Vectis

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 12/13 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Open-source cryptographic data protection toolkit for sensitive data workflows.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

    Vectis is an experimental open source cryptographic data protection toolkit under active development. It provides profile-driven hybrid cryptography,
    format-preserving encryption, tokenization, masking, MACs, blind indexes, commitments, secret sharing, protected messaging, and verifiable audit records.

    The project emphasizes bounded input validation, signed configuration, encrypted application-level storage, explicit trust boundaries, key lifecycle
    enforcement, negative testing, property-based testing, Schemathesis, native fuzzing, dependency auditing, CodeQL, and reproducible release workflows.

    Vectis v0.8.5 completed a source-backed security self-assessment with no Critical or High severity vulnerabilities identified. This was not an
    independent external security audit, certification, or compliance assessment. Vectis should currently be used for evaluation, testing, demos, and
    design-partner proofs of concept rather than as the sole protection layer for
    production sensitive data.

    Project scope, accepted risks, and operational assumptions are documented publicly in the threat model and security documentation.

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]
    This MUST be in language that potential users can understand (e.g., it uses minimal jargon).

    Vectis is an open-source advanced data protection toolkit.

    TLS protects the connection, but sensitive data keeps moving in plaintext afterward — through logs, queues, databases, and internal APIs. Vectis protects the data itself.

    Sensitive input in. Protected representation out

    Vectis protects and transforms sensitive values through a consistent HTTP API and CLI. Operator-signed profiles define the allowed operations, algorithms, keys, permissions, and lifecycle policy.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    Security: https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md
    Contributing: https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]
    We presume that projects on GitHub use issues and pull requests unless otherwise noted. This information can be short, e.g., stating that the project uses pull requests, an issue tracker, or posts to a mailing list (which one?)

    Non-trivial contribution file in repository: https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md.


    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

  • FLOSS license


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]
    FLOSS is software released in a way that meets the Open Source Definition or Free Software Definition. Examples of such licenses include the CC0, MIT, BSD 2-clause, BSD 3-clause revised, Apache 2.0, Lesser GNU General Public License (LGPL), and the GNU General Public License (GPL). For our purposes, this means that the license MUST be: The software MAY also be licensed other ways (e.g., "GPLv2 or proprietary" is acceptable).

    The Apache-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]
    The OSI uses a rigorous approval process to determine which licenses are OSS.

    The Apache-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]
    One convention is posting the license as a top-level file named LICENSE or COPYING, which MAY be followed by an extension such as ".txt" or ".md". An alternative convention is to have a directory named LICENSES containing license file(s); these files are typically named as their SPDX license identifier followed by an appropriate file extension, as described in the REUSE Specification. Note that this criterion is only a requirement on the source repository. You do NOT need to include the license file when generating something from the source code (such as an executable, package, or container). For example, when generating an R package for the Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN), follow standard CRAN practice: if the license is a standard license, use the standard short license specification (to avoid installing yet another copy of the text) and list the LICENSE file in an exclusion file such as .Rbuildignore. Similarly, when creating a Debian package, you may put a link in the copyright file to the license text in /usr/share/common-licenses, and exclude the license file from the created package (e.g., by deleting the file after calling dh_auto_install). We encourage including machine-readable license information in generated formats where practical.

    Non-trivial license location file in repository: https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/LICENSE.


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]
    This documentation must be in some media (such as text or video) that includes: how to install it, how to start it, how to use it (possibly with a tutorial using examples), and how to use it securely (e.g., what to do and what not to do) if that is an appropriate topic for the software. The security documentation need not be long. The project MAY use hypertext links to non-project material as documentation. If the project does not produce software, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    Vectis provides basic documentation in its README, including its purpose,
    current capabilities, scope, installation and Quick Start instructions,
    configuration overview, CLI and API entry points, testing, and security status.

    README:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis#readme

    Quick Start:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis#quick-start

    Detailed documentation:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/tree/main/doc


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]
    The documentation of an external interface explains to an end-user or developer how to use it. This would include its application program interface (API) if the software has one. If it is a library, document the major classes/types and methods/functions that can be called. If it is a web application, define its URL interface (often its REST interface). If it is a command-line interface, document the parameters and options it supports. In many cases it's best if most of this documentation is automatically generated, so that this documentation stays synchronized with the software as it changes, but this isn't required. The project MAY use hypertext links to non-project material as documentation. Documentation MAY be automatically generated (where practical this is often the best way to do so). Documentation of a REST interface may be generated using Swagger/OpenAPI. Code interface documentation MAY be generated using tools such as JSDoc (JavaScript), ESDoc (JavaScript), pydoc (Python), devtools (R), pkgdown (R), and Doxygen (many). Merely having comments in implementation code is not sufficient to satisfy this criterion; there needs to be an easy way to see the information without reading through all the source code. If the project does not produce software, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    Vectis documents its external HTTP and CLI interfaces, including request and
    response fields, status codes, error behavior, command arguments, output
    formats, configuration, and environment variables.

    HTTP API reference:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/API.md

    OpenAPI specification:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/openapi.yaml

    CLI reference:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/CLI.md

    Environment reference:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/ENV.md


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]
    This requires that the project home page URL and the version control repository URL begin with "https:", not "http:". You can get free certificates from Let's Encrypt. Projects MAY implement this criterion using (for example) GitHub pages, GitLab pages, or SourceForge project pages. If you support HTTP, we urge you to redirect the HTTP traffic to HTTPS.

    Given only https: URLs.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]
    Examples of acceptable mechanisms include archived mailing list(s), GitHub issue and pull request discussions, Bugzilla, Mantis, and Trac. Asynchronous discussion mechanisms (like IRC) are acceptable if they meet these criteria; make sure there is a URL-addressable archiving mechanism. Proprietary JavaScript, while discouraged, is permitted.

    GitHub supports discussions on issues and pull requests.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]
    English is currently the lingua franca of computer technology; supporting English increases the number of different potential developers and reviewers worldwide. A project can meet this criterion even if its core developers' primary language is not English.

