention is to have a directory named LICENSES containing license file(s); these files are typically named as their SPDX license identifier followed by an appropriate file extension, as described in the REUSE Specification. Note that this criterion is only a requirement on the source repository. You do NOT need to include the license file when generating something from the source code (such as an executable, package, or container). For example, when generating an R package for the Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN), follow standard CRAN practice: if the license is a standard license, use the standard short license specification (to avoid installing yet another copy of the text) and list the LICENSE file in an exclusion file such as .Rbuildignore. Similarly, when creating a Debian package, you may put a link in the copyright file to the license text in /usr/share/common-licenses, and exclude the license file from the created package (e.g., by deleting the file after calling dh_auto_install). We encourage including machine-readable license information in generated formats where practical.

    Non-trivial license location file in repository: https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/LICENSE.


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]
    This documentation must be in some media (such as text or video) that includes: how to install it, how to start it, how to use it (possibly with a tutorial using examples), and how to use it securely (e.g., what to do and what not to do) if that is an appropriate topic for the software. The security documentation need not be long. The project MAY use hypertext links to non-project material as documentation. If the project does not produce software, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    Some documentation basics file contents found.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]
    The documentation of an external interface explains to an end-user or developer how to use it. This would include its application program interface (API) if the software has one. If it is a library, document the major classes/types and methods/functions that can be called. If it is a web application, define its URL interface (often its REST interface). If it is a command-line interface, document the parameters and options it supports. In many cases it's best if most of this documentation is automatically generated, so that this documentation stays synchronized with the software as it changes, but this isn't required. The project MAY use hypertext links to non-project material as documentation. Documentation MAY be automatically generated (where practical this is often the best way to do so). Documentation of a REST interface may be generated using Swagger/OpenAPI. Code interface documentation MAY be generated using tools such as JSDoc (JavaScript), ESDoc (JavaScript), pydoc (Python), devtools (R), pkgdown (R), and Doxygen (many). Merely having comments in implementation code is not sufficient to satisfy this criterion; there needs to be an easy way to see the information without reading through all the source code. If the project does not produce software, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    The external interface is documented in four complementary places:

    GraphQL API: the full schema is frozen in the repository and guarded by a snapshot test that fails the build on any undeclared change — https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/docs/api/schema.graphql
    Compatibility contract: what is stable, what may change, and what a version bump means — https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/docs/API-STABILITY.md
    Ingest event contract and REST endpoints: documented in the manual, with every endpoint exercised by an importable Postman collection (55 requests) — https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/docs/MANUAL.md and https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/docs/perspectivegraph.postman_collection.json
    Configuration: every environment variable, with semantics and defaults — https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/.env.example


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]
    This requires that the project home page URL and the version control repository URL begin with "https:", not "http:". You can get free certificates from Let's Encrypt. Projects MAY implement this criterion using (for example) GitHub pages, GitLab pages, or SourceForge project pages. If you support HTTP, we urge you to redirect the HTTP traffic to HTTPS.

    Given only https: URLs.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]
    Examples of acceptable mechanisms include archived mailing list(s), GitHub issue and pull request discussions, Bugzilla, Mantis, and Trac. Asynchronous discussion mechanisms (like IRC) are acceptable if they meet these criteria; make sure there is a URL-addressable archiving mechanism. Proprietary JavaScript, while discouraged, is permitted.

    GitHub supports discussions on issues and pull requests.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]
    English is currently the lingua franca of computer technology; supporting English increases the number of different potential developers and reviewers worldwide. A project can meet this criterion even if its core developers' primary language is not English.

    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]
    As a minimum, the project should attempt to respond to significant problem and vulnerability reports. A project that is actively pursuing a badge is probably maintained. All projects and people have limited resources, and typical projects must reject some proposed changes, so limited resources and proposal rejections do not by themselves indicate an unmaintained project.

    When a project knows that it will no longer be maintained, it should set this criterion to "Unmet" and use the appropriate mechanism(s) to indicate to others that it is not being maintained. For example, use “DEPRECATED” as the first heading of its README, add “DEPRECATED” near the beginning of its home page, add “DEPRECATED” to the beginning of its code repository project description, add a no-maintenance-intended badge in its README and/or home page, mark it as deprecated in any package repositories (e.g., npm deprecate), and/or use the code repository's marking system to archive it (e.g., GitHub's "archive" setting, GitLab’s "archived" marking, Gerrit's "readonly" status, or SourceForge’s "abandoned" project status). Additional discussion can be found here.

    The project is actively maintained: 136 commits in the last 90 days and 15 releases, the most recent being v1.2.0. Releases are automated with release-please and every one carries a changelog entry. Issues and pull requests are handled by the maintainer.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/commits/main
    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/releases


 Change Control 9/9 ●

  • Public version-controlled source repository


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]
    The URL MAY be the same as the project URL. The project MAY use private (non-public) branches in specific cases while the change is not publicly released (e.g., for fixing a vulnerability before it is revealed to the public).

