tpm2-tss

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 Basics 13/13

  • Identification

    This repository hosts source code implementing the Trusted Computing Group's (TCG) TPM2 Software Stack (TSS). This stack consists of the following layers from top to bottom:

    • Feature API (FAPI) as described in the TCG Feature API (FAPI) Specification along with TCG TSS 2.0 JSON Data Types and Policy Language Specification This API is designed to be very high-level API, intended to make programming with the TPM as simple as possible. The API functions are exposed through a single library: libtss2-fapi.
    • Enhanced System API (ESAPI) as described in the TCG TSS 2.0 Enhanced System API (ESAPI) Specification This API is a 1-to-1 mapping of the TPM2 commands documented in Part 3 of the TPM2 specification. Additionally there are asynchronous versions of each command. In addition to SAPI, the ESAPI performs tracking of meta data for TPM object and automatic calculation of session based authorization and encryption values. Both the synchronous and asynchronous API are exposed through a single library: libtss2-esys.
    • System API (SAPI) as described in the TCG TSS 2.0 System Level API (SAPI) Specification This API is a 1-to-1 mapping of the TPM2 commands documented in Part 3 of the TPM2 specification. Additionally there are asynchronous versions of each command. These asynchronous variants may be useful for integration into event-driven programming environments. Both the synchronous and asynchronous API are exposed through a single library: libtss2-sys.
    • Marshaling/Unmarshaling (MU) as described in the TCG TSS 2.0 Marshaling/Unmarshaling API Specification This API provides a set of marshaling and unmarshaling functions for all data types define by the TPM library specification. The Marshaling/Unmarshaling API is exposed through a library called libtss2-mu.
    • TPM Command Transmission Interface (TCTI) as described in the TCG TSS 2.0 TPM Command Transmission Interface (TCTI) API Specification. This API provides a standard interface to transmit / receive TPM command / response buffers. It is expected that any number of libraries implementing the TCTI API will be implemented as a way to abstract various platform specific IPC mechanisms. Currently this repository provides several TCTI implementations: libtss2-tcti-device, libtss2-tcti-tbs (for Windows), libtss2-tcti-swtpm and libtss2-tcti-mssim. The former should be used for direct access to the TPM through the Linux kernel driver. The latter implements the protocol exposed by the Microsoft software TPM2 simulator.
    • The TCG TSS 2.0 Overview and Common Structures Specification forms the basis for all implementations in this project. NOTE: We deviate from this specification by increasing the value of TPM2_NUM_PCR_BANKS from 3 to 16 to ensure compatibility with TPM2 implementations that have enabled a larger than typical number of PCR banks. This larger value for TPM2_NUM_PCR_BANKS is expected to be included in a future revision of the specification.
    What programming language(s) are used to implement the project?
  • Basic project website content


    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]

    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    Habari juu ya jinsi ya kuchangia LAZIMA ieleze mchakato wa uchangiaji (kwa mfano, je! Maombi ya kuvuta yanatumika?) (URL required) [contribution]

    Non-trivial contribution file in repository: https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md.



    Habari juu ya jinsi ya kuchangia INAPASWA kujumuisha mahitaji ya michango inayokubalika (k.m., rejeleo la kiwango chochote kinachohitajika cha usimbaji). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]
  • FLOSS license

    What license(s) is the project released under?



    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]

    The BSD-2-Clause license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]

    The BSD-2-Clause license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]

    Non-trivial license location file in repository: https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/blob/master/LICENSE.


  • Documentation


    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]

    https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/blob/master/README.md - for General Overview https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/tree/master/doc - for General Documentation https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/tree/master/man - man pages for the some of the components Full Doxygen Documentation for ESAPI/FAPI layer - https://tpm2-tss.readthedocs.io/en/latest/



    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]

    https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/tree/master/man - man pages for the some of the components

    Full Doxygen Documentation for ESAPI/FAPI layer - https://tpm2-tss.readthedocs.io/en/latest/


  • Other


    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]

    Given only https: URLs - feature by Github



    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]

    GitHub supports discussions on issues and pull requests. Also a searchable Mailing List https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/tpm2@lists.01.org/



    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]

    All documentation and communication is done in English. https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/blob/master/README.md



    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]


(Advanced) What other users have additional rights to edit this badge entry? Currently: []



  • Public version-controlled source repository


    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]

    Repository on GitHub, which provides public git repositories with URLs.



