zscalerctl

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
If this is your project, please show your baseline badge status on your project page! The baseline badge status looks like this: Baseline badge level for project 13176 is baseline-3 Here is how to embed the baseline badge:
You can show your baseline badge status by embedding this in your markdown file:
[![OpenSSF Baseline](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13176/baseline)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13176)
or by embedding this in your HTML:
<a href="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13176"><img src="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13176/baseline"></a>


These are the Baseline Level 3 criteria. These are criteria version v2026.02.19.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Unofficial, security-first, read-only CLI for authorized Zscaler administrators: safe configuration query, inventory, and sanitized exports across ZIA, ZPA, ZTW, ZCC, and Zidentity. Every output field is explicitly classified through fail-closed allow-list projection, with redaction and secret scanning as defense-in-depth.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

    zscalerctl is defensive administration software for authorized Zscaler tenant
    admins — explicitly not an exploitation, credential-discovery, or bypass tool.

    Security posture highlights, each enforced by CI rather than asserted:

    • Fail-closed field classification — every SDK response field is either
      explicitly classified or deliberately excluded with a recorded reason;
      the build fails if a field ships undecided
      (FIELD_COVERAGE.md).
    • Threat model and data classification are documented and kept current by
      drift tests (THREAT_MODEL.md).
    • Releases ship checksums, per-target CycloneDX SBOMs, and GitHub build
      provenance attestations.
    • Single-maintainer project; review depth comes from the CI gate
      (tests, race detector, staticcheck, govulncheck, semgrep, secret scan)
      plus advisory CodeQL/gosec/Scorecard scanning.

 Controls 21/21 ●

  • Controls


    Enough for a badge!

    When a job is assigned permissions in a CI/CD pipeline, the source code or configuration MUST only assign the minimum privileges necessary for the corresponding activity. [OSPS-AC-04.02]
    Configure the project's CI/CD pipelines to assign the lowest available permissions to users and services by default, elevating permissions only when necessary for specific tasks. In some version control systems, this may be possible at the organizational or repository level. If not, set permissions at the top level of the pipeline.

    Permissions are assigned per job at the minimum needed: workflows default to contents: read; only the release job adds contents: write/id-token/attestations, and only the scanners add security-events: write.


    Enough for a badge!

    CI/CD pipelines which accept trusted collaborator input MUST sanitize and validate that input prior to use in the pipeline. [OSPS-BR-01.04]
    CI/CD pipelines should sanitize (quote, escape or exit on expected values) all collaborator inputs on explicit workflow executions. While collaborators are generally trusted, manual inputs to a workflow cannot be reviewed and could be abused by an account takeover or insider threat.

    Dispatch inputs are passed via environment variables (never inline shell interpolation) and validated against allowlists — e.g. the release bump input is rejected by next-version.sh unless it is exactly patch/minor/major/none.


    Enough for a badge!

    When an official release is created, all assets within that release MUST be clearly associated with the release identifier or another unique identifier for the asset. [OSPS-BR-02.02]
    Assign a unique version identifier to each software asset produced by the project, following a consistent naming convention or numbering scheme. Examples include SemVer, CalVer, or git commit id.

    Every release asset embeds the version in its filename (zscalerctl_<version><os><arch>.tar.gz and matching SBOMs), is attached to the tagged GitHub release, and is enumerated in that release's SHA256SUMS.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST define a policy for managing secrets and credentials used by the project. The policy should include guidelines for storing, accessing, and rotating secrets and credentials. [OSPS-BR-07.02]
    Document how secrets and credentials are managed and used within the project. This should include details on how secrets are stored (e.g., using a secrets management tool), how access is controlled, and how secrets are rotated or updated. Ensure that sensitive information is not hard-coded in the source code or stored in version control systems.

