SchildTCB

Miradi inayofuata mazoea bora hapa chini inaweza kujihakikisha kwa hiari na kuonyesha kuwa wamepata nishani ya mazoea bora ya Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF).

Hakuna seti ya mazoea yawezayo kuhakikisha kuwa programu haitakuwa na kasoro au udhaifu; hata mbinu rasmi zinaweza kushindwa ikiwa vipimo au dhana ni sahihi. Wala hakuna seti ya mazoea yawezayo kuhakikisha kuwa mradi utaendelea kuwa na jamii ya maendeleo yenye afya na inayofanya kazi vizuri. Hata hivyo, kufuata mazoea bora kunaweza kusaidia kuboresha matokeo ya miradi. Kwa mfano, baadhi ya mazoea huwezesha ukaguzi wa watu wengi kabla ya kutolewa, ambayo inaweza kusaidia kupata udhaifu wa kiufundi ambao vinginevyo ni vigumu kupata na kusaidia kujenga uaminifu na hamu ya mwingiliano wa kurudia kati ya wasanidi programu kutoka makampuni tofauti. Ili kupata nishani, vigezo vyote vya LAZIMA na LAZIMA WALA USIWAHI lazima vifuatwe, vigezo vyote vya INAPASWA lazima vifuatwe AU visivyo fufufutiliana na thibitisho, na vigezo vyote vya PENDEKEZA lazima vifuatwe AU visivyo fufufutiliana (tunataka vifikiwe angalau). Ikiwa unataka kuingiza maandishi ya thibitisho kama maoni ya jumla, badala ya kuwa maelezo ya busara kwamba hali ni inakubaliwa, anza kifungu cha maandishi na '//' ikifuatiwa na nafasi. Maoni ni karibu kupitia tovuti ya GitHub kama masuala au maombi ya kuvuta Kuna pia orodha ya barua pepe kwa majadiliano ya jumla.

Tunafuraha kutoa habari katika lugha nyingi, hata hivyo, ikiwa kuna mgongano au kutokuwa na usawa kati ya tafsiri, toleo la Kiingereza ni toleo lenye mamlaka.
Ikiwa huu ni mradi wako, tafadhali onyesha hadhi ya nishani yako kwenye ukurasa wa mradi wako! Hadhi ya nishani inaonekana kama hii: Kiwango cha nishani kwa mradi 16898 ni passing Hapa ni jinsi ya kuiweka:
Unaweza kuonyesha hali ya nishani yako kwa kuweka hii katika faili yako ya markdown:
[![OpenSSF Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/16898/badge)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/16898)
au kwa kuweka hii katika HTML yako:
<a href="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/16898"><img src="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/16898/badge"></a>


Hizi ni vigezo vya kiwango cha Kupita. Unaweza pia kuangalia vigezo vya kiwango cha Fedha au Dhahabu.

Baseline Series: Kiwango cha Msingi 1 Kiwango cha Msingi 2 Kiwango cha Msingi 3

        

 Misingi 13/13 ●

  • Jumla

    Kumbuka kwamba miradi mingine inaweza kutumia jina sawa.

    Minimalist, formally verified Trusted Computing Base on the seL4 MCS microkernel (Ada/SPARK Level 4). Provides a proven foundation for spatial-temporal domain isolation and MLS on x86_64, with a documented assurance case. ARM64 port in progress. Research prototype, not a product.

    Tafadhali tumia muundo wa maneno ya leseni ya SPDX; mifano ni pamoja na "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", na "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Usitumie alama za nukuu za moja au mbili.
    Ikiwa kuna lugha zaidi ya moja, ziorodhe kama thamani zilizotengwa kwa koma (nafasi ni za hiari) na ziorodhe kuanzia iliyotumiwa zaidi hadi iliyotumiwa kidogo. Ikiwa kuna orodha ndefu, tafadhali orodhesha angalau tatu za kawaida zaidi. Ikiwa hakuna lugha (k.m., huu ni mradi wa nyaraka tu au wa majaribio tu), tumia herufi moja "-". Tafadhali tumia herufi kubwa za kawaida kwa kila lugha, k.m., "JavaScript".
    Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) ni mpango wa kuweka majina yenye muundo kwa mifumo ya teknolojia ya habari, programu, na vifurushi. Inatumika katika mifumo na hifadhidata nyingi wakati wa kuripoti udhaifu.
  • Maudhui ya kimsingi ya tovuti ya mradi


    Tovuti ya mradi LAZIMA ieleze kwa ufupi programu inafanya nini (inasuluhu tatizo gani?). [description_good]
    Hii LAZIMA iwe katika lugha ambayo watumiaji watarajiwa wanaweza kuelewa (k.m., inatumia lugha ya kiufundi kidogo).

    The project website (README.md) succinctly describes the software as "a Trusted Computing Base research prototype: a formally verified core (seL4 microkernel + Ada/SPARK 2022) with an isolated-peripheral environment." The problem it solves is building a microkernel-based TCB with mathematically proven security properties (MLS Bell-LaPadula policy, capability model, crash containment) where unverified components like network and storage drivers are isolated in Ring 3 processes so that a fault or compromise cannot reach the proven core. The project provides an open reference architecture and methodology for high-assurance systems, not a production OS.



    Tovuti ya mradi LAZIMA itoe habari juu ya jinsi ya: kupata, kutoa maoni (kama ripoti za hitilafu au maboresho), na kuchangia kwenye programu. [interact]

    The project website (README.md and CONTRIBUTING.md) provides information on how to: (1) obtain the software — clone the GitHub repository and build from source using the provided build scripts (build.sh for bare-metal, SEL4_PRIMARY=1 build.sh for seL4 integration), or use the pre-built ISO artifacts from GitHub Actions CI; (2) provide feedback — open issues at https://github.com/Nik0laic4/SchildTCB/issues for bug reports and enhancement requests, or report security vulnerabilities privately per SECURITY.md; (3) contribute — submit pull requests following the guidelines in CONTRIBUTING.md and the engineering standards in AGENT_RULES.md.



    Habari juu ya jinsi ya kuchangia LAZIMA ieleze mchakato wa uchangiaji (kwa mfano, je! Maombi ya kuvuta yanatumika?) (URL inahitajika) [contribution]
    Tunafikiria kuwa miradi kwenye GitHub hutumia maswala na kuvuta maombi isipokuwa palipoonyeshwa vingine. Habari hii inaweza kuwa fupi, kwa mfano, ikisema kuwa mradi hutumia maombi ya kuvuta, msako wa suala, au machapisho kwenye orodha ya barua (ipi?)

    Non-trivial contribution file in repository: https://github.com/Nik0laic4/SchildTCB/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md.



    Habari juu ya jinsi ya kuchangia INAPASWA kujumuisha mahitaji ya michango inayokubalika (k.m., rejeleo la kiwango chochote kinachohitajika cha usimbaji). (URL inahitajika) [contribution_requirements]
  • Leseni ya FLOSS


    Programu iliyozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA itolewa kama FLOSS. [floss_license]
    FLOSS ni programu iliyotolewa kwa njia inayokidhi Ufafanuzi wa Chanzo Wazi au Ufafanuzi wa Programu Huria. Mifano ya leseni kama hizo ni pamoja na CC0, MIT, BSD 2-clause, BSD 3-clause revised, Apache 2.0, Lesser GNU General Public License (LGPL), na GNU General Public License (GPL). Kwa madhumuni yetu, hii inamaanisha kuwa leseni LAZIMA iwe: Programu YAWEZA pia kupatiwa leseni kwa njia nyingine (k.m., "GPLv2 au ya kibinafsi" inakubaliwa).

    The GPL-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    INAPENDEKEZA kwamba leseni yoyote inayohitajika kwa programu iliyozalishwa na mradi iwe imeidhinishwa na Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]
    OSI inatumia mchakato mgumu wa uidhinishaji kuamua ni leseni zipi ni OSS.

    The GPL-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    Mradi LAZIMA uweke leseni za matokeo yake mahali pa kawaida katika hazina yake ya chanzo. (URL inahitajika) [license_location]
    Desturi moja ni kuweka leseni kama faili ya ngazi ya juu inayoitwa LICENSE au COPYING, ambayo YAWEZA kufuatiwa na kiendelezi kama ".txt" au ".md". Desturi mbadala ni kuwa na saraka inayoitwa LICENSES inayohifadhi faili za leseni; faili hizi kwa kawaida zinaitwa kama kitambulisho chao cha leseni ya SPDX kikifuatiwa na kiendelezi kinachofaa, kama ilivyoelezwa katika Maelezo ya REUSE. Kumbuka kwamba kigezo hiki ni mahitaji tu kwenye hazina ya chanzo. Huhitaji kuingiza faili ya leseni wakati wa kuzalisha kitu kutoka kwenye msimbo wa chanzo (kama programu inayotekelezeka, kifurushi, au chombo). Kwa mfano, wakati wa kuzalisha kifurushi cha R kwa Mtandao wa Kumbukumbu Kamili wa R (CRAN), fuata mazoea ya kawaida ya CRAN: ikiwa leseni ni leseni ya kawaida, tumia maelezo mafupi ya kawaida ya leseni (ili kuepuka kusakinisha nakala nyingine ya maandishi) na orodhesha faili ya LICENSE katika faili ya kutengwa kama .Rbuildignore. Vivyo hivyo, wakati wa kuunda kifurushi cha Debian, unaweza kuweka kiungo katika faili ya hakimiliki kwa maandishi ya leseni katika /usr/share/common-licenses, na utenge faili ya leseni kutoka kwenye kifurushi kilichoundwa (k.m., kwa kufuta faili baada ya kuita dh_auto_install). Tunashauri jumuisha maelezo ya leseni yanayoweza kusomwa na mashine katika miundo iliyozalishwa mahali inapofaa.

    Non-trivial license location file in repository: https://github.com/Nik0laic4/SchildTCB/blob/master/LICENSE.


  • Nyaraka


    Mradi LAZIMA utoe nyaraka za msingi za programu iliyozalishwa na mradi. [documentation_basics]
    Nyaraka hizi lazima ziwe katika vyombo fulani (kama maandishi au video) vinavyojumuisha: jinsi ya kuisakinisha, jinsi ya kuianzisha, jinsi ya kuitumia (huenda ikijumuisha mafunzo kwa kutumia mifano), na jinsi ya kuitumia kwa usalama (k.m., nini cha kufanya na nini cha kutofanya) ikiwa hiyo ni mada inayofaa kwa programu. Nyaraka za usalama lazima zisiwe ndefu. Mradi YAWEZA kutumia viungo vya hypertext kwa nyenzo zisizo za mradi kama nyaraka. Ikiwa mradi hauzalishi programu, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A).

    Some documentation basics file contents found.



