boost

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Baseline Level 2 criteria. These are criteria version v2026.02.19.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Package manager for AI coding skills — search, install, and sync SKILL.md skills across Claude Code, Windsurf, and Cursor

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

 Controls 19/19 ●

  • Controls


    Enough for a badge!

    When a CI/CD task is executed with no permissions specified, the CI/CD system MUST default the task's permissions to the lowest permissions granted in the pipeline. [OSPS-AC-04.01]
    Configure the project's settings to assign the lowest available permissions to new pipelines by default, granting additional permissions only when necessary for specific tasks.

    GitHub Actions is configured so a task with no permissions block gets the lowest permissions in the pipeline: every workflow declares a top-level read-only default (ci.yml opens with 'permissions: contents: read'), and write scopes are granted per job only where required. zizmor's excessive-permissions audit runs on every pull request as a required check and fails a workflow that grants more than it needs, so the default cannot quietly widen.


    Enough for a badge!

    When an official release is created, that release MUST be assigned a unique version identifier. [OSPS-BR-02.01]
    Assign a unique version identifier to each release produced by the project, following a consistent naming convention or numbering scheme. Examples include SemVer, CalVer, or git commit id.

    Versions come from setuptools-scm reading git tags, so there is no hand-maintained version constant to fall out of sync and a version is unique by construction. 'boost --version' reports it. [version_unique]


    Enough for a badge!

    When an official release is created, that release MUST contain a descriptive log of functional and security modifications. [OSPS-BR-04.01]
    Ensure that all releases include a descriptive change log. It is recommended to ensure that the change log is human-readable and includes details beyond commit messages, such as descriptions of the security impact or relevance to different use cases. To ensure machine readability, place the content under a markdown header such as "## Changelog".

    https://github.com/jonnyeclectic/boost/releases - one GitHub release per version, with notes assembled by release-drafter from the merged pull-request titles. CONTRIBUTING asks contributors to write the PR description as the release note for exactly this reason. [release_notes]


    Enough for a badge!

    When a build and release pipeline ingests dependencies, it MUST use standardized tooling where available. [OSPS-BR-05.01]
    Use a common tooling for your ecosystem, such as package managers or dependency management tools to ingest dependencies at build time. This may include using a dependency file, lock file, or manifest to specify the required dependencies, which are then pulled in by the build system.

    Dependencies are ingested with standard ecosystem tooling only - pip, driven by pyproject.toml for the project's own extras and by requirements/*.txt for the toolchain. Those lock files pin an exact version and every artifact's sha256 for the full transitive closure, enforced by pip --require-hashes, so a build resolves to identical bytes on a contributor's machine and on a CI runner. Nothing is vendored or fetched ad hoc. See https://github.com/jonnyeclectic/boost/blob/main/docs/dependencies.md


    Enough for a badge!

    When an official release is created, that release MUST be signed or accounted for in a signed manifest including each asset's cryptographic hashes. [OSPS-BR-06.01]
    Sign all released software assets at build time with a cryptographic signature or attestations, such as GPG or PGP signature, Sigstore signatures, SLSA provenance, or SLSA VSAs. Include the cryptographic hashes of each asset in a signed manifest or metadata file.

    Every release is signed with SLSA build provenance at build time. publish.yml runs actions/attest-build-provenance over dist/* after 'twine check' and before the PyPI upload, so the exact bytes published are the bytes signed, and the attestation records which workflow built which artifact from which commit. Upload to PyPI additionally uses Trusted Publishing (a short-lived OIDC identity, no stored token). A CycloneDX SBOM is generated per released wheel and attached to the GitHub release. Verification instructions: https://github.com/jonnyeclectic/boost/blob/main/docs/verifying-releases.md


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include a description of how the project selects, obtains, and tracks its dependencies. [OSPS-DO-06.01]
    It is recommended to publish this information alongside the project's technical & design documentation on a publicly viewable resource such as the source code repository, project website, or other channel.

    https://github.com/jonnyeclectic/boost/blob/main/docs/dependencies.md documents selection (the runtime may import no third-party package at all, enforced by import-linter; extras and the toolchain are the only two places dependencies exist, with four stated tests a new one must pass), acquisition (by sha256 over HTTPS, enforced by pip --require-hashes, regenerated with scripts/lock_toolchain.py), and tracking (Dependabot, pip-audit and osv-scan as required checks, a licence gate, per-release CycloneDX SBOMs, and SHA-pinned actions audited by zizmor).