    The project's CI holds no long-lived secrets by policy — a dedicated, CI-enforced verifier (scripts/verify-ci-no-live-creds.sh) blocks workflows from referencing live credentials; the only token is the ephemeral least-privilege GITHUB_TOKEN. Credential-handling policy for the tool itself is documented in docs/THREAT_MODEL.md ("Secret Handling": env vars or owner-only permission-checked files, never CLI arguments).


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the integrity and authenticity of the release assets. [OSPS-DO-03.01]
    Instructions in the project should contain information about the technology used, the commands to run, and the expected output. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    docs/INSTALL.md documents integrity verification: shasum -a 256 -c SHA256SUMS plus provenance verification with gh attestation verify.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the expected identity of the person or process authoring the software release. [OSPS-DO-03.02]
    The expected identity may be in the form of key IDs used to sign, issuer and identity from a sigstore certificate, or other similar forms. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    The documented gh attestation verify step cryptographically proves the release was built by this repository's release workflow (GitHub-signed build provenance identifying the workflow and repo).


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include a descriptive statement about the scope and duration of support for each release. [OSPS-DO-04.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for the project's released software assets, the project should have a SUPPORT.md file, a "Support" section in SECURITY.md, or other documentation explaining the support lifecycle, including the expected duration of support for each release, the types of support provided (e.g., bug fixes, security updates), and any relevant policies or procedures for obtaining support.

    SECURITY.md "Project Roles" documents the access model: the repository owner is the only person with privileged access, and GitHub requires the owner's explicit manual action to grant any collaborator role.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST provide a descriptive statement when releases or versions will no longer receive security updates. [OSPS-DO-05.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for security fixes, the project should have a SUPPORT.md or other documentation explaining the project's policy for security updates.

    SECURITY.md "Supported Versions" states the support scope: only the latest released minor version receives security updates unless a release note says otherwise.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST have a policy that code collaborators are reviewed prior to granting escalated permissions to sensitive resources. [OSPS-GV-04.01]
    Publish an enforceable policy in the project documentation that requires code collaborators to be reviewed and approved before being granted escalated permissions to sensitive resources, such as merge approval or access to secrets. It is recommended that vetting includes establishing a justifiable lineage of identity such as confirming the contributor's association with a known trusted organization.

    SECURITY.md "Project Roles" documents the access model: the repository owner is the only person with privileged access, and GitHub requires the owner's explicit manual action to grant any collaborator role.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, all compiled released software assets MUST be delivered with a software bill of materials. [OSPS-QA-02.02]
    It is recommended to auto-generate SBOMs at build time using a tool that has been vetted for accuracy. This enables users to ingest this data in a standardized approach alongside other projects in their environment.

    Every compiled release asset ships with a per-target CycloneDX SBOM, both inside the archive and as a standalone asset covered by SHA256SUMS.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release comprising multiple source code repositories, all subprojects MUST enforce security requirements that are as strict or stricter than the primary codebase. [OSPS-QA-04.02]
    Any additional subproject code repositories produced by the project and compiled into a release must enforce security requirements as applicable to the status and intent of the respective codebase. In addition to following the corresponding OSPS Baseline requirements, this may include requiring a security review, ensuring that it is free of vulnerabilities, and ensuring that it is free of known security issues.

    Single-repository project.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, project's documentation MUST clearly document when and how tests are run. [OSPS-QA-06.02]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains how to run the tests locally and how to run the tests in the CI/CD pipeline. The documentation should explain what the tests are testing and how to interpret the results.

    README documents how and when tests run: make check locally, and every PR must pass the full suite (tests, race detector, static analysis, secret scan) via the required CI gate before merge.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project's documentation MUST include a policy that all major changes to the software produced by the project should add or update tests of the functionality in an automated test suite. [OSPS-QA-06.03]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains the policy for adding or updating tests. The policy should explain what constitutes a major change and what tests should be added or updated.

    The README Contributing section states the policy: new functionality must include tests. It is additionally enforced mechanically for the security core by drift tests (catalog/shape-registry/field-coverage).


    Enough for a badge!