    Mradi LAZIMA utoe nyaraka za marejeleo zinazofafanua kiolesura cha nje (ingizo na matokeo) cha programu iliyozalishwa na mradi. [documentation_interface]
    Nyaraka za kiolesura cha nje zinaeleza kwa mtumiaji wa mwisho au msanidi jinsi ya kuitumia. Hii itajumuisha kiolesura chake cha programu ya programu (API) ikiwa programu ina. Ikiwa ni maktaba, andika madarasa/aina kuu na mbinu/vitendakazi vinavyoweza kuitwa. Ikiwa ni programu ya wavuti, fafanua kiolesura chake cha URL (mara nyingi kiolesura chake cha REST). Ikiwa ni kiolesura cha mstari wa amri, andika vigezo na chaguo zinazosaidia. Katika hali nyingi ni bora ikiwa nyingi ya nyaraka hizi zinazalishwa kiotomatiki, ili nyaraka hizi zibaki zikisawazishwa na programu inavyobadilika, lakini hii haihitajiki. Mradi YAWEZA kutumia viungo vya hypertext kwa nyenzo zisizo za mradi kama nyaraka. Nyaraka ZIWEZA kuzalishwa kiotomatiki (ambapo ni vitendo hii mara nyingi ndiyo njia bora ya kufanya hivyo). Nyaraka za kiolesura cha REST zinaweza kuzalishwa kwa kutumia Swagger/OpenAPI. Nyaraka za kiolesura cha msimbo ZINAWEZA kuzalishwa kwa kutumia zana kama vile JSDoc (JavaScript), ESDoc (JavaScript), pydoc (Python), devtools (R), pkgdown (R), na Doxygen (nyingi). Kuwa na maoni tu katika msimbo wa utekelezaji haitoshi kutosheleza kigezo hiki; kunahitaji kuwa na njia rahisi ya kuona habari bila kusoma kupitia msimbo wote wa chanzo. Ikiwa mradi hauzalishi programu, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A).

    The project uses Ada/SPARK contracts (pre-conditions, post-conditions, type invariants) as formal, machine-checked API documentation for the verified core. Every public subprogram in the proved modules is documented through its SPARK contracts. The syscall seam ABI is separately specified in SYSCALL_SEAM_ABI_SPEC.md with a host-side fuzzing test validating the encoding round-trip. The repository also contains a comprehensive README.md with build instructions and architecture overview, plus detailed technical documentation in docs/technical/ including ASSURANCE.md, THREAT_MODEL.md, and ARCHITECTURE.md.


  • Mengine


    Tovuti za mradi (tovuti, hifadhi, na URL za kupakua) LAZIMA zisaidie HTTPS kwa kutumia TLS. [sites_https]
    Hii inahitaji kwamba URL ya ukurasa wa nyumbani wa mradi na URL ya hifadhi ya udhibiti wa toleo vianze na "https:", si "http:". Unaweza kupata vyeti vya bure kutoka Let's Encrypt. Miradi YAWEZA kutekeleza kigezo hiki kwa kutumia (kwa mfano) GitHub pages, GitLab pages, au SourceForge project pages. Ikiwa unasaidia HTTP, tunakuhimiza uelekeze trafiki ya HTTP kwenda HTTPS.

    Given only https: URLs.



    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na taratibu moja au zaidi za majadiliano (ikiwa ni pamoja na mabadiliko yaliyopendekezwa na masuala) yenye utafutaji, inaruhusu ujumbe na mada kuelekezwa kwa URL, inaruhusu watu wapya kushiriki katika baadhi ya majadiliano, na haihitaji usakinishaji wa upande wa mteja wa programu ya kibinafsi. [discussion]
    Mifano ya taratibu zinazokubalika ni pamoja na orodha za barua pepe zilizohifadhiwa, majadiliano ya suala la GitHub na ombi la kuvuta, Bugzilla, Mantis, na Trac. Taratibu za majadiliano yasiyo ya wakati mmoja (kama IRC) zinakubaliwa ikiwa zinakidhi vigezo hivi; hakikisha kuna utaratibu wa kuhifadhi unaoelekezwa kwa URL. JavaScript ya kibinafsi, ingawa haikubalika, inaruhusiwa.

    GitHub supports discussions on issues and pull requests.



    Mradi UNAPASWA kutoa nyaraka kwa Kiingereza na uweze kukubali ripoti za hitilafu na maoni kuhusu msimbo kwa Kiingereza. [english]
    Kiingereza kwa sasa ni lingua franca ya teknolojia ya kompyuta; kusaidia Kiingereza huongeza idadi ya wasanidi na wakaguzi tofauti wa uwezekano duniani kote. Mradi unaweza kukidhi kigezo hiki hata ikiwa lugha ya msingi ya wasanidi wake wakuu si Kiingereza.

    All project documentation (README, technical docs, threat model, assurance case) is written in English. Bug reports and code comments can be submitted in English via GitHub Issues. The project's technical articles are also published in English on international platforms (Reddit r/ada).



    Mradi LAZIMA utunzwe. [maintained]
    Kama kiwango cha chini, mradi unapaswa kujaribu kujibu ripoti za tatizo muhimu na udhaifu. Mradi unaofuata kwa bidii nishani pengine unatengenezwa. Miradi yote na watu wana rasilimali zilizowekewa mipaka, na miradi ya kawaida lazima ikatae baadhi ya mabadiliko yaliyopendekezwa, hivyo rasilimali zilizowekewa mipaka na kukataa mapendekezo sio ishara ya mradi usiotekelezwa.

    Mradi unapojua kwamba hautatengenezwa tena, unapaswa kuweka kigezo hiki kama "Haikidhi" na utumie utaratibu sahihi ili kuwaonyesha wengine kwamba hautengenezwi. Kwa mfano, tumia "DEPRECATED" kama kichwa cha kwanza cha README yake, ongeza "DEPRECATED" karibu na mwanzo wa ukurasa wake wa nyumbani, ongeza "DEPRECATED" mwanzoni mwa maelezo ya mradi wa hifadhi ya msimbo, ongeza nishani isiyolindwa katika README yake na/au ukurasa wa nyumbani, iweke kama iliyolemewa katika hifadhi yoyote ya kifurushi (k.m., npm deprecate), na/au utumie mfumo wa alama wa hifadhi ya msimbo ili kuihifadhi (k.m., mpangilio wa "archive" wa GitHub, alama ya "archived" ya GitLab, hali ya "readonly" ya Gerrit, au hali ya mradi wa "abandoned" wa SourceForge). Majadiliano ya ziada yanaweza kupatikana hapa.

    The project is actively maintained with regular commits. The most recent release (v0.54) was published on 2026-11-15, implementing FS/MLS audit closure and C9 heartbeat health probe. The CHANGELOG shows continuous development with 50+ releases since project inception in 2026. Issues are responded to within days, and the CI pipeline (GitHub Actions) runs automated verification on every commit.


 Udhibiti wa Mabadiliko 9/9 ●

  • Hifadhi ya chanzo ya kudhibiti toleo ya hadharani


    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na hifadhi ya chanzo ya kudhibiti toleo ambayo inaweza kusomwa hadharani na ina URL. [repo_public]
    URL YAWEZA kuwa sawa na URL ya mradi. Mradi YAWEZA kutumia matawi ya faragha (yasiyo ya umma) katika hali maalum wakati mabadiliko hayajatolewa hadharani (k.m., kwa kurekebisha udhaifu kabla haujafichuliwa kwa umma).

    Repository on GitHub, which provides public git repositories with URLs.



    Hifadhi ya chanzo ya mradi LAZIMA ifuatilie mabadiliko yaliyofanywa, nani alifanya mabadiliko, na mabadiliko yalifanywa lini. [repo_track]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made.



    Ili kuwezesha ukaguzi wa ushirikiano, hifadhi ya chanzo ya mradi LAZIMA ijumuishe matoleo ya kati kwa ukaguzi kati ya matoleo; HAIPASWA kujumuisha matoleo ya mwisho tu. [repo_interim]
    Miradi YAWEZA kuchagua kuondoa matoleo maalum ya kati kutoka hifadhi zao za chanzo za umma (k.m., zile zinazorekebi udhaifu maalum usiokuwa wa umma, huenda zisitolewe hadharani, au zijumuishe nyenzo ambazo haziwezi kuwekwa kisheria na haziko katika toleo la mwisho).

    The GitHub repository includes the complete commit history between releases, providing interim versions for collaborative review. The repository does not only contain final releases; every architectural decision, bug fix, and formal verification step is recorded as an individual commit on the master branch, allowing full transparency and review of the development process.



    INASHAURIWA kwamba programu ya kawaida ya udhibiti wa toleo iliyosambazwa itumike (k.m., git) kwa hifadhi ya chanzo ya mradi. [repo_distributed]
    Git haihitajiki kihususa na miradi inaweza kutumia programu ya udhibiti wa toleo iliyokusanyika (kama subversion) na sababu.

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • Unambari wa toleo wa kipekee


    Matokeo ya mradi LAZIMA yawe na kitambulisho cha kipekee cha toleo kwa kila toleo linalokusudiwa kutumiwa na watumiaji. [version_unique]
    Hii YAWEZA kukidhi kwa njia mbalimbali ikiwa ni pamoja na vitambulisho vya kuwasilisha (kama kitambulisho cha kuwasilisha cha git au kitambulisho cha seti ya mabadiliko cha mercurial) au nambari ya toleo (ikiwa ni pamoja na nambari za toleo zinazotumia uainishaji wa maana au mipango ya tarehe kama YYYYMMDD).

    Each release has a unique version identifier documented in the CHANGELOG.md file (e.g., v0.54, v0.53, v1.0.0-pre). The identifiers are sequential and uniquely identify the exact state of the codebase and its formal verification results at the time of the release.



    INASHAURIWA kwamba muundo wa nambari ya toleo ya Semantic Versioning (SemVer) au Calendar Versioning (CalVer) itumike kwa matoleo. INASHAURIWA kwamba wale wanaotumia CalVer wajumuishe thamani ya kiwango cha mdogo. [version_semver]
    Miradi kwa ujumla inapaswa kupendelea muundo wowote unaotarajiwa na watumiaji wao, k.m., kwa sababu ni muundo wa kawaida unaotumiwa na ikolojia yao. Ikolojia nyingi zinapendelea SemVer, na SemVer kwa ujumla hupendelewa kwa kiolesura cha programu ya programu (API) na zana za maendeleo ya programu (SDK). CalVer hutumiwa na miradi ambayo ni kubwa, ina idadi kubwa ya utegemezi ulioundwa kwa uhuru, ina upeo wa mara kwa mara unaobadilika, au ni ya muda muhimu. INASHAURIWA kwamba wale wanaotumia CalVer wajumuishe thamani ya kiwango cha mdogo, kwa sababu kujumuisha kiwango cha mdogo kunasaidia matawi yaliyotunzwa kwa wakati mmoja wakati wowote hilo linakuwa lazima. Miundo mingine ya nambari ya toleo inaweza kutumiwa kama nambari za toleo, ikiwa ni pamoja na vitambulisho vya kuwasilisha cha git au vitambulisho vya seti ya mabadiliko cha mercurial, mradi tu vikitambulisha matoleo kwa kipekee. Hata hivyo, baadhi ya mbadala (kama vitambulisho vya kuwasilisha cha git) vinaweza kusababisha matatizo kama vitambulisho vya toleo, kwa sababu watumiaji huenda wasiwe na uwezo wa kuamua kwa urahisi ikiwa wako na toleo la hivi karibuni. Muundo wa kitambulisho cha toleo unaweza kutokuwa wa maana kwa kutambulisha matoleo ya programu ikiwa wapokeaji wote wanaendesha toleo la hivi karibuni tu (k.m., ni msimbo wa tovuti moja au huduma ya mtandao ambayo inasasishwa mara kwa mara kupitia utoaji wa kuendelea).


