sipnab

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Baseline Level 1 criteria. These are criteria version v2026.08.28.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    sipnab is a SIP and RTP capture, analysis, and security tool for VoIP networks. It unifies sngrep (interactive TUI) and sipgrep (CLI) into a single Rust binary, adding first-class RTP quality monitoring (jitter, loss, MOS), VoIP diagnostic aliases, TLS/SRTP decryption, and security analysis (scanner, flood and fraud detection, STIR/SHAKEN). It also runs as an MCP server so an AI agent can drive it. Its only runtime dependency is libpcap.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

    sipnab is under active development and not yet recommended for production use (the README states this). Despite the pre-1.0 status, it enforces a strict quality bar: more than 10,000 automated tests (10,468 at v0.5.196) run in CI on every push; Clippy and CodeQL gate every merge on a deny-on-warning basis; 19 fuzz targets cover every attacker-controlled parser and run daily under AddressSanitizer via ClusterFuzzLite, with ThreadSanitizer weekly over the threaded paths; releases ship with sigstore build provenance and CycloneDX SBOMs; and the tool is validated against a real-traffic pcap corpus. SECURITY.md documents the security model, including privilege drop, chroot and the scope of reportable issues.

    One note for reviewers of the crypto criteria: sipnab decrypts SIP and RTP that other systems encrypted, so it must interoperate with whatever algorithm a capture used. Vetted "weak" algorithms may therefore appear where reading an existing capture requires them — the project does not choose weak cryptography for its own protection.

 Controls 24/24 ●

  • Controls


    Enough for a badge!

    When a user attempts to read or modify a sensitive resource in the project's authoritative repository, the system MUST require the user to complete a multi-factor authentication process. [OSPS-AC-01.01]
    Enforce multi-factor authentication for the project's version control system, requiring collaborators to provide a second form of authentication when accessing sensitive data or modifying repository settings. Passkeys are acceptable for this control.

    GitHub requires 2FA as of March 2023.


    Enough for a badge!

    When a new collaborator is added, the version control system MUST require manual permission assignment, or restrict the collaborator permissions to the lowest available privileges by default. [OSPS-AC-02.01]
    Most public version control systems are configured in this manner. Ensure the project's version control system always assigns the lowest available permissions to collaborators by default when added, granting additional permissions only when necessary.

    GitHub grants new collaborators only the permission level the owner explicitly assigns, and there are no organization base permissions (user-owned repository). Workflows default to least privilege too: every workflow declares top-level permissions of contents: read (scorecard.yml declares none) and raises scopes only per job.


    Enough for a badge!

    When a direct commit is attempted on the project's primary branch, an enforcement mechanism MUST prevent the change from being applied. [OSPS-AC-03.01]
    If the VCS is centralized, set branch protection on the primary branch in the project's VCS. Alternatively, use a decentralized approach, like the Linux kernel's, where changes are first proposed in another repository, and merging changes into the primary repository requires a specific separate act.

    Branch protection on main requires the CI success status check, so changes reach main only through pull requests that pass CI (documented in CONTRIBUTING.md: https://github.com/NormB/sipnab/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md).


    Enough for a badge!

    When an attempt is made to delete the project's primary branch, the version control system MUST treat this as a sensitive activity and require explicit confirmation of intent. [OSPS-AC-03.02]
    Set branch protection on the primary branch in the project's version control system to prevent deletion.

    Branch protection on main blocks deletion and force-pushes; deleting the branch would require the owner to first remove the protection rule explicitly in repository settings.


    Enough for a badge!

    When a CI/CD pipeline operates on untrusted metadata, those parameters MUST be sanitized and validated prior to use in the pipeline. [OSPS-BR-01.01]
    CI/CD pipelines should sanitize (quote, escape or exit on expected values) all metadata inputs which correspond to untrusted sources. This includes data such as branch names, commit messages, tags, pull request titles, and author information.

    No workflow interpolates untrusted event data (PR titles, bodies, branch names, issue or comment text) into run: scripts; a repository-wide search finds no github.event.pull_request.* / issue / comment / head_ref expressions in .github/workflows/. No workflow uses pull_request_target. Every third-party action is pinned to a full commit SHA.


    Enough for a badge!

    When a CI/CD pipeline operates on untrusted code snapshots, it MUST prevent access to privileged CI/CD credentials and assets. [OSPS-BR-01.03]
    CI/CD pipelines should isolate untrusted code snapshots from privileged credentials and assets. In particular, projects should be careful to ensure that workflows which build or execute code prior to review by a collaborator do not have access to CI/CD credentials.

    Pull requests from forks run under the pull_request trigger, which GitHub executes without repository secrets and with a read-only token; no workflow uses pull_request_target or workflow_run on untrusted code. Credential-bearing jobs (release, crates.io publish via the crates-io environment and OIDC trusted publishing, sigstore attestations) run only on tag pushes by the maintainer.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project lists a URI as an official project channel, that URI MUST be exclusively delivered using encrypted channels. [OSPS-BR-03.01]
    Configure the project's websites and version control systems to use encrypted channels such as SSH or HTTPS for data transmission. Ensure all tools and domains referenced in project documentation can only be accessed via encrypted channels.

