houndarr

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 14028 is passing Here is how to embed it:
You can show your badge status by embedding this in your markdown file:
[![OpenSSF Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14028/badge)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14028)
or by embedding this in your HTML:
<a href="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14028"><img src="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14028/badge"></a>


These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 13/13 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Self-hosted *arr companion for controlled missing, cutoff, and upgrade searches.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

    Houndarr runs as a single container next to an existing *arr stack. It makes
    no outbound connection other than to the instances you configure, with one
    optional exception: a release check against the GitHub releases API, which you
    can turn off.

    Security documentation, including the threat model, credential handling, and
    the CI evidence behind those claims, lives at
    https://av1155.github.io/houndarr/docs/security/overview

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]
    This MUST be in language that potential users can understand (e.g., it uses minimal jargon).

    Houndarr searches for missing, cutoff-unmet, and upgrade-eligible media in
    Radarr, Sonarr, Lidarr, Readarr, and Whisparr, in small rate-limited batches.
    The README and the documentation home page both open with a plain-language
    explanation of the problem: the *arr apps monitor RSS feeds for new releases
    but do not go back and search for content already in your library that is
    missing or below your quality cutoff, and their built-in "Search All Missing"
    button fires every item at once, which can exhaust indexer API limits and get
    you temporarily banned. Houndarr works through that backlog slowly and
    automatically instead, using configurable batch sizes, sleep intervals,
    per-item cooldowns, and hourly API caps.

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr#what-is-houndarr
    https://av1155.github.io/houndarr/


    Enough for a badge!

    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    Obtain: the README Quick Start gives a copy-paste docker-compose.yml and a
    docker run equivalent. The container image is published at
    ghcr.io/av1155/houndarr, and the docs site covers Docker, Docker Compose,
    Kubernetes, Helm, Unraid, and building from source.
    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr#quick-start
    https://av1155.github.io/houndarr/docs/guides/installation/docker-compose

    Feedback: bug reports and feature requests go through GitHub issues, which
    use structured issue forms.
    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/issues/new/choose
    Security vulnerabilities are reported privately through GitHub security
    advisories, as documented in SECURITY.md.
    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/security/advisories/new
    There is also a Discord server for questions and troubleshooting.

    Contribute: CONTRIBUTING.md documents the development setup, branch and
    commit conventions, required local quality gates, and the pull request
    process.
    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]
    We presume that projects on GitHub use issues and pull requests unless otherwise noted. This information can be short, e.g., stating that the project uses pull requests, an issue tracker, or posts to a mailing list (which one?)

    CONTRIBUTING.md describes the full process: open a GitHub issue first, branch
    from main, implement with tests, run the quality gates locally, then open a
    pull request that links the issue. All required CI checks must pass before a
    PR is merged, and merges are squash-merged to keep linear history.

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#workflow


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    CONTRIBUTING.md states the requirements for an acceptable contribution:
    Python 3.13 or newer, Conventional Commits for commit messages, tests updated
    for any behavior change, no secrets or generated artifacts committed, and five
    quality gates that must pass locally before commit: ruff check, ruff format
    --check, mypy (strict), bandit, and pytest. CI enforces the same gates on
    every pull request, so a contribution that skips them will not merge.

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#required-local-checks
    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#code-style


  • FLOSS license


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]
    FLOSS is software released in a way that meets the Open Source Definition or Free Software Definition. Examples of such licenses include the CC0, MIT, BSD 2-clause, BSD 3-clause revised, Apache 2.0, Lesser GNU General Public License (LGPL), and the GNU General Public License (GPL). For our purposes, this means that the license MUST be: The software MAY also be licensed other ways (e.g., "GPLv2 or proprietary" is acceptable).

    The AGPL-3.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]
    The OSI uses a rigorous approval process to determine which licenses are OSS.

    The AGPL-3.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]
    One convention is posting the license as a top-level file named LICENSE or COPYING, which MAY be followed by an extension such as ".txt" or ".md". An alternative convention is to have a directory named LICENSES containing license file(s); these files are typically named as their SPDX license identifier followed by an appropriate file extension, as described in the REUSE Specification. Note that this criterion is only a requirement on the source repository. You do NOT need to include the license file when generating something from the source code (such as an executable, package, or container). For example, when generating an R package for the Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN), follow standard CRAN practice: if the license is a standard license, use the standard short license specification (to avoid installing yet another copy of the text) and list the LICENSE file in an exclusion file such as .Rbuildignore. Similarly, when creating a Debian package, you may put a link in the copyright file to the license text in /usr/share/common-licenses, and exclude the license file from the created package (e.g., by deleting the file after calling dh_auto_install). We encourage including machine-readable license information in generated formats where practical.

    Non-trivial license location file in repository: https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/blob/main/LICENSE.