    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made.



    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]

    The complete development is done on github - every interim version, every change, every commit can be found on the repository.



    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • Unique version numbering


    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]

    Semantic versioning scheme is used and the release process is documented in https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/blob/master/RELEASE.md



    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]

    Semantic versioning scheme is used and the release process is documented in https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/blob/master/RELEASE.md



    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

    Every release is tagged with a signed tag. Even release candidates are marked with a signed tag. https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/blob/master/RELEASE.md


  • Release notes


    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]

    Non-trivial release notes file in repository: https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md. They are also included on the Release Page https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/releases



    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]

    Currently there are no known CVE entries - nevertheless, security relevant fixes are marked as such.


  • Working build system


    Ikiwa programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi inahitaji ujenzi wa matumizi, mradi LAZIMA utoe mfumo wa kujenga ambao unaweza kujenga programu kiotomatiki kutoka kwa chanzo-msimbo. [build]

    Each commit is automatically compiled using travis CI and AppVeyor. Each pull request is also automatically compiled travis CI and AppVeyor. https://travis-ci.org/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss and https://ci.appveyor.com/project/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss



    INAPENDEKEZWA kuwa zana za kawaida zitumike kujenga programu. [build_common_tools]

    The build step of the software is based on the ubiquitous 'autotools' - known as "./configure && make && sudo make install" The software can also be built via a dockerfile.



    Mradi UNAPASWA kujengwa kwa kutumia zana za FLOSS pekee yake. [build_floss_tools]

    It relies on autotools for building. Other software/libraries are also covered by floss licenses.


  • Automated test suite


    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]

    The tests are checked in under https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/tree/master/test and are perfomed on each commit using travis-ci. https://travis-ci.org/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss



    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]

    invocation via simple standard 'make check'



    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    Code Coverage by automated testsuite (via travis-ci) is automatically reported to coveralls and is at about 85+% https://coveralls.io/github/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss?branch=master



    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    The tests are checked in under https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/tree/master/test and are perfomed on each commit using travis-ci. https://travis-ci.org/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss


  • New functionality testing


    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]

    https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md This is also part of the review cycle and has been enforced multple times. But could be made clearer - TODO



    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]

    General Code Coverage is always improved and must be kept above 80%. New tests are also mentioned in the release notes.



    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]

    Part of the review cycle - but could be made clearer - TODO.


  • Warning flags


    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]

    A lot of the most common secure compile flags are enabled in configure per default. https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/blob/master/configure.ac#L192

    Also the code is compiled using gcc and clang to enable more warning coverage. In addition to that static code analysis is done via coverity and scan-build (via clang).



    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]

    All compiler warnings are treated as errors ("-Werror"). https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/blob/master/configure.ac#L196

    Static Code Analyzer Warnings are adressed / reviewed on a regular basis https://scan.coverity.com/projects/tpm2-tss



    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]

    A lot of the most common secure compile flags are enabled in configure per default. https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/blob/master/configure.ac#L192

    Also the code is compiled using gcc and clang to enable more warning coverage. In addition to that static code analysis is done via coverity and scan-build (via clang).


  • Secure development knowledge


    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]

    The design of the specification of the software is performed within a Working Group within the Trusted Computing Group. Software development in the context of the TCG is always related to security and secure software. The maintainers have several years of experience in developing secure software.



    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]

    The design of the specification of the software is performed within a Working Group within the Trusted Computing Group. Software development in the context of the TCG is always related to security and secure software. The maintainers have several years of experience in developing secure software.


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi LAZIMA itumie, kwa chaguo-msingi, tu itifaki za kriptografia na mifumbo ambazo zimechapishwa hadharani na kukaguliwa na wataalam (ikiwa itifaki za kriptografia na mafumbo imetumika). [crypto_published]

    The design of the specification of the software is performed within a Working Group within the Trusted Computing Group. Software development in the context of the TCG is always related to security and secure software. The cryptography depends on public cryptographic protocols and algorithms like TLS, sha, aes, rsa....



