Vectis

遵循以下最佳实践的项目将能够自愿的自我认证,并显示他们已经实现了核心基础设施计划(OpenSSF)徽章。

没有一套可以保证软件永远不会有缺陷或漏洞的做法;如果规范或假设是错误的,即使合适的方法也可能失败。也没有哪些做法可以保证一个项目能够维持健康和运作良好的开发者社区。但是,遵循最佳做法可以帮助改善项目的成果。例如,一些做法可以在发布之前进行多人评估,这可以帮助您找到其他难以找到的技术漏洞,并帮助建立信任,并希望不同公司的开发人员之间进行重复的交互。要获得徽章,必须满足所有“必须”和“禁止”的条款,满足所有“应该”条款或有合适的理由,所有“建议”条款必须满足或未满足(至少希望考虑)。欢迎通过 GitHub网站创建问题或提出请求进行反馈。另外还有一个一般讨论邮件列表

如果这是您的项目,请在您的项目页面上显示您的徽章状态!徽章状态如下所示: 项目14194的徽章级别为in_progress 这里是如何嵌入它:
您可以通过将其嵌入在您的Markdown文件中:
[![OpenSSF Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14194/badge)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14194)
或将其嵌入到HTML中来显示您的徽章状态:
<a href="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14194"><img src="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14194/badge"></a>


这些是通过级别条款。您还可以查看白银黄金级别条款。

Baseline Series: 基准等级1 基准等级2 基准等级3

        

 基本 12/13

  • 常规

    请注意,其他项目可能使用相同的名称。

    Open-source cryptographic data protection toolkit for sensitive data workflows.

    请使用 SPDX许可证表达格式;例子包括“Apache-2.0”,“BSD-2-Clause”,“BSD-3-Clause”,“GPL-2.0+”,“LGPL-3.0 +”,“MIT”和“(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)”。
    如果有多种语言,请将它们列为逗号分隔值(可选空格),并将它们从最多到最少使用。如果有长列表,请至少列出前三个最常见的列表。如果没有语言(例如,这是仅文档或仅测试项目),请使用单个字符“ - ”。请使用每种语言的常规大小写,例如“JavaScript”。
    通用平台枚举(CPE)是用于信息技术系统,软件和软件包的结构化命名方案。在报告漏洞时,它可用于多个系统和数据库。

    Vectis is an experimental open source cryptographic data protection toolkit under active development. It provides profile-driven hybrid cryptography,
    format-preserving encryption, tokenization, masking, MACs, blind indexes, commitments, secret sharing, protected messaging, and verifiable audit records.

    The project emphasizes bounded input validation, signed configuration, encrypted application-level storage, explicit trust boundaries, key lifecycle
    enforcement, negative testing, property-based testing, Schemathesis, native fuzzing, dependency auditing, CodeQL, and reproducible release workflows.

    Vectis v0.8.5 completed a source-backed security self-assessment with no Critical or High severity vulnerabilities identified. This was not an
    independent external security audit, certification, or compliance assessment. Vectis should currently be used for evaluation, testing, demos, and
    design-partner proofs of concept rather than as the sole protection layer for
    production sensitive data.

    Project scope, accepted risks, and operational assumptions are documented publicly in the threat model and security documentation.

  • 基本项目网站内容


    项目网站必须简明扼要地描述软件的作用(它解决了什么问题?)。 [description_good]
    必须采用潜在用户可以理解的语言(例如,它使用最少的术语/行话)。

    Vectis is an open-source advanced data protection toolkit.

    TLS protects the connection, but sensitive data keeps moving in plaintext afterward — through logs, queues, databases, and internal APIs. Vectis protects the data itself.

    Sensitive input in. Protected representation out

    Vectis protects and transforms sensitive values through a consistent HTTP API and CLI. Operator-signed profiles define the allowed operations, algorithms, keys, permissions, and lifecycle policy.



    项目网站必须提供有关如何获取和提供反馈(错误报告或增强功能)以及如何贡献的信息。 [interact]

    关于如何贡献的信息必须解释贡献流程(例如,是否使用拉请求?) (需要网址) [contribution]
    除非另有说明,否则我们假定 GitHub上的项目使用问题列表(Issues)和拉(Pull)请求。这些信息可以简短,例如,说明项目使用拉请求,问题跟踪器或邮寄到邮件列表中的哪一个。

    Non-trivial contribution file in repository: https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md.



    关于如何贡献的信息应包括对可接受的贡献的要求(例如,引用任何所需的编码标准)。 (需要网址) [contribution_requirements]

  • FLOSS许可证


    项目生产的软件必须作为FLOSS发布。 [floss_license]
    FLOSS是以符合开源定义免费软件定义。此类许可证的示例包括 CC0 MIT BSD 2条款 BSD 3条款修订版 Apache 2.0 Lesser GNU通用公共许可证(LGPL),以及 GNU通用公共许可证(GPL)。为了我们的目的,这意味着许可证必须是:该软件也可以用其他许可证(例如,“GPLv2或专有”是可以接受的)。

    The Apache-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    建议由项目生成的软件的任何必需的许可证是由开放源码促进会(OSI)批准的许可证(英文)[floss_license_osi]
    OSI (开放源代码促进会)使用严格的审批流程来确定哪些许可证是开源软件(OSS)。

    The Apache-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    项目必须将其许可证在其源代码存储库中的标准位置发布。 (需要网址) [license_location]
    一种约定是将许可证发布为名为LICENSE或COPYING的顶级文件,其后可以带有扩展名,例如“ .txt”或“ .md”。另一种约定是使用一个名为LICENSES的目录,其中包含许可证文件。这些文件通常被命名为其SPDX许可证标识符,后跟适当的文件扩展名,如REUSE Specification中所述。请注意,此标准只是源存储库上的要求。从源代码生成某些内容(例如可执行文件,程序包或容器)时,无需包括许可证文件。例如,在为综合R存档网络(CRAN)生成R软件包时,请遵循标准CRAN惯例:如果许可证是标准许可证,请使用标准简短许可证规范(以避免安装另一文本副本)并列出排除文件(例如.Rbuildignore)中的LICENSE文件。同样,在创建Debian软件包时,您可以在版权文件中放置一个指向/ usr / share / common-licenses中的许可证文本的链接,并从创建的软件包中排除许可证文件(例如,通过在调用dh_auto_install之后删除文件) )。我们鼓励在可行的情况下以生成的格式包含机器可读的许可证信息。

    Non-trivial license location file in repository: https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/LICENSE.