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]
    This documentation must be in some media (such as text or video) that includes: how to install it, how to start it, how to use it (possibly with a tutorial using examples), and how to use it securely (e.g., what to do and what not to do) if that is an appropriate topic for the software. The security documentation need not be long. The project MAY use hypertext links to non-project material as documentation. If the project does not produce software, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    Some documentation basics file contents found.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]
    The documentation of an external interface explains to an end-user or developer how to use it. This would include its application program interface (API) if the software has one. If it is a library, document the major classes/types and methods/functions that can be called. If it is a web application, define its URL interface (often its REST interface). If it is a command-line interface, document the parameters and options it supports. In many cases it's best if most of this documentation is automatically generated, so that this documentation stays synchronized with the software as it changes, but this isn't required. The project MAY use hypertext links to non-project material as documentation. Documentation MAY be automatically generated (where practical this is often the best way to do so). Documentation of a REST interface may be generated using Swagger/OpenAPI. Code interface documentation MAY be generated using tools such as JSDoc (JavaScript), ESDoc (JavaScript), pydoc (Python), devtools (R), pkgdown (R), and Doxygen (many). Merely having comments in implementation code is not sufficient to satisfy this criterion; there needs to be an easy way to see the information without reading through all the source code. If the project does not produce software, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    Houndarr's external interfaces are its web UI, one read-only HTTP endpoint for
    external dashboards, and its configuration surface. All are documented in the
    reference section of the docs site.

    Widget API: GET /api/v1/widget, with the full request, response, field, and
    error contract, including the X-Api-Key auth header.
    https://av1155.github.io/houndarr/docs/reference/widget-api

    Environment variables: every variable the application reads, with defaults,
    grouped by application, security, and container settings.
    https://av1155.github.io/houndarr/docs/reference/environment-variables

    Per-instance settings and the *arr search commands Houndarr issues are
    documented alongside them.
    https://av1155.github.io/houndarr/docs/reference/instance-settings
    https://av1155.github.io/houndarr/docs/reference/search-commands

    The application also serves auto-generated OpenAPI documentation at /api/docs
    when HOUNDARR_DEV=true. It is disabled in production builds by design.


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]
    This requires that the project home page URL and the version control repository URL begin with "https:", not "http:". You can get free certificates from Let's Encrypt. Projects MAY implement this criterion using (for example) GitHub pages, GitLab pages, or SourceForge project pages. If you support HTTP, we urge you to redirect the HTTP traffic to HTTPS.

    Given only https: URLs.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]
    Examples of acceptable mechanisms include archived mailing list(s), GitHub issue and pull request discussions, Bugzilla, Mantis, and Trac. Asynchronous discussion mechanisms (like IRC) are acceptable if they meet these criteria; make sure there is a URL-addressable archiving mechanism. Proprietary JavaScript, while discouraged, is permitted.

    GitHub supports discussions on issues and pull requests.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]
    English is currently the lingua franca of computer technology; supporting English increases the number of different potential developers and reviewers worldwide. A project can meet this criterion even if its core developers' primary language is not English.

    All documentation, the web UI, the code base, issue forms, and the changelog are written in English, and issues and pull requests are handled in English.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]
    As a minimum, the project should attempt to respond to significant problem and vulnerability reports. A project that is actively pursuing a badge is probably maintained. All projects and people have limited resources, and typical projects must reject some proposed changes, so limited resources and proposal rejections do not by themselves indicate an unmaintained project.

    When a project knows that it will no longer be maintained, it should set this criterion to "Unmet" and use the appropriate mechanism(s) to indicate to others that it is not being maintained. For example, use “DEPRECATED” as the first heading of its README, add “DEPRECATED” near the beginning of its home page, add “DEPRECATED” to the beginning of its code repository project description, add a no-maintenance-intended badge in its README and/or home page, mark it as deprecated in any package repositories (e.g., npm deprecate), and/or use the code repository's marking system to archive it (e.g., GitHub's "archive" setting, GitLab’s "archived" marking, Gerrit's "readonly" status, or SourceForge’s "abandoned" project status). Additional discussion can be found here.

    Actively maintained by the author, with releases published regularly to GHCR
    and as a Helm chart. Recent activity: 31 commits in the last 30 days and 54 in
    the last 90, with v1.13.1 as the current release. Issues are triaged and
    labeled, and vulnerability reports have a documented private reporting path
    and stated response expectations in SECURITY.md.

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/commits/main
    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/releases
    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/blob/main/SECURITY.md


 Change Control 9/9 ●

  • Public version-controlled source repository


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]
    The URL MAY be the same as the project URL. The project MAY use private (non-public) branches in specific cases while the change is not publicly released (e.g., for fixing a vulnerability before it is revealed to the public).

    Repository on GitHub, which provides public git repositories with URLs.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made.


    Enough for a badge!

    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]
    Projects MAY choose to omit specific interim versions from their public source repositories (e.g., ones that fix specific non-public security vulnerabilities, may never be publicly released, or include material that cannot be legally posted and are not in the final release).