    INASHAURIWA kwamba miradi itambulishe kila toleo ndani ya mfumo wao wa udhibiti wa toleo. Kwa mfano, INASHAURIWA kwamba wale wanaotumia git watambulishe kila toleo kwa kutumia lebo za git. [version_tags]

    Releases are identified within the git version control system using git tags. Specific milestone commits are tagged (e.g., v0.1.0, v0.22-pre) to mark stable reference points in the repository history, as documented in the project's internal handoff and changelog records.


  • Maelezo ya kutolewa


    Mradi LAZIMA utoe, katika kila toleo, maelezo ya toleo ambayo ni muhtasari unaosomeka na binadamu wa mabadiliko makuu katika toleo hilo ili kuwasaidia watumiaji kuamua ikiwa wanapaswa kusasisha na athari ya kusasisha itakuwa nini. Maelezo ya toleo LAZIMA yasiwe matokeo ghafi ya kumbukumbu ya udhibiti wa toleo (k.m., matokeo ya amri ya "git log" si maelezo ya toleo). Miradi ambayo matokeo yake hayakusudiwa kutumika tena katika maeneo mengi (kama programu kwa tovuti moja au huduma) NA wanaotumia utoaji wa kuendelea WAWEZA kuchagua "N/A". (URL inahitajika) [release_notes]
    Maelezo ya toleo YAWEZA kutekelezwa kwa njia mbalimbali. Miradi mingi hutoa katika faili inayoitwa "NEWS", "CHANGELOG", au "ChangeLog", kwa hiari na viendelezi kama ".txt", ".md", au ".html". Kihistoria neno "change log" lilimaanisha kumbukumbu ya kila mabadiliko, lakini ili kukidhi vigezo hivi kinachohitajika ni muhtasari unaosomeka na binadamu. Maelezo ya toleo YAWEZA badala yake kutolewa na taratibu za mfumo wa udhibiti wa toleo kama mtiririko wa Matoleo ya GitHub.

    https://github.com/Nik0laic4/SchildTCB/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md The project maintains a comprehensive CHANGELOG.md file that provides a human-readable summary of major changes, validated results, and architectural decisions for each release. The changelog explicitly records only verified results (not raw git log output) and details the security, formal verification, and isolation improvements in each version. Dedicated release notes are also provided for major milestones (e.g., RELEASE_NOTES_v0.22-pre).



    Maelezo ya toleo LAZIMA yatambulishe kila udhaifu wa muda wa kutekeleza uliojulikana hadharani uliorekebishwa katika toleo hili ambao tayari ulikuwa na mgawanyo wa CVE au sawa wakati toleo lilipobuniwa. Kigezo hiki kinaweza kuwekwa alama kama haihusiki (N/A) ikiwa watumiaji kwa kawaida hawawezi kwa vitendo kusasisha programu wao wenyewe (k.m., kama inavyokuwa kweli mara nyingi kwa masasisho ya kernel). Kigezo hiki kinatumika tu kwa matokeo ya mradi, si kwa utegemezi wake. Ikiwa hakuna maelezo ya toleo au hakujawa na udhaifu uliojulikana hadharani, chagua N/A. [release_notes_vulns]
    Kigezo hiki kinawasaidia watumiaji kuamua ikiwa sasisho fulani litarekebisha udhaifu ambao unajulikana hadharani, ili kuwasaidia watumiaji kufanya uamuzi wa habari kuhusu kusasisha. Ikiwa watumiaji kwa kawaida hawawezi kwa vitendo kusasisha programu wao wenyewe kwenye kompyuta zao, lakini badala yake lazima wategemee wapatanishi mmoja au zaidi kutekeleza sasisho (kama inavyokuwa mara nyingi kwa kernel na programu ya kiwango cha chini ambayo imefungwa na kernel), mradi unaweza kuchagua "haihusiki" (N/A) badala yake, kwani habari hii ya ziada haitakuwa ya msaada kwa watumiaji hao. Vivyo hivyo, mradi unaweza kuchagua N/A ikiwa wapokeaji wote wanaendesha toleo la hivi karibuni tu (k.m., ni msimbo wa tovuti moja au huduma ya mtandao ambayo inasasishwa mara kwa mara kupitia utoaji wa kuendelea). Kigezo hiki kinatumika tu kwa matokeo ya mradi, si kwa utegemezi wake. Kuorodhesha udhaifu wa utegemezi wote wa mpito wa mradi unakuwa mgumu kadiri utegemezi unavyoongezeka na kutofautiana, na haihitajiki kwani zana zinazochunguza na kufuatilia utegemezi zinaweza kufanya hivi kwa njia inayopanuka.

    The CHANGELOG.md and the internal AUDIT_REGISTRY.md explicitly identify and document fixes for known vulnerabilities. For example, CVE-2026-SCHILD-02 #005 (PID reuse without delay) is explicitly referenced in the release notes, and its mitigation (monotonic PID generation) is documented in the v0.34 release entry. Any publicly known runtime vulnerabilities fixed in a release are clearly identified with their CVE or internal registry ID.


 Kuripoti 8/8 ●

  • Mchakato wa kuripoti hitilafu


    Mradi LAZIMA utoe mchakato kwa watumiaji kuwasilisha ripoti za hitilafu (k.m., kwa kutumia kifuatiliaji cha masuala au orodha ya barua pepe). (URL inahitajika) [report_process]

    Non-trivial SECURITY[.md] file found file in repository: https://github.com/Nik0laic4/SchildTCB/blob/master/SECURITY.md. [osps_do_02_01]



    Mradi UNAPASWA kutumia kifuatiliaji cha masuala kwa kufuatilia masuala ya mtu binafsi. [report_tracker]

    The project uses GitHub Issues as its issue tracker at https://github.com/Nik0laic4/SchildTCB/issues. Each issue is tracked individually with labels, milestones, and status tracking. The tracker is publicly accessible and searchable.



    Mradi LAZIMA uthibitishe wengi wa ripoti za hitilafu zilizowasilishwa katika miezi 2-12 iliyopita (ikiwemo); jibu halihitaji kuwa na marekebisho. [report_responses]

    As a single-developer research project, bug reports are acknowledged and triaged promptly. The project maintains an internal AUDIT_REGISTRY.md that documents all security findings with severity classifications, status, and ownership. External reports submitted via GitHub Issues are acknowledged within days, and the maintainer actively engages with the community on platforms like Reddit (r/ada) and Hacker News to address feedback.



    Mradi UNAPASWA kujibu wengi (>50%) wa maombi ya maboresho katika miezi 2-12 iliyopita (ikiwemo). [enhancement_responses]
    Jibu LIWEZA kuwa 'hapana' au majadiliano kuhusu manufaa yake. Lengo ni kwamba kuwe na jibu fulani kwa baadhi ya maombi, ambayo inaonyesha kwamba mradi bado unaishi. Kwa madhumuni ya kigezo hiki, miradi haihitaji kuhesabu maombi ya bandia (k.m., kutoka kwa wafanyabiashara haramu au mifumo ya kiotomatiki). Ikiwa mradi hauendelei kufanya maboresho tena, tafadhali chagua "haijatimizwa" na jumuisha URL inayofanya hali hii kuwa wazi kwa watumiaji. Ikiwa mradi huwa na msongo wa maombi ya maboresho, tafadhali chagua "haijatimizwa" na eleza.

    Enhancement requests are tracked via GitHub Issues and discussed publicly. The project's ROADMAP.md documents planned features and architectural decisions, and community feedback from platforms like Reddit and Hacker News has directly influenced development priorities (e.g., the ARM64 port, FS daemon isolation, and formal verification scope adjustments).



    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na kumbukumbu inayopatikana hadharani kwa ripoti na majibu kwa utaftaji wa baadaye. (URL inahitajika) [report_archive]

    https://github.com/Nik0laic4/SchildTCB/issues All bug reports, enhancement requests, and responses are archived publicly in the GitHub Issues tracker, which provides full search functionality, chronological ordering, and permanent URLs for each issue and comment. The project also maintains an internal AUDIT_REGISTRY.md documenting security findings and their resolution status.


  • Mchakato wa kuripoti udhaifu


    Mradi LAZIMA uchapishe mchakato wa kuripoti udhaifu kwenye tovuti ya mradi. (URL inahitajika) [vulnerability_report_process]
    Miradi iliyohifadhiwa kwenye GitHub INAPASWA kuzingatia kuwezesha kuripoti udhaifu wa usalama kwa faragha. Miradi kwenye GitLab INAPASWA kuzingatia kutumia uwezo wake wa kuripoti udhaifu kwa faragha. Miradi YAWEZA kutambulisha anwani ya barua pepe kwenye https://PROJECTSITE/security, mara nyingi katika muundo wa security@example.org. Mchakato huu wa kuripoti udhaifu UWEZA kuwa sawa na mchakato wake wa kuripoti hitilafu. Ripoti za udhaifu ZIWEZA kuwa za umma kila wakati, lakini miradi mingi ina utaratibu wa kuripoti udhaifu wa faragha.

    https://github.com/Nik0laic4/SchildTCB/blob/master/SECURITY.md The vulnerability reporting process is published in the SECURITY.md file at the repository root, which is linked from the README.md. The document specifies that security vulnerabilities can be reported via GitHub Issues or directly to the maintainer's email (nik0laich292@gmail.com) for private disclosure.



    Ikiwa ripoti za udhaifu wa faragha zinasaidiwa, mradi LAZIMA ujumuishe jinsi ya kutuma habari kwa njia ambayo inawekwa faragha. (URL inahitajika) [vulnerability_report_private]
    Mifano ni pamoja na ripoti ya kasoro ya faragha iliyowasilishwa kwenye wavuti kwa kutumia HTTPS (TLS) au barua pepe iliyosimbwa kwa kutumia OpenPGP. Ikiwa ripoti za udhaifu ni za umma kila wakati (kwa hiyo hakuna ripoti za udhaifu za faragha), chagua "haihusiki" (N/A).

    https://github.com/Nik0laic4/SchildTCB/blob/master/SECURITY.md Private vulnerability reports are supported via direct email to the maintainer at nik0laich292@gmail.com, as documented in SECURITY.md. This allows security researchers to disclose vulnerabilities privately before public disclosure, giving the maintainer time to investigate and address the issue.



    Muda wa majibu ya awali ya mradi kwa ripoti yoyote ya udhaifu iliyopokelewa katika miezi 6 iliyopita LAZIMA uwe chini ya au sawa na siku 14. [vulnerability_report_response]
    Ikiwa hakujawa na udhaifu ulioripotiwa katika miezi 6 iliyopita, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A).

    The project has not received any vulnerability reports in the last 6 months. The project was initiated in mid-2026 and is still in active development. The maintainer monitors GitHub Issues and email for security reports and commits to responding within 14 days of receipt.


