hve-squad

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 14231 is passing Here is how to embed it:
You can show your badge status by embedding this in your markdown file:
[![OpenSSF Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14231/badge)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14231)
or by embedding this in your HTML:
<a href="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14231"><img src="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14231/badge"></a>


These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 13/13 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    APM package that assembles HVE Core agents, prompts, instructions, and skills into one installable bundle for Copilot target environments, and ships a Squad Coordinator that routes your request to a cast of agents in parallel.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]
    This MUST be in language that potential users can understand (e.g., it uses minimal jargon).

    In order not to have a really large readme. The documentation of the product and description were kept under a github pages site. Note that access to this documentation is linked to the github repo.

    https://peter-n91.github.io/hve-squad/index.html


    Enough for a badge!

    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    There is a contributing page in the documentation website of the package that includes everything. Note that access to this documentation is linked to the github repo.

    https://peter-n91.github.io/hve-squad/contributing.html


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]
    We presume that projects on GitHub use issues and pull requests unless otherwise noted. This information can be short, e.g., stating that the project uses pull requests, an issue tracker, or posts to a mailing list (which one?)

    Non-trivial contribution file in repository: https://github.com/Peter-N91/hve-squad/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md.


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    The contributing URLs will guide the user on how to properly contribute and we already have some examples where contributors followed the steps to apply their changes.

    https://github.com/Peter-N91/hve-squad/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md
    https://peter-n91.github.io/hve-squad/contributing.html


  • FLOSS license


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]
    FLOSS is software released in a way that meets the Open Source Definition or Free Software Definition. Examples of such licenses include the CC0, MIT, BSD 2-clause, BSD 3-clause revised, Apache 2.0, Lesser GNU General Public License (LGPL), and the GNU General Public License (GPL). For our purposes, this means that the license MUST be: The software MAY also be licensed other ways (e.g., "GPLv2 or proprietary" is acceptable).

    The MIT license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]
    The OSI uses a rigorous approval process to determine which licenses are OSS.

    The MIT license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]
    One convention is posting the license as a top-level file named LICENSE or COPYING, which MAY be followed by an extension such as ".txt" or ".md". An alternative convention is to have a directory named LICENSES containing license file(s); these files are typically named as their SPDX license identifier followed by an appropriate file extension, as described in the REUSE Specification. Note that this criterion is only a requirement on the source repository. You do NOT need to include the license file when generating something from the source code (such as an executable, package, or container). For example, when generating an R package for the Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN), follow standard CRAN practice: if the license is a standard license, use the standard short license specification (to avoid installing yet another copy of the text) and list the LICENSE file in an exclusion file such as .Rbuildignore. Similarly, when creating a Debian package, you may put a link in the copyright file to the license text in /usr/share/common-licenses, and exclude the license file from the created package (e.g., by deleting the file after calling dh_auto_install). We encourage including machine-readable license information in generated formats where practical.

    Non-trivial license location file in repository: https://github.com/Peter-N91/hve-squad/blob/main/LICENSE.


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]
    This documentation must be in some media (such as text or video) that includes: how to install it, how to start it, how to use it (possibly with a tutorial using examples), and how to use it securely (e.g., what to do and what not to do) if that is an appropriate topic for the software. The security documentation need not be long. The project MAY use hypertext links to non-project material as documentation. If the project does not produce software, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    Some documentation basics file contents found.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]
    The documentation of an external interface explains to an end-user or developer how to use it. This would include its application program interface (API) if the software has one. If it is a library, document the major classes/types and methods/functions that can be called. If it is a web application, define its URL interface (often its REST interface). If it is a command-line interface, document the parameters and options it supports. In many cases it's best if most of this documentation is automatically generated, so that this documentation stays synchronized with the software as it changes, but this isn't required. The project MAY use hypertext links to non-project material as documentation. Documentation MAY be automatically generated (where practical this is often the best way to do so). Documentation of a REST interface may be generated using Swagger/OpenAPI. Code interface documentation MAY be generated using tools such as JSDoc (JavaScript), ESDoc (JavaScript), pydoc (Python), devtools (R), pkgdown (R), and Doxygen (many). Merely having comments in implementation code is not sufficient to satisfy this criterion; there needs to be an easy way to see the information without reading through all the source code. If the project does not produce software, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    A usage screen with some validated scenarios is present on the github pages documentation. Explanatory videos are also available for users. Note that access to this documentation is linked to the github repo.

    https://peter-n91.github.io/hve-squad/usage.html


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]
    This requires that the project home page URL and the version control repository URL begin with "https:", not "http:". You can get free certificates from Let's Encrypt. Projects MAY implement this criterion using (for example) GitHub pages, GitLab pages, or SourceForge project pages. If you support HTTP, we urge you to redirect the HTTP traffic to HTTPS.

    Given only https: URLs.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]
    Examples of acceptable mechanisms include archived mailing list(s), GitHub issue and pull request discussions, Bugzilla, Mantis, and Trac. Asynchronous discussion mechanisms (like IRC) are acceptable if they meet these criteria; make sure there is a URL-addressable archiving mechanism. Proprietary JavaScript, while discouraged, is permitted.

    GitHub supports discussions on issues and pull requests.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]
    English is currently the lingua franca of computer technology; supporting English increases the number of different potential developers and reviewers worldwide. A project can meet this criterion even if its core developers' primary language is not English.

    The full documentation is under Github pages and in english

    https://peter-n91.github.io/hve-squad


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]
    As a minimum, the project should attempt to respond to significant problem and vulnerability reports. A project that is actively pursuing a badge is probably maintained. All projects and people have limited resources, and typical projects must reject some proposed changes, so limited resources and proposal rejections do not by themselves indicate an unmaintained project.