    Every change lands on main as an individual pull request, so the repository
    carries the full development history between releases rather than release
    drops. Release tags point at commits that were already on main and visible
    for review. 35 version tags to date.

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/commits/main
    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/pulls?q=is%3Apr+is%3Amerged


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]
    Git is not specifically required and projects can use centralized version control software (such as subversion) with justification.

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • Unique version numbering


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]
    This MAY be met in a variety of ways including a commit IDs (such as git commit id or mercurial changeset id) or a version number (including version numbers that use semantic versioning or date-based schemes like YYYYMMDD).

    Each release has a unique X.Y.Z identifier. The VERSION file is the single
    source of truth, and a CI check blocks any pull request where VERSION and the
    topmost CHANGELOG heading disagree. Each version ships as a git tag, a GitHub
    Release, and matching GHCR image tags. Current release: 1.13.1.

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/blob/main/VERSION
    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/releases


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]
    Projects should generally prefer whatever format is expected by their users, e.g., because it is the normal format used by their ecosystem. Many ecosystems prefer SemVer, and SemVer is generally preferred for application programmer interfaces (APIs) and software development kits (SDKs). CalVer tends to be used by projects that are large, have an unusually large number of independently-developed dependencies, have a constantly-changing scope, or are time-sensitive. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value, because including a micro level supports simultaneously-maintained branches whenever that becomes necessary. Other version numbering formats may be used as version numbers, including git commit IDs or mercurial changeset IDs, as long as they uniquely identify versions. However, some alternatives (such as git commit IDs) can cause problems as release identifiers, because users may not be able to easily determine if they are up-to-date. The version ID format may be unimportant for identifying software releases if all recipients only run the latest version (e.g., it is the code for a single website or internet service that is constantly updated via continuous delivery).

    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

    Every release is tagged in git as vX.Y.Z. Pushing the tag is what drives the
    release: it triggers the multi-arch image build and push to GHCR, creates the
    GitHub Release from the matching CHANGELOG block, and packages the Helm chart.

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/tags


  • Release notes


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]
    The release notes MAY be implemented in a variety of ways. Many projects provide them in a file named "NEWS", "CHANGELOG", or "ChangeLog", optionally with extensions such as ".txt", ".md", or ".html". Historically the term "change log" meant a log of every change, but to meet these criteria what is needed is a human-readable summary. The release notes MAY instead be provided by version control system mechanisms such as the GitHub Releases workflow.

    Non-trivial release notes file in repository: https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md.


    Enough for a badge!

    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]
    This criterion helps users determine if a given update will fix a vulnerability that is publicly known, to help users make an informed decision about updating. If users typically cannot practically update the software themselves on their computers, but must instead depend on one or more intermediaries to perform the update (as is often the case for a kernel and low-level software that is intertwined with a kernel), the project may choose "not applicable" (N/A) instead, since this additional information will not be helpful to those users. Similarly, a project may choose N/A if all recipients only run the latest version (e.g., it is the code for a single website or internet service that is constantly updated via continuous delivery). This criterion only applies to the project results, not its dependencies. Listing the vulnerabilities of all transitive dependencies of a project becomes unwieldy as dependencies increase and vary, and is unnecessary since tools that examine and track dependencies can do this in a more scalable way.

    Houndarr has had no publicly known vulnerabilities of its own, so there is
    nothing of this kind to list. The changelog does name upstream CVEs by
    identifier whenever a dependency bump clears one, for example the starlette
    and python-multipart advisories cleared in 1.12.x, even though dependency
    vulnerabilities fall outside this criterion.

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md


 Reporting 8/8 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    Non-trivial SECURITY[.md] file found file in repository: https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/blob/main/SECURITY.md. [osps_do_02_01]


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    GitHub Issues, with structured bug report and feature request forms. Every
    issue carries a type label and a priority label, and an automation follows up
    on issues waiting on the reporter so threads do not go silent.

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    24 issues were opened by people other than the maintainer over the last 12
    months, and all 24 are closed. Every bug report got a reply in the thread.
    Recent examples: #632, #586, #577, #385, #363, #343, #308, #309.

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/issues?q=is%3Aissue+sort%3Acreated-desc


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]
    The response MAY be 'no' or a discussion about its merits. The goal is simply that there be some response to some requests, which indicates that the project is still alive. For purposes of this criterion, projects need not count fake requests (e.g., from spammers or automated systems). If a project is no longer making enhancements, please select "unmet" and include the URL that makes this situation clear to users. If a project tends to be overwhelmed by the number of enhancement requests, please select "unmet" and explain.

    Feature requests get a reply and a stated outcome. Of the 11 opened by users
    in the last 12 months, all 11 are closed with the decision visible in the
    thread. Some were closed by shipping the feature, for example #619 landed in
    pull request #624. Others were closed as duplicates or as out of scope, for
    example #656.