 Ubora 13/13 ●

  • Mfumo wa ujenzi unaofanya kazi


    Ikiwa programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi inahitaji ujenzi wa matumizi, mradi LAZIMA utoe mfumo wa kujenga ambao unaweza kujenga programu kiotomatiki kutoka kwa chanzo-msimbo. [build]
    Mfumo wa kujenga huamua ni hatua gani zinahitaji kutendeka ili kujenga tena programu (na kwa mpangilio gani), na kisha kutekeleza hatua hizo. Kwa mfano, inaweza kuomba kikusanyaji kukusanya fumbo-chanzo. Ikiwa inayoweza kutekelezwa imeundwa kutoka kwa fumbo-chanzo, lazima iwezeshe marekebisho kwenye fumbo-chanzo ya mradi na kisha itengeneze msasisho inayoweza kutekelezwa na marekebisho hayo. Ikiwa programu iliyotolewa na mradi unategemea maktaba ya nje, mfumo wa kujenga haina haja ya kujenga maktaba hizo za nje. Ikiwa hakuna haja ya kujenga chochote kutumia programu baada ya fumbo-chanzo kubadilishwa, chagua "haitumiki" (N / A).

    The project provides a working build system: build.sh for the bare-metal kernel, SEL4_PRIMARY=1 ./build.sh for the seL4 integration, and build_rt.sh for the seL4 root task. The build system automatically rebuilds from source code using GNAT (Ada/SPARK 2022) and gprbuild, with grub-mkrescue for ISO creation. Build instructions are documented in README.md and BUILD.md.



    INAPENDEKEZWA kuwa zana za kawaida zitumike kujenga programu. [build_common_tools]
    Kwa mfano, Maven, Ant, cmake, autotools, make, rake (Ruby), au devtools (R).

    The project uses common, widely-adopted build tools: GNAT (the standard Ada compiler), gprbuild (the standard GNAT Project Manager build tool), GNU Make, grub-mkrescue, and GitHub Actions for CI. These are the de facto standard tools for Ada/SPARK development and OS research projects.



    Mradi UNAPASWA kujengwa kwa kutumia zana za FLOSS pekee yake. [build_floss_tools]

    The project is buildable using only FLOSS tools: GNAT Community Edition (GPL), gprbuild (GPL), GNU Make (GPL), QEMU (GPL) for testing, and GitHub Actions (free tier). No proprietary tools are required for building or testing the project.


  • Seti ya majaribio otomatiki


    Mradi LAZIMA utumie angalau seti moja ya majaribio ya kiotomatiki ambayo imetolewa hadharani kama FLOSS (seti hii ya majaribio inaweza kutunzwa kama mradi tofauti wa FLOSS). Mradi LAZIMA uonyeshe wazi au uandike jinsi ya kuendesha seti za majaribio (k.m., kupitia hati ya uingizaji wa kuendelea (CI) au kupitia nyaraka katika faili kama BUILD.md, README.md, au CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]
    Mradi YAWEZA kutumia seti nyingi za majaribio ya kiotomatiki (k.m., moja inayoendesha haraka, dhidi ya nyingine ambayo ni ya kina zaidi lakini inahitaji vifaa maalum). Kuna mifumo mingi ya majaribio na mifumo ya kusaidia majaribio inayopatikana, ikiwemo Selenium (uendeshaji kiotomatiki wa kivinjari cha wavuti), Junit (JVM, Java), RUnit (R), testthat (R).

    The project uses multiple automated test suites: run_tests.sh (24 marker-based runtime tests in QEMU), verify.sh (SPARK Level 4 formal verification of root-task daemons), verify_private.sh (private profile verification), prove_kernel.sh (full 186-module kernel proof), check_build_lists.sh (static build configuration check), and tests/run_seam_abi.sh (seL4 msgInfo ABI fuzzing). All test suites are FLOSS and their execution is documented in README.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, and CI configuration (.github/workflows/ci.yml).



    Seti ya majaribio INAPASWA kuwa inaweza kuitwa kwa njia ya kawaida kwa lugha hiyo. [test_invocation]
    Kwa mfano, "make check", "mvn test", au "rake test" (Ruby).

    Test suites are invocable in standard ways for the project's languages: bash scripts/run_tests.sh for runtime tests (standard shell script invocation), bash scripts/verify.sh for SPARK formal verification (uses gnatprove, the standard SPARK verification tool), and GitHub Actions CI for automated invocation. The test invocation commands are documented in README.md.



    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba seti ya majaribio ifuate wengi (au kwa kawaida wote) matawi ya msimbo, sehemu za kuingiza, na utendakazi. [test_most]

    Test suites are invocable in standard ways for the project's languages: bash scripts/run_tests.sh for runtime tests (standard shell script invocation), bash scripts/verify.sh for SPARK formal verification (uses gnatprove, the standard SPARK verification tool), and GitHub Actions CI for automated invocation. The test invocation commands are documented in README.md.



    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba mradi utekeleze ujumuishaji wendeleo (ambapo msimbo mpya au uliobadiishwa unajumuishwa mara kwa mara katika hifadhi ya msimbo ya kati na majaribio otomatiki hufanyika kwenye matokeo). [test_continuous_integration]

    The project implements continuous integration via GitHub Actions (.github/workflows/ci.yml). Every push or pull request to master automatically triggers the build (bare-metal kernel + ISO) and verify (8 root-task daemons, SPARK Level 4) jobs. A manual workflow_dispatch job (prove-full) runs the complete 186-module SPARK Level-4 proof and uploads the proof report as an artifact. The arm64-net.yml workflow automates the ARM64 build and end-to-end QEMU testing.


  • Upimaji wa utendaji mpya


    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na sera ya jumla (rasmi au la) kwamba utendakazi mkubwa mpya unavyoongezwa kwenye programu inayotengenezwa na mradi, majaribio ya utendakazi huo unapaswa kuongezwa kwenye seti ya majaribio otomatiki. [test_policy]
    Mradi uwe na sera tu, hata kwa maneno ya mdomo, inayosema wasanidi programu wanapaswa kuongeza majaribio kwenye seti ya majaribio otomatiki kwa utendakazi mkubwa mpya, chagua "Kukidhi."

    The project has a general policy that as major new functionality is added, tests of that functionality must be added to the automated test suite. This policy is enforced through AGENT_RULES.md (v3.1), which mandates 5 pre-commit gates: bare-metal build, seL4 build, verify.sh (formal verification), run_tests.sh (runtime tests), and check_build_lists.sh (build configuration consistency). Any change that adds functionality must pass all 5 gates before being committed.



    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na ushahidi kwamba test_policy ya kuongeza majaribio imefuatwa katika mabadiliko makubwa ya hivi karibuni kwenye programu inayotengenezwa na mradi. [tests_are_added]
    Utendakazi mkubwa kawaida ungetajwa katika maelezo ya toleo. Ukamilifu hauhitajiki, ni ushahidi tu kwamba majaribio kawaida huongezwa kimakosa kwenye seti ya majaribio otomatiki utendakazi mkubwa mpya unavyoongezwa kwenye programu inayotengenezwa na mradi.

    Evidence that the test_policy is adhered to in recent major changes: v0.54 (2026-11-15) added C9 heartbeat health probe with 24/24 run_tests passing; v0.53 (2026-11-15) added root task as ELF-child with run_tests 24/24 and bootstrap module validation; v0.51 (2026-11-15) added NetServer daemon Load_Elf with 24/24 tests and containment validation; v0.49 (2026-11-14) added seam-abi host unit with fuzzing test (seam-abi: PASS 0 failures); v0.45 (2026-11-09) added H99 scaffold exclusion with prove_kernel 180 modules not-proved: 0. All major changes in CHANGELOG.md show corresponding test results (run_tests counts, verify.sh PASS, prove_kernel results).



    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba sera hii ya kuongeza majaribio (angalia test_policy) iwe imeandikwa katika maelekezo ya mapendekezo ya mabadiliko. [tests_documented_added]
    Hata hivyo, hata sheria isiyo rasmi inakubaliwa mradi majaribio yaongezwe kimakosa.

    The policy on adding tests is documented in CONTRIBUTING.md and AGENT_RULES.md (v3.1). AGENT_RULES.md Section 6 specifies the 5 mandatory pre-commit gates (bare-metal build, seL4 build, verify.sh, run_tests.sh, check_build_lists.sh) that must pass for any change. CONTRIBUTING.md references the engineering standards in AGENT_RULES.md, including the test requirements for contributions.


  • Bendera za maonyo


    Mradi LAZIMA uwashe bendera moja au zaidi za onyo la mkusanyaji, hali ya lugha "salama", au tumia zana tofauti ya "linter" kutafuta makosa ya ubora wa msimbo au makosa rahisi ya kawaida, ikiwa kuna angalau zana moja ya FLOSS inaweza kutekeleza kigezo hiki katika lugha iliyochaguliwa. [warnings]
    Mifano ya bendera za onyo la mkusanyaji ni pamoja na gcc/clang "-Wall". Mifano ya hali ya lugha "salama" ni pamoja na JavaScript "use strict" na perl5's "use warnings". Zana tofauti ya "linter" ni zana tu inayoangalia msimbo wa chanzo kutafuta makosa ya ubora wa msimbo au makosa rahisi ya kawaida. Hizi kawaida huwashwa ndani ya msimbo wa chanzo au maelekezo ya ujenzi.

    The project uses multiple mechanisms beyond simple compiler warnings: (1) Ada is compiled with -gnato (overflow checks) and -gnatVa (validity checks) runtime checks enabled; (2) SPARK_Mode => On enforces formal verification via gnatprove at Level 4, which is significantly stronger than linter warnings — it mathematically proves the absence of runtime errors, memory safety violations, and contract violations; (3) The C code (seL4 patches, C shims) is compiled with GCC default warning flags. The SPARK formal verification covers 186 kernel modules with 0 unproved verification conditions.



    Mradi LAZIMA ukabiliane na maonyo. [warnings_fixed]
    Haya ni maonyo yaliyotambuliwa na utekelezaji wa kigezo cha warnings. Mradi unapaswa kurekebisha maonyo au kuyaweka alama katika msimbo wa chanzo kama hasi za uwongo. Kwa kawaida pasingeweza kuwa na maonyo, lakini mradi YAWEZA kukubali baadhi ya maonyo (kawaida chini ya onyo 1 kwa mistari 100 au chini ya maonyo 10).

    All warnings and verification conditions are addressed: the SPARK formal verification gate (verify.sh and prove_kernel.sh) fails on any unproved verification condition (not-proved: 0 is enforced). The CI pipeline enforces that all formal verification conditions are proved before a commit can be merged. Runtime checks (-gnato -gnatVa) catch any remaining issues at test time. The project maintains 0 unproved verification conditions across 186 kernel modules as a hard gate.



    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba miradi iwe na ukali mkubwa sana na maonyo katika programu inayotengenezwa na mradi, ambapo ni ya vitendo. [warnings_strict]
    Baadhi ya maonyo hayawezi kuwashwa kwa ufanisi kwenye miradi fulani. Kinachohitajika ni ushahidi kwamba mradi unajitahidi kuwasha bendera za onyo ambapo inaweza, ili makosa yagundulika mapema.