    When a project knows that it will no longer be maintained, it should set this criterion to "Unmet" and use the appropriate mechanism(s) to indicate to others that it is not being maintained. For example, use “DEPRECATED” as the first heading of its README, add “DEPRECATED” near the beginning of its home page, add “DEPRECATED” to the beginning of its code repository project description, add a no-maintenance-intended badge in its README and/or home page, mark it as deprecated in any package repositories (e.g., npm deprecate), and/or use the code repository's marking system to archive it (e.g., GitHub's "archive" setting, GitLab’s "archived" marking, Gerrit's "readonly" status, or SourceForge’s "abandoned" project status). Additional discussion can be found here.

    There are several workflows used to make sure everything is maintained even some testing workflows that validate that what is being implemented and merged didn't break anything (Always called before official release)

    https://github.com/Peter-N91/hve-squad/actions


 Change Control 9/9 ●

  • Public version-controlled source repository


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]
    The URL MAY be the same as the project URL. The project MAY use private (non-public) branches in specific cases while the change is not publicly released (e.g., for fixing a vulnerability before it is revealed to the public).

    Repository on GitHub, which provides public git repositories with URLs.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made.


    Enough for a badge!

    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]
    Projects MAY choose to omit specific interim versions from their public source repositories (e.g., ones that fix specific non-public security vulnerabilities, may never be publicly released, or include material that cannot be legally posted and are not in the final release).

    There is a pre-release process that creates a pre-release tag of what is being merged to main but the official release stays intact. Like the current situation, we are at v0.16.1 but the pre-release is at v0.16.2-pre
    Users can always use the pre-release if they wish to but it is always better to use the latest one as it is tested.

    https://github.com/Peter-N91/hve-squad/tags
    https://github.com/Peter-N91/hve-squad/releases


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]
    Git is not specifically required and projects can use centralized version control software (such as subversion) with justification.

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • Unique version numbering


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]
    This MAY be met in a variety of ways including a commit IDs (such as git commit id or mercurial changeset id) or a version number (including version numbers that use semantic versioning or date-based schemes like YYYYMMDD).

    Releases and tags are unique for each release and changelog explains what changes.

    https://github.com/Peter-N91/hve-squad/tags
    https://github.com/Peter-N91/hve-squad/releases
    https://github.com/Peter-N91/hve-squad/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]
    Projects should generally prefer whatever format is expected by their users, e.g., because it is the normal format used by their ecosystem. Many ecosystems prefer SemVer, and SemVer is generally preferred for application programmer interfaces (APIs) and software development kits (SDKs). CalVer tends to be used by projects that are large, have an unusually large number of independently-developed dependencies, have a constantly-changing scope, or are time-sensitive. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value, because including a micro level supports simultaneously-maintained branches whenever that becomes necessary. Other version numbering formats may be used as version numbers, including git commit IDs or mercurial changeset IDs, as long as they uniquely identify versions. However, some alternatives (such as git commit IDs) can cause problems as release identifiers, because users may not be able to easily determine if they are up-to-date. The version ID format may be unimportant for identifying software releases if all recipients only run the latest version (e.g., it is the code for a single website or internet service that is constantly updated via continuous delivery).

    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

    Tags are used https://github.com/Peter-N91/hve-squad/tags


  • Release notes


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]
    The release notes MAY be implemented in a variety of ways. Many projects provide them in a file named "NEWS", "CHANGELOG", or "ChangeLog", optionally with extensions such as ".txt", ".md", or ".html". Historically the term "change log" meant a log of every change, but to meet these criteria what is needed is a human-readable summary. The release notes MAY instead be provided by version control system mechanisms such as the GitHub Releases workflow.

    Non-trivial release notes file in repository: https://github.com/Peter-N91/hve-squad/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md.


    Enough for a badge!

    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]
    This criterion helps users determine if a given update will fix a vulnerability that is publicly known, to help users make an informed decision about updating. If users typically cannot practically update the software themselves on their computers, but must instead depend on one or more intermediaries to perform the update (as is often the case for a kernel and low-level software that is intertwined with a kernel), the project may choose "not applicable" (N/A) instead, since this additional information will not be helpful to those users. Similarly, a project may choose N/A if all recipients only run the latest version (e.g., it is the code for a single website or internet service that is constantly updated via continuous delivery). This criterion only applies to the project results, not its dependencies. Listing the vulnerabilities of all transitive dependencies of a project becomes unwieldy as dependencies increase and vary, and is unnecessary since tools that examine and track dependencies can do this in a more scalable way.

    release notes file in repository: https://github.com/Peter-N91/hve-squad/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md.


 Reporting 8/8 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    Bug reports are submitted through the GitHub issue tracker at https://github.com/Peter-N91/hve-squad/issues, which is open to the public and requires only a GitHub account. A structured Bug report form at .github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug-report.yml collects the installed version, the Copilot host, expected against actual behaviour, reproduction steps, and optional squad state. The "Reporting a bug" section of CONTRIBUTING.md documents the process and the two exceptions: security vulnerabilities go privately through GitHub Security Advisories as described in SECURITY.md, and defects in upstream microsoft/hve-core assets are directed to that repository. .github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml surfaces both routes directly in the issue-creation chooser.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    Some of the issues can be labeled to squad/auto and have the squad itself handle them. The history of the squad member will be saved under .copilot-tracking


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]
    The response MAY be 'no' or a discussion about its merits. The goal is simply that there be some response to some requests, which indicates that the project is still alive. For purposes of this criterion, projects need not count fake requests (e.g., from spammers or automated systems). If a project is no longer making enhancements, please select "unmet" and include the URL that makes this situation clear to users. If a project tends to be overwhelmed by the number of enhancement requests, please select "unmet" and explain.

    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]

    Reports and responses are archived publicly in the GitHub issue tracker at https://github.com/Peter-N91/hve-squad/issues?q=is%3Aissue, which lists open and closed issues together. The archive is readable without a GitHub account, is indexed by GitHub's full-text search across titles, bodies, and comments, and every issue and comment has a stable, permanently addressable URL. It currently holds 16 issues, 15 of them closed with the discussion and resolution intact, alongside 82 pull requests at https://github.com/Peter-N91/hve-squad/pulls?q=is%3Apr, where most defect fixes are discussed and linked back to the issue they close. Nothing is deleted on closure, so the reasoning behind a past fix stays retrievable.