  • 文档


    项目必须为项目生成的软件提供基本文档。 [documentation_basics]
    该文档必须在某些媒体(例如文本或视频)中,包括:如何安装它,如何启动它,如何使用它(可能使用教程使用示例)以及如何安全地使用它(例如,做什么和不做什么),如果这是软件的一个适当的话题。安全文档不需要太长篇幅。项目可以使用非项目内容的超文本链接作为文档。如果项目不生产软件,请选择“不适用”(N/A)。

    Vectis provides basic documentation in its README, including its purpose,
    current capabilities, scope, installation and Quick Start instructions,
    configuration overview, CLI and API entry points, testing, and security status.

    README:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis#readme

    Quick Start:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis#quick-start

    Detailed documentation:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/tree/main/doc



    项目必须提供描述项目生成的软件的外部接口(输入和输出)的参考文档。 [documentation_interface]
    外部接口的文档向最终用户或开发人员解释如何使用它。这将包括其应用程序接口(API),如果软件有。如果它是一个库,记录可以调用的主要类/类型和方法/函数。如果是Web应用程序,定义其URL接口(通常是其REST接口)。如果是命令行界面,请记录其支持的参数和选项。在许多情况下,最好是自动生成大部分文档,以便本文档随着软件的更改而保持同步,但这并不是必需的。项目可以使用非项目材料的超文本链接作为文档。文档可以自动生成(实际上这通常是最好的方法)。可以使用Swagger / OpenAPI生成REST接口的文档。代码界面文档可以使用 JSDoc (JavaScript), ESDoc (JavaScript),pydoc(Python)和Doxygen(很多)。仅在实现代码中添加注释不足以满足本条款;在没有阅读所有源代码的情况下,需要一个简单的方法来查看信息。如果项目不生产软件,请选择“不适用”(N/A)。

    Vectis documents its external HTTP and CLI interfaces, including request and
    response fields, status codes, error behavior, command arguments, output
    formats, configuration, and environment variables.

    HTTP API reference:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/API.md

    OpenAPI specification:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/openapi.yaml

    CLI reference:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/CLI.md

    Environment reference:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/ENV.md


  • 其他


    项目网站(网站,存储库和下载URL)必须使用TLS支持HTTPS。 [sites_https]
    您可以从Let's Encrypt获取免费证书。项目可以使用(例如) GitHub页面实现此条款, GitLab页面,或 SourceForge项目页面。如果您使用具有自定义域的GitHub页面,则可以使用内容传送网络(CDN)作为代理来支持HTTPS,例如博客文章“使用CloudFlare安全加速GitHub页面”,以满足此条款。如果您支持HTTP,我们敦促您将HTTP流量重定向到HTTPS。

    Given only https: URLs.



    该项目必须有一个或多个讨论机制(包括建议的更改和问题),可搜索,允许通过URL访问消息和主题,使新人能够参与一些讨论,并且不需要客户端安装专有软件。 [discussion]
    可接受机制的示例包括归档邮件列表,GitHub问题和拉请求讨论,Bugzilla,Mantis和Trac。如果满足这些标准,异步讨论机制(如IRC)是可以接受的;确保有一个URL可访问归档机制。允许专有JavaScript,但不鼓励。

    GitHub supports discussions on issues and pull requests.



    项目应该提供英文文档,并能够接受英文的代码的错误报告和评论。 [english]
    英语是计算机技术的通用语言;支持英语增加了全球不同潜在开发者和检视者的数量。即使核心开发人员的主要语言不是英文,项目也可以达到这个标准。

    Vectis documentation, contribution guidance, security policy, API reference,
    and source-code documentation are written in English. Bug reports, pull
    requests, and code-review comments are accepted in English through GitHub.

    Documentation:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis#readme

    Contribution guidance:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md

    Bug reports:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/issues

    Pull requests:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/pulls



    必须维护该项目。 [maintained]
    至少,项目应尝试响应重大问题和漏洞报告。可能正在维护一个积极追求徽章的项目。所有项目和人员的资源都有限,典型项目必须拒绝某些提议的更改,因此有限的资源和提议拒绝本身并不表示未维护的项目。

    当项目知道将不再维护该项目时,应将此标准设置为“未满足”,并使用适当的机制向其他人指示该项目将不会得到维护。例如,使用“ DEPRECATED”作为其自述文件的第一个标题,在其主页开头附近添加“ DEPRECATED”,在其代码存储库项目说明的开头添加“ DEPRECATED”,在其中添加无需维护的标志其自述文件和/或主页,在任何软件包存储库中将其标记为已弃用(例如npm deprecate ),和/或使用代码存储库的标记系统对其进行归档(例如GitHub的“ archive”设置,GitLab的“ archived”标记, Gerrit的“只读”状态,或SourceForge的“已放弃”项目状态)。可以在这里找到更多讨论。

    Vectis is under active development and is maintained through regular commits,
    continuous integration, dependency and security scanning, and a public issue
    tracker. The supported release series is documented in SECURITY.md, together
    with a private vulnerability-reporting process and an acknowledgment target.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/commits/main/
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/actions
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/issues
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md


 变更控制 9/9

  • 公开的版本控制的源代码存储库


    该项目必须有一个版本控制的源代码存储库。它必须是公开可读的并可通过URL访问。 [repo_public]
    该URL可以与项目URL相同。该项目可能在特定情况下使用私人(非公开)分支,而更改不会公开发布(例如,在向公众披露漏洞之前修复漏洞)。

    Repository on GitHub, which provides public git repositories with URLs.



    项目的源代码存储库必须跟踪所做的更改,谁进行了更改,何时进行了更改。 [repo_track]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made.