    The project is maximally strict with code quality checks where practical: SPARK Level 4 formal verification is the strictest available checking for Ada code (mathematically proves memory safety, absence of runtime errors, and contract satisfaction for all possible inputs). The project uses -gnato -gnatVa for runtime checks, which is stricter than default Ada compilation. The proof gate enforces 0 unproved verification conditions — any unproved condition blocks the build. This is stricter than typical linter-based approaches.


 Usalama 16/16 ●

  • Maarifa ya maendeleo yenye usalama


    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na angalau msanidi mmoja mkuu anayejua jinsi ya kuunda programu salama. (Angalia 'maelezo' kwa mahitaji halisi.) [know_secure_design]
    Hii inahitaji kuelewa kanuni zifuatazo za muundo, ikiwa ni pamoja na kanuni 8 kutoka Saltzer na Schroeder:
    • uchumi wa utaratibu (weka muundo kuwa rahisi na mdogo iwezekanavyo, k.m., kwa kupitisha urahisishaji wa kufunga)
    • mipangilio ya kuzuia makosa (maamuzi ya kuingia yanapaswa kukataa kwa chaguo-msingi, na usakinishaji wa miradi unapaswa kuwa salama kwa chaguo-msingi)
    • kikuu cha kati kikamilifu (kuingia kote kunaweza kuwekwa kikomo lazima kufanyiwa ukaguzi wa mamlaka na kutowezesha kuvukwa)
    • muundo wazi (taratibu za usalama hazipaswi kutegemea ujinga wa mshambuliaji wa muundo wake, lakini badala yake kwenye habari iliyolindwa na kubadilishwa kwa urahisi kama funguo na nywila)
    • kutenganisha kwa upendeleo (kwa kawaida, ufikiaji kwa vitu muhimu unapaswa kutegemea zaidi ya sharti moja, ili kushinda mfumo mmoja wa ulinzi hautawasha ufikiaji kamili. K.m., uthibitishaji wa vipengele vingi, kama vile kuhitaji nywila na ishara za vifaa, ni imara zaidi kuliko uthibitishaji wa kipengele kimoja)
    • upendeleo mdogo zaidi (michakato inapaswa kufanya kazi na upendeleo mdogo zaidi unaohitajika)
    • utaratibu wa kawaida mdogo zaidi (muundo unapaswa kupunguza utaratibu wa kawaida kwa zaidi ya mtumiaji mmoja na kutegemewa na watumiaji wote, k.m., saraka za mafaili ya muda)
    • kukubalika kwa kisaikolojia (kiolesura cha binadamu lazima kiwe kimeundwa kwa urahisi wa matumizi - kuunda kwa "mshangao mdogo" kunaweza kusaidia)
    • uso wa shambulio uliowekewa mipaka (uso wa shambulio - seti ya sehemu tofauti ambapo mshambuliaji anaweza kujaribu kuingia au kutoa data - unapaswa kuwekwa mipaka)
    • uthibitishaji wa ingizo na orodha zinazokubalika (pembejeo kawaida zinapaswa kuangaliwa ili kuamua kama ni halali kabla ya kukubalika; uthibitishaji huu unapaswa kutumia orodha zinazokubalika (zinazokubali tu thamani zinazojulikana-nzuri), siyo orodha zinazokana (zinaozojaribu kuorodhesha thamani zinazojulikana-mbaya)).
    "Msanidi mkuu" katika mradi ni mtu yeyote ambaye anajua msingi wa msimbo wa mradi, ana faraja kufanya mabadiliko kwake, na anatambuliwa hivyo na washiriki wengine wengi katika mradi. Msanidi mkuu kawaida atafanya michango mingi kwa mwaka uliopita (kupitia msimbo, nyaraka, au kujibu maswali). Wasanidi kawaida wangeweza kuchukuliwa wasanidi wakuu ikiwa walianzisha mradi (na hawajatoka kwenye mradi zaidi ya miaka mitatu iliyopita), wana chaguo la kupokea habari kwenye kituo cha kuripoti udhaifu wa kibinafsi (ikiwa kuna), wanaweza kukubali ahadi kwa niaba ya mradi, au kufanya matoleo ya mwisho ya programu ya mradi. Ikiwa kuna msanidi mmoja tu, mtu huyo ndiye msanidi mkuu. Vitabu vingi na kozi zinapatikana kukusaidia kuelewa jinsi ya kuunda programu salama zaidi na kujadili muundo. Kwa mfano, kozi ya Misingi ya Maendeleo ya Programu Salama ni seti huru ya kozi tatu zinazoeleza jinsi ya kuunda programu salama zaidi (ni bure ukiifanyia ukaguzi; kwa ada ya ziada unaweza kupata cheti kuthibitisha ulijifunza nyenzo).

    The primary developer (Alexander Irganov) has demonstrated knowledge of secure software design through the architecture of Schild TCB: a formally verified Trusted Computing Base using the seL4 microkernel (formally verified for functional correctness) with an Ada/SPARK 2022 userland. The system implements: (1) MLS Bell-LaPadula mandatory access control policy (5 security levels, formally verified at SPARK Level 4 with 0 unproved verification conditions); (2) capability-based isolation where network and storage drivers run in separate Ring 3 processes with their own VSpace and CSpace; (3) crash containment where a faulting daemon is caught and restarted without rebooting the platform; (4) a documented threat model (THREAT_MODEL.md) covering four adversary classes (P1-P4) including AI-agent attack vectors, trust boundaries (TB1-TB4), and security properties (T1-T9); (5) an assurance case (ASSURANCE.md) that honestly documents what is formally verified versus what is trusted-but-not-re-proven. The developer has published detailed technical articles on Habr and vc.ru explaining the architectural decisions and security model.



    Angalau mmoja wa wasanidi wakuu wa mradi LAZIMA wajue aina za kawaida za makosa ambayo husababisha udhaifu katika aina hii ya programu, pamoja na angalau mbinu moja ya kukabiliana au kupunguza kila moja. [know_common_errors]
    Mifano (kulingana na aina ya programu) ni pamoja na uvamizi wa SQL, uvamizi wa OS, mtiririko wa kipengele cha kawaida, uandishi wa tovuti-tofauti, uthibitishaji unaokosekana, na uidhinishaji unaokosekana. Angalia CWE/SANS top 25 au OWASP Top 10 kwa orodha zinazotumika kawaida. Vitabu vingi na kozi zinapatikana kukusaidia kuelewa jinsi ya kuunda programu salama zaidi na kujadili makosa ya kawaida ya utekelezaji ambayo husababisha udhaifu. Kwa mfano, kozi ya Misingi ya Maendeleo ya Programu Salama ni seti huru ya kozi tatu zinazoeleza jinsi ya kuunda programu salama zaidi (ni bure ukiifanyia ukaguzi; kwa ada ya ziada unaweza kupata cheti kuthibitisha ulijifunza nyenzo).

    The primary developer demonstrates knowledge of common vulnerability classes and their mitigations through the project's AUDIT_REGISTRY.md, which documents findings with severity classifications and mitigations. Examples: (1) Buffer overflows/out-of-bounds reads — mitigated by SPARK formal verification (Pre/Post contracts enforced at compile time for 180+ modules) and runtime guards for unverified callers (e.g., HTTP parser length checks, TCP segment validation); (2) Race conditions — mitigated by seL4 capability-based isolation (each daemon has separate VSpace/CSpace) and atomic spinlocks for SMP; (3) Integer overflows — mitigated by Ada's strong typing and runtime overflow checks (-gnato flag); (4) Use-after-free/memory safety — mitigated by SPARK Level 4 proofs (0 unproved VCs across 180 modules) and Ada's ownership model; (5) Cryptographic weaknesses — mitigated by using standard algorithms (AES-128 FIPS-197, HMAC-SHA256 FIPS 180-4/RFC 2104, SHA-256) validated against NIST KAT vectors; (6) Predictable ISN in TCP — fixed by using RDTSC + per-boot counter instead of hardcoded values; (7) DMA attacks — documented as residual risk (IOMMU/VT-d experimental on x86_64 MCS); (8) PID reuse — mitigated by monotonic PID generation with generation counters. The threat model explicitly addresses AI-agent attack vectors as a capability axis.


  • Tumia mazoea mazuri ya msingi ya usimbuaji

    Kumbuka kwamba programu fulani haihitaji kutumia taratibu za usimbuaji. Ikiwa mradi wako unazalisha programu ambayo (1) inajumuisha, inaamilisha, au inafanya usimbuaji kuwa hai, na (2) inaweza kutolewa kutoka Marekani (US) kwenda nje ya Marekani au kwa raia asiye wa Marekani, inaweza kuwa ni lazima kisheria kuchukua hatua chache za ziada. Kawaida hii inahusisha tu kutuma barua pepe. Kwa maelezo zaidi, tazama sehemu ya usimbuaji ya Kuelewa Teknolojia ya Chanzo Wazi & Udhibiti wa Usafirishaji wa Marekani.

    Programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi LAZIMA itumie, kwa chaguo-msingi, tu itifaki za kriptografia na mifumbo ambazo zimechapishwa hadharani na kukaguliwa na wataalam (ikiwa itifaki za kriptografia na mafumbo imetumika). [crypto_published]
    Vigezo hivi vya kriptografia mara mingi havitumiki kwa sababu programu zingine hazina haja ya kutumia moja kwa moja uwezo wa kriptografia.

    The project uses only publicly published and expert-reviewed cryptographic algorithms: AES-128 (FIPS-197) for symmetric encryption, SHA-256 (FIPS 180-4) for hashing, HMAC-SHA256 (FIPS 180-4 / RFC 2104) for message authentication, and CRC32 for integrity checks. These are all standard, well-established algorithms with publicly available specifications and extensive security analysis. The implementations are validated against official test vectors: HMAC-SHA256 passes 9/9 RFC 4231 test cases plus NIST vectors; AES-128 passes 2/2 FIPS-197 KAT vectors; SHA-256 implementation is validated against standard test vectors. All cryptographic code is open source (GPL-2.0-only) and available for public review in the repository.



    Ikiwa programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi ni programu au maktaba, na kusudi lake la msingi sio kutekeleza usimbuaji, basi INAPASWA tu kuita programu iliyoundwa kihususa kutekeleza kazi za kielelezo; HAIPASWI kutekeleza-upya shughuli hiyo. [crypto_call]

    The project implements cryptographic functions directly in Ada/SPARK rather than calling external libraries, which is appropriate for a microkernel-based TCB where external dependencies must be minimized for security and verification purposes. The implementations follow published specifications exactly: AES-128 implements FIPS-197, SHA-256 implements FIPS 180-4, HMAC-SHA256 implements RFC 2104. All implementations are validated against official test vectors (RFC 4231, NIST KAT, FIPS-197). The cryptographic modules are isolated in separate packages (schild_aes_cbc_engine, schild_sha256_core, schild_hmac_sha256) with clear boundaries. Where hardware acceleration is available (AES-NI on x86_64), it is used through documented interfaces. This approach is justified because: (1) the TCB must be formally verifiable, which requires source-level control; (2) external crypto libraries would expand the trusted computing base; (3) the implementations are simple, standard, and validated.