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]
    Projects hosted on GitHub SHOULD consider enabling privately reporting a security vulnerability. Projects on GitLab SHOULD consider using its ability for privately reporting a vulnerability. Projects MAY identify a mailing address on https://PROJECTSITE/security, often in the form security@example.org. This vulnerability reporting process MAY be the same as its bug reporting process. Vulnerability reports MAY always be public, but many projects have a private vulnerability reporting mechanism.

    All vulnerabilities will be shown under this tab and handled by contributors

    https://github.com/Peter-N91/hve-squad/security/code-scanning


    Enough for a badge!

    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]
    Examples include a private defect report submitted on the web using HTTPS (TLS) or an email encrypted using OpenPGP. If vulnerability reports are always public (so there are never private vulnerability reports), choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    Private vulnerability reports are supported through GitHub Security Advisories at https://github.com/Peter-N91/hve-squad/security/advisories/new. Private vulnerability reporting is enabled on the repository, so any GitHub user can open a report that is visible only to the reporter and the maintainer until an advisory is published. Submission is over HTTPS. The process is documented in SECURITY.md, which states explicitly that vulnerabilities must not be filed as public issues, lists what to include (affected version or commit, component, reproduction steps, observed impact, suggested mitigation), and commits to acknowledgement within 5 business days and a status update within 10. The same private route is surfaced in the issue-creation chooser through .github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml and in the Bug report template, so a reporter who starts down the public path is redirected before disclosing anything.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]
    If there have been no vulnerabilities reported in the last 6 months, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    All vulnerabilities were treated in a single day.


 Quality 13/13 ●

  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]
    A build system determines what actions need to occur to rebuild the software (and in what order), and then performs those steps. For example, it can invoke a compiler to compile the source code. If an executable is created from source code, it must be possible to modify the project's source code and then generate an updated executable with those modifications. If the software produced by the project depends on external libraries, the build system does not need to build those external libraries. If there is no need to build anything to use the software after its source code is modified, select "not applicable" (N/A).

    The build is automated in PowerShell and driven from CI. scripts/Build-SquadPlugin.ps1 deterministically assembles the distributable Copilot CLI plugin from the squad-src/ tree and is invoked by .github/workflows/publish-plugin.yml on every release tag; it can also be run locally as a manual fallback. scripts/Update-ApmDependencies.ps1 regenerates the apm.yml dependency manifest and apm.lock.yaml from source, and .github/workflows/pr-validation.yml re-runs it on every pull request to verify the checked-in manifest matches what the build produces. Modifying source under squad-src/ and re-running either script yields updated artifacts with no manual steps. External dependencies (microsoft/hve-core) are fetched at install time by APM and are not rebuilt here.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]
    For example, Maven, Ant, cmake, the autotools, make, rake (Ruby), or devtools (R).

    The build uses PowerShell 7 (pwsh), a widely adopted cross-platform build and automation tool, rather than a project-specific build system. Named build targets are declared in the scripts: section of apm.yml (sync-deps, install-sync, change, release-prep), which serves the same role as make targets and gives contributors a single documented entry point per task. The APM CLI performs dependency resolution and installation, and GitHub Actions orchestrates the build in CI. All of these are standard, off-the-shelf tools; the project defines no custom build engine or DSL.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    Every tool in the build chain is FLOSS. The build scripts run on PowerShell 7 (MIT), dependency resolution and installation use the APM CLI (microsoft/apm, MIT), source and ref handling uses Git (GPL-2.0), the plugin packaging path uses Node.js and npm (MIT / Artistic-2.0), and release automation uses the GitHub CLI (MIT). No proprietary compiler, SDK, or build tool is required. The build is not Windows-dependent: PowerShell 7 is cross-platform and CI executes the same scripts on Ubuntu runners, so a contributor can reproduce the full build on a Linux machine using only free/libre software.


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]
    The project MAY use multiple automated test suites (e.g., one that runs quickly, vs. another that is more thorough but requires special equipment). There are many test frameworks and test support systems available, including Selenium (web browser automation), Junit (JVM, Java), RUnit (R), testthat (R).

    The project uses Pester 5.7.1 (Apache-2.0), a FLOSS test framework for PowerShell, across three automated suites in tests/: Tier 0 conformance (tests/tier0/) validates the package manifest and shipped asset structure, Tier 1 behavior (tests/tier1/) validates the squad state contract and coordinator assertions against recorded scenarios, and Tier 2 semantic (tests/tier2/) compares live squad runs against stored baselines. Each tier has a runner script (Invoke-Tier0Tests.ps1, Invoke-Tier1Tests.ps1, Invoke-Tier2Tests.ps1) that can be executed locally with pwsh. All three run in CI on every pull request via .github/workflows/tier0-conformance.yml, tier1-behavior.yml, and tier2-semantic.yml, which document the exact install and invocation steps. The test suites and their fixtures are MIT-licensed as part of this repository.


    Enough for a badge!

    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]
    For example, "make check", "mvn test", or "rake test" (Ruby).

    Tests are invoked in the standard way for PowerShell. Each suite is executed through Invoke-Pester with New-PesterConfiguration, the conventional Pester entry point, wrapped in a per-tier runner script (tests/tier0/Invoke-Tier0Tests.ps1 and equivalents for Tier 1 and Tier 2). The wrappers are required because the suites are parameterised through New-PesterContainer -Data, so they cannot be discovered by a bare Invoke-Pester call. A single-command entry point is also declared as the test target in the scripts: section of apm.yml, so apm run test runs the fast conformance suite in the same way make check would. CI invokes the same runner scripts, so local and CI invocation are identical.


    Barely enough for a badge.