    Project URLs use HTTPS exclusively.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project lists a URI as an official distribution channel, that channel MUST be protected from adversary-in-the-middle attacks using cryptographically authenticated channels. [OSPS-BR-03.02]
    Artifacts distributed by the project should be distributed through channels which ensure integrity and authenticity. Use of HTTPS for downloads, signed releases, or distribution through trusted package managers are all acceptable methods to protect against adversary-in-the-middle attacks.

    Distribution channels use HTTPS exclusively.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST prevent the unintentional storage of unencrypted sensitive data, such as secrets and credentials, in the version control system. [OSPS-BR-07.01]
    Configure .gitignore or equivalent to exclude files that may contain sensitive information. Use pre-commit hooks and automated scanning tools to detect and prevent the inclusion of sensitive data in commits.

    No credentials are stored in the repository. [no_leaked_credentials]


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include user guides for all basic functionality. [OSPS-DO-01.01]
    Create user guides or documentation for all basic functionality of the project, explaining how to install, configure, and use the project's features. If there are any known dangerous or destructive actions available, include highly-visible warnings.

    Basic documentation is published on the documentation site and in the repository, covering all four required topics:
    • How to install — https://sipnab.com/docs/install/
    • How to start / how to use — the interactive TUI guide at https://sipnab.com/docs/tui/ and the command-line reference at https://sipnab.com/docs/cli/
    • How to use, with worked examples — the cookbook of task-based recipes at https://sipnab.com/docs/cookbook/, plus a step-by-step MCP walkthrough at https://sipnab.com/docs/mcp-walkthrough/ and a troubleshooting guide at https://sipnab.com/docs/troubleshooting/
    • How to use it securely — SECURITY.md documents the security model and operational guidance, including running with privilege drop (--user) and filesystem isolation (--chroot), the "do not open a public issue for vulnerabilities" reporting rule, and the tool's threat model: https://github.com/NormB/sipnab/blob/main/SECURITY.md [documentation_basics]


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include a guide for reporting defects. [OSPS-DO-02.01]
    It is recommended that projects use their VCS default issue tracker. If an external source is used, ensure that the project documentation and contributing guide clearly and visibly explain how to use the reporting system. It is recommended that project documentation also sets expectations for how defects will be triaged and resolved.

    Non-trivial SECURITY[.md] file found file in repository: https://github.com/NormB/sipnab/blob/main/SECURITY.md.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for public discussions about proposed changes and usage obstacles. [OSPS-GV-02.01]
    Establish one or more mechanisms for public discussions within the project, such as mailing lists, instant messaging, or issue trackers, to facilitate open communication and feedback.

    GitHub supports public discussions on proposed changes (via pull requests) and usage obstacles (via issues).


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include an explanation of the contribution process, or clearly state that public contributions are not accepted [OSPS-GV-03.01]
    Create a CONTRIBUTING.md or CONTRIBUTING/ directory to outline the contribution process including the steps for submitting changes, and engaging with the project maintainers.

    Contribution process documented in repository.


    Enough for a badge!

    The license for the source code MUST meet the OSI Open Source Definition or the FSF Free Software Definition. [OSPS-LE-02.01]
    Add a LICENSE file to the project's repo with a license that is an approved license by the Open Source Initiative (OSI), or a free license as approved by the Free Software Foundation (FSF). Examples of such licenses include the MIT, BSD 2-clause, BSD 3-clause revised, Apache 2.0, Lesser GNU General Public License (LGPL), and the GNU General Public License (GPL). Releasing to the public domain meets this control if there are no other encumbrances such as patents.

    sipnab is released under MIT OR Apache-2.0. Both licenses independently satisfy every bar the criterion lists:

    • OSI-approved: MIT and Apache-2.0 are both on the OSI approved-license list.
    • FSF free: both are FSF-approved free-software licenses.
    • Debian main: both are accepted in Debian main.
    • Fedora "good": both are Fedora-approved "good" licenses. [floss_license]

    Enough for a badge!

    The license for the released software assets MUST meet the OSI Open Source Definition or the FSF Free Software Definition. [OSPS-LE-02.02]
    If a different license is included with released software assets, ensure it is an approved license by the Open Source Initiative (OSI), or a free license as approved by the Free Software Foundation (FSF). Examples of such licenses include the MIT, BSD 2-clause, BSD 3-clause revised, Apache 2.0, Lesser GNU General Public License (LGPL), and the GNU General Public License (GPL). Note that the license for the released software assets may be different than the source code.

    sipnab is released under MIT OR Apache-2.0. Both licenses independently satisfy every bar the criterion lists:

    • OSI-approved: MIT and Apache-2.0 are both on the OSI approved-license list.
    • FSF free: both are FSF-approved free-software licenses.
    • Debian main: both are accepted in Debian main.
    • Fedora "good": both are Fedora-approved "good" licenses. [floss_license]

    Enough for a badge!