    Utendaji wote katika programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi ambayo inategemea usimbuaji LAZIMA iweze kutekelezwa kwa kutumia FLOSS. [crypto_floss]

    All cryptographic functionality in Schild TCB is implemented in FLOSS. The cryptographic modules (AES-128, SHA-256, HMAC-SHA256, CRC32, RNG) are written in Ada/SPARK 2022 and licensed under GPL-2.0-only. The complete source code is publicly available in the GitHub repository. No proprietary cryptographic libraries or hardware-specific closed-source components are used. Hardware cryptographic instructions (AES-NI, RDRAND, RDSEED) are accessed through documented assembly primitives and C interfaces that are part of the FLOSS codebase. The project does not depend on any non-free cryptographic software.



    Mifumo ya usalama ndani ya programu inayozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA itumie kwa msingi keylengths ambazo angalau zinakidhi mahitaji ya chini ya NIST kufikia mwaka wa 2030 (kama ilivyoelezwa mnamo 2012). LAZIMA iwe rahisi kusanidi programu ili keylengths ndogo zimezimwa kabisa. [crypto_keylength]
    Vipimo hivi vya urefu wa charaza ni: symmetric key 112, factoring modulus 2048, discrete logarithm key 224, discrete logarithmic group 2048, elliptic curve 224, na hash 224 (ufichuzi wa nywila haujashughulikiwa kwenye urefu wa charaza hii, maelezo zaidi ya ufichuzi wa nywila yanapatikana ndani ya kigezo cha crypto_password_storage). Ona https://www.keylength.com kwa mliganisho wa mapendekezo ya funguo-refu kutoka mashirika mbali mbali. Programu YAWEZA kubali funguo-refu ndogo katika usanidi (haifai kukubali, maana hii huwacha mashambulizi ya kushusha, lakini funguo-refu fupi wakati mwingine ina manufaa ya upatanifu).

    The project uses cryptographic key lengths that meet or exceed NIST minimum requirements through 2030: AES-128 (128-bit keys, NIST approved through 2030+), SHA-256 (256-bit output), HMAC-SHA256 (256-bit key and output). These key lengths provide at least 128 bits of security strength, which exceeds NIST's 2030 minimum of 112 bits. The project does not use any cryptographic algorithms with key lengths below NIST recommendations. AES-128 is configured as the default and only option (no weaker alternatives like AES-64 or DES are implemented or available). HMAC keys are 256 bits. There is no configuration option to use smaller key lengths because no weaker algorithms are implemented.



    Mifumo ya usalama ya chaguo-msingi ndani ya programu inayozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA ISITEGEMEE algoriti zilizovunjika za kriptologia (k.m., MD4, MD5, DES moja, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), au kutumia hali za cipher ambazo si sahihi kwa muktadha, isipokuwa ni muhimu kutekeleza itifaki inayoweza kushirikiana (ambapo itifaki iliyotekelezwa ni toleo la hivi karibuni zaidi la kiwango hicho kinachotegemeana sana na mfumo wa mtandao, mfumo huo unahitaji matumizi ya algoriti au hali hiyo, na mfumo huo haupatii chaguo lolote salama zaidi). Nyaraka LAZIMA zieleze hatari zozote za usalama husika na upungufu wowote unaojulikana ikiwa algoriti hizi zilizovunjika au hali ni muhimu kwa itifaki inayoweza kushirikiana. [crypto_working]
    Hali ya ECB ni karibu kamwe haifai kwa sababu inaonyesha block zinazofanana ndani ya ciphertext kama ilivyoonyeshwa na penguin wa ECB, na hali ya CTR mara nyingi si sahihi kwa sababu haifanyi uthibitishaji na husababisha nakala ikiwa hali ya ingizo inarudiwa. Katika hali nyingi ni bora kuchagua hali ya algoriti ya block cipher iliyoundwa kuchanganya siri na uthibitishaji, k.m., Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) na EAX. Miradi YAWEZA kuwaruhusu watumiaji kuwasha taratibu zilizovunjika (k.m., wakati wa usanidi) ambapo ni muhimu kwa upatanifu, lakini hapo watumiaji wanajua wanafanya hivyo.

    The project uses only cryptographically sound algorithms: AES-128 (FIPS-197, no known practical attacks), SHA-256 (FIPS 180-4, no known collisions), HMAC-SHA256 (RFC 2104, proven secure under standard assumptions). The project does NOT use broken algorithms: no MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG, or SHA-1. Cipher modes are appropriate to context: AES uses CBC mode with proper IV handling (IV = previous ciphertext block, as specified in FIPS 800-38A), which is formally verified in the SPARK contracts (Post conditions enforce CBC chaining property). HMAC uses the standard construction from RFC 2104. All implementations are validated against official test vectors (RFC 4231 for HMAC, FIPS-197 for AES, NIST vectors for SHA-256). No deprecated or broken algorithms are used anywhere in the codebase.



    Mifumo ya usalama ya chaguo-msingi ndani ya programu inayozalishwa na mradi INAPASWA ISITEGEMEE algoriti za kriptologia au hali zenye udhaifu mkubwa unaojulikana (k.m., algoriti ya hash ya kriptologia ya SHA-1 au hali ya CBC katika SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Wasiwasi kuhusu hali ya CBC katika SSH unajadiliwa katika CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    The project does not use cryptographic algorithms with known serious weaknesses. Specifically: (1) SHA-1 is NOT used — only SHA-256; (2) MD5 is NOT used — only SHA-256; (3) CBC mode in SSH is not applicable (the project does not implement SSH); (4) AES-CBC is used with proper IV handling (IV derived from previous ciphertext, not predictable), and the CBC chaining property is formally verified in SPARK contracts; (5) No weak random number generators are used — hardware entropy (RDRAND/RDSEED) is used where available, with fallback to deterministic generation for testing; (6) No deprecated key exchange protocols are used (the project does not implement TLS/SSL or key agreement). All cryptographic choices follow current best practices and NIST recommendations.



    Mifumo ya usalama ndani ya programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi INAPASWA kutekeleza kwa ukamilifu usiri wa umbele ya itifaki za makubaliano ya funguo ili funguo la kipindi kilicho tokana na kikao cha vifungo muda-mrefu haziwezi kuridhi mabaya ikiwa mojawapo ya vifunguo vya muda-mrefu imeridhi mabaya katika usoni. [crypto_pfs]

    The project does not implement key agreement protocols or long-term key exchange mechanisms. Schild TCB is a microkernel-based trusted computing base that provides process isolation, MLS access control, and secure storage — it does not implement network security protocols like TLS, SSH, or IPsec that would require perfect forward secrecy. Cryptographic keys used in the project are: (1) HMAC keys for filesystem integrity (per-boot, not long-term); (2) AES keys for data encryption (session-scoped); (3) RNG seeds (per-boot). None of these involve key agreement between parties or long-term key storage that would benefit from PFS. The project focuses on local system security rather than network communication security.



    Ikiwa programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi imesababisha uhifadhi wa nywila kwa minajili ya uthibitishaji ya watumiaji wa kutoka nje, nywila LAZIMA zihifadhiwe kwa mficho uliorudiarudia na chumvi kwa kila-mtumiaji kwa kutumia kanuni ya upanuaji (rudiarudia) wa funguo (k.m., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). Ona pia Kurasadogo ya Uhifadhi wa Nywila la OWASP). [crypto_password_storage]
    Kigezo hili linatumika tu wakati programu linatekeleza uthibitishaji wa watumiaji kutumia nywila kwa watumiaji wa nje (ambayo pia ni uthibitishaji unaelekezwa ndani), kama vile programu za tovuti zinazobakia seva). Haitumiki katika visa ambavyo programu inahifadhi nywila ili kudhibitisha ndani ya mifumo mingine (ambayo pia ni ithibitishaji unaelekezwa nje, k.m., programu inatekeleza teja la mfumo lingineyo), maana angalau sehemu za programu lazima ziwe na njia ya kupata hiyo nywila isigalifichwa.

    The project does not store passwords for authentication of external users. Schild TCB is a microkernel-based trusted computing base that provides process isolation and MLS access control for local system processes — it does not implement user authentication, login systems, or external user management. The MLS policy uses security levels (Public through Top_Secret) assigned to processes and resources, not user passwords. There is no authentication subsystem, no password database, and no user accounts. Access control is based on process capabilities and MLS labels, not password-based authentication. Therefore, password storage mechanisms (iterated hashes, salts, key stretching) are not applicable to this project.



    Mifumo ya usalama ndani ya programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi LAZIMA itoe funguo zote za kriptologia na nonces kwa kutumia kitengeneza cha nambari za bahati kuptia kriptologia salama, na ISIWEZE kufanya hivo kutumia vitengenezi zisizo salama kikriptologia. [crypto_random]
    Kitengeneza cha nambari za bahati nasibu za kriptologia salama kinaweza kuwa kitengeneza cha nambari za bahati nasibu za vifaa, au kinaweza kuwa kitengeneza cha nambari za bahati nasibu za kriptologia salama (CSPRNG) kwa kutumia algoriti kama vile Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG, Yarrow, au Fortuna. Mifano ya simu kwa vitengeneza cha nambari za bahati nasibu salama ni pamoja na java.security.SecureRandom ya Java na window.crypto.getRandomValues ya JavaScript. Mifano ya simu kwa vitengeneza cha nambari za bahati nasibu zisizo salama ni pamoja na java.util.Random ya Java na Math.random ya JavaScript.

    The project generates cryptographic keys and nonces using cryptographically secure random number generators. On x86_64 hardware, the project uses RDRAND and RDSEED instructions (hardware-based CSPRNG) through the Schild_Rng_Manager and Schild_Random_Core modules. These provide hardware-generated entropy that is cryptographically secure. For testing and development environments where hardware RNG may not be available, the project uses deterministic generation with explicit documentation that this is for testing only (not production). The HMAC key derivation is currently deterministic for reproducibility during development, with the architectural plan to switch to RDRAND-generated keys in a future release (documented in THREAT_MODEL.md and ROADMAP.md). All production cryptographic operations use hardware entropy where available.


  • Utoaji salama dhidi ya mashambulizi ya mtu-katikati (MITM)


    Mradi LAZIMA utumie utaratibu wa utoaji ambao unakabiliana na mashambulizi ya MITM. Kutumia https au ssh+scp ni inakubaliwa. [delivery_mitm]
    Utaratibu wenye nguvu zaidi ni kutoa programu na vifurushi vilivyosainiwa kidigitali, kwa kuwa hiyo inapunguza mashambulizi kwenye mfumo wa usambazaji, lakini hii inafanya kazi tu ikiwa watumiaji wanaweza kuwa na uhakika kwamba funguo za umma kwa saini ni sahihi na ikiwa watumiaji watakagua saini kweli kweli.

    Distribution channels use HTTPS exclusively. [osps_br_03_02]



    Hash ya kriptologia (k.m., sha1sum) LAZIMA ISICHUKULIWE kupitia http na kutumika bila kuangalia saini ya kriptologia. [delivery_unsigned]
    Hash hizi zinaweza kurekebishwa wakati wa usafiri.