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/issues?q=is%3Aissue+label%3A%22type%3A+feature%22


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]

    All issue and pull request discussion is public, searchable through GitHub
    search, and addressable by URL. Threads are locked after a long period of
    inactivity but stay readable.

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/issues?q=is%3Aissue


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]
    Projects hosted on GitHub SHOULD consider enabling privately reporting a security vulnerability. Projects on GitLab SHOULD consider using its ability for privately reporting a vulnerability. Projects MAY identify a mailing address on https://PROJECTSITE/security, often in the form security@example.org. This vulnerability reporting process MAY be the same as its bug reporting process. Vulnerability reports MAY always be public, but many projects have a private vulnerability reporting mechanism.

    SECURITY.md documents the process: do not open a public issue, use GitHub's
    private reporting flow, and include the affected version or commit, the
    environment, reproduction steps, an impact assessment, and a proof of concept
    if there is one. It also states the response expectations. The security pages
    on the documentation site link to the same flow.

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/blob/main/SECURITY.md
    https://av1155.github.io/houndarr/docs/security/overview


    Enough for a badge!

    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]
    Examples include a private defect report submitted on the web using HTTPS (TLS) or an email encrypted using OpenPGP. If vulnerability reports are always public (so there are never private vulnerability reports), choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    Private vulnerability reporting is enabled on the repository, so reports go
    through GitHub over HTTPS and stay private until an advisory is published.
    The form is linked from SECURITY.md and from the security section of the
    documentation site.

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/security/advisories/new


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]
    If there have been no vulnerabilities reported in the last 6 months, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    No vulnerability reports have been received in the last 6 months, and no advisory has been published for the project. SECURITY.md commits to an initial acknowledgement within 72 hours.


 Quality 13/13 ●

  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]
    A build system determines what actions need to occur to rebuild the software (and in what order), and then performs those steps. For example, it can invoke a compiler to compile the source code. If an executable is created from source code, it must be possible to modify the project's source code and then generate an updated executable with those modifications. If the software produced by the project depends on external libraries, the build system does not need to build those external libraries. If there is no need to build anything to use the software after its source code is modified, select "not applicable" (N/A).

    A multi-stage Dockerfile builds the shipped artifact from source: a Node stage
    compiles the Tailwind CSS bundle, and the runtime stage installs Python
    dependencies from uv.lock. docker build . reproduces the published image, and
    CI builds it on every pull request. Building outside Docker is documented as
    uv sync, pnpm install --frozen-lockfile, pnpm run build-css, then
    uv run houndarr.

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/blob/main/Dockerfile
    https://av1155.github.io/houndarr/docs/guides/installation/from-source


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]
    For example, Maven, Ant, cmake, the autotools, make, rake (Ruby), or devtools (R).

    Docker with BuildKit for the image, uv for Python dependency resolution and environment creation, pnpm for the CSS build, and a justfile that wraps the gates, the test slices, and the dev server.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    Every tool in the build path is FLOSS: Docker Engine and BuildKit, uv, Node.js, pnpm, CPython, and Tailwind CSS. Nothing proprietary is needed to build or run the project.


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]
    The project MAY use multiple automated test suites (e.g., one that runs quickly, vs. another that is more thorough but requires special equipment). There are many test frameworks and test support systems available, including Selenium (web browser automation), Junit (JVM, Java), RUnit (R), testthat (R).

    A pytest suite of 2806 tests lives in tests/ and is released under the same
    AGPL-3.0 license as the rest of the repository. How to run it is documented in
    CONTRIBUTING.md (uv run pytest) and in the justfile (just test,
    just test-quick, just test-integration, just test-browser). CI runs it on
    every pull request.

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/tree/main/tests
    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#required-local-checks


    Enough for a badge!

    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]
    For example, "make check", "mvn test", or "rake test" (Ruby).

    pytest is the standard invocation for Python. uv run pytest runs it against
    the project environment, and just test is the repository shorthand.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    Measured with pytest-cov and branch coverage enabled, the suite covers 92% of src/houndarr: 6012 statements with 355 missed, and 1384 branches with 133 partial. Coverage includes the auth middleware, the encryption layer, instance URL validation, and the search engine cycle.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    Every pull request runs the full suite on Python 3.13 alongside lint, format,
    type check, bandit, Trivy filesystem and image scans, CodeQL, a pip-audit
    dependency audit, dependency review, and a live security smoke test against a
    freshly built container. Merges are blocked until the required checks pass.

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/tree/main/.github/workflows


  • New functionality testing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]
    As long as a policy is in place, even by word of mouth, that says developers should add tests to the automated test suite for major new functionality, select "Met."

    Behaviour changes require test changes. CONTRIBUTING.md states it, and the
    pull request template carries it as a checklist item: "Tests added/updated for
    all changes".

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#pull-request-guidance


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]
    Major functionality would typically be mentioned in the release notes. Perfection is not required, merely evidence that tests are typically being added in practice to the automated test suite when new major functionality is added to the software produced by the project.