    The license for the source code MUST be maintained in the corresponding repository's LICENSE file, COPYING file, LICENSES/ directory, or LICENSE/ directory. [OSPS-LE-03.01]
    Include the project's source code license in the project's LICENSE file, COPYING file, LICENSES/ directory, or LICENSE/ directory to provide visibility and clarity on the licensing terms. The filename MAY have an extension. If the project has multiple repositories, ensure that each repository includes the license file.

    License file found in repository.


    Enough for a badge!

    The license for the released software assets MUST be included in the released source code, or in a LICENSE file, COPYING file, or LICENSE/ directory alongside the corresponding release assets. [OSPS-LE-03.02]
    Include the project's released software assets license in the released source code, or in a LICENSE file, COPYING file, or LICENSE/ directory alongside the corresponding release assets to provide visibility and clarity on the licensing terms. The filename MAY have an extension. If the project has multiple repositories, ensure that each repository includes the license file.

    https://github.com/NormB/sipnab/blob/main/LICENSES/Apache-2.0.txt
    https://github.com/NormB/sipnab/blob/main/LICENSES/MIT.txt [license_location]


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's source code repository MUST be publicly readable at a static URL. [OSPS-QA-01.01]
    Use a common VCS such as GitHub, GitLab, or Bitbucket. Ensure the repository is publicly readable. Avoid duplication or mirroring of repositories unless highly visible documentation clarifies the primary source. Avoid frequent changes to the repository that would impact the repository URL. Ensure the repository is public.

    Repository is publicly available on GitHub.


    Enough for a badge!

    The version control system MUST contain a publicly readable record of all changes made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [OSPS-QA-01.02]
    Use a common VCS such as GitHub, GitLab, or Bitbucket to maintain a publicly readable commit history. Avoid squashing or rewriting commits in a way that would obscure the author of any commits.

    Repository git metadata is publicly available on GitHub.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the package management system supports it, the source code repository MUST contain a dependency list that accounts for the direct language dependencies. [OSPS-QA-02.01]
    This may take the form of a package manager or language dependency file that enumerates all direct dependencies such as package.json, Gemfile, or go.mod.

    Direct dependencies are declared in Cargo.toml and fully resolved in the committed Cargo.lock; the fuzz workspace has its own manifest and lockfile. CycloneDX SBOMs are also published with each release.


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects with multiple repositories MUST document a list of codebases that are part of the project. [OSPS-QA-04.01]
    Document any additional subproject code repositories produced by the project and compiled into a release. This documentation should include the status and intent of the respective codebase.

    sipnab is a single-repository project; the source, documentation site (https://sipnab.com, built by .github/workflows/pages.yml) and fuzz targets all live in https://github.com/NormB/sipnab


    Enough for a badge!

    The version control system MUST NOT contain generated executable artifacts. [OSPS-QA-05.01]
    Remove generated executable artifacts in the project's version control system. It is recommended that any scenario where a generated executable artifact appears critical to a process such as testing, it should be instead be generated at build time or stored separately and fetched during a specific well-documented pipeline step.

    No generated executables are committed; binaries are built by CI and published only as release assets.


    Enough for a badge!

    The version control system MUST NOT contain unreviewable binary artifacts. [OSPS-QA-05.02]
    Do not add any unreviewable binary artifacts to the project's version control system. This includes executable application binaries, library files, and similar artifacts. It does not include assets such as graphical images, sound or music files, and similar content typically stored in a binary format.

    The only binary files are small test fixtures: packet captures (.pcap/.pcapng) under tests/ that are readable with sipnab, tshark or Wireshark, and three tiny .bin protocol fixtures (TLS premaster values, an rtpengine reply) documented alongside the tests that use them. No opaque or compiled binaries are committed.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST contain security contacts. [OSPS-VM-02.01]
    Create a security.md (or similarly-named) file that contains security contacts for the project.

    The vulnerability reporting process is published in SECURITY.md (https://github.com/NormB/sipnab/blob/main/SECURITY.md): do not open a public issue; email security@sipnab.com with a description, reproduction steps and impact, using a [SECURITY] subject prefix. It also defines scope, response targets and disclosure policy. [vulnerability_report_process]



You can use tools and AI systems to propose changes via a simple URL, such as https://www.bestpractices.dev/en/projects/13931/choose/edit?osps_ac_01_01_status=Met&osps_ac_01_01_justification=GitHub+enforced. See our automation proposals system for how to do that. This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Norm Brandinger and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Norm Brandinger.
Entry created on 2026-08-02 14:39:34 UTC, last updated on 2026-09-30 15:50:33 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-08-06 13:59:14 UTC.