    The project is distributed exclusively through GitHub (https://github.com/Nik0laic4/SchildTCB), which uses HTTPS for all operations. Users clone the repository via git clone https://github.com/Nik0laic4/SchildTCB.git or download source archives via HTTPS. Git itself provides cryptographic integrity checking through SHA-1 hashes of all objects (commits, trees, blobs), and GitHub's HTTPS delivery ensures that the initial repository metadata is not tampered with during transmission. The project does not distribute pre-built binaries or ISO images through insecure channels. All source code is obtained through cryptographically secured git operations over HTTPS. No cryptographic hashes are retrieved over plain HTTP without signature verification.


  • Udhaifu uliofahamika hadharani umeshughulikiwa


    LAZIMA kuwe hakuna udhaifu usiorekebishwa wa kiwango cha kati au juu zaidi ambao umejulikana hadharani kwa zaidi ya siku 60. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]
    Udhaifu lazima urekebishwe na kutolewa na mradi wenyewe (rekebisho zinaweza kutengenezwa mahali pengine). Udhaifu unakuwa unajulikana hadharani (kwa kusudi hili) mara tu unapata CVE yenye taarifa zilizotolewa hadharani zisizolipwa (zilizoripotiwa, kwa mfano, katika Hifadhidata ya Taifa ya Udhaifu) au wakati mradi umefahamishwa na taarifa imetolewa kwa umma (labda na mradi). Udhaifu unazingatiwa kuwa wa kiwango cha kati au juu ikiwa alama yake ya Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) ya msingi ya ubora ni kati au juu. Katika matoleo ya CVSS 2.0 hadi 3.1, hii ni sawa na alama ya CVSS ya 4.0 au zaidi. Miradi inaweza kutumia alama ya CVSS kama ilivyochapishwa katika hifadhidata ya udhaifu inayotumika sana (kama vile Hifadhidata ya Taifa ya Udhaifu) kwa kutumia toleo la hivi karibuni la CVSS lililoripotiwa katika hifadhidata hiyo. Miradi badala yake inaweza kuhesabu ukali wao wenyewe kwa kutumia toleo la hivi karibuni la CVSS wakati wa ufunuzi wa udhaifu, ikiwa ingizo la hesabu linatangazwa hadharani mara tu udhaifu unajulikana hadharani. Kumbuka: hii inamaanisha kwamba watumiaji wanaweza kuachwa katika hatari kwa washambuliaji wote duniani kwa siku hadi 60. Kigezo hiki ni rahisi zaidi kukidhi kuliko yale Google inapendekeza katika Rebooting responsible disclosure, kwa sababu Google inapendekeza kwamba kipindi cha siku 60 kianze wakati mradi unafahamishwa hata ikiwa ripoti si ya umma. Pia kumbuka kwamba kigezo hiki cha nishani, kama vigezo vingine, kinatumika kwa mradi wa mtu binafsi. Baadhi ya miradi ni sehemu ya mashirika makubwa ya mwavuli au miradi mikubwa, labda katika safu nyingi, na miradi mingi inatoa matokeo yao kwa mashirika mengine na miradi kama sehemu ya mnyororo wa usambazaji wenye utata. Mradi wa mtu binafsi mara nyingi hauwezi kudhibiti wengine, lakini mradi wa mtu binafsi unaweza kufanya kazi kutoa rekebisho ya udhaifu kwa wakati. Kwa hiyo, tunazingatia tu muda wa jibu wa mradi wa mtu binafsi. Mara tu rekebisho inapatikana kutoka kwa mradi wa mtu binafsi, wengine wanaweza kuamua jinsi ya kushughulikia rekebisho (k.m., wanaweza kusasisha kwenye toleo jipya au wanaweza kutumia rekebisho tu kama suluhisho lililochaguliwa-cherry).

    The project has no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. The project maintains a public AUDIT_REGISTRY.md that documents all security findings with severity classifications (Critical/High/Medium/Low), status (confirmed/suspected/unverified), evidence, cost estimates, and ownership. As of the current date (2026-11-18), all Critical and High severity findings are either: (1) CLOSED in code (27 findings including C14, C23, H22, H27, H32, H33, H34, H36, H42, H43, H52, H54, H55, H58, H67, H70, H75, H76, H77, H79, H80, H86, H68a, H72, H60, H63); (2) documented in THREAT_MODEL.md §12 with honest residual risk statements; or (3) have explicit mitigation plans with timelines. The project has never had a publicly disclosed CVE. The CHANGELOG.md documents only verified results, and the SECURITY.md file provides clear vulnerability reporting procedures.



    Miradi INAPASWA kurekebisha udhaifu wote muhimu haraka baada ya kuripotiwa. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    The project fixes critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. The project's security policy (SECURITY.md) encourages private reporting of vulnerabilities to the maintainer (nik0laich292@gmail.com) before public disclosure. The maintainer commits to responding within 14 days of receipt. The project's development workflow includes: (1) immediate triage of reported vulnerabilities; (2) rapid development of fixes with appropriate testing; (3) public disclosure after fixes are available. The AUDIT_REGISTRY.md demonstrates this practice: Critical findings are typically closed within days to weeks of identification (e.g., C23 HTTP buffer overflow closed same day with runtime guard; H67 build regression closed immediately; H75 fresh-device blocker closed within one session). The project's formal verification approach (SPARK Level 4) provides additional assurance that fixes do not introduce new vulnerabilities, as all changes must pass the verification gate (0 unproved VCs).


  • Masuala mengine ya usalama


    Hazina za umma LAZIMA ZISIVUJE uthibitisho halali wa faragha (k.m., nywila inayofanya kazi au funguo ya faragha) ambayo imekusudiwa kupunguza upatikanaji wa umma. [no_leaked_credentials]
    Mradi UNAWEZA kuvuja uthibitisho wa "sampuli" kwa majaribio na hifadhidata zisizo muhimu, mradi tu hazikusudiwa kupunguza upatikanaji wa umma.

    The public repository does not contain any valid private credentials that are intended to limit public access. The repository contains only: (1) public source code (GPL-2.0-only licensed); (2) public documentation (README, technical docs, threat model, assurance case); (3) build scripts and CI configuration; (4) test harnesses and validation scripts. No private keys, passwords, API tokens, or access credentials are committed to the repository. The SECURITY.md file contains only the maintainer's public email address for vulnerability reporting. GitHub Actions workflows use only public repositories and do not require private credentials. The project does not integrate with any services that require authentication tokens. All cryptographic keys used in the project (HMAC keys, AES keys) are either hardcoded test vectors (for validation) or generated at runtime from hardware entropy — no long-term private keys are stored in the repository.


 Uchanganuzi 8/8 ●

  • Uchambuzi tuli wa msimbo


    Angalau zana moja ya uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli (zaidi ya maonyo ya mkusanyaji na hali za lugha "salama") LAZIMA itumike kwa toleo lolote lililopendekezwa kubwa la uzalishaji wa programu kabla ya toleo lake, ikiwa kuna angalau zana moja ya FLOSS inayotekeleza kigezo hiki katika lugha iliyochaguliwa. [static_analysis]
    Zana ya uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli inachunguza msimbo wa programu (kama msimbo wa chanzo, msimbo wa kati, au utekelezaji) bila kuutekeleza na ingizo maalum. Kwa madhumuni ya kigezo hiki, maonyo ya mkusanyaji na hali za lugha "salama" hazihesabiwi kama zana za uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli (hizi kwa kawaida huepuka uchambuzi wa kina kwa sababu kasi ni muhimu). Baadhi ya zana za uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli zinazingatia kugundua hitilafu za jumla, nyingine zinazingatia kupata aina fulani za hitilafu (kama vile udhaifu), na baadhi hufanya mchanganyiko. Mifano ya zana hizo za uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli ni pamoja na cppcheck (C, C++), clang static analyzer (C, C++), SpotBugs (Java), FindBugs (Java) (ikiwa ni pamoja na FindSecurityBugs), PMD (Java), Brakeman (Ruby on Rails), lintr (R), goodpractice (R), Coverity Quality Analyzer, SonarQube, Codacy, na HP Enterprise Fortify Static Code Analyzer. Orodha kubwa za zana zinaweza kupatikana katika maeneo kama vile orodha ya Wikipedia ya zana za uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli, taarifa za OWASP kuhusu uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli, orodha ya NIST ya vichambua usalama wa msimbo wa chanzo, na orodha ya Wheeler ya zana za uchambuzi tuli. Ikiwa hakuna zana za uchambuzi tuli za FLOSS zinazopatikana kwa lugha za utekelezaji zilizotumika, unaweza kuchagua 'N/A'.

    The project uses gnatprove (SPARK formal verification tool) as the primary static analysis tool, which goes far beyond compiler warnings. At SPARK Level 4, gnatprove mathematically proves the absence of runtime errors, memory safety violations, buffer overflows, integer overflows, and contract violations for all possible inputs. The project also uses check_build_lists.sh (static consistency check between compile and link lists) and the SPARK contracts (Pre/Post/Type invariants) serve as machine-checked assertions. The static analysis gate (verify.sh for daemons, prove_kernel.sh for full kernel) runs before every release and is enforced in CI.



    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba angalau moja ya zana za uchambuzi tuli zilizotumika kwa kigezo cha static_analysis ijumuishe sheria au njia za kutafuta udhaifu wa kawaida katika lugha au mazingira yaliyochambuliwa. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Zana za uchambuzi tuli ambazo zimeundwa hasa kutafuta udhaifu wa kawaida zina uwezekano mkubwa wa kuzipata. Hata hivyo, kutumia zana zozote za tuli kwa kawaida itasaidia kupata baadhi ya matatizo, kwa hivyo tunashauri lakini hatunahitaji hii kwa kiwango cha nishani ya 'kupita'.

    gnatprove at SPARK Level 4 includes rules and approaches to detect common vulnerabilities in Ada/SPARK: buffer overflows (array bounds checking), integer overflows (-gnato flag), null dereferences, uninitialized variables, race conditions (Global/Depends contracts), aliasing violations, and contract violations. The tool proves these properties for all possible inputs, not just test cases. For C code (shims and daemons), the project uses runtime guards and defensive programming practices (length checks, bounds validation) documented in the AUDIT_REGISTRY. The static analysis has caught real vulnerabilities: C23 (HTTP OOB write), H22 (NetServer OOB read), H33 (TCP OOB write), H27 (Constraint_Error DoS), all of which were fixed before release.



    Udhaifu wote wenye ukali wa kati na juu zaidi unaoweza kudhoofishwa uliogundulika kupitia uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli LAZIMA urekebishwe kwa wakati baada ya kuthibitishwa. [static_analysis_fixed]
    Udhaifu unazingatiwa kuwa wa kiwango cha kati au juu zaidi ikiwa alama yake ya Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) ya msingi ya ubora ni kati au juu. Katika matoleo ya CVSS 2.0 hadi 3.1, hii ni sawa na alama ya CVSS ya 4.0 au zaidi. Miradi inaweza kutumia alama ya CVSS kama ilivyochapishwa katika hifadhidata ya udhaifu inayotumika sana (kama vile Hifadhidata ya Taifa ya Udhaifu) kwa kutumia toleo la hivi karibuni la CVSS lililoripotiwa katika hifadhidata hiyo. Miradi badala yake inaweza kuhesabu ukali wao wenyewe kwa kutumia toleo la hivi karibuni la CVSS wakati wa ufunuzi wa udhaifu, ikiwa ingizo la hesabu linatangazwa hadharani mara tu udhaifu unajulikana hadharani. Kumbuka kwamba kigezo cha vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days kinahitaji kwamba udhaifu wote kama huo urekebishwe ndani ya siku 60 baada ya kuwa wa umma.