    Repository on GitHub, which provides public git repositories with URLs.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made.


    Enough for a badge!

    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]
    Projects MAY choose to omit specific interim versions from their public source repositories (e.g., ones that fix specific non-public security vulnerabilities, may never be publicly released, or include material that cannot be legally posted and are not in the final release).

    The repository contains the full development history, not release snapshots: 136 commits on main, of which only 14 are the automated release commits - so 122 are interim work available for review between releases. Changes land through pull requests that run the full CI suite (build, vet, tests, race detector, staticcheck, gosec, govulncheck, CodeQL, Trivy, fuzzing and an 80% coverage gate) before merge.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/commits/main
    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/pulls?q=is%3Apr+is%3Aclosed


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]
    Git is not specifically required and projects can use centralized version control software (such as subversion) with justification.

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • Unique version numbering


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]
    This MAY be met in a variety of ways including a commit IDs (such as git commit id or mercurial changeset id) or a version number (including version numbers that use semantic versioning or date-based schemes like YYYYMMDD).

    Every release has a unique version identifier. 16 git tags, all of the form vX.Y.Z, with no duplicates. Versions are produced by release-please from Conventional Commits, so a version is never reused or hand-assigned, and the same identifier appears on the git tag, the GitHub release, the release binaries, the container image tags on GHCR, and the version markers in the README.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/tags


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]
    Projects should generally prefer whatever format is expected by their users, e.g., because it is the normal format used by their ecosystem. Many ecosystems prefer SemVer, and SemVer is generally preferred for application programmer interfaces (APIs) and software development kits (SDKs). CalVer tends to be used by projects that are large, have an unusually large number of independently-developed dependencies, have a constantly-changing scope, or are time-sensitive. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value, because including a micro level supports simultaneously-maintained branches whenever that becomes necessary. Other version numbering formats may be used as version numbers, including git commit IDs or mercurial changeset IDs, as long as they uniquely identify versions. However, some alternatives (such as git commit IDs) can cause problems as release identifiers, because users may not be able to easily determine if they are up-to-date. The version ID format may be unimportant for identifying software releases if all recipients only run the latest version (e.g., it is the code for a single website or internet service that is constantly updated via continuous delivery).

    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

    Every release is identified in version control by a git tag of the form vX.Y.Z, created automatically by release-please when the release pull request is merged. 16 tags to date, matching the 15 published GitHub releases one to one.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/tags


  • Release notes


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]
    The release notes MAY be implemented in a variety of ways. Many projects provide them in a file named "NEWS", "CHANGELOG", or "ChangeLog", optionally with extensions such as ".txt", ".md", or ".html". Historically the term "change log" meant a log of every change, but to meet these criteria what is needed is a human-readable summary. The release notes MAY instead be provided by version control system mechanisms such as the GitHub Releases workflow.

    Non-trivial release notes file in repository: https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md.


    Enough for a badge!

    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]
    This criterion helps users determine if a given update will fix a vulnerability that is publicly known, to help users make an informed decision about updating. If users typically cannot practically update the software themselves on their computers, but must instead depend on one or more intermediaries to perform the update (as is often the case for a kernel and low-level software that is intertwined with a kernel), the project may choose "not applicable" (N/A) instead, since this additional information will not be helpful to those users. Similarly, a project may choose N/A if all recipients only run the latest version (e.g., it is the code for a single website or internet service that is constantly updated via continuous delivery). This criterion only applies to the project results, not its dependencies. Listing the vulnerabilities of all transitive dependencies of a project becomes unwieldy as dependencies increase and vary, and is unnecessary since tools that examine and track dependencies can do this in a more scalable way.

    N/A: no publicly known vulnerability with a CVE assignment has ever affected this project's own code. Every release carries generated release notes (release-please, from Conventional Commits) and a CHANGELOG entry, so the mechanism to record such a fix exists and will be used if one is ever assigned. Security reporting goes through a private channel documented in SECURITY.md, and no advisory has been published against the repository.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/releases
    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/security/advisories


 Reporting 8/8 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    Non-trivial SECURITY[.md] file found file in repository: https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/SECURITY.md. [osps_do_02_01]


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    GitHub Issues is enabled and is the tracker for individual issues, with labels used to mark entry points for new contributors ("good first issue"). Pull requests are tracked in the same place and every one runs the full CI suite before merge.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    No bug report has been submitted by anyone other than the maintainer in the period. The five open issues were all opened by the maintainer as scoped tasks for new contributors, so there is no backlog of unacknowledged external reports. The project went public very recently; the tracker is open and monitored.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]
    The response MAY be 'no' or a discussion about its merits. The goal is simply that there be some response to some requests, which indicates that the project is still alive. For purposes of this criterion, projects need not count fake requests (e.g., from spammers or automated systems). If a project is no longer making enhancements, please select "unmet" and include the URL that makes this situation clear to users. If a project tends to be overwhelmed by the number of enhancement requests, please select "unmet" and explain.

