commitment-issues

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 13528 is passing Here is how to embed it:
You can show your badge status by embedding this in your markdown file:
[![OpenSSF Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13528/badge)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13528)
or by embedding this in your HTML:
<a href="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13528"><img src="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13528/badge"></a>


These are the Silver level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 16/17 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    For developers who overthink every commit. Advisory-first pre-commit and pre-push checks for JavaScript and TypeScript projects using Husky, lint-staged, ESLint, and Prettier. Advisory by default: commitment-issues reports issues without discarding unstaged work, rewriting already-pushed history, or blocking pushes.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

  • Prerequisites


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST achieve a passing level badge. [achieve_passing]

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    The contributing guide documents requirements for acceptable contributions. Pull requests should include tests for behavior changes and regression tests for bug fixes, stay focused to one logical change, pass npm test, npm run lint, and npm run format:check, update the changelog and documentation for user-visible changes, and follow the project's advisory-first design philosophy. The guide also documents the coding style: Prettier for formatting, ESLint flat config for linting, small composable functions, clear names, and comments only where intent is non-obvious.

    https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md#contribution-requirements


  • Project oversight


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD have a legal mechanism where all developers of non-trivial amounts of project software assert that they are legally authorized to make these contributions. The most common and easily-implemented approach for doing this is by using a Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO), where users add "signed-off-by" in their commits and the project links to the DCO website. However, this MAY be implemented as a Contributor License Agreement (CLA), or other legal mechanism. (URL required) [dco]
    The DCO is the recommended mechanism because it's easy to implement, tracked in the source code, and git directly supports a "signed-off" feature using "commit -s". To be most effective it is best if the project documentation explains what "signed-off" means for that project. A CLA is a legal agreement that defines the terms under which intellectual works have been licensed to an organization or project. A contributor assignment agreement (CAA) is a legal agreement that transfers rights in an intellectual work to another party; projects are not required to have CAAs, since having CAA increases the risk that potential contributors will not contribute, especially if the receiver is a for-profit organization. The Apache Software Foundation CLAs (the individual contributor license and the corporate CLA) are examples of CLAs, for projects which determine that the risks of these kinds of CLAs to the project are less than their benefits.

    The project uses the Developer Certificate of Origin as its legal contribution authorization mechanism. The DCO text is published in the repository, the contributing guide requires every commit to include a Signed-off-by: trailer using git commit -s, and CI runs a DCO workflow on pull requests to verify sign-offs.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/DCO
    https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md#developer-certificate-of-origin
    https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/workflows/dco.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and document its project governance model (the way it makes decisions, including key roles). (URL required) [governance]
    There needs to be some well-established documented way to make decisions and resolve disputes. In small projects, this may be as simple as "the project owner and lead makes all final decisions". There are various governance models, including benevolent dictator and formal meritocracy; for more details, see Governance models. Both centralized (e.g., single-maintainer) and decentralized (e.g., group maintainers) approaches have been successfully used in projects. The governance information does not need to document the possibility of creating a project fork, since that is always possible for FLOSS projects.

    The project documents a maintainer-led governance model in GOVERNANCE.md. It explains how decisions are made, maintainer authority, contributor roles, the normal change process, review and merge policy, release process, security decisions, and how governance changes are made.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST adopt a code of conduct and post it in a standard location. (URL required) [code_of_conduct]
    Projects may be able to improve the civility of their community and to set expectations about acceptable conduct by adopting a code of conduct. This can help avoid problems before they occur and make the project a more welcoming place to encourage contributions. This should focus only on behavior within the community/workplace of the project. Example codes of conduct are the Linux kernel code of conduct, the Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct, the Debian Code of Conduct, the Ubuntu Code of Conduct, the Fedora Code of Conduct, the GNOME Code Of Conduct, the KDE Community Code of Conduct, the Python Community Code of Conduct, The Ruby Community Conduct Guideline, and The Rust Code of Conduct.

    The project has adopted the Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct and posts it in the standard GitHub location: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and publicly document the key roles in the project and their responsibilities, including any tasks those roles must perform. It MUST be clear who has which role(s), though this might not be documented in the same way. (URL required) [roles_responsibilities]
    The documentation for governance and roles and responsibilities may be in one place.