    Vectis documentation, contribution guidance, security policy, API reference,
    and source-code documentation are written in English. Bug reports, pull
    requests, and code-review comments are accepted in English through GitHub.

    Documentation:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis#readme

    Contribution guidance:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md

    Bug reports:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/issues

    Pull requests:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/pulls


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]
    As a minimum, the project should attempt to respond to significant problem and vulnerability reports. A project that is actively pursuing a badge is probably maintained. All projects and people have limited resources, and typical projects must reject some proposed changes, so limited resources and proposal rejections do not by themselves indicate an unmaintained project.

    When a project knows that it will no longer be maintained, it should set this criterion to "Unmet" and use the appropriate mechanism(s) to indicate to others that it is not being maintained. For example, use “DEPRECATED” as the first heading of its README, add “DEPRECATED” near the beginning of its home page, add “DEPRECATED” to the beginning of its code repository project description, add a no-maintenance-intended badge in its README and/or home page, mark it as deprecated in any package repositories (e.g., npm deprecate), and/or use the code repository's marking system to archive it (e.g., GitHub's "archive" setting, GitLab’s "archived" marking, Gerrit's "readonly" status, or SourceForge’s "abandoned" project status). Additional discussion can be found here.

    Vectis is under active development and is maintained through regular commits,
    continuous integration, dependency and security scanning, and a public issue
    tracker. The supported release series is documented in SECURITY.md, together
    with a private vulnerability-reporting process and an acknowledgment target.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/commits/main/
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/actions
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/issues
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md


 Change Control 9/9 ●

  • Public version-controlled source repository


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]
    The URL MAY be the same as the project URL. The project MAY use private (non-public) branches in specific cases while the change is not publicly released (e.g., for fixing a vulnerability before it is revealed to the public).

    Repository on GitHub, which provides public git repositories with URLs.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made.


    Enough for a badge!

    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]
    Projects MAY choose to omit specific interim versions from their public source repositories (e.g., ones that fix specific non-public security vulnerabilities, may never be publicly released, or include material that cannot be legally posted and are not in the final release).

    Vectis is developed in its public Git repository. The main branch contains intermediate development commits between releases, and the complete commit
    history and proposed pull-request changes are available for review. The repository is not limited to final release snapshots or generated artifacts.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/commits/main/
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/pulls
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]
    Git is not specifically required and projects can use centralized version control software (such as subversion) with justification.

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • Unique version numbering


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]
    This MAY be met in a variety of ways including a commit IDs (such as git commit id or mercurial changeset id) or a version number (including version numbers that use semantic versioning or date-based schemes like YYYYMMDD).

    Each Vectis release is assigned a unique Semantic Versioning identifier from Cargo.toml. The version is exposed by vectis version, recorded in
    CHANGELOG.md, and used in release artifact names.

    The release workflow requires the Git tag to match v${Cargo.toml.version} before publishing release artifacts, preventing a release from being published under an inconsistent version identifier.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/Cargo.toml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/release.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]
    Projects should generally prefer whatever format is expected by their users, e.g., because it is the normal format used by their ecosystem. Many ecosystems prefer SemVer, and SemVer is generally preferred for application programmer interfaces (APIs) and software development kits (SDKs). CalVer tends to be used by projects that are large, have an unusually large number of independently-developed dependencies, have a constantly-changing scope, or are time-sensitive. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value, because including a micro level supports simultaneously-maintained branches whenever that becomes necessary. Other version numbering formats may be used as version numbers, including git commit IDs or mercurial changeset IDs, as long as they uniquely identify versions. However, some alternatives (such as git commit IDs) can cause problems as release identifiers, because users may not be able to easily determine if they are up-to-date. The version ID format may be unimportant for identifying software releases if all recipients only run the latest version (e.g., it is the code for a single website or internet service that is constantly updated via continuous delivery).

    Barely enough for a badge.

    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

    Vectis has a release workflow that requires release tags to match v${Cargo.toml.version}, but the first public release has not yet been identified with a Git tag.


  • Release notes


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]
    The release notes MAY be implemented in a variety of ways. Many projects provide them in a file named "NEWS", "CHANGELOG", or "ChangeLog", optionally with extensions such as ".txt", ".md", or ".html". Historically the term "change log" meant a log of every change, but to meet these criteria what is needed is a human-readable summary. The release notes MAY instead be provided by version control system mechanisms such as the GitHub Releases workflow.

    Non-trivial release notes file in repository: https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md.


    Enough for a badge!

    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]
    This criterion helps users determine if a given update will fix a vulnerability that is publicly known, to help users make an informed decision about updating. If users typically cannot practically update the software themselves on their computers, but must instead depend on one or more intermediaries to perform the update (as is often the case for a kernel and low-level software that is intertwined with a kernel), the project may choose "not applicable" (N/A) instead, since this additional information will not be helpful to those users. Similarly, a project may choose N/A if all recipients only run the latest version (e.g., it is the code for a single website or internet service that is constantly updated via continuous delivery). This criterion only applies to the project results, not its dependencies. Listing the vulnerabilities of all transitive dependencies of a project becomes unwieldy as dependencies increase and vary, and is unnecessary since tools that examine and track dependencies can do this in a more scalable way.

    N/A. At the time Vectis v0.8.5 was prepared, there were no publicly known run-time vulnerabilities in Vectis with a CVE or equivalent public identifier that were fixed by the release.

    Dependency advisories are monitored separately and are not treated as vulnerabilities in the Vectis project results for this criterion.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md


 Reporting 6/8 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    Non-trivial SECURITY[.md] file found file in repository: https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md. [osps_do_02_01]


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    Vectis uses GitHub Issues as its public issue tracker. Individual bug reports,
    enhancement proposals, documentation problems, and user questions can be created, discussed, tracked, and closed there.