    Same situation as bug reports: no enhancement request has been submitted by a third party in the period. Planned work is tracked publicly in ROADMAP.md, which states explicitly what is done, what is scaffolded and what has not been started, so the direction is reviewable before anyone asks.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/issues
    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/ROADMAP.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]

    GitHub Issues is the public, searchable archive of reports and responses; it is open to anyone without an account for reading, and every issue keeps its full comment history. Pull request discussions are archived in the same place, and each release links the commits it contains.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/issues?q=is%3Aissue


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]
    Projects hosted on GitHub SHOULD consider enabling privately reporting a security vulnerability. Projects on GitLab SHOULD consider using its ability for privately reporting a vulnerability. Projects MAY identify a mailing address on https://PROJECTSITE/security, often in the form security@example.org. This vulnerability reporting process MAY be the same as its bug reporting process. Vulnerability reports MAY always be public, but many projects have a private vulnerability reporting mechanism.

    SECURITY.md publishes the process: how to report, what to include, what happens next, and what is in and out of scope. It states the preferred private channel and a fallback if private reporting is unavailable, and describes how the reporter is credited in the advisory and release notes unless they prefer anonymity. It is linked from the README and surfaced by GitHub in the repository's Security tab.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]
    Examples include a private defect report submitted on the web using HTTPS (TLS) or an email encrypted using OpenPGP. If vulnerability reports are always public (so there are never private vulnerability reports), choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    Private reporting is supported and is the preferred route. GitHub private vulnerability reporting is enabled on the repository (verified: the API reports "enabled": true), so a reporter uses Security → Report a vulnerability and the report stays private to the maintainers until a fix is published. SECURITY.md documents this as the first option, with a fallback for cases where it is unavailable: open a minimal public issue containing no details, asking only for a private contact.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]
    If there have been no vulnerabilities reported in the last 6 months, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    N/A: no vulnerability report has been received. The repository has no published or draft security advisories, and no third party has opened an issue. The reporting channel is documented and live (GitHub private vulnerability reporting is enabled on the repository), so reports have somewhere to arrive; none have.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/security/advisories


 Quality 13/13 ●

  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]
    A build system determines what actions need to occur to rebuild the software (and in what order), and then performs those steps. For example, it can invoke a compiler to compile the source code. If an executable is created from source code, it must be possible to modify the project's source code and then generate an updated executable with those modifications. If the software produced by the project depends on external libraries, the build system does not need to build those external libraries. If there is no need to build anything to use the software after its source code is modified, select "not applicable" (N/A).

    Non-trivial build file in repository: https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/Makefile.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]
    For example, Maven, Ant, cmake, the autotools, make, rake (Ruby), or devtools (R).

    Non-trivial build file in repository: https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/Makefile.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    The entire toolchain is FLOSS: Go (BSD-3-Clause), Node/npm (MIT), Make, Docker/BuildKit (Apache-2.0), Helm (Apache-2.0), and for the release path cosign, syft and Trivy (all Apache-2.0). Nothing proprietary is required to build, test or release. CGO_ENABLED=0 keeps the build free of a system C toolchain as well.


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]
    The project MAY use multiple automated test suites (e.g., one that runs quickly, vs. another that is more thorough but requires special equipment). There are many test frameworks and test support systems available, including Selenium (web browser automation), Junit (JVM, Java), RUnit (R), testthat (R).

    Two automated suites, both FLOSS: Go's standard testing package (BSD-3-Clause) for the backend, and Vitest (MIT) for the dashboard. How to run them is documented in CONTRIBUTING.md and wired into the Makefile (make test), and CI runs both on every push.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#dev-loop
    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/Makefile


    Enough for a badge!

    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]
    For example, "make check", "mvn test", or "rake test" (Ruby).

    go test ./... for the backend and npm test for the frontend — the standard invocation for each language, with no custom harness. make test runs the backend suite for convenience.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    Statement coverage on the engine (internal/ and pkg/) is 81.1%, enforced by a CI gate that fails below 80% and uses cross-package attribution so a package tested through another still gets credit. 533 tests across 56 packages. Beyond unit tests: 11 Go fuzz targets against the ingest parsers, a deterministic hostile-input battery (11 collectors × 23 payloads) that runs on every build, -race across all packages, an integration suite against a real Apache AGE database, and a CloudGoat benchmark that measures the path-finding engine's precision and recall against declared ground truth.