    Recent pull requests that touched src/houndarr all shipped test changes with
    them. Counts of source files against test files: #644 (29 / 25), #643
    (17 / 17), #631 (15 / 11), #624 (10 / 9), #679 (7 / 5), #642 (4 / 3).

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/pulls?q=is%3Apr+is%3Amerged


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    CONTRIBUTING.md tells contributors to implement changes with tests and to
    update tests for behaviour changes, and the pull request template has a
    checklist item for it.

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md
    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/blob/main/.github/pull_request_template.md


  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]
    Examples of compiler warning flags include gcc/clang "-Wall". Examples of a "safe" language mode include JavaScript "use strict" and perl5's "use warnings". A separate "linter" tool is simply a tool that examines the source code to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes. These are typically enabled within the source code or build instructions.

    Ruff runs with eleven rule families selected: pycodestyle E and W, pyflakes F,
    isort I, bugbear B, comprehensions C4, pyupgrade UP, simplify SIM, annotations
    ANN, bandit security S, and pep8-naming N. mypy runs in strict mode over src/.
    hadolint checks the Dockerfile and actionlint checks the workflows. All are CI
    gates.

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/blob/main/pyproject.toml


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]
    These are the warnings identified by the implementation of the warnings criterion. The project should fix warnings or mark them in the source code as false positives. Ideally there would be no warnings, but a project MAY accept some warnings (typically less than 1 warning per 100 lines or less than 10 warnings).

    The lint and type check jobs fail the build on any finding, so main stays clean. The few suppressions are narrow and each carries a comment explaining why: assert in tests, binding all interfaces for a self-hosted server, function calls in defaults for the FastAPI Depends pattern, and nested context managers that aiosqlite cannot combine.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    mypy runs with strict = true plus warn_return_any, warn_unused_ignores,
    warn_redundant_casts, disallow_untyped_defs, disallow_incomplete_defs, and
    no_implicit_optional. Ruff's selection includes the bandit security rules
    across the whole source tree, and the per-file relaxations are limited to the
    test directory.


 Security 16/16 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]
    This requires understanding the following design principles, including the 8 principles from Saltzer and Schroeder:
    • economy of mechanism (keep the design as simple and small as practical, e.g., by adopting sweeping simplifications)
    • fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default)
    • complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable)
    • open design (security mechanisms should not depend on attacker ignorance of its design, but instead on more easily protected and changed information like keys and passwords)
    • separation of privilege (ideally, access to important objects should depend on more than one condition, so that defeating one protection system won't enable complete access. E.G., multi-factor authentication, such as requiring both a password and a hardware token, is stronger than single-factor authentication)
    • least privilege (processes should operate with the least privilege necessary)
    • least common mechanism (the design should minimize the mechanisms common to more than one user and depended on by all users, e.g., directories for temporary files)
    • psychological acceptability (the human interface must be designed for ease of use - designing for "least astonishment" can help)
    • limited attack surface (the attack surface - the set of the different points where an attacker can try to enter or extract data - should be limited)
    • input validation with allowlists (inputs should typically be checked to determine if they are valid before they are accepted; this validation should use allowlists (which only accept known-good values), not denylists (which attempt to list known-bad values)).
    A "primary developer" in a project is anyone who is familiar with the project's code base, is comfortable making changes to it, and is acknowledged as such by most other participants in the project. A primary developer would typically make a number of contributions over the past year (via code, documentation, or answering questions). Developers would typically be considered primary developers if they initiated the project (and have not left the project more than three years ago), have the option of receiving information on a private vulnerability reporting channel (if there is one), can accept commits on behalf of the project, or perform final releases of the project software. If there is only one developer, that individual is the primary developer. Many books and courses are available to help you understand how to develop more secure software and discuss design. For example, the Secure Software Development Fundamentals course is a free set of three courses that explain how to develop more secure software (it's free if you audit it; for an extra fee you can earn a certificate to prove you learned the material).

    I am the sole maintainer and designed the security model. The principles show
    up in specific decisions rather than as a claim.

    Fail-safe defaults and complete mediation: one global authentication
    middleware validates the session and CSRF token for every request, so a newly
    added route is protected unless it is explicitly listed in a small
    unauthenticated allowlist. There are no per-route auth decorators to forget.

    Least privilege: the container drops to a non-root user after PUID/PGID
    remapping. Calls to *arr instances are read-only apart from the search command
    itself, and Houndarr holds no download client or indexer credentials.

    Limited attack surface: no download client integration, no indexer access, no
    request workflow, no media file manipulation. OpenAPI documentation is served
    only when dev mode is on. Exactly one endpoint is authorized by the Houndarr
    API key, and it is read-only.

    Economy of mechanism: a single admin account, one authentication middleware,
    one encryption path for stored credentials.

    Open design: the encryption scheme, session handling, cookie flags, and the
    trust boundary are published rather than kept quiet.