    Suspected unpatched vulnerabilities are handled separately through the private reporting process documented in SECURITY.md.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/issues
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]
    The response MAY be 'no' or a discussion about its merits. The goal is simply that there be some response to some requests, which indicates that the project is still alive. For purposes of this criterion, projects need not count fake requests (e.g., from spammers or automated systems). If a project is no longer making enhancements, please select "unmet" and include the URL that makes this situation clear to users. If a project tends to be overwhelmed by the number of enhancement requests, please select "unmet" and explain.

    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]

    Vectis uses GitHub Issues as a publicly available and searchable archive for bug reports, enhancement requests, questions, and maintainer responses. Open and closed reports remain available for later review and searching.

    Public archive:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/issues?q=is%3Aissue


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]
    Projects hosted on GitHub SHOULD consider enabling privately reporting a security vulnerability. Projects on GitLab SHOULD consider using its ability for privately reporting a vulnerability. Projects MAY identify a mailing address on https://PROJECTSITE/security, often in the form security@example.org. This vulnerability reporting process MAY be the same as its bug reporting process. Vulnerability reports MAY always be public, but many projects have a private vulnerability reporting mechanism.

    Vectis publishes its vulnerability-reporting process in SECURITY.md. The policy defines the private reporting channel, requested report contents, supported versions, expected acknowledgment period, disclosure process, and information that reporters must not include.

    Vulnerability-reporting process:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]
    Examples include a private defect report submitted on the web using HTTPS (TLS) or an email encrypted using OpenPGP. If vulnerability reports are always public (so there are never private vulnerability reports), choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    Vectis accepts private vulnerability reports through the maintainer's direct email address, using the subject specified in SECURITY.md. Reporters are instructed not to open a public issue for an unpatched vulnerability. If a more protected exchange is needed, the reporter can request an appropriate channel
    in the initial private message.

    Private reporting instructions:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md#reporting-a-vulnerability


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]
    If there have been no vulnerabilities reported in the last 6 months, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    N/A. Vectis has not received any vulnerability reports during the last six months. SECURITY.md establishes a target acknowledgment period of five business
    days for future reports.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md


 Quality 13/13 ●

  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]
    A build system determines what actions need to occur to rebuild the software (and in what order), and then performs those steps. For example, it can invoke a compiler to compile the source code. If an executable is created from source code, it must be possible to modify the project's source code and then generate an updated executable with those modifications. If the software produced by the project depends on external libraries, the build system does not need to build those external libraries. If there is no need to build anything to use the software after its source code is modified, select "not applicable" (N/A).

    Vectis uses Cargo as its automated build system. The complete application can be rebuilt from source with cargo build --locked or cargo build --release --locked.

    Cargo.toml defines the package and dependencies, Cargo.lock pins dependency resolution, and rust-toolchain.toml defines the Rust toolchain. GitHub Actions
    continuously verifies that the project builds from source.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/Cargo.toml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/Cargo.lock
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/rust-toolchain.toml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/Rust.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]
    For example, Maven, Ant, cmake, the autotools, make, rake (Ruby), or devtools (R).

    Vectis uses Cargo and rustup, the standard build and toolchain-management tools of the Rust ecosystem. Common Cargo commands are used for development, testing, linting, and release builds; no proprietary or project-specific build system is required.

    Typical commands include:

    cargo build --locked
    cargo test --locked
    cargo clippy --locked --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/Cargo.toml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/rust-toolchain.toml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    Vectis can be built entirely with FLOSS tools. Its standard build uses the open-source Rust compiler, Cargo, LLVM-based tooling, and common GNU/Linux build
    tools.

    The container build demonstrates this path using Debian with Cargo, rustc, Clang, GCC, CMake, Make, and other open-source packages, followed by
    cargo build --release --locked. No proprietary compiler or build system is required.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/image/Dockerfile.tag
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/Cargo.toml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/rust-toolchain.toml


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]
    The project MAY use multiple automated test suites (e.g., one that runs quickly, vs. another that is more thorough but requires special equipment). There are many test frameworks and test support systems available, including Selenium (web browser automation), Junit (JVM, Java), RUnit (R), testthat (R).

    Vectis includes publicly available automated test suites released under the project's Apache-2.0 license. The primary Rust suite runs with cargo test --locked.

    The project also includes Python HTTP integration tests, Schemathesis OpenAPI contract testing, native cargo-fuzz targets, and dedicated CLI and cryptographic integration tests. Execution instructions and the role of each suite are documented in doc/Test.md, and the standard suite runs automatically through GitHub Actions.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/Test.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/tree/main/tests
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/tree/main/fuzz
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/Rust.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/LICENSE


    Enough for a badge!

    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]
    For example, "make check", "mvn test", or "rake test" (Ruby).

    Vectis uses Cargo's standard Rust test interface. The primary unit and integration test suite is invoked with:

    cargo test --locked

    Targeted Rust tests can also be selected through Cargo's standard test filters. Additional Python, Schemathesis, and cargo-fuzz suites are documented separately, but they do not replace the standard Cargo test entry point.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/Test.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/Rust.yml


    Barely enough for a badge.

    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    Vectis has extensive unit, integration, negative-contract, property-based, HTTP, Schemathesis, and native fuzz testing. These suites cover the primary
    cryptographic capabilities, input fields, validation boundaries, storage behavior, and public API workflows.

    However, Vectis does not yet publish or enforce a coverage result demonstrating that most code branches are executed. This suggested criterion has been
    considered but is not currently claimed as met.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/Test.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/tree/main/tests
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/tree/main/fuzz


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    Vectis uses GitHub Actions for continuous integration. The Rust workflow runs automatically for every pull request targeting main and for every push to main.

    The workflow checks formatting, runs the complete Rust test suite, runs Clippy with warnings treated as errors, validates shell scripts, audits dependencies,
    builds the binary, and then executes the Python integration tests.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/Rust.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/actions/workflows/Rust.yml


  • New functionality testing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]
    As long as a policy is in place, even by word of mouth, that says developers should add tests to the automated test suite for major new functionality, select "Met."