    为了实现协作检视,项目的源代码存储库必须包括临时版本,以便检视版本之间的变化;它不得仅包括最终版本。 [repo_interim]
    项目可以选择从其公共源代码库中删除特定的临时版本(例如,修复特定的未公开安全漏洞,可能永远不会公开发布的内容,或者包括不能合法发布而且不是最终版本的内容)。

    Vectis is developed in its public Git repository. The main branch contains intermediate development commits between releases, and the complete commit
    history and proposed pull-request changes are available for review. The repository is not limited to final release snapshots or generated artifacts.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/commits/main/
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/pulls
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis



    建议使用通用分布式版本控制软件(例如,git)作为项目的源代码存储库。 [repo_distributed]
    Git不是必须,项目在合适场景可以使用集中版本控制软件(如subversion)。

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • 唯一版本编号


    项目生成的用于每个用户使用的版本必须具有唯一版本标识符。 [version_unique]
    本条款可以通过各种方式来满足,包括提交ID(例如git提交ID或者Mercurial 更改列表id)或版本号(包括使用语义版本或基于日期的方案,如YYYYMMDD的版本号)。

    Each Vectis release is assigned a unique Semantic Versioning identifier from Cargo.toml. The version is exposed by vectis version, recorded in
    CHANGELOG.md, and used in release artifact names.

    The release workflow requires the Git tag to match v${Cargo.toml.version} before publishing release artifacts, preventing a release from being published under an inconsistent version identifier.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/Cargo.toml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/release.yml



    建议使用语义版本控制(SemVer)格式进行发布。 [version_semver]
    其他版本编号方案,如提交ID(例如git commit id或mercurial changeset id)或基于日期的方案,如YYYYMMDD,可以用作版本号,因为它们是唯一的。一些备选方案可能会导致问题,因为用户可能无法轻松确定是否是最新的。如果所有目标客户仅运行最新版本,则SemVer可能不太有助于识别软件版本(例如,它是通过持续交付不断更新的单个网站或互联网服务的代码)。


    建议项目识别其版本控制系统中的每个版本。例如,建议使用git的项目,使用git标签识别每个版本。 [version_tags]

    Vectis has a release workflow that requires release tags to match v${Cargo.toml.version}, but the first public release has not yet been identified with a Git tag.


  • 发行说明


    该项目必须在每个版本中提供发布说明,这是该版本中主要变化的可读的摘要,以帮助用户确定是否应升级,升级影响将如何。发行说明不能是版本控制日志的原始输出(例如,“git log”命令结果不是发行说明)。其产出不适用于多个地点的项目(如单个网站或服务的软件),并采用持续交付,可以选择“N/A”。 (需要网址) [release_notes]
    发行说明可以以各种方式实施。许多项目将它们添加到名为“NEWS”,“CHANGELOG”或“ChangeLog”的文件中,可选的包含“.txt”,“.md”或“.html”等扩展名。历史上,术语“更改日志”是指每个更改的日志,但为了满足这些条款,需要的是可读取的摘要。发行说明可以由版本控制系统机制提供,例如 GitHub发布工作流程

    Non-trivial release notes file in repository: https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md.



    发行说明必须列出每个新版本中修复的每个公开的漏洞。如果没有发行说明或者没有公开的漏洞,选择“不适用”。 [release_notes_vulns]
    如果用户通常不能在自己的计算机上实际更新软件,而必须依靠中间人来执行升级(对于内核和与内核交织的底层软件通常是这种情况),项目可以选择“不适用”(N/A)。

    N/A. At the time Vectis v0.8.5 was prepared, there were no publicly known run-time vulnerabilities in Vectis with a CVE or equivalent public identifier that were fixed by the release.

    Dependency advisories are monitored separately and are not treated as vulnerabilities in the Vectis project results for this criterion.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md


 报告 6/8

  • 错误报告流程


    项目必须为用户提交错误报告(例如,使用问题跟踪器或邮件列表)提供相关流程。 (需要网址) [report_process]

    Non-trivial SECURITY[.md] file found file in repository: https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md. [osps_do_02_01]



    项目必须使用问题跟踪器来跟踪每个问题。 [report_tracker]

    Vectis uses GitHub Issues as its public issue tracker. Individual bug reports,
    enhancement proposals, documentation problems, and user questions can be created, discussed, tracked, and closed there.

    Suspected unpatched vulnerabilities are handled separately through the private reporting process documented in SECURITY.md.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/issues
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md



    该项目必须响应过去2-12个月内(含)提交的大多数错误报告;响应不需要包括修复。 [report_responses]


    该项目应该对过去2-12个月内(包括)的大部分(> 50%)的增强请求作出回应。 [enhancement_responses]
    答复可能是“不”或有关其价值的讨论。目的只是对某些请求有一些回应,这表明项目还活着。为了该条款的目的,项目不需要计数无效请求(例如,来自垃圾邮件发送者或自动系统)。如果项目不再进行增强,请选择“未满足”,并将介绍此情况的URL包含在内。如果一个项目有超出处理能力的增强需求数量,请选择“未满足”并解释。


    该项目必须有一个公开的报告和回复的档案供后续搜索。 (需要网址) [report_archive]

    Vectis uses GitHub Issues as a publicly available and searchable archive for bug reports, enhancement requests, questions, and maintainer responses. Open and closed reports remain available for later review and searching.

    Public archive:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/issues?q=is%3Aissue


  • 漏洞报告流程


    项目必须在项目网站上发布报告漏洞的流程。 (需要网址) [vulnerability_report_process]
    例如,https://PROJECTSITE/security 上的一个明确指定的邮箱地址,通常以 security@example.org 的形式。这可能与其错误报告流程相同。漏洞报告可能一直是公开的,但是许多项目都有一个私密漏洞报告机制。

    Vectis publishes its vulnerability-reporting process in SECURITY.md. The policy defines the private reporting channel, requested report contents, supported versions, expected acknowledgment period, disclosure process, and information that reporters must not include.