    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    Coverage is substantial for the shipped asset package but not yet comprehensive, and it is not measured. The suite implements 122 assertions across three tiers, each traced to a numbered case in tests/squad-behavior-contract.md that cites the source file stating the rule, spanning package conformance, routing, gates, state contract, governance, and semantic comparison. Two known gaps remain and are documented in that contract rather than glossed over: no Tier 1 scenario exercises autopilot mode, and the PowerShell build and release scripts under scripts/ have no unit tests. Code coverage is not currently instrumented via Pester's CodeCoverage configuration, so no percentage can be cited. Planned improvements are an autopilot scenario, Pester unit tests for the build scripts, and enabling coverage reporting in CI.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    The project practises continuous integration against a single central repository. All changes land on main through squash-merged pull requests, with 103 commits integrated in the last 30 days, and branches are short-lived. Every pull request triggers automated validation in GitHub Actions: .github/workflows/tier0-conformance.yml installs the package the branch would deliver and runs the Pester static conformance suite against it, and .github/workflows/pr-validation.yml verifies release state and change-fragment hygiene. Security analysis runs on the same trigger through CodeQL, Zizmor, Checkov, and OpenSSF Scorecard. The same Tier 0 workflow is reused as the release gate via workflow_call, so the check that guards a merge is the check that guards a tag. Merged work is rebuilt onto a rolling pre-release tag within minutes, keeping the integrated state continuously installable and testable.


  • New functionality testing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]
    As long as a policy is in place, even by word of mouth, that says developers should add tests to the automated test suite for major new functionality, select "Met."

    The policy is documented in the "Automated tests" section of CONTRIBUTING.md: major new functionality must come with tests. A pull request adding a new agent, routing rule, gate, or any consumer-observable behavior is expected to add or extend a case in the automated suite. Documentation, wording fixes, and behavior-preserving refactors are exempt, and a maintainer may waive the requirement for behavior that cannot be asserted without a live model run, stating so on the pull request. The policy is enforced at review time through a Tests checklist in the pull request template, which asks the contributor to confirm the case was added, declared in tests/squad-behavior-contract.md with a citation to the source file stating the rule, and that apm run test passed locally.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]
    Major functionality would typically be mentioned in the release notes. Perfection is not required, merely evidence that tests are typically being added in practice to the automated test suite when new major functionality is added to the software produced by the project.

    The automated suite was introduced on 2026-08-20 and the policy has been followed since. Of the sixteen changes merged after that date, ten added or extended test cases. Every change to squad behavior shipped a regression case traced to a numbered entry in tests/squad-behavior-contract.md: PR #79 (state records survive on every host, 5 test files), #81 (Scribe line-number leakage, 3), #82 (Deliverable Root binding, 5), #83 (deliverable path truncation, 4), #84 and #85 (ledger arithmetic and turn accumulation, 3 and 4), #87 (Init floor record, 2), and #89 (dispatch-backed ledger rows, 3). The most recent feature work, PR #86, added four test files alongside the behavior change. Changes merged without tests are confined to build and release workflow fixes (#92, #93, #94), which sit outside the suite's scope of asserting the shipped asset package.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    The policy is documented in the instructions for change proposals in two places. CONTRIBUTING.md carries an "Automated tests" section stating that major new functionality must come with tests, naming the exemptions (documentation, wording fixes, behavior-preserving refactors) and the maintainer waiver for behavior that cannot be asserted without a live model run. It also explains the three test tiers, how to run each locally, and the required Pester version. The pull request template at .github/pull_request_template.md is injected into every pull request description and includes a Tests checklist asking the contributor to confirm that a case was added or extended, that it was declared in tests/squad-behavior-contract.md with a citation to the source file stating the rule, and that apm run test passed locally. Contributors therefore see the policy both before and during change proposal.


  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]
    Examples of compiler warning flags include gcc/clang "-Wall". Examples of a "safe" language mode include JavaScript "use strict" and perl5's "use warnings". A separate "linter" tool is simply a tool that examines the source code to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes. These are typically enabled within the source code or build instructions.

    The project uses PSScriptAnalyzer, the standard FLOSS linter for PowerShell, over scripts/ and tests/, which together contain all executable code the repository authors. It runs on every pull request and push to main via .github/workflows/lint-powershell.yml, blocks the build on Error-severity findings, and publishes all findings as SARIF to the GitHub Security tab. Rule configuration lives in PSScriptAnalyzerSettings.psd1 at the repository root, so contributors get identical results in VS Code and in CI; the two excluded rules each carry a written justification in that file. In addition, the build scripts and test runners set Set-StrictMode -Version Latest and $ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop', PowerShell's equivalent of a safe language mode. Three further FLOSS analysers run on the same trigger: CodeQL for Python, Zizmor for GitHub Actions workflows, and Checkov for infrastructure-as-code.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]
    These are the warnings identified by the implementation of the warnings criterion. The project should fix warnings or mark them in the source code as false positives. Ideally there would be no warnings, but a project MAY accept some warnings (typically less than 1 warning per 100 lines or less than 10 warnings).

    All PSScriptAnalyzer findings are addressed. Actionable findings were fixed rather than suppressed: five empty catch blocks now record why the failure is deliberately ignored, seven inconsistent pipeline continuations were realigned, and a line-numbering loop that relied on a cross-scriptblock counter was rewritten. Findings that are genuine false positives are marked in the source with [Diagnostics.CodeAnalysis.SuppressMessageAttribute] carrying a written justification; these cover parameters PSScriptAnalyzer cannot resolve across Pester's separate discovery and run scopes, and a parameter-set selector consumed through $PSCmdlet.ParameterSetName. Two rules are excluded repository-wide in PSScriptAnalyzerSettings.psd1, each with a documented reason: PSAvoidUsingWriteHost, because these are interactive CLI scripts whose console output is the intended behaviour, and PSUseBOMForUnicodeEncodedFile, because every script begins with a #!/usr/bin/env pwsh shebang that a byte-order mark would break on the Linux runners CI uses. The remaining 22 findings are all Warning or Information severity across 5,506 lines of PowerShell, a rate of 0.40 per 100 lines, and none is Error severity. The CI gate blocks the build on Error severity.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    The project enables strict checking wherever it is practical. PSScriptAnalyzer runs with IncludeDefaultRules = $true and reports at all three severities (Error, Warning, Information) rather than errors alone, so nothing is filtered out before a human sees it. Only two rules are excluded repository-wide, each with a written justification in PSScriptAnalyzerSettings.psd1, and individual false positives are marked at the call site rather than by broadening those exclusions. Every script and module additionally runs under Set-StrictMode -Version Latest, PowerShell's strictest language mode, which turns references to uninitialized variables, non-existent properties, and malformed method calls into terminating errors, combined with $ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop' so no error is silently swallowed. Three further analysers run at their default full rule sets on every pull request: CodeQL for Python, Zizmor for GitHub Actions workflows, and Checkov for infrastructure-as-code, with Checkov configured as blocking and accepted findings requiring a justified inline checkov:skip.