    Not covered: cmd/ sits at ~1% by design — it is process wiring, and the security-relevant parts of it (the production, auth and secret startup gates) are extracted into pure functions that are tested.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    Every push and pull request runs build, go vet, tests, -race, staticcheck, gosec, govulncheck, the coverage gate, the frontend build/lint/test/audit, an Apache AGE integration job, container image scanning with Trivy, CodeQL, gitleaks and OpenSSF Scorecard. Fuzzing runs as its own workflow. Releases are automated end to end: release-please cuts the version, then binaries and multi-arch images are built, signed with cosign, and attested with an SBOM and SLSA provenance.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/actions


  • New functionality testing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]
    As long as a policy is in place, even by word of mouth, that says developers should add tests to the automated test suite for major new functionality, select "Met."

    CONTRIBUTING.md states it under "Conventions": "Tests (and a fuzz test for parsers) for new logic." The policy is enforced mechanically as well as socially — a coverage gate fails the build below 80% on internal/ and pkg/, so new logic without tests moves the number down and blocks the merge.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#conventions


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]
    Major functionality would typically be mentioned in the release notes. Perfection is not required, merely evidence that tests are typically being added in practice to the automated test suite when new major functionality is added to the software produced by the project.

    Recent major changes each shipped with their tests, visible in the commit history. Examples: request correlation added internal/reqid with 8 tests including hostile-input cases; the file-based secret support added 8 tests plus 3 for the startup gate that refuses an unreadable secret; moving /metrics to its own listener added tests for both halves of the mux decision and for the configuration plumbing; the GraphQL cost guard added 6 tests, one of which reproduces a 1.2 KB document that previously took the guard over ten seconds to measure. The suite is 533 tests across 56 packages.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/commits/main


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    The policy is in CONTRIBUTING.md, which is the instructions for change proposals, in the "Conventions" section alongside the exact CI commands to run locally before opening a pull request. The pull request template is in .github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#conventions


  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]
    Examples of compiler warning flags include gcc/clang "-Wall". Examples of a "safe" language mode include JavaScript "use strict" and perl5's "use warnings". A separate "linter" tool is simply a tool that examines the source code to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes. These are typically enabled within the source code or build instructions.

    Go: go vet on every build, plus staticcheck (which on introduction found real defects vet does not see), gosec for security patterns and govulncheck for vulnerable dependencies. Frontend: ESLint and the TypeScript compiler (tsc -b). All run in CI on every push and pull request.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]
    These are the warnings identified by the implementation of the warnings criterion. The project should fix warnings or mark them in the source code as false positives. Ideally there would be no warnings, but a project MAY accept some warnings (typically less than 1 warning per 100 lines or less than 10 warnings).

    Zero tolerance on both sides. Go is gated by vet, staticcheck and gosec; the frontend runs eslint . --max-warnings=0, so a warning fails the build exactly as an error does. Two suppressions exist, both scoped to the line or file where the decision was made and both carrying the reason inline: a rule false positive on factory-produced icon components, and a deliberate state reset inside a debounced effect whose cleared values are not in the effect's dependencies.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    Maximally strict on both sides: no warning of any kind is tolerated in CI


 Security 16/16 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]
    This requires understanding the following design principles, including the 8 principles from Saltzer and Schroeder:
    • economy of mechanism (keep the design as simple and small as practical, e.g., by adopting sweeping simplifications)
    • fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default)
    • complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable)
    • open design (security mechanisms should not depend on attacker ignorance of its design, but instead on more easily protected and changed information like keys and passwords)
    • separation of privilege (ideally, access to important objects should depend on more than one condition, so that defeating one protection system won't enable complete access. E.G., multi-factor authentication, such as requiring both a password and a hardware token, is stronger than single-factor authentication)
    • least privilege (processes should operate with the least privilege necessary)
    • least common mechanism (the design should minimize the mechanisms common to more than one user and depended on by all users, e.g., directories for temporary files)
    • psychological acceptability (the human interface must be designed for ease of use - designing for "least astonishment" can help)
    • limited attack surface (the attack surface - the set of the different points where an attacker can try to enter or extract data - should be limited)
    • input validation with allowlists (inputs should typically be checked to determine if they are valid before they are accepted; this validation should use allowlists (which only accept known-good values), not denylists (which attempt to list known-bad values)).
    A "primary developer" in a project is anyone who is familiar with the project's code base, is comfortable making changes to it, and is acknowledged as such by most other participants in the project. A primary developer would typically make a number of contributions over the past year (via code, documentation, or answering questions). Developers would typically be considered primary developers if they initiated the project (and have not left the project more than three years ago), have the option of receiving information on a private vulnerability reporting channel (if there is one), can accept commits on behalf of the project, or perform final releases of the project software. If there is only one developer, that individual is the primary developer. Many books and courses are available to help you understand how to develop more secure software and discuss design. For example, the Secure Software Development Fundamentals course is a free set of three courses that explain how to develop more secure software (it's free if you audit it; for an extra fee you can earn a certificate to prove you learned the material).