    Vulnerability-reporting process:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md



    如果支持私有漏洞报告,项目必须包括如何以保密的方式发送信息。 (需要网址) [vulnerability_report_private]
    示例包括使用HTTPS(TLS)或使用OpenPGP加密的电子邮件在网络上提交的私密缺陷报告。如果漏洞报告总是公开的(从来没有私密漏洞报告),请选择“不适用”(N/A)。

    Vectis accepts private vulnerability reports through the maintainer's direct email address, using the subject specified in SECURITY.md. Reporters are instructed not to open a public issue for an unpatched vulnerability. If a more protected exchange is needed, the reporter can request an appropriate channel
    in the initial private message.

    Private reporting instructions:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md#reporting-a-vulnerability



    该项目在过去6个月收到的任何漏洞报告的初始响应时间必须小于或等于14天。 [vulnerability_report_response]
    如果过去6个月没有报告漏洞,请选择“不适用”(N/A)。

    N/A. Vectis has not received any vulnerability reports during the last six months. SECURITY.md establishes a target acknowledgment period of five business
    days for future reports.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md


 质量 13/13

 安全 15/16

  • 安全开发知识


    该项目必须至少有一个主要开发人员知道如何设计安全软件。 [know_secure_design]
    这需要了解以下设计原则,包括 Saltzer和Schroeder 中的8项原则:
    • 机制经济(保持设计简单实用,例如采用彻底简化)
    • 故障安全默认(默认情况下,访问决策应拒绝),项目安装应默认安全)
    • 完全仲裁(必须检查每个可能被限制的访问权限,并且不可绕过)
    • 开放式设计(安全机制不应该依赖于攻击者对其设计的无知,而应该更容易地保护和更改信息,例如密钥和密码)
    • 特权分离(理想情况下,对重要对象的访问应该取决于多个条件,从而破坏一个保护系统将无法实现完全访问。如,多因子身份验证,要求密码和硬件令牌,比单因子认证安全性更高)
    • 最小权限(进程应该以最少的权限运行)
    • 最少的公共机制(设计应该最大限度地减少所有用户所依赖的,涉及到多个用户的共同机制,如,临时文件的目录)
    • 心理可接受性(人机接口必须设计为易于使用 —— 设计为“最不惊讶”)
    • 有限的攻击面(攻击面 —— 一组不同的入口,其​​中攻击者可以尝试输入或提取数据 —— 应该受到限制)
    • 输入验证与白名单(输入通常应该在被接受之前检查以确定是否有效;此验证应使用白名单(仅接受已知的有效值),而不是黑名单(尝试列出已知的非法值))。
    项目中的“主要开发人员”的定义是熟悉项目代码的任何人,很乐意对其进行更改,并被项目中大多数其他参与者确认。主要开发人员通常会在过去一年中通过代码,文档或回答问题提供一些贡献。开发人员通常被认为是主要开发人员,如果他们启动项目(并且还没有离开项目满三年),可以选择在私人漏洞报告渠道(如果有的话)上接收信息,可以代表项目接受提交,或执行项目软件的最终版本发布。如果只有一个开发者,那个人是主要开发人员。

    Eduardo Lopez is the original author, primary developer, maintainer, release operator, and recipient of private vulnerability reports for Vectis.

    Vectis applies secure-design principles throughout its implementation and documentation: narrow scope and economy of mechanism; fail-closed sealed
    startup and authorization; centralized lifecycle and permission mediation; public design and threat-model documentation; separation of policy, keys, and
    operations; least-privilege container execution; bounded inputs and attack surface; allowlist-based validation; explicit trust boundaries; and simple,
    inspectable HTTP, CLI, JSON, and OpenAPI interfaces.

    The project's Design and Threat Model documents explain these principles, their implementation, and the security properties Vectis deliberately leaves
    to other layers.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/Design.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/ThreatModel.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/Internal.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/SelfAssessment.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/NOTICE



    该项目的主要开发人员中,至少有一个必须知道导致这类型软件漏洞的常见错误类型,以及至少有一种方法来对付或缓解这些漏洞。 [know_common_errors]
    示例(取决于软件的类型)包括SQL注入,操作系统注入,经典缓冲区溢出,跨站点脚本(XSS),缺少认证和缺少授权。请参阅 CWE/SANS 25种最常见漏洞 OWASP十大漏洞类型项目

    Vectis's primary developer understands common vulnerability classes relevant to a networked cryptographic data-protection service and applies corresponding
    mitigations, including:

    • SQL injection: SQLx queries use bound parameters; dynamic SQL is limited to internally generated placeholders.
    • Missing authentication or authorization: protected endpoints use API-key authentication, signed permissions, KID scoping, peer authorization, and
      centralized lifecycle checks.
    • SSRF and destination injection: peer and final-application destinations come from signed configuration, not request-supplied addresses.
    • Invalid or malicious input: external fields are bounded and validated using allowlists, typed parsers, strict JSON contracts, and canonical structured
      contexts.
    • Cryptographic misuse: Vectis uses published algorithms through Botan and established libraries, CSPRNG-generated material, profile-controlled policy,
      context-bound AEAD, and verify-before-decrypt.
    • Timing attacks: API-key, MAC, commitment, signature-hash, and share authentication comparisons use constant-time comparison.
    • Secret disclosure: sensitive values are redacted from errors and logs, zeroized where practical, and encrypted before application-level storage.
    • Resource-exhaustion attacks: HTTP bodies, fields, batches, files, timeouts, and shutdown behavior have explicit bounds.
    • Concurrency and state races: token consumption and lifecycle changes use transactions or compare-and-swap semantics where required.
    • Memory-safety errors: Vectis is implemented in Rust and avoids manual memory management in production application logic.

    These threats and mitigations are documented and tested through unit, integration, negative-contract, property-based, and fuzz testing.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/ThreatModel.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/Design.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/SelfAssessment.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/validation.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/storage/sqlite.rs


  • 使用基础的良好加密实践

    请注意,某些软件不需要使用加密机制。

    项目生成的软件默认情况下,只能使用由专家公开发布和审查的加密协议和算法(如果使用加密协议和算法)。 [crypto_published]
    这些加密条款并不总是适用,因为某些软件不需要直接使用加密功能。

    Vectis uses publicly published and expert-reviewed cryptographic algorithms, including AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305, SHA-3, BLAKE2, HMAC, KMAC, HKDF,
    Ed25519/Ed448, X25519/X448, ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and FF1. Its transport and time protocols use established TLS, NTS, and Roughtime implementations.

