OTT-play FOSS

Contribution rules cover review/testing, but a published style and naming standard covering all maintained languages is not established. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/CONTRIBUTING.md

Biome and some formatting checks are used, but consistent all-language coding-standard enforcement is not demonstrated. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/.github/workflows/ci.yml

Builds use npm/Cargo and native tools, but standard build-variable preservation across every maintained build and native packaging path has not been qualified. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/docs/build-pipeline.md

The workspace release profile uses strip=true and does not demonstrate preserved native debug information for post-release diagnosis across all outputs. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/Cargo.toml

Artifact hashes and deterministic bundle reports exist, but complete same-environment two-build identical-output evidence for current browser/native distributions is not established. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/docs/build-pipeline.md

Platform installation commands are documented, but standard staged-install and prefix-variable semantics across the diverse output matrix have not been assessed. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/README.md

Lockfiles and selected vendor provenance are retained, but a complete direct/transitive runtime, provider, platform and build/release dependency inventory is not established. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/docs/rust-dependency-security.md

Dependency automation and scoped audits exist, but monitoring of the entire platform/provider/release-tool dependency closure has not been demonstrated. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/docs/openssf-evidence.md

Legacy device and provider compatibility APIs are intentionally retained; no complete deprecated/obsolete-interface audit across current platforms and release helpers is established. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/docs/architecture.md

Recent changes contain regression tests, but no quantified audit establishes the required fraction of bug fixes receiving such tests. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/CONTRIBUTING.md

Scoped Python coverage and broad suites do not demonstrate 80 percent statement coverage for the whole maintained multilingual project. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/docs/openssf-evidence.md

Some checks use strict warnings, including fuzz-library Clippy, but strict settings across every maintained implementation language and build are not qualified. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/.github/workflows/ci.yml

Owned components have explicit bounds and authorization, but incomplete PIN, transport, provider and external runtime assessments prevent a whole-project implemented-design claim. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/docs/security-design.md

Full cryptographic weakness review remains open across classic providers, outbound/native transports, local credential formats and build/release dependencies. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/docs/security-design.md

No complete algorithm replacement and data-migration mechanism is established for all maintained credential formats, providers and native platforms. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/docs/security-design.md

Some tokens and source credentials can be replaced, but complete safe rotation across stored PINs, native keys, release signing and provider credentials is unqualified. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/docs/security-design.md

Supported deployment/media modes include plaintext HTTP, and complete encryption of sensitive network traffic across the advertised project is not established. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/README.md

The Rust TLS listener's policy does not establish a TLS 1.2-or-newer minimum for every outbound client, native runtime and release path. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/docs/security-design.md

Owned server configuration checks and default client verification do not prove correct certificate/hostname verification across every supported provider/native transport. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/docs/security-design.md

The project has focused before-listen and authorization tests, but complete proof that all private data is sent only after required peer verification is not established. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/docs/security-design.md

Several distributions may be unsigned or ad-hoc signed; authenticated signing and a published trusted verification identity for every required release artifact are not established. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/README.md

Version tags are retained, but cryptographic signatures on all releases and accessible public verification keys have not been verified. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/RELEASING.md

Many network and parser inputs are bounded and regression-tested, but a complete audit of every provider, native/plugin, import and release-helper input is outstanding. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/docs/security-design.md

Platform isolation and optimized builds exist, but applicable hardening flags and runtime properties have not been qualified across every native distribution. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/Cargo.toml

Trust-boundary documentation and focused tests exist, but no complete evidence-backed assurance argument covers the acknowledged PIN, transport and native dependency risks. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/docs/security-design.md

Security analysis covers several major languages, but provider sources are excluded and complete Java/native/Objective-C coverage or equivalent manual analysis is not established. Existing tools do not prove all-language coverage. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/docs/security-design.md

RC fuzzing instruments selected Rust/native parser paths, but sanitizer or equivalent coverage of all maintained unsafe/FFI/native paths, including Objective-C and device-specific adapters, has not been established. Evidence: https://github.com/open-ott-play/ottplay-foss/blob/e953b55183cc3dd9d4b4fa8c1b281493af4928cf/FUZZING.md