    Vectis requires tests to be added alongside new behavior. Its engineering rules state that validation functions require unit tests and public contracts require
    positive and negative end-to-end tests. New endpoints are expected to add validators, limits, unit tests, and negative contract coverage as part of the
    same change.

    CONTRIBUTING.md also states that tests must not be omitted to make a change appear smaller and requires contributors to run the automated Rust suite before submitting.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/Design.md#7-testing-and-tooling-discipline
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]
    Major functionality would typically be mentioned in the release notes. Perfection is not required, merely evidence that tests are typically being added in practice to the automated test suite when new major functionality is added to the software produced by the project.

    Recent major Vectis capabilities were implemented together with automated tests:

    • SLH-DSA artifact signing added unit tests, parser validation tests, four native fuzz targets, and seed corpora.
    • One-time tokenization added SQLite transaction tests, HTTP positive and negative tests, CLI tests, and fuzz coverage.
    • Authenticated Shamir secret sharing added core and operation tests, positive and negative HTTP tests, CLI coverage, and fuzz inputs.
    • Cryptographic commitments added unit, HTTP contract, negative, CLI, and fuzz tests.

    This commit history demonstrates that the project's policy of adding tests with new functionality is followed in practice.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/commit/154cb816c41667d521c1f30cf25c50f6f524321d
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/commit/7f7f0fa4814494f7dad7fc740e1c70dd2606ba1d
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/commit/a337628e14e69ca4f2116a55d292fa9915a5eeca
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/commit/4bbf0047773cdc590da923f465a6b13cd7f02ea6


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    Vectis documents its testing policy in the contribution instructions. Contributors must not omit tests to reduce the apparent size of a change, must document the tests performed in the pull request, and must run the automated Rust suite before submission.

    The engineering rules additionally require unit tests for validation behavior and positive and negative end-to-end tests for public contracts.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/Design.md#7-testing-and-tooling-discipline


  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]
    Examples of compiler warning flags include gcc/clang "-Wall". Examples of a "safe" language mode include JavaScript "use strict" and perl5's "use warnings". A separate "linter" tool is simply a tool that examines the source code to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes. These are typically enabled within the source code or build instructions.

    Vectis documents its testing policy in the contribution instructions. Contributors must not omit tests to reduce the apparent size of a change, must document the tests performed in the pull request, and must run the automated Rust suite before submission.

    The engineering rules additionally require unit tests for validation behavior and positive and negative end-to-end tests for public contracts.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/Design.md#7-testing-and-tooling-discipline


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]
    These are the warnings identified by the implementation of the warnings criterion. The project should fix warnings or mark them in the source code as false positives. Ideally there would be no warnings, but a project MAY accept some warnings (typically less than 1 warning per 100 lines or less than 10 warnings).

    Vectis treats compiler and Clippy warnings as errors. The continuous integration workflow runs Clippy with -D warnings across all targets and features, so any
    new warning causes the check to fail and must be resolved before the change can be accepted.

    The project's engineering rules define zero warnings as the required state, and the same check is documented for contributors.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/Rust.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/Design.md#7-testing-and-tooling-discipline
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/actions/workflows/Rust.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    Vectis applies strict warning handling across all targets and features. Clippy and compiler warnings are promoted to errors through -D warnings, so warnings
    cannot be merged while the CI check is required.

    The project uses only narrow, local lint allowances for specific cases such as intentionally unused internal helpers and configuration functions whose
    signatures reflect explicit validation hooks. It does not disable warning categories globally.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/Rust.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/Design.md#7-testing-and-tooling-discipline


 Security 15/16 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]
    This requires understanding the following design principles, including the 8 principles from Saltzer and Schroeder:
    • economy of mechanism (keep the design as simple and small as practical, e.g., by adopting sweeping simplifications)
    • fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default)
    • complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable)
    • open design (security mechanisms should not depend on attacker ignorance of its design, but instead on more easily protected and changed information like keys and passwords)
    • separation of privilege (ideally, access to important objects should depend on more than one condition, so that defeating one protection system won't enable complete access. E.G., multi-factor authentication, such as requiring both a password and a hardware token, is stronger than single-factor authentication)
    • least privilege (processes should operate with the least privilege necessary)
    • least common mechanism (the design should minimize the mechanisms common to more than one user and depended on by all users, e.g., directories for temporary files)
    • psychological acceptability (the human interface must be designed for ease of use - designing for "least astonishment" can help)
    • limited attack surface (the attack surface - the set of the different points where an attacker can try to enter or extract data - should be limited)
    • input validation with allowlists (inputs should typically be checked to determine if they are valid before they are accepted; this validation should use allowlists (which only accept known-good values), not denylists (which attempt to list known-bad values)).
    A "primary developer" in a project is anyone who is familiar with the project's code base, is comfortable making changes to it, and is acknowledged as such by most other participants in the project. A primary developer would typically make a number of contributions over the past year (via code, documentation, or answering questions). Developers would typically be considered primary developers if they initiated the project (and have not left the project more than three years ago), have the option of receiving information on a private vulnerability reporting channel (if there is one), can accept commits on behalf of the project, or perform final releases of the project software. If there is only one developer, that individual is the primary developer. Many books and courses are available to help you understand how to develop more secure software and discuss design. For example, the Secure Software Development Fundamentals course is a free set of three courses that explain how to develop more secure software (it's free if you audit it; for an extra fee you can earn a certificate to prove you learned the material).

    Eduardo Lopez is the original author, primary developer, maintainer, release operator, and recipient of private vulnerability reports for Vectis.

    Vectis applies secure-design principles throughout its implementation and documentation: narrow scope and economy of mechanism; fail-closed sealed
    startup and authorization; centralized lifecycle and permission mediation; public design and threat-model documentation; separation of policy, keys, and
    operations; least-privilege container execution; bounded inputs and attack surface; allowlist-based validation; explicit trust boundaries; and simple,
    inspectable HTTP, CLI, JSON, and OpenAPI interfaces.