    Ikiwa programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi ni programu au maktaba, na kusudi lake la msingi sio kutekeleza usimbuaji, basi INAPASWA tu kuita programu iliyoundwa kihususa kutekeleza kazi za kielelezo; HAIPASWI kutekeleza-upya shughuli hiyo. [crypto_call]

    It uses openssl or mbedtls as crypto-backends. It does not implement its own crypto.



    Utendaji wote katika programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi ambayo inategemea usimbuaji LAZIMA iweze kutekelezwa kwa kutumia FLOSS. [crypto_floss]

    It uses openssl or mbedtls as crypto-backends - both are FLOSS.



    Mifumo ya usalama ndani ya programu inayozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA itumie kwa msingi keylengths ambazo angalau zinakidhi mahitaji ya chini ya NIST kufikia mwaka wa 2030 (kama ilivyoelezwa mnamo 2012). LAZIMA iwe rahisi kusanidi programu ili keylengths ndogo zimezimwa kabisa. [crypto_keylength]

    The TPM specification currently still allows the usage of these algorithms/keysizes even if better algorithms are available, so we must support them.

    However a new configure flag --disable-weakcrypto was introduced which prevents the usage of these algorithms as much as possible.



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]

    tpm2-tss does not support any of these. Only SM3 may be an issue in the future here. Re-assessment will be done regularly - TODO.



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]

    The TPM specification currently still allows the usage of these algorithms, even if better algorithms are available, so we must support them.

    However a new configure flag --disable-weakcrypto was introduced which prevents the usage of these algorithms as much as possible.



    Mifumo ya usalama ndani ya programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi INAPASWA kutekeleza kwa ukamilifu usiri wa umbele ya itifaki za makubaliano ya funguo ili funguo la kipindi kilicho tokana na kikao cha vifungo muda-mrefu haziwezi kuridhi mabaya ikiwa mojawapo ya vifunguo vya muda-mrefu imeridhi mabaya katika usoni. [crypto_pfs]

    tpm2-tss does not establish cryptographic sessions that qualify for perfect forward secrecy. The Auth-Sessions to the TPM would be prone to this issue, but those are bound to the hardware specification and the private keys are held inside SmartCards-like ICs aka TPMs. Nothing we can do here.



    Ikiwa programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi imesababisha uhifadhi wa nywila kwa minajili ya uthibitishaji ya watumiaji wa kutoka nje, nywila LAZIMA zihifadhiwe kwa mficho uliorudiarudia na chumvi kwa kila-mtumiaji kwa kutumia kanuni ya upanuaji (rudiarudia) wa funguo (k.m., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). Ona pia Kurasadogo ya Uhifadhi wa Nywila la OWASP). [crypto_password_storage]

    tpm2-tss does not store passwords.



    Mifumo ya usalama ndani ya programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi LAZIMA itoe funguo zote za kriptologia na nonces kwa kutumia kitengeneza cha nambari za bahati kuptia kriptologia salama, na ISIWEZE kufanya hivo kutumia vitengenezi zisizo salama kikriptologia. [crypto_random]
  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]

    Each release is performed with signed tags as described in https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/blob/master/RELEASE.md Apart from that the software can also be downloaded via https or via the git protocol.



    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]

    Each release is performed with signed tags as described in https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/blob/master/RELEASE.md The signature verification is performed by github on the release page and the signature of the release packages can be retrieved via https.


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]

    No publicly known vulnerabilities open.



    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    No publicly known vulnerabilities open.


  • Other security issues


    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]

    No leaks.


  • Static code analysis


    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]

    Coverity Scan and scan-build from clang/llvm.



    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]

    Covered by coverity.



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]

    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    Coverity is run before a release - https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/blob/master/RELEASE.md Scan-build is run on a per commit basis.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]

    Currently not implemented - code coverage is above 80% using the automatic testsuite.



    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]

    Currently not implemented - code coverage is above 80% using the automatic testsuite including some boundary checks.

    Valgrind can be easily used with make check-valgrind



    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]

    Currently not implemented - code coverage is above 80% using the automatic testsuite



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]

    Currently not implemented



This data is available under the Creative Commons Attribution version 3.0 or later license (CC-BY-3.0+). All are free to share and adapt the data, but must give appropriate credit. Please credit Peter Huewe and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Peter Huewe.
Entry created on 2018-11-08 16:22:22 UTC, last updated on 2020-11-24 13:31:51 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2019-04-01 19:29:20 UTC.

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