    The project documents key roles and responsibilities in docs/project-roles.md. The document identifies the current project member, sensitive-resource access, and responsibilities for the Maintainer, Release manager, Security contact, and Contributor roles.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/docs/project-roles.md


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST be able to continue with minimal interruption if any one person dies, is incapacitated, or is otherwise unable or unwilling to continue support of the project. In particular, the project MUST be able to create and close issues, accept proposed changes, and release versions of software, within a week of confirmation of the loss of support from any one individual. This MAY be done by ensuring someone else has any necessary keys, passwords, and legal rights to continue the project. Individuals who run a FLOSS project MAY do this by providing keys in a lockbox and a will providing any needed legal rights (e.g., for DNS names). (URL required) [access_continuity]

    The project does not yet fully satisfy this criterion.

    The repository documents project roles and sensitive-resource access, but the current access list identifies only one maintainer/release manager/security contact with GitHub repository administration, GitHub Actions, GitHub Security Advisories, npm package publishing, release creation, and dependency/security settings access.

    The repository also currently lists only one default code owner for all files. Because no second maintainer, emergency successor, lockbox process, or equivalent access-continuity arrangement is publicly documented yet, the project has not shown that issues could be created/closed, proposed changes accepted, and releases published within one week if the current maintainer became unavailable.

    Current evidence:
    https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/docs/project-roles.md
    https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/CODEOWNERS


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The project SHOULD have a "bus factor" of 2 or more. (URL required) [bus_factor]
    A "bus factor" (aka "truck factor") is the minimum number of project members that have to suddenly disappear from a project ("hit by a bus") before the project stalls due to lack of knowledgeable or competent personnel. The truck-factor tool can estimate this for projects on GitHub. For more information, see Assessing the Bus Factor of Git Repositories by Cosentino et al.

    The project does not currently have a bus factor of 2 or more. The repository currently lists only one default code owner, @RoryGlenn, for all files, so the project does not yet show that at least two people can continue key project maintenance if one person becomes unavailable. Current evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/CODEOWNERS


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented roadmap that describes what the project intends to do and not do for at least the next year. (URL required) [documentation_roadmap]
    The project might not achieve the roadmap, and that's fine; the purpose of the roadmap is to help potential users and contributors understand the intended direction of the project. It need not be detailed.

    The project has a public one-year roadmap. It describes what the project intends to do over the next 12 months, including maintenance, compatibility, security and release practices, testing, documentation, onboarding, and feature direction. It also documents explicit non-goals.

    Evidence:
    https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/ROADMAP.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include documentation of the architecture (aka high-level design) of the software produced by the project. If the project does not produce software, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [documentation_architecture]
    A software architecture explains a program's fundamental structures, i.e., the program's major components, the relationships among them, and the key properties of these components and relationships.

    The project documents its high-level architecture and public interface through the contributing guide and external interface reference. The contributing guide describes the project layout, including entry-point scripts, shared helper modules, tests, docs, and CI workflows. The external interface reference documents CLI commands, init-added scripts, Git hook entrypoints, configuration keys/defaults, output behavior, and exit behavior. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md#project-layout and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/docs/external-interface.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST document what the user can and cannot expect in terms of security from the software produced by the project (its "security requirements"). (URL required) [documentation_security]
    These are the security requirements that the software is intended to meet.

    The project documents what users can and cannot expect in terms of security. The security review documents the security boundary: commitment-issues runs locally, shells out to local tools, reads local Git/files, does not expose a network service, and does not transmit repository content. The README also documents the no-telemetry/no-phone-home posture. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/docs/security-review-2026-07.md and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues#privacy.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a "quick start" guide for new users to help them quickly do something with the software. (URL required) [documentation_quick_start]
    The idea is to show users how to get started and make the software do anything at all. This is critically important for potential users to get started.

    The README provides a Quickstart guide for new users, including install, initialization, normal commit workflow, fix commands, and push behavior. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues#quickstart.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST make an effort to keep the documentation consistent with the current version of the project results (including software produced by the project). Any known documentation defects making it inconsistent MUST be fixed. If the documentation is generally current, but erroneously includes some older information that is no longer true, just treat that as a defect, then track and fix as usual. [documentation_current]
    The documentation MAY include information about differences or changes between versions of the software and/or link to older versions of the documentation. The intent of this criterion is that an effort is made to keep the documentation consistent, not that the documentation must be perfect.

    The project makes an effort to keep documentation consistent with the current version. The contribution guide requires user-visible behavior changes to update CHANGELOG.md and docs, and the pull request process requires contributors to explain testing and update docs where behavior changes. Recent release notes also show documentation updates tracked alongside behavior and release changes. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md, https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md, and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project repository front page and/or website MUST identify and hyperlink to any achievements, including this best practices badge, within 48 hours of public recognition that the achievement has been attained. (URL required) [documentation_achievements]
    An achievement is any set of external criteria that the project has specifically worked to meet, including some badges. This information does not need to be on the project website front page. A project using GitHub can put achievements on the repository front page by adding them to the README file.