 Security 16/16 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]
    This requires understanding the following design principles, including the 8 principles from Saltzer and Schroeder:
    • economy of mechanism (keep the design as simple and small as practical, e.g., by adopting sweeping simplifications)
    • fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default)
    • complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable)
    • open design (security mechanisms should not depend on attacker ignorance of its design, but instead on more easily protected and changed information like keys and passwords)
    • separation of privilege (ideally, access to important objects should depend on more than one condition, so that defeating one protection system won't enable complete access. E.G., multi-factor authentication, such as requiring both a password and a hardware token, is stronger than single-factor authentication)
    • least privilege (processes should operate with the least privilege necessary)
    • least common mechanism (the design should minimize the mechanisms common to more than one user and depended on by all users, e.g., directories for temporary files)
    • psychological acceptability (the human interface must be designed for ease of use - designing for "least astonishment" can help)
    • limited attack surface (the attack surface - the set of the different points where an attacker can try to enter or extract data - should be limited)
    • input validation with allowlists (inputs should typically be checked to determine if they are valid before they are accepted; this validation should use allowlists (which only accept known-good values), not denylists (which attempt to list known-bad values)).
    A "primary developer" in a project is anyone who is familiar with the project's code base, is comfortable making changes to it, and is acknowledged as such by most other participants in the project. A primary developer would typically make a number of contributions over the past year (via code, documentation, or answering questions). Developers would typically be considered primary developers if they initiated the project (and have not left the project more than three years ago), have the option of receiving information on a private vulnerability reporting channel (if there is one), can accept commits on behalf of the project, or perform final releases of the project software. If there is only one developer, that individual is the primary developer. Many books and courses are available to help you understand how to develop more secure software and discuss design. For example, the Secure Software Development Fundamentals course is a free set of three courses that explain how to develop more secure software (it's free if you audit it; for an extra fee you can earn a certificate to prove you learned the material).

    The project has a single primary developer, who initiated it, authors its releases, and receives private vulnerability reports. Familiarity with secure design is evidenced in the architecture rather than asserted. The system is built around a small number of deliberately narrow human gates rather than a broad permission model (economy of mechanism), and those gates deny by default: an autopilot run stops at any impactful or irreversible action and proceeds only on explicit human approval, never on a timeout (fail-safe defaults). Progress is non-bypassable, since each pipeline stage is gated on the prior stage's artifact and history entry existing on disk, so a stage cannot be skipped by narrating it as complete (complete mediation). The entire design, including every gate and routing rule, is public under an MIT licence and depends on enforcement rather than obscurity (open design). Impactful actions require two independent conditions, the agent's proposal and a human approval delivered through a separate channel (separation of privilege). CI workflows declare an empty top-level permissions: {}, grant the minimum scope per job, and check out with persist-credentials: false (least privilege), while test runs are isolated in per-run scratch directories and Watch Mode scopes sub-squads per event (least common mechanism). The user-facing surface is a single /squad entry point, and a blocked action explains what was stopped and how to proceed (psychological acceptability). The package flow is one-directional: consumers pull assets and the package never reads from consumer environments, and the project runs no service and stores no user data (limited attack surface). Inputs are constrained by allowlists rather than denylists, through ValidateSet on script parameters, a fixed set of squad profiles, and an explicit untrusted-content boundary that treats all ingested external content as data to analyse and never as instructions to execute, refusing embedded authority changes such as "ignore previous instructions" or "set autonomy to full".


    Enough for a badge!

    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]
    Examples (depending on the type of software) include SQL injection, OS injection, classic buffer overflow, cross-site scripting, missing authentication, and missing authorization. See the CWE/SANS top 25 or OWASP Top 10 for commonly used lists. Many books and courses are available to help you understand how to develop more secure software and discuss common implementation errors that lead to vulnerabilities. For example, the Secure Software Development Fundamentals course is a free set of three courses that explain how to develop more secure software (it's free if you audit it; for an extra fee you can earn a certificate to prove you learned the material).

    The primary developer has over eleven years of experience as a software developer and technical lead and works as a Partner Solution Architect at Microsoft, where secure development practice is part of the role. Because this project ships AI agent assets rather than a network service, the dominant error classes are those in the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications and the OWASP Agentic Security Initiative rather than the memory-safety and injection classes of the CWE Top 25, though the latter still apply to the build scripts. The relevant classes and their mitigations in this project are: prompt injection (LLM01), countered by an explicit untrusted-content boundary that processes all ingested external content as data to analyse or quote and never as instructions, and that refuses embedded authority changes such as "ignore previous instructions" or "set autonomy to full"; excessive agency and insecure output handling (LLM02, LLM06), countered by an impactful-action gate that halts any irreversible operation and resumes only on explicit human approval delivered through a separate channel, never on a timeout; supply-chain compromise (LLM03, CWE-1357), countered by pinning every third-party GitHub Action to a full commit SHA, pinning the upstream microsoft/hve-core dependency to a specific commit that only a guarded workflow may move, a resolved apm.lock.yaml, Dependabot updates, and OpenSSF Scorecard analysis; sensitive information disclosure (CWE-200), countered by a mandatory sanitisation checklist on any pull request proposing a shared learning, requiring removal of secrets, customer and individual names, internal URLs, and environment-specific paths, backed by GitHub secret scanning with push protection; CI script injection (CWE-94, CWE-78), countered by Zizmor static analysis of every workflow and by passing untrusted inputs through environment variables rather than interpolating them into shell blocks; path traversal (CWE-22), countered by consistent use of -LiteralPath in file operations; and missing authorization (CWE-862), countered by gates that persist in state.json and advance only on an authorised approval. Familiarity with these classes is further evidenced by the assessment tooling the project ships: security-review-llm.prompt.md drives owasp-llm and owasp-agentic assessments, and the package includes dedicated CVE analysis, dependency review, supply-chain review, and VEX generation agents.