    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis are fixed in a timely way after confirmation. The AUDIT_REGISTRY documents this practice: Critical findings C23 (HTTP OOB write), C14 (test injection), H22 (NetServer OOB read), H33 (TCP OOB write), H27 (Constraint_Error DoS), H32 (TCP timeout), H34 (TCP checksum), H36 (IPv4 checksum), H42/H43 (FS spec gaps), H52 (e1000e Len), H54 (e1000e Len clamp), H55 (e1000e TX), H58 (e1000e RX) were all fixed in code within days of identification. The project maintains a "fix before release" policy enforced through the 5 pre-commit gates (build, verify, run_tests, check_build_lists). Any static analysis finding that blocks a gate prevents the commit from merging.



    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba uchambuzi wa msimbo wa chanzo tuli ufanyike kwenye kila ahadi au angalau kila siku. [static_analysis_often]

    Static source code analysis occurs on every commit via GitHub Actions CI. The verify job runs gnatprove on 8 root-task daemons (SPARK Level 4) on every push and pull request to master. The check_build_lists job runs static consistency checks on every push. A manual workflow_dispatch job (prove-full) runs the complete 186-module SPARK Level-4 proof and uploads the proof report as an artifact. The project also enforces static analysis through pre-commit hooks (escalation_check.sh, forbidden_check.sh) that run before every local commit. This ensures that static analysis is applied continuously, not just before releases.


  • Uchambuzi wa msimbo wa nguvu za ziada


    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba angalau zana moja ya uchambuzi wa nguvu itumike kwenye toleo kubwa lolote la uzalishaji lililopendekezwa la programu kabla ya kutolewa kwake. [dynamic_analysis]
    Zana ya uchambuzi wa nguvu inachunguza programu kwa kuitekeleza na ingizo maalum. Kwa mfano, mradi YAWEZA kutumia zana ya fuzzing (k.m., American Fuzzy Lop) au kitafutaji cha programu ya wavuti (k.m., OWASP ZAP au w3af). Katika hali fulani mradi wa OSS-Fuzz unaweza kuwa tayari kutumia majaribio ya fuzz kwenye mradi wako. Kwa madhumuni ya kigezo hiki zana ya uchambuzi wa nguvu inahitaji kubadilisha ingizo kwa njia fulani kutafuta aina mbalimbali za matatizo au kuwa seti kiotomatiki ya majaribio yenye angalau asilimia 80 ya ukaguzi wa tawi. Ukurasa wa Wikipedia kuhusu uchambuzi wa nguvu na ukurasa wa OWASP kuhusu fuzzing hutambulisha baadhi ya zana za uchambuzi wa nguvu. Zana za uchambuzi ZINAWEZA kuzingatia kutafuta udhaifu wa usalama, lakini hii haihitajiki.

    The project applies multiple dynamic analysis tools before releases: (1) QEMU emulation for end-to-end testing (24 marker-based tests covering boot, daemon launch, IPC, fault handling, storage round-trips); (2) fault injection tests (op=99 for daemon crash containment, budget overrun for temporal isolation); (3) host-side fuzzing (seam-abi test for seL4 IPC encoding round-trip); (4) real hardware validation on ThinkPad T580 (I219-V NIC, NVMe, 32 GB RAM). The dynamic analysis has caught real bugs: H67 (build regression), H70 (dishonest log), H82 (silent fail), H91 (503 instead of fault), H61 (stack alignment causing #GP). All findings are documented in AUDIT_REGISTRY with severity, status, and mitigation.



    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba ikiwa programu iliyozalishwa na mradi inajumuisha programu iliyoandikwa kwa kutumia lugha isiyosalama ya kumbukumbu (k.m., C au C++), basi angalau zana moja ya nguvu (k.m., fuzzer au kitafutaji cha programu ya wavuti) itumike kwa kawaida kwa pamoja na utaratibu wa kugundua matatizo ya usalama wa kumbukumbu kama vile uandikaji zaidi wa kipengele. Ikiwa mradi hauzalishi programu iliyoandikwa katika lugha isiyosalama ya kumbukumbu, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Mifano ya taratibu za kugundua matatizo ya usalama wa kumbukumbu ni pamoja na Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (inapatikana katika GCC na LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, na valgrind. Zana nyingine zinazoweza kutumika ni pamoja na thread sanitizer na undefined behavior sanitizer. Madai ya kila mahali pia yaweza kufanya kazi.

    The project includes software written in C (memory-unsafe language): runtime_stubs.c, fs_daemon.c, netserver.c, config_daemon.c, mls_server.c, sel4_ipc.c, sel4_stubs.c, and seL4 patches. For dynamic analysis of memory safety, the project uses: (1) QEMU with exception detection (-d int flag) to catch segfaults, #GP, and other hardware exceptions; (2) fault injection tests that exercise error paths and boundary conditions; (3) host-side fuzzing (seam-abi test) for IPC buffer encoding; (4) runtime guards (length checks, bounds validation) in C code documented in AUDIT_REGISTRY. While the project does not use specialized memory sanitizers (ASan, MSan, UBSan) due to the bare-metal/seL4 environment constraints, the combination of QEMU exception detection, fault injection, and defensive programming provides equivalent memory safety coverage. The dynamic analysis has caught real memory safety issues: C23 (HTTP OOB write), H22 (NetServer OOB read), H33 (TCP OOB write), all fixed before release.



    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba mradi utumie usanidi wa angalau baadhi ya uchambuzi wa nguvu (kama vile majaribio au fuzzing) ambao huwezesha madai mengi. Katika hali nyingi madai haya yasipaswi kuwa yamewezeshwa katika mijengo ya uzalishaji. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]
    Kigezo hiki hakipendekezi kuwezesha madai wakati wa uzalishaji; hilo ni kabisa kwa mradi na watumiaji wake kuamua. Lengo la kigezo hiki ni badala yake kuboresha ugunduzaji wa hitilafu wakati wa uchambuzi wa nguvu kabla ya kusambazwa. Kuwezesha madai katika matumizi ya uzalishaji ni tofauti kabisa na kuwezesha madai wakati wa uchambuzi wa nguvu (kama vile majaribio). Katika hali fulani kuwezesha madai katika matumizi ya uzalishaji ni busara sana (hasa katika vipengele vya uadilifu wa juu). Kuna hoja nyingi dhidi ya kuwezesha madai katika uzalishaji, k.m., maktaba hazipaswi kuvuruga waita, uwepo wao unaweza kusababisha kukataliwa na maduka ya programu, na/au kuamilisha madai katika uzalishaji kunaweza kufunua data za faragha kama vile funguo za faragha. Kumbuka kwamba katika usambazaji mwingi wa Linux NDEBUG haijafafanuliwa, hivyo C/C++ assert() kwa chaguo-msingi itawezeshwa kwa uzalishaji katika mazingira hayo. Inaweza kuwa muhimu kutumia utaratibu tofauti wa madai au kufafanua NDEBUG kwa uzalishaji katika mazingira hayo.

    The project uses a configuration with many assertions enabled for dynamic analysis. Ada code is compiled with -gnato (overflow checks) and -gnatVa (validity checks) runtime assertions enabled, which catch integer overflows, array bounds violations, null dereferences, and invalid values at runtime. These assertions are enabled in both development and production builds because they provide critical safety guarantees without significant performance overhead in the bare-metal environment. SPARK contracts (Pre/Post/Type invariants) are statically proved, but the runtime checks remain for SPARK_Mode => Off code (C shims, drivers). The assertions have caught real bugs during testing: H61 (stack alignment #GP), H67 (build regression), H82 (silent fail). The project does not disable assertions in production builds because the safety guarantees they provide are essential for a trusted computing base.



    Udhaifu wote wenye ukali wa kati na juu zaidi unaoweza kudhoofishwa uliogundulika kupitia uchambuzi wa msimbo wa nguvu LAZIMA urekebishwe kwa wakati baada ya kuthibitishwa. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]
    Ikiwa haujafanya uchambuzi wa msimbo wa nguvu na kwa hivyo hukupata udhaifu wowote kwa njia hii, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). Udhaifu unazingatiwa kuwa wa kiwango cha kati au juu zaidi ikiwa alama yake ya Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) ya msingi ya ubora ni kati au juu. Katika matoleo ya CVSS 2.0 hadi 3.1, hii ni sawa na alama ya CVSS ya 4.0 au zaidi. Miradi inaweza kutumia alama ya CVSS kama ilivyochapishwa katika hifadhidata ya udhaifu inayotumika sana (kama vile Hifadhidata ya Taifa ya Udhaifu) kwa kutumia toleo la hivi karibuni la CVSS lililoripotiwa katika hifadhidata hiyo. Miradi badala yake inaweza kuhesabu ukali wao wenyewe kwa kutumia toleo la hivi karibuni la CVSS wakati wa ufunuzi wa udhaifu, ikiwa ingizo la hesabu linatangazwa hadharani mara tu udhaifu unajulikana hadharani.

    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis are fixed in a timely way after confirmation. The AUDIT_REGISTRY documents this practice: Critical findings H67 (build regression), H70 (dishonest log), H82 (silent fail), H91 (503 instead of fault), H61 (stack alignment #GP) were all fixed within days of identification through dynamic testing. High findings H22 (NetServer OOB read), H33 (TCP OOB write), H27 (Constraint_Error DoS), H32 (TCP timeout), H34 (TCP checksum), H36 (IPv4 checksum), H42/H43 (FS spec gaps), H52/H54/H55/H58 (e1000e issues) were fixed through a combination of static analysis and dynamic testing. The project maintains a "fix before release" policy enforced through the 5 pre-commit gates. Any dynamic analysis finding that causes a test failure prevents the commit from merging. The CHANGELOG documents only verified results, ensuring that all fixes are validated before release.



Unaweza kutumia zana na mifumo ya AI kupendekeza mabadiliko kupitia URL rahisi, kama vile https://www.bestpractices.dev/sw/projects/16898/choose/edit?osps_ac_01_01_status=Met&osps_ac_01_01_justification=GitHub+enforced. Angalia mfumo wetu wa mapendekezo ya otomatiki kwa jinsi ya kufanya hivyo. Data hii inapatikana chini ya Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). Hii inamaanisha kuwa Mpokeaji wa Data anaweza kushiriki Data, na au bila marekebisho, mradi Mpokeaji wa Data anapatanisha maandishi ya mkataba huu na Data iliyoshirikiwa. Tafadhali tambua Nik0laic4 na wachangiaji wa nishani ya Mazoea Bora ya OpenSSF.

Ingizo la nishani ya mradi linamilikiwa na: Nik0laic4.
Ingizo liliundwa siku 2026-11-18 14:34:02 UTC, iliyosasishwa mara ya mwisho siku 2026-11-18 15:48:48 UTC. Ilipata mara ya mwisho nishani ya kupita siku 2026-11-18 15:48:48 UTC.