    The project's Design and Threat Model documents explain these principles, their implementation, and the security properties Vectis deliberately leaves
    to other layers.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/Design.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/ThreatModel.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/Internal.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/SelfAssessment.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/NOTICE


    Enough for a badge!

    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]
    Examples (depending on the type of software) include SQL injection, OS injection, classic buffer overflow, cross-site scripting, missing authentication, and missing authorization. See the CWE/SANS top 25 or OWASP Top 10 for commonly used lists. Many books and courses are available to help you understand how to develop more secure software and discuss common implementation errors that lead to vulnerabilities. For example, the Secure Software Development Fundamentals course is a free set of three courses that explain how to develop more secure software (it's free if you audit it; for an extra fee you can earn a certificate to prove you learned the material).

    Vectis's primary developer understands common vulnerability classes relevant to a networked cryptographic data-protection service and applies corresponding
    mitigations, including:

    • SQL injection: SQLx queries use bound parameters; dynamic SQL is limited to internally generated placeholders.
    • Missing authentication or authorization: protected endpoints use API-key authentication, signed permissions, KID scoping, peer authorization, and
      centralized lifecycle checks.
    • SSRF and destination injection: peer and final-application destinations come from signed configuration, not request-supplied addresses.
    • Invalid or malicious input: external fields are bounded and validated using allowlists, typed parsers, strict JSON contracts, and canonical structured
      contexts.
    • Cryptographic misuse: Vectis uses published algorithms through Botan and established libraries, CSPRNG-generated material, profile-controlled policy,
      context-bound AEAD, and verify-before-decrypt.
    • Timing attacks: API-key, MAC, commitment, signature-hash, and share authentication comparisons use constant-time comparison.
    • Secret disclosure: sensitive values are redacted from errors and logs, zeroized where practical, and encrypted before application-level storage.
    • Resource-exhaustion attacks: HTTP bodies, fields, batches, files, timeouts, and shutdown behavior have explicit bounds.
    • Concurrency and state races: token consumption and lifecycle changes use transactions or compare-and-swap semantics where required.
    • Memory-safety errors: Vectis is implemented in Rust and avoids manual memory management in production application logic.

    These threats and mitigations are documented and tested through unit, integration, negative-contract, property-based, and fuzz testing.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/ThreatModel.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/Design.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/SelfAssessment.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/validation.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/storage/sqlite.rs


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Not enough for a badge.

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]
    These cryptographic criteria do not always apply because some software has no need to directly use cryptographic capabilities.

    Vectis uses publicly published and expert-reviewed cryptographic algorithms, including AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305, SHA-3, BLAKE2, HMAC, KMAC, HKDF,
    Ed25519/Ed448, X25519/X448, ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and FF1. Its transport and time protocols use established TLS, NTS, and Roughtime implementations.

    However, Vectis also defines project-specific cryptographic compositions and envelope formats for protected messages, hybrid signatures, tokenization,
    commitments, and audit checkpoints. These designs are publicly documented but have not yet completed independent expert cryptographic review. Therefore, the project does not currently claim that this strict criterion is fully met.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/README.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/ThreatModel.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/Internal.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/SelfAssessment.md


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    Vectis's primary purpose is to provide cryptographic data-protection capabilities, including encryption, signatures, FPE, tokenization, MACs,
    commitments, secret sharing, and protected messaging. Therefore, the condition for this criterion does not apply.

    Nevertheless, Vectis delegates established cryptographic primitives to specialized FLOSS implementations such as Botan, RustCrypto crates, rustls,
    and the FF1 implementation maintained in liesware/fpe. Vectis does not implement block ciphers, cryptographic hash functions, digital-signature
    algorithms, or post-quantum primitives from scratch. Project code primarily implements policy, validation, key derivation, formats, and compositions around
    those primitives.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis#readme
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/Cargo.toml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/crypto.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/Internal.md


    Enough for a badge!

    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]
    See the Open Standards Requirement for Software by the Open Source Initiative.

    All cryptography-dependent functionality in Vectis can be built and operated using FLOSS components. Vectis is licensed under Apache-2.0 and publishes its
    complete source code.

    Cryptographic primitives are provided by open-source implementations including Botan, RustCrypto crates, rustls, and the open-source Vectis FF1 fork. Vectis
    does not require proprietary cryptographic libraries, SDKs, hardware, or hosted services for its current functionality. Dependencies are declared and pinned
    through Cargo.toml and Cargo.lock, and the project can be rebuilt from source
    using the documented FLOSS toolchain.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/LICENSE
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/Cargo.toml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/Cargo.lock
    https://github.com/liesware/fpe
    https://github.com/randombit/botan
    https://github.com/rustls/rustls


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]
    These minimum bitlengths are: symmetric key 112, factoring modulus 2048, discrete logarithm key 224, discrete logarithmic group 2048, elliptic curve 224, and hash 224 (password hashing is not covered by this bitlength, more information on password hashing can be found in the crypto_password_storage criterion). See https://www.keylength.com for a comparison of keylength recommendations from various organizations. The software MAY allow smaller keylengths in some configurations (ideally it would not, since this allows downgrade attacks, but shorter keylengths are sometimes necessary for interoperability).

    Vectis uses cryptographic profiles whose weakest supported components provide at least 128 bits of security, exceeding the 112-bit NIST minimum required
    through 2030.

    The default hybrid-performance-v1 profile uses ChaCha20Poly1305, Ed25519, X25519, ML-DSA-44, and ML-KEM-512. Other profiles use AES-128, AES-192, or
    AES-256 together with equal or stronger signature and key-establishment parameters. Internal encryption, FPE, tokenization, MAC, commitments, secret
    sharing authentication, and key derivation use 256-bit key material.