    The maintainer's professional field is cybersecurity software engineering, and the design record is public rather than asserted. The project's threat model enumerates trust boundaries and assets, then walks each surface with STRIDE, recording both the control and the residual risk — including cases where the residual is uncomfortable, such as an in-memory brute-force lockout that a restart clears.

    The design applies least privilege (read-only cloud roles, viewer/admin RBAC, per-tenant isolation), fail-closed defaults (the binary refuses to start with SSO configured but issuer or audience missing, with credentials that parse to nothing, with an unreadable mounted secret, or with a declared production environment and an unreachable database), defence in depth (HMAC on ingest, rate limits with bounded state, query cost limits, a tamper-evident audit log, encryption at rest), and input validation at every trust boundary.


    Enough for a badge!

    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]
    Examples (depending on the type of software) include SQL injection, OS injection, classic buffer overflow, cross-site scripting, missing authentication, and missing authorization. See the CWE/SANS top 25 or OWASP Top 10 for commonly used lists. Many books and courses are available to help you understand how to develop more secure software and discuss common implementation errors that lead to vulnerabilities. For example, the Secure Software Development Fundamentals course is a free set of three courses that explain how to develop more secure software (it's free if you audit it; for an extra fee you can earn a certificate to prove you learned the material).

    Common vulnerability classes are addressed explicitly, each with a countermeasure and a regression test:

    Injection: parameterised queries; a hostile-input battery of 11 collectors × 23 payloads on every build; 11 fuzz targets on the parsers.
    Broken authentication: constant-time token comparison; algorithm allowlist on JWT verification; mandatory issuer and audience, enforced by refusing to start — which closes the confused-deputy case where a token minted for another application sharing the same JWKS would otherwise be accepted.
    Denial of service: body-size caps, per-IP rate limiting with a bounded client table, and GraphQL depth and cost budgets. A fragment-expansion bomb that stalled the guard for over ten seconds was found and fixed by memoisation; the reproduction is a permanent test.
    Log injection: structured logging only, never message interpolation, verified empirically against a forged log line.
    Prompt injection: environment-derived strings are bounded and neutralised before reaching the model, with the hostile inputs kept as a permanent test.
    Supply chain: SHA-pinned Actions, digest-pinned base images, govulncheck, Trivy, CodeQL, gitleaks, cosign signatures, SBOM and SLSA provenance.


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]
    These cryptographic criteria do not always apply because some software has no need to directly use cryptographic capabilities.

    Only published, expert-reviewed primitives, all from the Go standard library: AES-GCM (NIST SP 800-38D), Ed25519 (RFC 8032), HMAC (RFC 2104), SHA-2 (FIPS 180-4), TLS 1.2/1.3 (RFC 5246 / RFC 8446), RSA-SSA with SHA-2 for JWT verification (RFC 7518), and PKCE S256 (RFC 7636). Nothing bespoke.


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    The project implements no cryptography. Every primitive is called from the Go standard library — crypto/aes, crypto/cipher, crypto/ed25519, crypto/hmac, crypto/sha256, crypto/rand, crypto/tls — and JWT verification uses the widely reviewed golang-jwt/jwt/v5, restricted to an explicit allowlist of signing methods so algorithm confusion is impossible. The one place the project writes protocol code by hand is the PKCE challenge, and that too calls crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256") rather than implementing a hash.


    Enough for a badge!

    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]
    See the Open Standards Requirement for Software by the Open Source Initiative.

    All cryptography-dependent functionality runs on the Go standard library (BSD-3-Clause), golang-jwt/jwt/v5 (MIT), and the Web Crypto API in the browser. Verification tooling - cosign, syft, Trivy - is Apache-2.0. There is no proprietary or export-restricted component anywhere in the cryptographic path.


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]
    These minimum bitlengths are: symmetric key 112, factoring modulus 2048, discrete logarithm key 224, discrete logarithmic group 2048, elliptic curve 224, and hash 224 (password hashing is not covered by this bitlength, more information on password hashing can be found in the crypto_password_storage criterion). See https://www.keylength.com for a comparison of keylength recommendations from various organizations. The software MAY allow smaller keylengths in some configurations (ideally it would not, since this allows downgrade attacks, but shorter keylengths are sometimes necessary for interoperability).