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include instructions on how to build the software, including required libraries, frameworks, SDKs, and dependencies. [OSPS-DO-07.01]
    It is recommended to publish this information alongside the project's contributor documentation, such as in CONTRIBUTING.md or other developer task documentation. This may also be documented using Makefile targets or other automation scripts.

    https://github.com/jonnyeclectic/boost/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md documents the build from a clean clone: 'make venv' installs every gate tool from the hash-pinned requirements, and the full gate table lists each command. noxfile.py reproduces the exact CI gate in isolated venvs across every supported interpreter, so 'green on my machine' and 'green in CI' mean the same thing. Prerequisites are Python 3.12+ and git, stated in the README; the runtime itself has no third-party dependencies.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include a list of project members with access to sensitive resources. [OSPS-GV-01.01]
    Document project participants and their roles through such artifacts as members.md, governance.md, maintainers.md, or similar file within the source code repository of the project. This may be as simple as including names or account handles in a list of maintainers, or more complex depending on the project's governance.

    https://github.com/jonnyeclectic/boost/blob/main/MAINTAINERS.md lists the project members and, in a dedicated 'Access to sensitive resources' table, every credential and privileged surface with who holds it: repository admin, the main branch (no one directly - a ruleset requires a pull request), the PyPI project (no stored credential exists, because publishing uses Trusted Publishing), GitHub Actions secrets, security advisories, and the docs site.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include descriptions of the roles and responsibilities for members of the project. [OSPS-GV-01.02]
    Document project participants and their roles through such artifacts as members.md, governance.md, maintainers.md, or similar file within the source code repository of the project.

    The same file describes each role and what it is responsible for - lead maintainer, maintainer, contributor and security reporter - along with the policy for granting and removing access, and a continuity section. It states plainly that boost is a single-maintainer project today rather than implying a succession process that does not exist.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include a guide for code contributors that includes requirements for acceptable contributions. [OSPS-GV-03.02]
    Extend the CONTRIBUTING.md or CONTRIBUTING/ contents in the project documentation to outline the requirements for acceptable contributions, including coding standards, testing requirements, and submission guidelines for code contributors. It is recommended that this guide is the source of truth for both contributors and approvers.

    CONTRIBUTING.md's 'Ground rules' section states the requirements: stdlib-only runtime, the cli -> commands -> core layering rule, and that behaviour changes need tests. https://github.com/jonnyeclectic/boost/blob/main/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md pre-fills the same checklist on every PR. [contribution_requirements]


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the version control system MUST require all code contributors to assert that they are legally authorized to make the associated contributions on every commit. [OSPS-LE-01.01]
    Include a DCO in the project's repository, requiring code contributors to assert that they are legally authorized to commit the associated contributions on every commit. Use a status check to ensure the assertion is made. A CLA also satisfies this requirement. Some version control systems, such as GitHub, may include this in the platform terms of service.

    The repository requires a Developer Certificate of Origin sign-off on every commit a pull request adds. The certificate is the standard DCO 1.1 text at https://github.com/jonnyeclectic/boost/blob/main/DCO ; enforcement is scripts/check_dco.py, wired as the 'dco' required status check (.github/workflows/dco.yml) and listed in .github/required-checks.txt, so a commit without a sign-off cannot merge. Contributors are told how in CONTRIBUTING.md ('Sign your commits'), and the same check runs locally.

    One design point worth stating, because it is what makes the assertion meaningful: the checker compares the trailer against each commit's OWN AUTHOR and rejects a sign-off naming anybody else. A DCO is the contributor certifying they have the right to submit the work, so a trailer added later by a reviewer or a script certifies nothing; tests/unit/test_check_dco.py::test_signoff_naming_someone_else_is_rejected pins that behaviour, and it is the test the file exists for.

    The requirement applies from the commit that introduced it forward, which is how DCO adoption normally works. Sign-offs were deliberately NOT backfilled onto the 569 pre-existing commits: doing so would have rewritten main, breaking 478 git tags, every setuptools-scm version derived from them, and the SLSA build-provenance attestation on every published release - all to record an assertion nobody actually made. Bot authors are exempt because an account cannot agree to a certificate.


    Enough for a badge!

    When a commit is made to the primary branch, any automated status checks for commits MUST pass or be manually bypassed. [OSPS-QA-03.01]
    Configure the project's version control system to require that all automated status checks pass or require manual acknowledgement before a commit can be merged into the primary branch. It is recommended that any optional status checks are NOT configured as a pass or fail requirement that approvers may be tempted to bypass.

    GitHub Actions runs the full gate on every push and every pull request: https://github.com/jonnyeclectic/boost/actions/workflows/ci.yml [test_continuous_integration]


    Enough for a badge!