    Input validation with allowlists: instance URLs are checked against an
    allowlist of schemes and a hostname pattern, and both literal addresses and
    DNS-resolved addresses are rejected when they land on loopback or link-local
    ranges. Private LAN ranges are deliberately permitted because that is where
    *arr instances live, and the reasoning is documented in the module.

    Psychological acceptability: polite defaults out of the box, so an operator
    who changes nothing cannot exhaust their indexer budget.

    https://av1155.github.io/houndarr/docs/security/threat-model


    Enough for a badge!

    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]
    Examples (depending on the type of software) include SQL injection, OS injection, classic buffer overflow, cross-site scripting, missing authentication, and missing authorization. See the CWE/SANS top 25 or OWASP Top 10 for commonly used lists. Many books and courses are available to help you understand how to develop more secure software and discuss common implementation errors that lead to vulnerabilities. For example, the Secure Software Development Fundamentals course is a free set of three courses that explain how to develop more secure software (it's free if you audit it; for an extra fee you can earn a certificate to prove you learned the material).

    Yes, for the classes that apply to a self-hosted Python web application.

    SQL injection: all queries use parameterised aiosqlite statements.
    XSS: Jinja2 autoescaping, with no raw rendering of user-supplied values.
    CSRF: a signed double-submit token validated in middleware with a constant-time
    comparison.
    Missing authentication and authorization: enforced globally in middleware, so
    protection is the default state for a route.
    SSRF: scheme allowlisting plus post-resolution address checks on configured
    instance URLs.
    Credential exposure: instance API keys are encrypted at rest and never sent
    back to the browser; Houndarr API keys are stored as SHA-256 digests of
    256-bit random tokens.
    Brute force: per-IP login rate limiting, with bucket eviction so the limiter
    cannot grow without bound.
    Header spoofing: proxy auth trusts forwarded headers only from configured
    trusted proxy ranges, and dispatch and validation share one code path.
    Vulnerable dependencies: pip-audit, Trivy, CodeQL, and Dependabot.

    tests/test_huntarr_vulns.py runs 63 cases derived from a published security
    review of a comparable tool, covering unauthenticated access to every
    protected route, secret leakage in response bodies, and setup lockout after
    first run.

    https://av1155.github.io/houndarr/docs/security/audit


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]
    These cryptographic criteria do not always apply because some software has no need to directly use cryptographic capabilities.

    Only published, reviewed primitives. Instance API keys are encrypted at rest
    with Fernet from pyca/cryptography, which is AES-128 in CBC mode with
    HMAC-SHA256 for integrity. The admin password is hashed with bcrypt. Session
    cookies are signed with HMAC-SHA256 through itsdangerous. Houndarr API keys
    are 256-bit random tokens stored as SHA-256 digests.

    https://av1155.github.io/houndarr/docs/security/credential-handling


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    Houndarr implements no cryptography of its own. It calls pyca/cryptography for Fernet, the bcrypt package for password hashing, itsdangerous for cookie signing, and the Python standard library's secrets, hmac, and hashlib for token generation and constant-time comparison.


    Enough for a badge!

    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]
    See the Open Standards Requirement for Software by the Open Source Initiative.

    Every cryptographic dependency is FLOSS: pyca/cryptography (Apache-2.0 or BSD-3-Clause), bcrypt (Apache-2.0), itsdangerous (BSD-3-Clause), and the Python standard library, with OpenSSL underneath.


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]
    These minimum bitlengths are: symmetric key 112, factoring modulus 2048, discrete logarithm key 224, discrete logarithmic group 2048, elliptic curve 224, and hash 224 (password hashing is not covered by this bitlength, more information on password hashing can be found in the crypto_password_storage criterion). See https://www.keylength.com for a comparison of keylength recommendations from various organizations. The software MAY allow smaller keylengths in some configurations (ideally it would not, since this allows downgrade attacks, but shorter keylengths are sometimes necessary for interoperability).

    Defaults exceed the NIST through-2030 minimums and there is no setting that
    lowers them. The Fernet master key is 256 bits from Fernet.generate_key(),
    which draws from os.urandom(32), and splits into a 128-bit AES key and a
    256-bit HMAC-SHA256 key. The session signing secret is 256 bits from
    os.urandom(32). CSRF tokens are 256 bits from secrets.token_hex(32). Houndarr
    API keys are 256 bits from secrets.token_urlsafe(32). Password hashing uses
    bcrypt at cost factor 12.


    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]
    ECB mode is almost never appropriate because it reveals identical blocks within the ciphertext as demonstrated by the ECB penguin, and CTR mode is often inappropriate because it does not perform authentication and causes duplicates if the input state is repeated. In many cases it's best to choose a block cipher algorithm mode designed to combine secrecy and authentication, e.g., Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and EAX. Projects MAY allow users to enable broken mechanisms (e.g., during configuration) where necessary for compatibility, but then users know they're doing it.