    Defaults exceed the NIST minimums through 2030 and beyond: AES-256 for encryption at rest, Ed25519 (≈128-bit security) for signatures, SHA-256 for hashing and HMAC, TLS 1.2 as the floor with 1.3 preferred, and RSA JWT verification restricted to RS256/384/512.

    Smaller keylengths cannot be selected at all: the algorithms and sizes are fixed in code with no configuration knob to weaken them, which satisfies the requirement more strongly than making the weakening merely disableable. The one length an operator supplies is the at-rest encryption key, which must be exactly 32 bytes or the process refuses to start.


    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]
    ECB mode is almost never appropriate because it reveals identical blocks within the ciphertext as demonstrated by the ECB penguin, and CTR mode is often inappropriate because it does not perform authentication and causes duplicates if the input state is repeated. In many cases it's best to choose a block cipher algorithm mode designed to combine secrecy and authentication, e.g., Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and EAX. Projects MAY allow users to enable broken mechanisms (e.g., during configuration) where necessary for compatibility, but then users know they're doing it.

    No default security mechanism depends on a broken algorithm. No MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4 or Dual_EC_DRBG appears anywhere, and no CBC-mode construction is used - the at-rest cipher is AES-GCM, an AEAD. The only legacy primitive present is SHA-1, used solely for git-style content-addressed identifiers, never for authentication, integrity or confidentiality, and annotated inline where it appears. No interoperability constraint forces a weak algorithm on this project.


    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    Defaults are modern: AES-256-GCM at rest, Ed25519 for export signatures, HMAC-SHA-256 for ingest authentication, SHA-256 for the audit hash chain, RS256/384/512 for JWT verification against the IdP's JWKS, PKCE with the S256 challenge method, and TLS with MinVersion: TLS 1.2. No MD5, DES, RC4 or CBC-mode construction anywhere.

    One deliberate use of SHA-1 exists and is declared: pkg/ontology/event.go derives content-addressed node identifiers git-style. It is not a security primitive — the digest identifies a node, never authenticates or protects anything — and it is annotated inline (#nosec G505) so the intent is reviewable at the call site rather than hidden in a global exclude.


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]

    The project implements no key agreement of its own: all transport uses Go's standard crypto/tls with MinVersion: TLS 1.2, whose default cipher suite selection is ECDHE-based, and TLS 1.3 - negotiated whenever the peer supports it - provides forward secrecy unconditionally. The same applies to outbound connections (Postgres, NATS, IdP JWKS, LLM providers) and to TLS terminated at an ingress.


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]
    This criterion applies only when the software is enforcing authentication of users using passwords for external users (aka inbound authentication), such as server-side web applications. It does not apply in cases where the software stores passwords for authenticating into other systems (aka outbound authentication, e.g., the software implements a client for some other system), since at least parts of that software must have often access to the unhashed password.

    The software stores no user passwords. Authentication is either a bearer API token supplied by the operator, or OIDC, where the identity provider holds the credential and the project only verifies signed JWTs against its JWKS.

    For completeness, since a reviewer will find it: a static API token may optionally be configured as sha256$<hex> so only its digest is stored. Plain SHA-256 is correct there and iterated hashing would not be: these are high-entropy random secrets, not user-chosen passwords, so there is no low-entropy guessing space for a work factor to defend. That is the same approach GitHub and Stripe take for API keys.


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]
    A cryptographically secure random number generator may be a hardware random number generator, or it may be a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG) using an algorithm such as Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG, Yarrow, or Fortuna. Examples of calls to secure random number generators include Java's java.security.SecureRandom and JavaScript's window.crypto.getRandomValues. Examples of calls to insecure random number generators include Java's java.util.Random and JavaScript's Math.random.

    Every security-relevant value comes from crypto/rand: AES-GCM nonces (a fresh random nonce per seal), request identifiers, ticket and validation identifiers, and generated tokens.

    math/rand/v2 appears only where determinism is the requirement and security is not involved: the Monte Carlo risk simulation and the uncertainty sampling, which are seeded deliberately so a before/after comparison reflects the change rather than sampling noise, plus the synthetic load and scenario generators used in testing. Those call sites carry an inline #nosec G404 stating exactly that.


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]
    An even stronger mechanism is releasing the software with digitally signed packages, since that mitigates attacks on the distribution system, but this only works if the users can be confident that the public keys for signatures are correct and if the users will actually check the signature.

    Distribution channels use HTTPS exclusively. [osps_br_03_02]


    Enough for a badge!

    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]
    These hashes can be modified in transit.

    Nothing is retrieved over http, and the hash is never trusted on its own. Releases publish SHA256SUMS together with SHA256SUMS.bundle, a cosign keyless signature over that file, so the documented verification order is signature first and checksum second — the README gives the exact command. Container images are signed with cosign and carry an SPDX SBOM and SLSA build provenance. Go dependencies are verified against go.sum and the public checksum database; GitHub Actions are pinned to commit SHAs; base images are pinned by digest; npm uses npm ci against a committed lockfile.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph#check-your-own-account-in-30-seconds


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    Enough for a badge!