    Vectis does not expose legacy or reduced key sizes. The default VECTIS_CRYPTO_POLICY=profile-only rejects individual algorithm overrides and
    allows only the fixed, validated profiles. Even development overrides are restricted to an allowlist containing no algorithms below the required
    security strength.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/ops/keys.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/config.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/fpe.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/ENV.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis#crypto-profiles


    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]
    ECB mode is almost never appropriate because it reveals identical blocks within the ciphertext as demonstrated by the ECB penguin, and CTR mode is often inappropriate because it does not perform authentication and causes duplicates if the input state is repeated. In many cases it's best to choose a block cipher algorithm mode designed to combine secrecy and authentication, e.g., Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and EAX. Projects MAY allow users to enable broken mechanisms (e.g., during configuration) where necessary for compatibility, but then users know they're doing it.

    Vectis does not use cryptographic algorithms known to be broken, including MD4, MD5, SHA-1, DES, Triple DES, RC4, or Dual_EC_DRBG.

    The default profile uses BLAKE2b(256), ChaCha20Poly1305, Ed25519, X25519, ML-DSA-44, and ML-KEM-512. Other supported profiles use SHA-3, AES-GCM,
    Ed25519 or Ed448, X25519 or X448, ML-DSA, and ML-KEM.

    Encryption uses authenticated encryption modes: ChaCha20Poly1305 or AES-GCM. Stored internal material uses AES-256/GCM, and FPE uses FF1 with AES-256 and enforces a minimum domain size. Keyed operations use HMAC or KMAC. HTTPS uses rustls and its modern TLS defaults.

    Algorithm selection is restricted through explicit allowlists. The default profile-only policy rejects request-supplied algorithm overrides, and no compatibility fallback enables broken algorithms or inappropriate cipher modes.

    Vectis currently has no interoperability requirement that requires a broken algorithm, so no exception or legacy-risk mitigation is necessary.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/crypto.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/config.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/ops/keys.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/fpe.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/Cargo.toml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/ThreatModel.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    Vectis default security mechanisms do not depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses.

    The default cryptographic profile uses BLAKE2b(256), ChaCha20Poly1305, Ed25519, X25519, ML-DSA-44, and ML-KEM-512. Internal storage encryption uses
    AES-256/GCM. Other supported profiles use SHA-3 and AES-GCM with stronger parameter sets.

    Vectis does not use SHA-1, MD5, DES, Triple DES, RC4, ECB, unauthenticated CBC encryption, or legacy TLS cipher suites. Encryption uses authenticated
    modes with contextual AAD, while TLS is provided through rustls with modern defaults.

    FPE uses FF1 with AES-256 and validates the minimum domain size required by the current FF1 specification. The default profile-only policy also prevents
    requests from selecting arbitrary cryptographic algorithms.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/config.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/crypto.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/ops/keys.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/fpe.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/Cargo.toml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/ENV.md


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]

    Vectis partially satisfies this criterion through TLS: HTTPS connections use rustls and modern ephemeral TLS key exchange.

    However, the protected-message protocol does not currently provide full perfect forward secrecy. Each sender generates a fresh ephemeral X25519 or
    X448 key and a fresh ML-KEM encapsulation, but both are established against the recipient's persistent operational public keys.

    The envelope retains the sender's ephemeral public key, ML-KEM ciphertext, salt, and encrypted payload. An attacker who records an envelope and later
    obtains the recipient's complete operational private key material could reconstruct both shared secrets and derive the historical message key.

    Fresh per-message key establishment prevents key and nonce reuse and isolates messages from each other, but it does not protect historical messages after
    recipient long-term key compromise.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/ops/message.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/ThreatModel.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/Design.md


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]
    This criterion applies only when the software is enforcing authentication of users using passwords for external users (aka inbound authentication), such as server-side web applications. It does not apply in cases where the software stores passwords for authenticating into other systems (aka outbound authentication, e.g., the software implements a client for some other system), since at least parts of that software must have often access to the unhashed password.

    Not applicable. Vectis does not provide password-based authentication and does not store passwords belonging to external users.

    HTTP authentication uses high-entropy API keys generated from a CSPRNG. The server stores a keyed HMAC verifier derived from protected init key material,
    rather than storing the API key in plaintext. Client authorization data uses the same keyed identifier model inside signed configuration.

    The unseal key, database credentials, TLS private keys, and similar operator secrets are not external-user passwords and are governed by separate storage
    and deployment controls.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/ops/apikey.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/ops/internal_keys.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/permissions.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/ThreatModel.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/ENV.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]
    A cryptographically secure random number generator may be a hardware random number generator, or it may be a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG) using an algorithm such as Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG, Yarrow, or Fortuna. Examples of calls to secure random number generators include Java's java.security.SecureRandom and JavaScript's window.crypto.getRandomValues. Examples of calls to insecure random number generators include Java's java.util.Random and JavaScript's Math.random.

    Vectis generates cryptographic keys, nonces, salts, tokens, commitment openings, and secret-sharing coefficients using Botan's cryptographically
    secure random number generator.

    The core crypto module centralizes random generation through RandomNumberGenerator::new(), random_bytes(), and random_bytes_with_rng(). Cryptographic operations may reuse one Botan RNG during a single operation, but they do not replace it with a non-cryptographic generator.

    This CSPRNG is used for:

    • symmetric and asymmetric operational key generation;
    • EdDSA, X25519/X448, ML-DSA, ML-KEM, and SLH-DSA material;
    • AES-GCM and ChaCha20Poly1305 nonces;
    • ML-KEM and HKDF salts;
    • reversible random tokens;
    • commitment openings;
    • Shamir secret-sharing coefficients and set identifiers;
    • API keys, unseal keys, signature serials, and audit chain identifiers.