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]
    These cryptographic criteria do not always apply because some software has no need to directly use cryptographic capabilities.

    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    Enough for a badge!

    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]
    See the Open Standards Requirement for Software by the Open Source Initiative.

    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]
    These minimum bitlengths are: symmetric key 112, factoring modulus 2048, discrete logarithm key 224, discrete logarithmic group 2048, elliptic curve 224, and hash 224 (password hashing is not covered by this bitlength, more information on password hashing can be found in the crypto_password_storage criterion). See https://www.keylength.com for a comparison of keylength recommendations from various organizations. The software MAY allow smaller keylengths in some configurations (ideally it would not, since this allows downgrade attacks, but shorter keylengths are sometimes necessary for interoperability).

    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]
    ECB mode is almost never appropriate because it reveals identical blocks within the ciphertext as demonstrated by the ECB penguin, and CTR mode is often inappropriate because it does not perform authentication and causes duplicates if the input state is repeated. In many cases it's best to choose a block cipher algorithm mode designed to combine secrecy and authentication, e.g., Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and EAX. Projects MAY allow users to enable broken mechanisms (e.g., during configuration) where necessary for compatibility, but then users know they're doing it.

    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]

    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]
    This criterion applies only when the software is enforcing authentication of users using passwords for external users (aka inbound authentication), such as server-side web applications. It does not apply in cases where the software stores passwords for authenticating into other systems (aka outbound authentication, e.g., the software implements a client for some other system), since at least parts of that software must have often access to the unhashed password.

    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]
    A cryptographically secure random number generator may be a hardware random number generator, or it may be a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG) using an algorithm such as Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG, Yarrow, or Fortuna. Examples of calls to secure random number generators include Java's java.security.SecureRandom and JavaScript's window.crypto.getRandomValues. Examples of calls to insecure random number generators include Java's java.util.Random and JavaScript's Math.random.

  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]
    An even stronger mechanism is releasing the software with digitally signed packages, since that mitigates attacks on the distribution system, but this only works if the users can be confident that the public keys for signatures are correct and if the users will actually check the signature.

    Distribution channels use HTTPS exclusively. [osps_br_03_02]


    Enough for a badge!

    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]
    These hashes can be modified in transit.

    The project never retrieves a cryptographic hash, over HTTP or otherwise, so there is no hash whose integrity could depend on an unauthenticated channel. No file in the repository contains an http:// URL, and no build script or workflow invokes curl, wget, Invoke-WebRequest, Invoke-RestMethod, or any other direct download mechanism. All external content is fetched by established tools over HTTPS: git for source, the APM CLI for package dependencies, npm for the Copilot CLI, and the GitHub CLI for release automation. Integrity is enforced through immutable identifiers rather than separately published checksums. Every third-party GitHub Action is pinned to a full commit SHA, the upstream microsoft/hve-core dependency is pinned to a specific commit that only a guarded workflow is permitted to advance, apm.lock.yaml records the resolved dependency set, and build-time tooling such as Pester and PSScriptAnalyzer is installed at an exact -RequiredVersion.


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    Enough for a badge!

    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]
    The vulnerability must be patched and released by the project itself (patches may be developed elsewhere). A vulnerability becomes publicly known (for this purpose) once it has a CVE with publicly released non-paywalled information (reported, for example, in the National Vulnerability Database) or when the project has been informed and the information has been released to the public (possibly by the project). A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known. Note: this means that users might be left vulnerable to all attackers worldwide for up to 60 days. This criterion is often much easier to meet than what Google recommends in Rebooting responsible disclosure, because Google recommends that the 60-day period start when the project is notified even if the report is not public. Also note that this badge criterion, like other criteria, applies to the individual project. Some projects are part of larger umbrella organizations or larger projects, possibly in multiple layers, and many projects feed their results to other organizations and projects as part of a potentially-complex supply chain. An individual project often cannot control the rest, but an individual project can work to release a vulnerability patch in a timely way. Therefore, we focus solely on the individual project's response time. Once a patch is available from the individual project, others can determine how to deal with the patch (e.g., they can update to the newer version or they can apply just the patch as a cherry-picked solution).

    The project has never had a vulnerability reported against it. There are no published GitHub security advisories, no open Dependabot alerts, and no known CVEs affecting the software this project produces. Dependabot alerts, Dependabot security updates, secret scanning, and push protection are enabled on the repository, and CodeQL, Zizmor, Checkov, and OpenSSF Scorecard run on every pull request with findings published to the GitHub Security tab. One code-scanning alert is currently open, a zizmor/artipacked warning raised on 2026-08-24 against a workflow. It is a static-analysis hygiene finding rather than a disclosed vulnerability, it carries no CVE or CVSS score, and it has been open for less than 60 days.