    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]
    The vulnerability must be patched and released by the project itself (patches may be developed elsewhere). A vulnerability becomes publicly known (for this purpose) once it has a CVE with publicly released non-paywalled information (reported, for example, in the National Vulnerability Database) or when the project has been informed and the information has been released to the public (possibly by the project). A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known. Note: this means that users might be left vulnerable to all attackers worldwide for up to 60 days. This criterion is often much easier to meet than what Google recommends in Rebooting responsible disclosure, because Google recommends that the 60-day period start when the project is notified even if the report is not public. Also note that this badge criterion, like other criteria, applies to the individual project. Some projects are part of larger umbrella organizations or larger projects, possibly in multiple layers, and many projects feed their results to other organizations and projects as part of a potentially-complex supply chain. An individual project often cannot control the rest, but an individual project can work to release a vulnerability patch in a timely way. Therefore, we focus solely on the individual project's response time. Once a patch is available from the individual project, others can determine how to deal with the patch (e.g., they can update to the newer version or they can apply just the patch as a cherry-picked solution).

    There are no unpatched vulnerabilities of any severity. No vulnerability has ever been publicly known against this project's own code, and dependencies are gated: govulncheck runs on every build against the Go vulnerability database, Trivy scans the release images, CodeQL performs taint analysis, and Dependabot opens update pull requests which are merged promptly. A finding in any of these fails CI, so an unpatched dependency cannot sit for 60 days — it blocks the next merge.


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    No critical vulnerability has been reported to date. The evidence that the project fixes security defects rapidly comes from its own auditing: a denial of service in the GraphQL cost guard (a 1.2 KB document that stalled the guard for over ten seconds), two unbounded maps reachable pre-authentication, and a production configuration that could start with authentication silently disabled were each found and fixed within the same working session, with regression tests that fail without the fix.


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]
    A project MAY leak "sample" credentials for testing and unimportant databases, as long as they are not intended to limit public access.

    gitleaks scans the full history on every build and fails it on a finding; the last scan covered 116 commits with no leaks. .gitignore excludes .env, /secrets/, *.pem, *.key and *.crt. Credentials are never committed: the repository ships .env.example and .env.production.example with empty values, and the software additionally accepts every credential through a <KEY>_FILE path so it need not be written into a file at all.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml


 Analysis 8/8 ●

  • Static code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]
    A static code analysis tool examines the software code (as source code, intermediate code, or executable) without executing it with specific inputs. For purposes of this criterion, compiler warnings and "safe" language modes do not count as static code analysis tools (these typically avoid deep analysis because speed is vital). Some static analysis tools focus on detecting generic defects, others focus on finding specific kinds of defects (such as vulnerabilities), and some do a combination. Examples of such static code analysis tools include cppcheck (C, C++), clang static analyzer (C, C++), SpotBugs (Java), FindBugs (Java) (including FindSecurityBugs), PMD (Java), Brakeman (Ruby on Rails), lintr (R), goodpractice (R), Coverity Quality Analyzer, SonarQube, Codacy, and HP Enterprise Fortify Static Code Analyzer. Larger lists of tools can be found in places such as the Wikipedia list of tools for static code analysis, OWASP information on static code analysis, NIST list of source code security analyzers, and Wheeler's list of static analysis tools. If there are no FLOSS static analysis tools available for the implementation language(s) used, you may select 'N/A'.

    Six static analysis tools run on every push and pull request, well beyond compiler warnings:

    staticcheck, which on introduction found real defects that go vet does not see
    gosec, security-focused SAST
    CodeQL, semantic taint analysis
    govulncheck, which reports reachable vulnerable code paths rather than merely vulnerable versions
    gitleaks, secret scanning across the full history
    ESLint and tsc for the dashboard
    There is also a repository-specific gate: a test holds every configuration key the backend reads to all three deployment surfaces, so a key that is settable in one place and silently ignored in another fails the build.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    Two of the tools are specifically vulnerability-oriented. gosec carries rules for the common Go classes: command and SQL injection, path traversal, weak cryptography, insecure randomness, unhandled errors. CodeQL performs dataflow taint tracking for the OWASP-style classes, following untrusted input to sensitive sinks across function boundaries. govulncheck goes further than a version comparison, reporting only vulnerabilities whose affected code the binary actually reaches.


    Enough for a badge!

    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]
    A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known. Note that criterion vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days requires that all such vulnerabilities be fixed within 60 days of being made public.