    However, Vectis also defines project-specific cryptographic compositions and envelope formats for protected messages, hybrid signatures, tokenization,
    commitments, and audit checkpoints. These designs are publicly documented but have not yet completed independent expert cryptographic review. Therefore, the project does not currently claim that this strict criterion is fully met.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/README.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/ThreatModel.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/Internal.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/SelfAssessment.md



    如果项目生成的软件是应用程序或库,其主要目的不是实现加密,那么它应该只调用专门设计实现加密功能的软件,而不应该重新实现自己的。 [crypto_call]

    Vectis's primary purpose is to provide cryptographic data-protection capabilities, including encryption, signatures, FPE, tokenization, MACs,
    commitments, secret sharing, and protected messaging. Therefore, the condition for this criterion does not apply.

    Nevertheless, Vectis delegates established cryptographic primitives to specialized FLOSS implementations such as Botan, RustCrypto crates, rustls,
    and the FF1 implementation maintained in liesware/fpe. Vectis does not implement block ciphers, cryptographic hash functions, digital-signature
    algorithms, or post-quantum primitives from scratch. Project code primarily implements policy, validation, key derivation, formats, and compositions around
    those primitives.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis#readme
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/Cargo.toml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/crypto.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/Internal.md



    项目所产生的软件中,所有依赖于密码学的功能必须使用FLOSS实现。 [crypto_floss]

    All cryptography-dependent functionality in Vectis can be built and operated using FLOSS components. Vectis is licensed under Apache-2.0 and publishes its
    complete source code.

    Cryptographic primitives are provided by open-source implementations including Botan, RustCrypto crates, rustls, and the open-source Vectis FF1 fork. Vectis
    does not require proprietary cryptographic libraries, SDKs, hardware, or hosted services for its current functionality. Dependencies are declared and pinned
    through Cargo.toml and Cargo.lock, and the project can be rebuilt from source
    using the documented FLOSS toolchain.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/LICENSE
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/Cargo.toml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/Cargo.lock
    https://github.com/liesware/fpe
    https://github.com/randombit/botan
    https://github.com/rustls/rustls



    项目生成的软件中的安全机制使用的默认密钥长度必须至少达到2030年(如2012年所述)的NIST最低要求。必须提供配置,以使较小的密钥长度被完全禁用。 [crypto_keylength]
    这些最小位长度是:对称密钥112,因式分解模数2048,离散对数密钥224,离散对数组2048,椭圆曲线224和散列224(密码散列不涉及该位长度),关于密码散列的更多信息可以在 crypto_password_storage 条款)。请参阅 http://www.keylength.com 以比较不同组织的密钥长度建议。在某些配置中,软件可能允许较小的密钥长度(理想情况下不会,因为这允许降级攻击,但是互操作性有时需要较短的密钥长度)。

    Vectis uses cryptographic profiles whose weakest supported components provide at least 128 bits of security, exceeding the 112-bit NIST minimum required
    through 2030.

    The default hybrid-performance-v1 profile uses ChaCha20Poly1305, Ed25519, X25519, ML-DSA-44, and ML-KEM-512. Other profiles use AES-128, AES-192, or
    AES-256 together with equal or stronger signature and key-establishment parameters. Internal encryption, FPE, tokenization, MAC, commitments, secret
    sharing authentication, and key derivation use 256-bit key material.

    Vectis does not expose legacy or reduced key sizes. The default VECTIS_CRYPTO_POLICY=profile-only rejects individual algorithm overrides and
    allows only the fixed, validated profiles. Even development overrides are restricted to an allowlist containing no algorithms below the required
    security strength.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/ops/keys.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/config.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/fpe.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/ENV.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis#crypto-profiles



    项目产生的软件中的默认安全机制不得取决于已被破解的密码算法(例如,MD4,MD5,单DES,RC4,Dual_EC_DRBG)或使用不适合上下文的密码模式(例如,ECB模式几乎不适当,因为它揭示了密文中相同的块,如 ECB企鹅所示。CTR模式通常是不合适的,因为如果重复输入状态,则它不执行认证并导致重复)。 [crypto_working]
    在许多情况下,最好选择设计用于组合保密和认证的块密码算法模式,例如Galois / Counter Mode(GCM)和EAX。项目可以允许用户为必要的兼容性启用已被破解的加密机制,但是需要用户知道他们正在这么做。

    Vectis does not use cryptographic algorithms known to be broken, including MD4, MD5, SHA-1, DES, Triple DES, RC4, or Dual_EC_DRBG.

    The default profile uses BLAKE2b(256), ChaCha20Poly1305, Ed25519, X25519, ML-DSA-44, and ML-KEM-512. Other supported profiles use SHA-3, AES-GCM,
    Ed25519 or Ed448, X25519 or X448, ML-DSA, and ML-KEM.

    Encryption uses authenticated encryption modes: ChaCha20Poly1305 or AES-GCM. Stored internal material uses AES-256/GCM, and FPE uses FF1 with AES-256 and enforces a minimum domain size. Keyed operations use HMAC or KMAC. HTTPS uses rustls and its modern TLS defaults.

    Algorithm selection is restricted through explicit allowlists. The default profile-only policy rejects request-supplied algorithm overrides, and no compatibility fallback enables broken algorithms or inappropriate cipher modes.

    Vectis currently has no interoperability requirement that requires a broken algorithm, so no exception or legacy-risk mitigation is necessary.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/crypto.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/config.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/ops/keys.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/fpe.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/Cargo.toml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/ThreatModel.md



    由项目产生的软件中的默认安全机制不应该依赖于具有已知严重弱点的加密算法或模式(例如,SHA-1密码散列算法或SSH中的CBC模式)。 [crypto_weaknesses]
    CERT:SSH CBC漏洞中讨论了SSH中CBC模式的问题。

    Vectis default security mechanisms do not depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses.

    The default cryptographic profile uses BLAKE2b(256), ChaCha20Poly1305, Ed25519, X25519, ML-DSA-44, and ML-KEM-512. Internal storage encryption uses
    AES-256/GCM. Other supported profiles use SHA-3 and AES-GCM with stronger parameter sets.