    No broken algorithm appears anywhere in the codebase: no MD4, MD5, SHA-1, single DES, RC4, or ECB mode. Fernet's CBC mode is paired with HMAC-SHA256 in an encrypt-then-MAC construction, so ciphertext is authenticated before decryption. SHA-256 appears only as a lookup digest for API key tokens that are already 256 bits of CSPRNG output, where password-style stretching would add nothing.


    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    No SHA-1 and no unauthenticated cipher modes. Hashing is SHA-256 or stronger, symmetric encryption is authenticated, and password storage uses bcrypt rather than a fast hash.


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]

    Houndarr implements no key agreement protocol. Inbound TLS is terminated by
    the operator's reverse proxy, and outbound calls to *arr instances use the
    platform TLS stack through httpx. Forward secrecy is a property of those
    layers rather than of anything this project implements.


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]
    This criterion applies only when the software is enforcing authentication of users using passwords for external users (aka inbound authentication), such as server-side web applications. It does not apply in cases where the software stores passwords for authenticating into other systems (aka outbound authentication, e.g., the software implements a client for some other system), since at least parts of that software must have often access to the unhashed password.

    The admin password is stored as a bcrypt hash at cost factor 12 with a
    per-hash salt from bcrypt.gensalt(). Plaintext is never written to the
    database or to logs. In proxy auth mode no password is stored at all.

    https://av1155.github.io/houndarr/docs/security/credential-handling


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]
    A cryptographically secure random number generator may be a hardware random number generator, or it may be a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG) using an algorithm such as Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG, Yarrow, or Fortuna. Examples of calls to secure random number generators include Java's java.security.SecureRandom and JavaScript's window.crypto.getRandomValues. Examples of calls to insecure random number generators include Java's java.util.Random and JavaScript's Math.random.

    All keys, tokens, and nonces come from the operating system CSPRNG: os.urandom for the Fernet master key and the session signing secret, and the secrets module for CSRF tokens and Houndarr API keys. The random module appears only in search scheduling and ordering jitter, which has no security role, and those call sites are annotated as such.


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]
    An even stronger mechanism is releasing the software with digitally signed packages, since that mitigates attacks on the distribution system, but this only works if the users can be confident that the public keys for signatures are correct and if the users will actually check the signature.

    Distribution channels use HTTPS exclusively. [osps_br_03_02]


    Enough for a badge!

    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]
    These hashes can be modified in transit.

    Nothing is fetched over plain HTTP. Python dependencies install from uv.lock, which records a hash for every artifact, over HTTPS from PyPI. The CSS build uses pnpm with a lockfile carrying integrity hashes. Every GitHub Action is pinned to a full 40-character commit SHA, with a CI check that enforces the pinning. Container images move over HTTPS to and from GHCR.


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    Enough for a badge!

    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]
    The vulnerability must be patched and released by the project itself (patches may be developed elsewhere). A vulnerability becomes publicly known (for this purpose) once it has a CVE with publicly released non-paywalled information (reported, for example, in the National Vulnerability Database) or when the project has been informed and the information has been released to the public (possibly by the project). A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known. Note: this means that users might be left vulnerable to all attackers worldwide for up to 60 days. This criterion is often much easier to meet than what Google recommends in Rebooting responsible disclosure, because Google recommends that the 60-day period start when the project is notified even if the report is not public. Also note that this badge criterion, like other criteria, applies to the individual project. Some projects are part of larger umbrella organizations or larger projects, possibly in multiple layers, and many projects feed their results to other organizations and projects as part of a potentially-complex supply chain. An individual project often cannot control the rest, but an individual project can work to release a vulnerability patch in a timely way. Therefore, we focus solely on the individual project's response time. Once a patch is available from the individual project, others can determine how to deal with the patch (e.g., they can update to the newer version or they can apply just the patch as a cherry-picked solution).

    No vulnerability has been reported against Houndarr and none is publicly known. Dependency advisories surfaced by pip-audit, Trivy, CodeQL, or Dependabot are patched well inside 60 days, usually within the same week, and the changelog records which advisory each bump clears. The repository currently has no open code scanning alerts and no open Dependabot alerts.


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    Critical advisories are patched and released as soon as an upstream fix exists. The security workflow runs on every pull request, on a weekly schedule, and on manual dispatch, so a fix does not have to wait for the next pull request to be picked up.


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]
    A project MAY leak "sample" credentials for testing and unimportant databases, as long as they are not intended to limit public access.

    No credential is committed. The Fernet master key, the session signing secret, and the SQLite database are generated at runtime inside the operator's data directory, which is gitignored along with .env files. GitHub secret scanning and push protection are both enabled on the repository. Test fixtures use throwaway values.