    Non-cryptographic counters used for request correlation are not used as keys, nonces, salts, tokens, or other cryptographic material. Vectis does not use
    thread_rng, fastrand, timestamps, counters, or similar non-cryptographic sources for security-sensitive randomness.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/crypto.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/ops/key_material.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/ops/message.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/tokenization.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/sharing.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/ops/commitments.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/ops/init.rs


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]
    An even stronger mechanism is releasing the software with digitally signed packages, since that mitigates attacks on the distribution system, but this only works if the users can be confident that the public keys for signatures are correct and if the users will actually check the signature.

    Distribution channels use HTTPS exclusively. [osps_br_03_02]


    Enough for a badge!

    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]
    These hashes can be modified in transit.

    Vectis does not retrieve cryptographic hashes over plain HTTP and use them for integrity decisions without signature verification.

    Source and dependency downloads use HTTPS. Cargo dependencies are resolved through Cargo.lock, which records package checksums and pins the Git-based FPEdependency to a specific commit. Container base images are referenced by immutable SHA-256 digests.

    Release SHA256SUMS are generated locally inside the trusted GitHub Actions release workflow; they are not downloaded from an untrusted HTTP source.
    Release archives also receive GitHub build-provenance attestations before publication.

    No build, installation, update, or release workflow retrieves a checksum over plain HTTP and then trusts that checksum without an authenticated mechanism.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/Cargo.lock
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/image/Dockerfile.tag
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/release.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/release-image.yml


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    Enough for a badge!

    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]
    The vulnerability must be patched and released by the project itself (patches may be developed elsewhere). A vulnerability becomes publicly known (for this purpose) once it has a CVE with publicly released non-paywalled information (reported, for example, in the National Vulnerability Database) or when the project has been informed and the information has been released to the public (possibly by the project). A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known. Note: this means that users might be left vulnerable to all attackers worldwide for up to 60 days. This criterion is often much easier to meet than what Google recommends in Rebooting responsible disclosure, because Google recommends that the 60-day period start when the project is notified even if the report is not public. Also note that this badge criterion, like other criteria, applies to the individual project. Some projects are part of larger umbrella organizations or larger projects, possibly in multiple layers, and many projects feed their results to other organizations and projects as part of a potentially-complex supply chain. An individual project often cannot control the rest, but an individual project can work to release a vulnerability patch in a timely way. Therefore, we focus solely on the individual project's response time. Once a patch is available from the individual project, others can determine how to deal with the patch (e.g., they can update to the newer version or they can apply just the patch as a cherry-picked solution).

    As of 2026-08-21, Vectis has no publicly known unpatched vulnerability of Medium, High, or Critical severity that has remained unresolved for more than
    60 days.

    The project runs cargo audit in CI against the committed Cargo.lock. A current scan of 362 Rust dependencies completed successfully with no vulnerabilities.
    The previously reported RUSTSEC-2026-0258 vulnerability in h2 was remediated by upgrading to h2 0.4.16.

    Container release candidates are scanned with Trivy before publication, and CodeQL analyzes the source code. Security findings and dependency updates are
    handled through the documented vulnerability-reporting process.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/Rust.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/release-image.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/Cargo.lock
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/SelfAssessment.md


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    No Critical severity vulnerability has been reported or publicly identified in Vectis to date, and no confirmed Critical vulnerability remains unresolved.

    Vectis accepts private vulnerability reports through its published security policy, aims to acknowledge reports within five business days, provides status
    updates during investigation, and coordinates fixes and disclosure with the reporter.

    Critical findings would receive immediate triage and an expedited tested release before coordinated public disclosure. Cargo Audit, CodeQL, Trivy,
    OpenSSF Scorecard, and security-focused testing provide continuous detection paths for vulnerabilities requiring this response.

    Because no Critical vulnerability has been reported, Vectis does not yet have a historical Critical-vulnerability remediation time to report.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/Rust.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/release-image.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/SelfAssessment.md


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]
    A project MAY leak "sample" credentials for testing and unimportant databases, as long as they are not intended to limit public access.

    Vectis public repositories do not contain valid private credentials intended to control access to private resources.

    Runtime secret files such as .env, .unseal_key, init.json, TLS private keys, databases, generated configuration, and local demo state are excluded from
    version control. Demo and integration scripts generate temporary credentials at runtime instead of embedding reusable credentials.

    GitHub Actions retrieves publishing credentials through the GitHub Secrets context. The Helm chart accepts secrets through operator-supplied values or an
    existing Kubernetes Secret and does not contain populated credentials.

    Values shown in env.dist and documentation are synthetic localhost examples. They do not grant access to any public or private service and are not production
    credentials.

    A review of tracked files and repository history found no committed private-key blocks or recognizable live access-token formats.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.gitignore
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/env.dist
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/charts/vectis/values.yaml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/charts/vectis/templates/secret.yaml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/release-image.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md


 Analysis 8/8 ●

  • Static code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]
    A static code analysis tool examines the software code (as source code, intermediate code, or executable) without executing it with specific inputs. For purposes of this criterion, compiler warnings and "safe" language modes do not count as static code analysis tools (these typically avoid deep analysis because speed is vital). Some static analysis tools focus on detecting generic defects, others focus on finding specific kinds of defects (such as vulnerabilities), and some do a combination. Examples of such static code analysis tools include cppcheck (C, C++), clang static analyzer (C, C++), SpotBugs (Java), FindBugs (Java) (including FindSecurityBugs), PMD (Java), Brakeman (Ruby on Rails), lintr (R), goodpractice (R), Coverity Quality Analyzer, SonarQube, Codacy, and HP Enterprise Fortify Static Code Analyzer. Larger lists of tools can be found in places such as the Wikipedia list of tools for static code analysis, OWASP information on static code analysis, NIST list of source code security analyzers, and Wheeler's list of static analysis tools. If there are no FLOSS static analysis tools available for the implementation language(s) used, you may select 'N/A'.

    Vectis uses CodeQL as a static source-code analysis tool beyond compiler warnings and Rust's memory-safety guarantees.