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    No critical or high-severity vulnerabilities have been reported against this project, and none are outstanding. The project is nonetheless set up to ship a fix quickly rather than relying on a promise to do so. SECURITY.md commits to acknowledging a report within 5 business days and providing a status update within 10, with the fix shipping in the next release and the advisory published once it is available. Releases are cut on demand when pending work is judged ready rather than on a fixed schedule, so a fix does not wait for a release window. CONTRIBUTING.md documents a hotfix procedure for the case where the default branch holds work that must not ship yet: a hotfix branch is cut from the last release tag, the fix is applied there, and Release Prep assembles and tags a patch release from that branch alone, leaving unshippable pending work untouched. The hotfix is then merged back so the fix survives the next release. Separately, every merge rebuilds a rolling pre-release tag within minutes, so a fix is installable for verification as soon as it lands, before a formal release is cut. Automated detection runs continuously through Dependabot alerts and security updates, CodeQL, Zizmor, Checkov, and OpenSSF Scorecard, with findings published to the GitHub Security tab.


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]
    A project MAY leak "sample" credentials for testing and unimportant databases, as long as they are not intended to limit public access.

    The repository contains no credentials. All secrets consumed by CI are referenced exclusively through the GitHub Actions secrets context (GITHUB_TOKEN, COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN, HVE_SQUAD_PLUGIN_PUSH_TOKEN, SYNC_DEPS_TOKEN) and are stored as encrypted repository secrets, never as literals in tracked files. No private key material, keystore, or .env file is tracked. A pattern scan for GitHub tokens, AWS access keys, PEM private key blocks, Slack tokens, OpenAI keys, and JWTs found nothing across the 184 tracked files, and the same scan across the full 305-commit history on all branches likewise found nothing, so no credential was committed and later removed. GitHub secret scanning is enabled with push protection, currently reporting zero open alerts, which blocks a supported credential type from being pushed in the first place. The project runs no service and provisions no accounts, so there is no credential intended to limit public access that could be leaked.


 Analysis 8/8 ●

  • Static code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]
    A static code analysis tool examines the software code (as source code, intermediate code, or executable) without executing it with specific inputs. For purposes of this criterion, compiler warnings and "safe" language modes do not count as static code analysis tools (these typically avoid deep analysis because speed is vital). Some static analysis tools focus on detecting generic defects, others focus on finding specific kinds of defects (such as vulnerabilities), and some do a combination. Examples of such static code analysis tools include cppcheck (C, C++), clang static analyzer (C, C++), SpotBugs (Java), FindBugs (Java) (including FindSecurityBugs), PMD (Java), Brakeman (Ruby on Rails), lintr (R), goodpractice (R), Coverity Quality Analyzer, SonarQube, Codacy, and HP Enterprise Fortify Static Code Analyzer. Larger lists of tools can be found in places such as the Wikipedia list of tools for static code analysis, OWASP information on static code analysis, NIST list of source code security analyzers, and Wheeler's list of static analysis tools. If there are no FLOSS static analysis tools available for the implementation language(s) used, you may select 'N/A'.

    Four FLOSS static analysis tools run in CI, all beyond compiler warnings and safe language modes. Checkov 3.2.533 scans infrastructure-as-code and workflow definitions and is configured as blocking, with any accepted finding requiring a justified inline checkov:skip. Zizmor 1.29.0 performs security analysis of GitHub Actions workflows, targeting supply-chain and privilege weaknesses such as credential persistence and template injection. CodeQL analyses the Python surface. PSScriptAnalyzer 1.25.0 analyses the PowerShell build scripts and test suites. All four publish SARIF results to the GitHub Security tab under distinct categories. Checkov and Zizmor are triggered on every pull request targeting the default branch with no path filter, and pull requests are the only route by which a change can reach that branch. Because a release is a tag cut from the head of the default branch, the tree that is released is exactly the tree those analysers have already passed, so static analysis is applied to every proposed release by construction rather than as a separate step that could be omitted. CodeQL additionally runs on a weekly schedule, and Zizmor on a weekly schedule, so newly published rules are applied to released code even when no change is proposed.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    Three of the four static analysis tools are purpose-built vulnerability scanners rather than general-purpose quality linters. Zizmor exists specifically to find security vulnerabilities in GitHub Actions workflows, covering template injection, credential persistence, artifact poisoning, and excessive token permissions, which is the dominant vulnerability class for a project whose executable surface is largely CI automation. CodeQL applies semantic queries mapped to CWE categories such as injection, path traversal, and unsafe deserialization against the Python surface. Checkov scans infrastructure-as-code and workflow definitions for security misconfiguration and runs in blocking mode, with any accepted finding requiring a justified inline checkov:skip annotation. PSScriptAnalyzer additionally carries security-specific rules including PSAvoidUsingPlainTextForPassword, PSAvoidUsingConvertToSecureStringWithPlainText, PSAvoidUsingInvokeExpression, and PSUsePSCredentialType. All four publish SARIF to the GitHub Security tab under distinct categories. These tools find real issues rather than hypothetical ones: Zizmor currently reports an open artipacked finding against a workflow that persists a repository push token into the git configuration for the remainder of a job, which is being tracked for remediation.


    Enough for a badge!

    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]
    A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known. Note that criterion vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days requires that all such vulnerabilities be fixed within 60 days of being made public.

    No medium or higher severity exploitable vulnerability has been discovered by static analysis. CodeQL and Checkov currently report zero open alerts. PSScriptAnalyzer reports 22 findings, all Warning or Information severity and all code-quality in nature (naming conventions, comment-based help, ShouldProcess on internal helper functions), with no Error-severity findings and none carrying security impact; the CI gate blocks the build on Error severity. One Zizmor finding is open, artipacked, which reports that a checkout step in publish-plugin.yml persists a repository token into the git configuration for the remainder of the job. It was assessed and is not exploitable: that workflow is triggered solely by workflow_dispatch, which requires write access to the repository, and has no pull_request, pull_request_target, or fork-triggered path, so injecting a step to read the persisted credential requires privileges that already confer access to the token. Zizmor rates it Warning and GitHub assigns it no security severity level, placing it below the medium threshold. It is nonetheless tracked as a hardening item and will be addressed rather than dismissed. Findings that are accepted rather than fixed carry a justified inline annotation (# zizmor: ignore[...] or # checkov:skip=...) recording the reasoning, so no finding is silently suppressed.