    Findings are fixed or justified inline, never suppressed globally. CONTRIBUTING.md forbids blanket excludes, so every suppression is a // #nosec Gxxx -- why it's safe comment at the call site where a reviewer will see it.

    Two concrete cases. gosec raised G703 (path traversal via taint analysis) on the code that reads a mounted secret; it was reviewed, judged a false positive for that context (the path comes from an environment variable, and anyone who can set the process environment already owns it), and annotated with that reasoning rather than excluded. staticcheck raised ST1018 on a literal U+202E character in a test file, a Trojan Source pattern, which was replaced with an escape sequence.

    All six tools currently report zero findings.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    On every commit, not merely daily. staticcheck, gosec, govulncheck, go vet, gitleaks, ESLint and tsc run on every push and every pull request, and a finding fails the build. CodeQL runs on push and pull request and on a weekly schedule, so newly published query packs are applied to unchanged code. Extended fuzzing runs weekly on its own schedule.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/actions


  • Dynamic code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]
    A dynamic analysis tool examines the software by executing it with specific inputs. For example, the project MAY use a fuzzing tool (e.g., American Fuzzy Lop) or a web application scanner (e.g., OWASP ZAP or w3af). In some cases the OSS-Fuzz project may be willing to apply fuzz testing to your project. For purposes of this criterion the dynamic analysis tool needs to vary the inputs in some way to look for various kinds of problems or be an automated test suite with at least 80% branch coverage. The Wikipedia page on dynamic analysis and the OWASP page on fuzzing identify some dynamic analysis tools. The analysis tool(s) MAY be focused on looking for security vulnerabilities, but this is not required.

    Three kinds of dynamic analysis run against the software as it executes.

    Fuzzing: 14 Go fuzz targets against the ingest parsers, which are the boundary where attacker-influenceable bytes become graph structure. Their seed corpora execute on every go test, and a dedicated workflow runs extended campaigns weekly (Sunday, with a configurable duration on manual dispatch).

    Race detection: go test -race across all 56 packages on every push. It instruments the running program to catch data races that no static tool sees.

    A hostile-input battery: 11 collectors by 23 payloads (nesting bombs, invalid UTF-8, lone surrogates, 5 MB strings, path traversal, template injection, NUL bytes, bidirectional overrides), driven through the real parsers deterministically on every build. A 10-second per-payload timeout means a parser that can be stalled fails the test.

    All of this runs before every release, since releases are cut from main only after CI is green.

    https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph/blob/main/.github/workflows/fuzz.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    The project produces no software in a memory-unsafe language. The backend is Go and the dashboard TypeScript, both memory-safe, and the backend is built with CGO_ENABLED=0 so no C is linked in. That also keeps the release binaries static and portable.

    Fuzzing is nonetheless used extensively (14 targets), because in Go the classes it catches are panics, unbounded allocation and non-termination rather than buffer overwrites.


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    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]
    This criterion does not suggest enabling assertions during production; that is entirely up to the project and its users to decide. This criterion's focus is instead to improve fault detection during dynamic analysis before deployment. Enabling assertions in production use is completely different from enabling assertions during dynamic analysis (such as testing). In some cases enabling assertions in production use is extremely unwise (especially in high-integrity components). There are many arguments against enabling assertions in production, e.g., libraries should not crash callers, their presence may cause rejection by app stores, and/or activating an assertion in production may expose private data such as private keys. Beware that in many Linux distributions NDEBUG is not defined, so C/C++ assert() will by default be enabled for production in those environments. It may be important to use a different assertion mechanism or defining NDEBUG for production in those environments.

    The race detector is the Go analogue of an assertion-heavy build, and it is enabled exactly where the criterion suggests: -race runs across all packages in CI, and is not enabled in production builds, which are CGO_ENABLED=0 static binaries.

    Tests additionally assert invariants that production code does not re-check. Two examples: the hand-rolled priority queue must agree with container/heap element by element on randomised input full of ties, and scoring output must stay byte-identical across an optimisation.


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    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]
    If you are not running dynamic code analysis and thus have not found any vulnerabilities in this way, choose "not applicable" (N/A). A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known.

    No unfixed finding exists. The clearest example of the process working came from dynamic analysis of the GraphQL cost guard. A purpose-built probe timed the guard against a 1.2 KB document of non-cyclic fragments and showed it running for over ten seconds before a single field resolved, which is a denial of service in the very guard meant to prevent one. It was fixed in the same session by memoising fragment costs (49 µs for the same input), and the reproduction is now a permanent test that fails if the expansion stops being linear.

    Race-detector and fuzzing runs are currently clean.



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Project badge entry owned by: Luigi Iacuaniello.
Entry created on 2026-07-26 15:51:09 UTC, last updated on 2026-08-07 13:24:38 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-08-07 11:55:52 UTC.