    Vectis does not use SHA-1, MD5, DES, Triple DES, RC4, ECB, unauthenticated CBC encryption, or legacy TLS cipher suites. Encryption uses authenticated
    modes with contextual AAD, while TLS is provided through rustls with modern defaults.

    FPE uses FF1 with AES-256 and validates the minimum domain size required by the current FF1 specification. The default profile-only policy also prevents
    requests from selecting arbitrary cryptographic algorithms.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/config.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/crypto.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/ops/keys.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/fpe.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/Cargo.toml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/ENV.md



    项目产生的软件中的安全机制应该​​对密钥协商协议实施完美的前向保密(PFS),如果长期密钥集合中的一个长期密钥在将来泄露,也不能破坏从一组长期密钥导出的会话密钥。 [crypto_pfs]

    Vectis partially satisfies this criterion through TLS: HTTPS connections use rustls and modern ephemeral TLS key exchange.

    However, the protected-message protocol does not currently provide full perfect forward secrecy. Each sender generates a fresh ephemeral X25519 or
    X448 key and a fresh ML-KEM encapsulation, but both are established against the recipient's persistent operational public keys.

    The envelope retains the sender's ephemeral public key, ML-KEM ciphertext, salt, and encrypted payload. An attacker who records an envelope and later
    obtains the recipient's complete operational private key material could reconstruct both shared secrets and derive the historical message key.

    Fresh per-message key establishment prevents key and nonce reuse and isolates messages from each other, but it does not protect historical messages after
    recipient long-term key compromise.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/ops/message.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/ThreatModel.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/Design.md



    如果项目产生的软件存储用于外部用户认证的密码,则必须使用密钥拉伸(迭代)算法(例如,PBKDF2,Bcrypt或Scrypt)将密码存储为每用户盐值不同的迭代散列 。 [crypto_password_storage]
    此条款仅适用于软件强制使用密码验证用户身份的情况(如服务器端Web应用程序)。在软件存储用于认证到其他系统的密码(例如,该软件实现某个其他系统的客户端)的情况下,这是不适用的,因为该软件的至少某个部分必须经常访问未散列加密的密码。

    Not applicable. Vectis does not provide password-based authentication and does not store passwords belonging to external users.

    HTTP authentication uses high-entropy API keys generated from a CSPRNG. The server stores a keyed HMAC verifier derived from protected init key material,
    rather than storing the API key in plaintext. Client authorization data uses the same keyed identifier model inside signed configuration.

    The unseal key, database credentials, TLS private keys, and similar operator secrets are not external-user passwords and are governed by separate storage
    and deployment controls.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/ops/apikey.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/ops/internal_keys.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/permissions.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/ThreatModel.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/ENV.md



    由项目生成的软件中的安全机制必须使用密码学安全的随机数生成器生成所有加密密钥和随机数,并且不得使用密码学不安全的生成器。 [crypto_random]
    密码安全的随机数生成器可以是硬件随机数生成器,或者它可以是使用诸如Hash_DRBG,HMAC_DRBG,CTR_DRBG,Yarrow或Fortuna之类的算法的加密安全的伪随机数生成器(CSPRNG)。对安全性随机数生成器的调用示例包括Java的java.security.SecureRandom和JavaScript的window.crypto.getRandomValues。调用不安全随机数生成器的示例包括Java的java.util.Random和JavaScript的Math.random。

    Vectis generates cryptographic keys, nonces, salts, tokens, commitment openings, and secret-sharing coefficients using Botan's cryptographically
    secure random number generator.

    The core crypto module centralizes random generation through RandomNumberGenerator::new(), random_bytes(), and random_bytes_with_rng(). Cryptographic operations may reuse one Botan RNG during a single operation, but they do not replace it with a non-cryptographic generator.

    This CSPRNG is used for:

    • symmetric and asymmetric operational key generation;
    • EdDSA, X25519/X448, ML-DSA, ML-KEM, and SLH-DSA material;
    • AES-GCM and ChaCha20Poly1305 nonces;
    • ML-KEM and HKDF salts;
    • reversible random tokens;
    • commitment openings;
    • Shamir secret-sharing coefficients and set identifiers;
    • API keys, unseal keys, signature serials, and audit chain identifiers.

    Non-cryptographic counters used for request correlation are not used as keys, nonces, salts, tokens, or other cryptographic material. Vectis does not use
    thread_rng, fastrand, timestamps, counters, or similar non-cryptographic sources for security-sensitive randomness.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/crypto.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/ops/key_material.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/ops/message.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/tokenization.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/core/sharing.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/ops/commitments.rs
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/src/ops/init.rs


  • 安全交付防御中间人(MITM)的攻击


    该项目必须使用一种针对MITM攻击的传递机制。使用https或ssh + scp是可以接受的。 [delivery_mitm]
    一个更强大的机制是使用数字签名的软件包发布软件,因为这样可以减轻对分发系统的攻击,但只有在用户确信签名的公钥是否正确的情况下才可以确定。用户实际上会检查签名。

    Distribution channels use HTTPS exclusively. [osps_br_03_02]



    不得通过http协议获取加密散列(例如,sha1sum)并直接使用,而不检查密码学签名。 [delivery_unsigned]
    这些散列可以在传输过程中修改。

    Vectis does not retrieve cryptographic hashes over plain HTTP and use them for integrity decisions without signature verification.

    Source and dependency downloads use HTTPS. Cargo dependencies are resolved through Cargo.lock, which records package checksums and pins the Git-based FPEdependency to a specific commit. Container base images are referenced by immutable SHA-256 digests.

    Release SHA256SUMS are generated locally inside the trusted GitHub Actions release workflow; they are not downloaded from an untrusted HTTP source.
    Release archives also receive GitHub build-provenance attestations before publication.