    Prior to a commit being accepted, the project's CI/CD pipelines MUST run at least one automated test suite to ensure the changes meet expectations. [OSPS-QA-06.01]
    Automated tests should be run prior to every merge into the primary branch. The test suite should be run in a CI/CD pipeline and the results should be visible to all contributors. The test suite should be run in a consistent environment and should be run in a way that allows contributors to run the tests locally. Examples of test suites include unit tests, integration tests, and end-to-end tests.

    GitHub Actions runs the full gate on every push and every pull request: https://github.com/jonnyeclectic/boost/actions/workflows/ci.yml [test_continuous_integration]


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include design documentation demonstrating all actions and actors within the system. [OSPS-SA-01.01]
    Include designs in the project documentation that explains the actions and actors. Actors include any subsystem or entity that can influence another segment in the system. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    https://github.com/jonnyeclectic/boost/tree/main/docs/architecture holds C4 design documentation - system context, containers, core components, and a dynamic view of the install flow - showing the actors and the actions between them. https://github.com/jonnyeclectic/boost/blob/main/docs/security-design.md adds the security view of the same system: the trust boundaries, which actors are trusted and which are not (a tap author is treated as an attacker for modelling purposes), and where each untrusted input crosses into privileged behaviour. docs/rag-architecture.md covers the retrieval subsystem.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include descriptions of all external software interfaces of the released software assets. [OSPS-SA-02.01]
    Document all software interfaces (APIs) of the released software assets, explaining how users can interact with the software and what data is expected or produced. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    https://jonnyeclectic.github.io/boost/docs/commands.html documents every command and every flag. It is generated from the CLI itself - the COMMANDS registry plus each command's argparse parser - and a CI --check fails the build if it drifts, so the reference cannot go stale. 'boost --help' and 'boost <cmd> --help' are the same data. [documentation_interface]


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project MUST perform a security assessment to understand the most likely and impactful potential security problems that could occur within the software. [OSPS-SA-03.01]
    Performing a security assessment informs both project members as well as downstream consumers that the project understands what problems could arise within the software. Understanding what threats could be realized helps the project manage and address risk. This information is useful to downstream consumers to demonstrate the security acumen and practices of the project. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    https://github.com/jonnyeclectic/boost/blob/main/docs/security-design.md is that assessment. It identifies the most likely and impactful problems for a CLI that clones third-party repositories and writes files into the directories an AI agent reads - path traversal via attacker-controlled frontmatter, command injection through skill and tap names, archive extraction escapes, link following, untrusted deserialization, supply-chain and CI-action compromise - and pairs each with the mitigation in the codebase. It also states the residual risks plainly, including the most important one: boost can give provenance, integrity and a diff, but cannot vet what a skill instructs an agent to do.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include a policy for coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD), with a clear timeframe for response. [OSPS-VM-01.01]
    Create a SECURITY.md file at the root of the directory, outlining the project's policy for coordinated vulnerability disclosure. Include a method for reporting vulnerabilities. Set expectations for how the project will respond and address reported issues.

    https://github.com/jonnyeclectic/boost/blob/main/SECURITY.md states the channel, the expected acknowledgement time, and what a useful report contains. [vulnerability_report_process]


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST provide a means for private vulnerability reporting directly to the security contacts within the project. [OSPS-VM-03.01]
    Provide a means for security researchers to report vulnerabilities privately to the project. This may be a dedicated email address, a web form, VCS specialized tools, email addresses for security contacts, or other methods.

    GitHub private vulnerability reporting is enabled on the repository. Reports go to https://github.com/jonnyeclectic/boost/security/advisories/new and never to a public issue; SECURITY.md says so explicitly. [vulnerability_report_private]


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST publicly publish data about discovered vulnerabilities. [OSPS-VM-04.01]
    Provide information about known vulnerabilities in a predictable public channel, such as a CVE entry, blog post, or other medium. To the degree possible, this information should include affected version(s), how a consumer can determine if they are vulnerable, and instructions for mitigation or remediation.

    GitHub Security Advisories on this repository is the project's public channel for vulnerability data, and it is the same channel private reports are triaged through, so a fix and its advisory are published together. SECURITY.md commits in writing that any release fixing a publicly known vulnerability will name it and its identifier in the release notes, which are public per release. No vulnerability has been discovered in boost to date, so the channel currently has nothing to publish - the policy and the channel exist ahead of need rather than after it. https://github.com/jonnyeclectic/boost/blob/main/SECURITY.md



This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Jonathan Reyes and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Jonathan Reyes.
Entry created on 2026-08-28 13:39:22 UTC, last updated on 2026-08-29 02:20:11 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-08-28 14:27:12 UTC.