    CodeQL analyzes both Rust source code and GitHub Actions workflows. It runs for pull requests targeting main, every push to main, on a weekly schedule, and on manual request. Proposed release commits are merged into main and reviewed through this analysis before being tagged for release.

    Cargo Clippy, Cargo Audit, Trivy, and OpenSSF Scorecard provide additional analysis, but CodeQL is the static source-code analysis mechanism used to
    satisfy this criterion.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/actions/workflows/codeql.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/security/code-scanning


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    Vectis uses the CodeQL default security query suite for Rust and GitHub Actions.

    The Rust query suite includes vulnerability-focused data-flow and source-to-sink analysis mapped to common CWE categories, including:

    • SQL injection;
    • server-side request forgery;
    • path and regular-expression injection;
    • log injection and sensitive-data logging;
    • cleartext storage and transmission;
    • disabled TLS certificate verification;
    • hard-coded cryptographic values;
    • weak cryptographic algorithms;
    • uncontrolled allocation sizes;
    • invalid pointer and lifetime access.

    CodeQL also analyzes GitHub Actions workflows for security-relevant workflow issues. The analysis runs on pull requests, pushes to main, weekly, and on
    manual request.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/security/code-scanning
    https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/code-scanning/managing-your-code-scanning-configuration/rust-built-in-queries
    https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/rust-cwe/


    Enough for a badge!

    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]
    A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known. Note that criterion vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days requires that all such vulnerabilities be fixed within 60 days of being made public.

    Not applicable at present. CodeQL has not produced a confirmed exploitable Medium, High, or Critical severity vulnerability in Vectis that requires
    remediation.

    CodeQL continues to analyze Rust source code and GitHub Actions on pull requests, pushes to main, weekly, and on manual request. Any future finding is
    reviewed to distinguish an exploitable vulnerability from a false positive or non-security issue.

    A confirmed exploitable finding of Medium severity or higher will be fixed, covered by a regression test where practical, and recorded in the relevant
    release notes or security advisory.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/security/code-scanning
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    Vectis runs static source-code analysis on every commit that is proposed for or integrated into the main branch.

    The CodeQL workflow is triggered by:

    • every push to main;
    • every pull request targeting main, including new commits pushed to that PR;
    • a weekly scheduled scan as a fallback;
    • manual workflow dispatch.

    Therefore, each commit entering the supported development and release branch is analyzed without relying solely on the scheduled scan.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/actions/workflows/codeql.yml


  • Dynamic code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]
    A dynamic analysis tool examines the software by executing it with specific inputs. For example, the project MAY use a fuzzing tool (e.g., American Fuzzy Lop) or a web application scanner (e.g., OWASP ZAP or w3af). In some cases the OSS-Fuzz project may be willing to apply fuzz testing to your project. For purposes of this criterion the dynamic analysis tool needs to vary the inputs in some way to look for various kinds of problems or be an automated test suite with at least 80% branch coverage. The Wikipedia page on dynamic analysis and the OWASP page on fuzzing identify some dynamic analysis tools. The analysis tool(s) MAY be focused on looking for security vulnerabilities, but this is not required.

    Vectis applies dynamic analysis to every change proposed for or integrated into the main branch.

    The CI integration job starts a real Vectis server with generated keys and configuration, then runs project-specific HTTP mutation testing and
    OpenAPI-based property testing with Schemathesis. These tools exercise live handlers, parsers, validation, authorization, cryptographic workflows, and
    failure paths using generated and mutated inputs.

    Vectis also runs its native cargo-fuzz targets weekly with sanitizer instrumentation and accumulated corpora. This workflow can be triggered manually before a major production release.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    Not applicable. Vectis is implemented in Rust and does not include project-maintained production code written in a memory-unsafe language such as
    C or C++.

    Vectis interfaces with Botan through FFI, but Botan is an external dependency rather than memory-unsafe source code produced or maintained by the Vectis
    project. Native fuzzing and sanitizer-based testing are nevertheless used to exercise Vectis input-processing boundaries.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]
    This criterion does not suggest enabling assertions during production; that is entirely up to the project and its users to decide. This criterion's focus is instead to improve fault detection during dynamic analysis before deployment. Enabling assertions in production use is completely different from enabling assertions during dynamic analysis (such as testing). In some cases enabling assertions in production use is extremely unwise (especially in high-integrity components). There are many arguments against enabling assertions in production, e.g., libraries should not crash callers, their presence may cause rejection by app stores, and/or activating an assertion in production may expose private data such as private keys. Beware that in many Linux distributions NDEBUG is not defined, so C/C++ assert() will by default be enabled for production in those environments. It may be important to use a different assertion mechanism or defining NDEBUG for production in those environments.

    Vectis runs its automated test suite using Rust's test profile. This profile enables debug assertions and integer overflow checks that are not enabled by
    default in production release builds.

    The test suite contains assertions covering validation, cryptographic round-trips, lifecycle rules, authorization, storage, audit-chain integrity,
    and HTTP contracts. Native cargo-fuzz targets add explicit semantic assertions for properties such as canonical serialization, stable encoding, sanitized
    errors, and parser round-trips.

    These assertion-enabled test and fuzz configurations are separate from the production release profile.


    Enough for a badge!

    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]
    If you are not running dynamic code analysis and thus have not found any vulnerabilities in this way, choose "not applicable" (N/A). A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known.

    Not applicable at present. Vectis has no outstanding confirmed exploitable vulnerabilities of Medium or higher severity discovered through dynamic
    analysis.

    Findings produced by fuzzing and dynamic API testing are investigated before being dismissed. Confirmed defects are fixed, added to the regression test
    suite, and preserved as readable fuzz seeds when applicable.

    A recent canonical JSON fuzzing finding was corrected with centralized input validation, unit and HTTP regression tests, and a permanent cargo-fuzz seed. It was not formally classified as a Medium-or-higher vulnerability.



This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Liesware and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Liesware.
Entry created on 2026-08-21 14:40:13 UTC, last updated on 2026-08-21 16:38:28 UTC.