    When a commit is made to the primary branch, the project's version control system MUST require at least one non-author human approval of the changes before merging. [OSPS-QA-07.01]
    Configure the project's version control system to require at least one non-author human approval of changes before merging into the release or primary branch. This can be achieved by requiring a pull request to be reviewed and approved by at least one other collaborator before it can be merged.

    Not applicable: single-maintainer project — no second human with commit rights exists, so a non-author human approver is structurally impossible (this control's Baseline applicability is maturity level 3, which presupposes multiple maintainers). Compensating controls: branch protection on main requires pull requests and the full automated gate (tests, race detector, static analysis, secret scan) with "include administrators" enabled, so even the maintainer cannot bypass checks. If a second maintainer joins, required non-author review will be enabled and this answer revisited.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project MUST perform a threat modeling and attack surface analysis to understand and protect against attacks on critical code paths, functions, and interactions within the system. [OSPS-SA-03.02]
    Threat modeling is an activity where the project looks at the codebase, associated processes and infrastructure, interfaces, key components and "thinks like a hacker" and brainstorms how the system be be broken or compromised. Each identified threat is listed out so the project can then think about how to proactively avoid or close off any gaps/vulnerabilities that could arise. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    docs/THREAT_MODEL.md is a maintained threat model and attack-surface analysis: actors, trust boundaries, primary controls, and explicit scope decisions for the critical leak paths; reviewed alongside SDK upgrades.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, any vulnerabilities in the software components not affecting the project MUST be accounted for in a VEX document, augmenting the vulnerability report with non-exploitability details. [OSPS-VM-04.02]
    Establish a VEX feed communicating the exploitability status of known vulnerabilities, including assessment details or any mitigations in place preventing vulnerable code from being executed.

    Non-exploitable dependency advisories are accounted for in an OpenVEX document (.openvex.json in the repository root), currently recording 20 not_affected statements with justifications; docs/DEPENDENCY_POLICY.md defines when statements are written, and CI validates the document's format.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. [OSPS-VM-05.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    docs/DEPENDENCY_POLICY.md "Finding Remediation Policy" defines the thresholds: zero govulncheck findings to merge and to release (make release-check), hash-verified dependencies, Apache-2.0-compatible licenses only.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include a policy to address SCA violations prior to any release. [OSPS-VM-05.02]
    Document a policy in the project to address applicable Software Composition Analysis results before any release, and add status checks that verify compliance with that policy prior to release.

    docs/DEPENDENCY_POLICY.md "Finding Remediation Policy" defines the thresholds: zero govulncheck findings to merge and to release (make release-check), hash-verified dependencies, Apache-2.0-compatible licenses only.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, all changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for malicious dependencies and known vulnerabilities in dependencies, then blocked in the event of violations, except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-05.03]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Software Composition Analysis tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    Every change is automatically evaluated and blocked on violation: govulncheck runs in PR CI as part of the required gate; dependencies are hash-verified via go.sum and vendored for review; the policy is documented in DEPENDENCY_POLICY.md.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, the project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SAST findings. [OSPS-VM-06.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of Static Application Security Testing (SAST) findings. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    Blocking SAST (go vet, staticcheck, semgrep, secret scan) must report zero findings to merge, enforced by the required CI gate; advisory findings (gosec, CodeQL) are triaged with suppressions declared in code as #nosec with a written justification — both per the documented policy.


    Enough for a badge!

    While active, all changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for security weaknesses and blocked in the event of violations except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-06.02]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    Blocking SAST (go vet, staticcheck, semgrep, secret scan) must report zero findings to merge, enforced by the required CI gate; advisory findings (gosec, CodeQL) are triaged with suppressions declared in code as #nosec with a written justification — both per the documented policy.



This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Dave Murray and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Dave Murray.
Entry created on 2026-06-12 11:15:24 UTC, last updated on 2026-06-12 12:27:39 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-06-12 12:27:39 UTC.