 Analysis 8/8 ●

  • Static code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]
    A static code analysis tool examines the software code (as source code, intermediate code, or executable) without executing it with specific inputs. For purposes of this criterion, compiler warnings and "safe" language modes do not count as static code analysis tools (these typically avoid deep analysis because speed is vital). Some static analysis tools focus on detecting generic defects, others focus on finding specific kinds of defects (such as vulnerabilities), and some do a combination. Examples of such static code analysis tools include cppcheck (C, C++), clang static analyzer (C, C++), SpotBugs (Java), FindBugs (Java) (including FindSecurityBugs), PMD (Java), Brakeman (Ruby on Rails), lintr (R), goodpractice (R), Coverity Quality Analyzer, SonarQube, Codacy, and HP Enterprise Fortify Static Code Analyzer. Larger lists of tools can be found in places such as the Wikipedia list of tools for static code analysis, OWASP information on static code analysis, NIST list of source code security analyzers, and Wheeler's list of static analysis tools. If there are no FLOSS static analysis tools available for the implementation language(s) used, you may select 'N/A'.

    Several tools run beyond the linter and type checker. CodeQL default setup
    analyses Python, JavaScript, TypeScript, and Actions on every push to main,
    every pull request, and weekly. bandit runs against src/ on every pull
    request. Trivy scans both the filesystem and the built container image.
    pip-audit checks the dependency set generated from uv.lock, and GitHub
    dependency review runs on pull requests.

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/blob/main/.github/workflows/security.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    CodeQL's default query suite and bandit are both built to find common vulnerability patterns: injection, unsafe deserialization, weak hashing, hardcoded credentials, and path traversal. Trivy adds known-CVE detection across dependencies and image layers, with results uploaded to the GitHub security tab.


    Enough for a badge!

    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]
    A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known. Note that criterion vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days requires that all such vulnerabilities be fixed within 60 days of being made public.

    The repository has no open code scanning alerts and no open Dependabot alerts. Findings get fixed rather than dismissed. Where a rule fires on intentional behaviour, the suppression is inline and carries the reason, for example the bind-all-interfaces rule on a server meant to be reachable from the LAN.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    CodeQL runs on every push to main, on every pull request, and on a weekly schedule. bandit, Trivy, and pip-audit run on every pull request and weekly.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]
    A dynamic analysis tool examines the software by executing it with specific inputs. For example, the project MAY use a fuzzing tool (e.g., American Fuzzy Lop) or a web application scanner (e.g., OWASP ZAP or w3af). In some cases the OSS-Fuzz project may be willing to apply fuzz testing to your project. For purposes of this criterion the dynamic analysis tool needs to vary the inputs in some way to look for various kinds of problems or be an automated test suite with at least 80% branch coverage. The Wikipedia page on dynamic analysis and the OWASP page on fuzzing identify some dynamic analysis tools. The analysis tool(s) MAY be focused on looking for security vulnerabilities, but this is not required.

    The automated suite is 2806 tests covering 92% of src/houndarr with branch
    coverage enabled, above the 80% branch coverage this criterion accepts.
    Separately, every pull request builds the container image, starts it, creates
    an account, and runs a smoke test that varies inputs against the live
    instance: an unauthenticated sweep of every protected route, path traversal
    attempts, X-Forwarded-For spoofing against the proxy auth gate, CSRF omission
    on admin endpoints, and login rate limiting. A Playwright job drives the real
    UI in a browser against the same stack.

    https://github.com/av1155/houndarr/blob/main/scripts/security_smoke_test.sh


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    The project produces no code in a memory-unsafe language. It is Python, Jinja2 templates, CSS, and a small amount of browser JavaScript.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]
    This criterion does not suggest enabling assertions during production; that is entirely up to the project and its users to decide. This criterion's focus is instead to improve fault detection during dynamic analysis before deployment. Enabling assertions in production use is completely different from enabling assertions during dynamic analysis (such as testing). In some cases enabling assertions in production use is extremely unwise (especially in high-integrity components). There are many arguments against enabling assertions in production, e.g., libraries should not crash callers, their presence may cause rejection by app stores, and/or activating an assertion in production may expose private data such as private keys. Beware that in many Linux distributions NDEBUG is not defined, so C/C++ assert() will by default be enabled for production in those environments. It may be important to use a different assertion mechanism or defining NDEBUG for production in those environments.

    The suite is assertion-driven throughout and runs under pytest's assertion rewriting, which reports the values behind every failed comparison. Tests run without optimisation flags, so Python assert statements are active.


    Enough for a badge!

    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]
    If you are not running dynamic code analysis and thus have not found any vulnerabilities in this way, choose "not applicable" (N/A). A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known.

    Nothing of medium or higher severity has been found this way. The smoke test and the browser suite gate every pull request, and a failure blocks the merge until it is resolved.



This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Andrea Arturo Venti Fuentes and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Andrea Arturo Venti Fuentes.
Entry created on 2026-08-11 22:56:17 UTC, last updated on 2026-08-11 23:41:02 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-08-11 23:41:02 UTC.