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    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    Static analysis runs on every commit. Checkov and Zizmor are both triggered on every pull request targeting the default branch with no path filter, and pull requests are the only route by which a change can reach that branch, so no commit lands without being analysed regardless of which files it touches. Checkov additionally runs on every push to the default branch. CodeQL analyses the Python surface and PSScriptAnalyzer the PowerShell surface on any pull request or push touching those file types. Beyond change-triggered runs, three scheduled scans re-analyse the released code so that newly published rules are applied even when nothing has changed: Zizmor weekly on Mondays, OpenSSF Scorecard weekly on Tuesdays, and CodeQL weekly on Thursdays. All results are published to the GitHub Security tab under distinct categories, so a finding introduced by a rule update surfaces without a code change.


  • Dynamic code analysis


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    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]
    A dynamic analysis tool examines the software by executing it with specific inputs. For example, the project MAY use a fuzzing tool (e.g., American Fuzzy Lop) or a web application scanner (e.g., OWASP ZAP or w3af). In some cases the OSS-Fuzz project may be willing to apply fuzz testing to your project. For purposes of this criterion the dynamic analysis tool needs to vary the inputs in some way to look for various kinds of problems or be an automated test suite with at least 80% branch coverage. The Wikipedia page on dynamic analysis and the OWASP page on fuzzing identify some dynamic analysis tools. The analysis tool(s) MAY be focused on looking for security vulnerabilities, but this is not required.

    The project applies automated testing before release but does not currently meet the specific bar this criterion sets. The release gate is the Tier 0 conformance suite, which installs the package exactly as a consumer receives it and executes 575 Pester assertions against the installed tree. Tier 1 additionally performs live behavioural runs against fixture repositories, executing the squad end to end and asserting on the state artifacts left on disk, and Tier 2 compares a live run against stored semantic baselines. However, none of these vary their inputs in the manner of a fuzzer or scanner: Tier 1 exercises a fixed set of recorded scenarios. Branch coverage is also not instrumented, since none of the tier runners enable Pester's CodeCoverage configuration, so the project cannot demonstrate the 80% threshold this criterion offers as an alternative. Coverage of the PowerShell build scripts would in any case be low, because Tier 0 asserts against an installed package tree rather than executing those scripts. Planned improvements are to enable Pester code coverage reporting in CI to establish a measured baseline, and to add unit tests for the build and release scripts, which are currently the least-covered executable surface.


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    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    The project produces no software written in a memory-unsafe language. Its output is a package of markdown assets (agents, prompts, instructions, and skills) together with PowerShell 7 build scripts, Pester test suites, and YAML workflow definitions. There is no C, C++, or unsafe Rust in the repository and nothing is compiled to native code, so there is no memory-safety surface for a sanitizer or memory-error detector to examine. PowerShell runs on the .NET managed runtime, which provides memory safety by construction.


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    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]
    This criterion does not suggest enabling assertions during production; that is entirely up to the project and its users to decide. This criterion's focus is instead to improve fault detection during dynamic analysis before deployment. Enabling assertions in production use is completely different from enabling assertions during dynamic analysis (such as testing). In some cases enabling assertions in production use is extremely unwise (especially in high-integrity components). There are many arguments against enabling assertions in production, e.g., libraries should not crash callers, their presence may cause rejection by app stores, and/or activating an assertion in production may expose private data such as private keys. Beware that in many Linux distributions NDEBUG is not defined, so C/C++ assert() will by default be enabled for production in those environments. It may be important to use a different assertion mechanism or defining NDEBUG for production in those environments.

    The test configuration deliberately enables more assertions than a normal run. The suites are assertion-based throughout, with 575 Pester assertions executing in the Tier 0 conformance run alone, and every case traces to a numbered entry in tests/squad-behavior-contract.md. Two switches exist specifically to widen assertion coverage during analysis. Tier 1's -Strict promotes consumption findings, which are advisory during a live run, to blocking during the self-check, on the reasoning that a mutation the contract merely mentions is a mutation it does not catch. Tier 0's -IncludeAdvisory enables additional assertion cases that are otherwise reported without gating. Tier 1 also ships mutation controls invoked with -SelfCheck, where each case breaks exactly one rule and requires the contract to detect it, which is the evidence that the assertions can fail rather than passing vacuously. All PowerShell scripts, modules, and test runners execute under Set-StrictMode -Version Latest with $ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop', turning uninitialised variable references, non-existent property access, and malformed method calls into terminating errors during analysis. Tier 0 additionally treats a run that produces zero tests as a failure, so a discovery error cannot be mistaken for success. None of this carries into what consumers receive: the shipped package is markdown assets with no runtime assertion machinery, so there is no production assertion cost or disclosure risk.


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    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]
    If you are not running dynamic code analysis and thus have not found any vulnerabilities in this way, choose "not applicable" (N/A). A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known.

    The project does not perform dynamic code analysis as this criterion defines it, consistent with the answer given for dynamic_analysis: it uses no fuzzer or scanner that varies inputs, and branch coverage is not instrumented, so the 80% alternative threshold cannot be demonstrated. No vulnerability has therefore been discovered by dynamic analysis, and none is outstanding. The project does run automated Pester test suites across three tiers, including live behavioural runs against fixture repositories, and these have found functional defects that were fixed and covered by regression cases, but they have surfaced no security vulnerability. Should dynamic analysis be introduced and a medium or higher severity exploitable vulnerability be confirmed, it would be handled under the process documented in SECURITY.md, which commits to acknowledgement within 5 business days, a status update within 10, and a fix in the next release, with a hotfix path documented in CONTRIBUTING.md for shipping a patch without releasing unrelated pending work.



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Project badge entry owned by: Peter Nehme.
Entry created on 2026-08-25 06:53:21 UTC, last updated on 2026-10-19 21:45:30 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-08-25 08:33:58 UTC.