    No build, installation, update, or release workflow retrieves a checksum over plain HTTP and then trusts that checksum without an authenticated mechanism.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/Cargo.lock
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/image/Dockerfile.tag
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/release.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/release-image.yml


  • 修正公开的漏洞


    被公开了超过60天的中等或更高严重程度的漏洞,必须被修复。 [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]
    该漏洞必须由项目本身修补和发布(修补程序可能在其他地方开发)。一旦漏洞具有公开发布的非付费信息的CVE(例如,在国家漏洞数据库)或项目已被通知,且信息已经发布给公众(可能是项目自己发布),则视为漏洞已经公众所知。如果其 CVSS 2.0 基本分数为4或更高,则漏洞是中等到高的严重性。 注意:这意味着全世界的所有攻击者可能会对用户造成长达60天的伤害。这个标准通常比Google在重新启动负责任的披露中所推荐的容易得多。因为Google建议,如果报告不是公开的,那么当项目得到通知,甚至报告尚未公开时,60天的时间段就会开始。

    As of 2026-08-21, Vectis has no publicly known unpatched vulnerability of Medium, High, or Critical severity that has remained unresolved for more than
    60 days.

    The project runs cargo audit in CI against the committed Cargo.lock. A current scan of 362 Rust dependencies completed successfully with no vulnerabilities.
    The previously reported RUSTSEC-2026-0258 vulnerability in h2 was remediated by upgrading to h2 0.4.16.

    Container release candidates are scanned with Trivy before publication, and CodeQL analyzes the source code. Security findings and dependency updates are
    handled through the documented vulnerability-reporting process.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/Rust.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/release-image.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/Cargo.lock
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/SelfAssessment.md



    项目在得到报告后应该迅速修复所有致命漏洞。 [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    No Critical severity vulnerability has been reported or publicly identified in Vectis to date, and no confirmed Critical vulnerability remains unresolved.

    Vectis accepts private vulnerability reports through its published security policy, aims to acknowledge reports within five business days, provides status
    updates during investigation, and coordinates fixes and disclosure with the reporter.

    Critical findings would receive immediate triage and an expedited tested release before coordinated public disclosure. Cargo Audit, CodeQL, Trivy,
    OpenSSF Scorecard, and security-focused testing provide continuous detection paths for vulnerabilities requiring this response.

    Because no Critical vulnerability has been reported, Vectis does not yet have a historical Critical-vulnerability remediation time to report.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/Rust.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/release-image.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/doc/SelfAssessment.md


  • 其他安全问题


    公共存储库不得泄漏旨在限制公众访问的有效私人凭证(例如,工作密码或私钥)。 [no_leaked_credentials]
    项目可以泄漏测试和不重要数据库的“样本”凭据,只要它们不旨在限制公共访问。

    Vectis public repositories do not contain valid private credentials intended to control access to private resources.

    Runtime secret files such as .env, .unseal_key, init.json, TLS private keys, databases, generated configuration, and local demo state are excluded from
    version control. Demo and integration scripts generate temporary credentials at runtime instead of embedding reusable credentials.

    GitHub Actions retrieves publishing credentials through the GitHub Secrets context. The Helm chart accepts secrets through operator-supplied values or an
    existing Kubernetes Secret and does not contain populated credentials.

    Values shown in env.dist and documentation are synthetic localhost examples. They do not grant access to any public or private service and are not production
    credentials.

    A review of tracked files and repository history found no committed private-key blocks or recognizable live access-token formats.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.gitignore
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/env.dist
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/charts/vectis/values.yaml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/charts/vectis/templates/secret.yaml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/release-image.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md


 分析 8/8

  • 静态代码分析


    如果至少有一个FLOSS工具以所选择的语言实现此条款,则至少需要将一个静态代码分析工具应用于软件发布之前任何提议的主要生成版本。 [static_analysis]
    静态代码分析工具检查软件代码(源代码,中间代码或可执行文件),而不用特定输入执行。本条款中,编译器警告和“安全”语言模式不被视为静态代码分析工具(它们通常避免深入分析,因为速度至关重要)。此类静态代码分析工具的示例包括 cppcheck clang静态分析器 FindBugs (包括FindSecurityBugs), PMD Brakeman Coverity质量分析器 HP Fortify静态代码分析器。更多的工具列表可以在诸如维基百科静态代码分析工具列表关于静态代码分析的OWASP信息 NIST源代码安全分析器列表 Wheeler的静态分析工具列表 SWAMP 是使用各种工具评估软件漏洞的免费平台。如果没有可用于所使用的实现语言的FLOSS静态分析工具,请选择“N/A”。

    Vectis uses CodeQL as a static source-code analysis tool beyond compiler warnings and Rust's memory-safety guarantees.

    CodeQL analyzes both Rust source code and GitHub Actions workflows. It runs for pull requests targeting main, every push to main, on a weekly schedule, and on manual request. Proposed release commits are merged into main and reviewed through this analysis before being tagged for release.

    Cargo Clippy, Cargo Audit, Trivy, and OpenSSF Scorecard provide additional analysis, but CodeQL is the static source-code analysis mechanism used to
    satisfy this criterion.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/actions/workflows/codeql.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/security/code-scanning



    建议至少有一个用于static_analysis标准的静态分析工具包括在分析语言或环境中查找常见漏洞的规则或方法。 [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    专门设计用于寻找常见漏洞的静态分析工具更有可能找到它们。也就是说,使用任何静态工具通常会帮助找到一些问题,所以我们“通过”级别的徽章建议,但不要求这个条款。

    Vectis uses the CodeQL default security query suite for Rust and GitHub Actions.

    The Rust query suite includes vulnerability-focused data-flow and source-to-sink analysis mapped to common CWE categories, including:

    • SQL injection;
    • server-side request forgery;
    • path and regular-expression injection;
    • log injection and sensitive-data logging;
    • cleartext storage and transmission;
    • disabled TLS certificate verification;
    • hard-coded cryptographic values;
    • weak cryptographic algorithms;
    • uncontrolled allocation sizes;
    • invalid pointer and lifetime access.

    CodeQL also analyzes GitHub Actions workflows for security-relevant workflow issues. The analysis runs on pull requests, pushes to main, weekly, and on
    manual request.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/security/code-scanning
    https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/code-scanning/managing-your-code-scanning-configuration/rust-built-in-queries
    https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/rust-cwe/



    使用静态代码分析发现的所有中,高严重性可利用漏洞必须在确认后及时修复。 [static_analysis_fixed]
    如果其 CVSS 2.0 评分为4或更高,则此漏洞是中等到高的严重性。

    Not applicable at present. CodeQL has not produced a confirmed exploitable Medium, High, or Critical severity vulnerability in Vectis that requires
    remediation.

    CodeQL continues to analyze Rust source code and GitHub Actions on pull requests, pushes to main, weekly, and on manual request. Any future finding is
    reviewed to distinguish an exploitable vulnerability from a false positive or non-security issue.

    A confirmed exploitable finding of Medium severity or higher will be fixed, covered by a regression test where practical, and recorded in the relevant
    release notes or security advisory.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/security/code-scanning
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/SECURITY.md
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md



    建议每次提交或至少每天执行静态源代码分析。 [static_analysis_often]

    Vectis runs static source-code analysis on every commit that is proposed for or integrated into the main branch.

    The CodeQL workflow is triggered by:

    • every push to main;
    • every pull request targeting main, including new commits pushed to that PR;
    • a weekly scheduled scan as a fallback;
    • manual workflow dispatch.

    Therefore, each commit entering the supported development and release branch is analyzed without relying solely on the scheduled scan.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml
    https://github.com/liesware/Vectis/actions/workflows/codeql.yml


  • 动态代码分析


    建议在发布之前,至少将一个动态分析工具应用于软件任何发布的主要生产版本。 [dynamic_analysis]
    动态分析工具通过执行特定输入来检查软件。例如,项目可以使用模糊工具(例如, American Fuzzy Lop )或Web应用扫描程序(例如, ZAP w3af )。在某些情况下, OSS-Fuzz 项目可以对您的项目应用模糊测试。为满足此条款,动态分析工具需要以某种方式改变输入,以寻找各种问题,或者将其作为一个具有至少80%分支覆盖率的自动测试套件。 动态分析维基百科页面 OWASP的fuzzing页面 识别一些动态分析工具。分析工具可能专注于寻找安全漏洞,但这不是必需的。

    Vectis applies dynamic analysis to every change proposed for or integrated into the main branch.

    The CI integration job starts a real Vectis server with generated keys and configuration, then runs project-specific HTTP mutation testing and
    OpenAPI-based property testing with Schemathesis. These tools exercise live handlers, parsers, validation, authorization, cryptographic workflows, and
    failure paths using generated and mutated inputs.

    Vectis also runs its native cargo-fuzz targets weekly with sanitizer instrumentation and accumulated corpora. This workflow can be triggered manually before a major production release.



    建议如果项目生成的软件包含使用内存不安全语言编写的软件(例如C或C++),则至少有一个动态工具(例如,fuzzer或web应用扫描程序)与检测缓冲区覆盖等内存安全问题的机制例行应用。如果该项目生成的软件没有以内存不安全语言编写,请选择“不适用”(N / A)。 [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    检测内存安全问题的机制的示例包括AddressSanitizer(ASAN)(可在GCC和LLVM中使用),“Memory Sanitizer” valgrind 。其他可能使用的工具包括ThreadSanitizerUndefinedBehaviorSanitizer。广泛的断言也将起作用。

    Not applicable. Vectis is implemented in Rust and does not include project-maintained production code written in a memory-unsafe language such as
    C or C++.

    Vectis interfaces with Botan through FFI, but Botan is an external dependency rather than memory-unsafe source code produced or maintained by the Vectis
    project. Native fuzzing and sanitizer-based testing are nevertheless used to exercise Vectis input-processing boundaries.



    建议由项目生成的软件包括许多运行时断言,在动态分析期间检查。 [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]
    这个标准并不建议使生产过程中的断言;这完全取决于项目及其用户的决定。该标准的重点是部署之前的动态分析过程中改善故障检测。在生产使用中启用断言与在动态分析(例如测试)期间启用断言完全不同。在某些情况下,在生产中使用断言是极其不明智的(尤其是在高完整性组件中)。存在许多反对在生产环境中启用断言的论点,例如,库不应使调用程序崩溃,它们的存在可能会导致应用商店拒绝,和/或在生产环境中激活断言可能会暴露诸如私钥之类的私有数据。请注意,在许多Linux发行版中都未定义NDEBUG ,因此C / C ++缺省情况下,assert()将在这些环境中启用生产。对于那些环境中的生产,使用不同的断言机制或定义NDEBUG可能很重要。

    Vectis runs its automated test suite using Rust's test profile. This profile enables debug assertions and integer overflow checks that are not enabled by
    default in production release builds.

    The test suite contains assertions covering validation, cryptographic round-trips, lifecycle rules, authorization, storage, audit-chain integrity,
    and HTTP contracts. Native cargo-fuzz targets add explicit semantic assertions for properties such as canonical serialization, stable encoding, sanitized
    errors, and parser round-trips.

    These assertion-enabled test and fuzz configurations are separate from the production release profile.



    通过动态代码分析发现的所有严重性为中,高的可利用漏洞必须在确认后及时修复。 [dynamic_analysis_fixed]
    如果 CVSS 2.0 基本分数为4,那么一个漏洞是中等到高的严重性。如果您没有运行动态代码分析,没有发现任何这样的漏洞,选择“不适用”(N/A)。

    Not applicable at present. Vectis has no outstanding confirmed exploitable vulnerabilities of Medium or higher severity discovered through dynamic
    analysis.

    Findings produced by fuzzing and dynamic API testing are investigated before being dismissed. Confirmed defects are fixed, added to the regression test
    suite, and preserved as readable fuzz seeds when applicable.

    A recent canonical JSON fuzzing finding was corrected with centralized input validation, unit and HTTP regression tests, and a permanent cargo-fuzz seed. It was not formally classified as a Medium-or-higher vulnerability.



该数据可在社区数据许可协议 – 许可性,版本 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0)下获取。这意味着数据接收方可以共享数据,无论是否经过修改,只要数据接收方在共享数据时提供本协议文本。请注明Liesware和OpenSSF最佳实践徽章贡献者。

项目徽章条目拥有者: Liesware.
最后更新于 2026-08-21 14:40:13 UTC, 最后更新于 2026-08-21 16:38:28 UTC。