    The repository front page identifies and links project achievements, including CI, coverage, OpenSSF Scorecard, OpenSSF Best Practices, npm version, Node version, and license badges. The Best Practices badge is linked from the README front page here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues#readme.


  • Accessibility and internationalization


    Enough for a badge!

    The project (both project sites and project results) SHOULD follow accessibility best practices so that persons with disabilities can still participate in the project and use the project results where it is reasonable to do so. [accessibility_best_practices]
    For web applications, see the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG 2.0) and its supporting document Understanding WCAG 2.0; see also W3C accessibility information. For GUI applications, consider using the environment-specific accessibility guidelines (such as Gnome, KDE, XFCE, Android, iOS, Mac, and Windows). Some TUI applications (e.g. `ncurses` programs) can do certain things to make themselves more accessible (such as `alpine`'s `force-arrow-cursor` setting). Most command-line applications are fairly accessible as-is. This criterion is often N/A, e.g., for program libraries. Here are some examples of actions to take or issues to consider:
    • Provide text alternatives for any non-text content so that it can be changed into other forms people need, such as large print, braille, speech, symbols or simpler language ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.1)
    • Color is not used as the only visual means of conveying information, indicating an action, prompting a response, or distinguishing a visual element. ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.1)
    • The visual presentation of text and images of text has a contrast ratio of at least 4.5:1, except for large text, incidental text, and logotypes ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.3)
    • Make all functionality available from a keyboard (WCAG guideline 2.1)
    • A GUI or web-based project SHOULD test with at least one screen-reader on the target platform(s) (e.g. NVDA, Jaws, or WindowEyes on Windows; VoiceOver on Mac & iOS; Orca on Linux/BSD; TalkBack on Android). TUI programs MAY work to reduce overdraw to prevent redundant reading by screen-readers.

    The project makes a reasonable accessibility effort by using standard GitHub Markdown documentation, text-based CLI output, and descriptive alt text for README screenshots. The README's visual examples include alt text describing what each screenshot shows. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues#what-it-looks-like.


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The software produced by the project SHOULD be internationalized to enable easy localization for the target audience's culture, region, or language. If internationalization (i18n) does not apply (e.g., the software doesn't generate text intended for end-users and doesn't sort human-readable text), select "not applicable" (N/A). [internationalization]
    Localization "refers to the adaptation of a product, application or document content to meet the language, cultural and other requirements of a specific target market (a locale)." Internationalization is the "design and development of a product, application or document content that enables easy localization for target audiences that vary in culture, region, or language." (See W3C's "Localization vs. Internationalization".) Software meets this criterion simply by being internationalized. No localization for another specific language is required, since once software has been internationalized it's possible for others to work on localization.

    The software produces end-user-facing English CLI output, but it does not yet appear to provide an internationalization/localization mechanism for translating messages into other languages or adapting output for other locales. Current user-facing documentation and CLI behavior are documented here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues#readme and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/docs/external-interface.md.


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    If the project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) store passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). If the project sites do not store passwords for this purpose, select "not applicable" (N/A). [sites_password_security]
    Note that the use of GitHub meets this criterion. This criterion only applies to passwords used for authentication of external users into the project sites (aka inbound authentication). If the project sites must log in to other sites (aka outbound authentication), they may need to store authorization tokens for that purpose differently (since storing a hash would be useless). This applies criterion crypto_password_storage to the project sites, similar to sites_https.

    N/A. The project sites are hosted by GitHub and npm, and the project itself does not store passwords for authentication of external users. The software also does not expose a network service, does not provide its own user-authentication system, and does not transmit repository data. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues#privacy and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/docs/security-review-2026-07.md.


 Change Control 1/1 ●

  • Previous versions


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST maintain the most often used older versions of the product or provide an upgrade path to newer versions. If the upgrade path is difficult, the project MUST document how to perform the upgrade (e.g., the interfaces that have changed and detailed suggested steps to help upgrade). [maintenance_or_update]

    The project provides an upgrade path to newer versions. The security policy states that security fixes are released against the latest published npm version and recommends using the most recent 3.x release. The migration guide documents the upgrade path from commitment-issues 2.x to 3.x, including the interface changes from husky/lint-staged wiring to plain .git/hooks, detailed install/init commands, expected file changes, and follow-up checks after migration. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/SECURITY.md#supported-versions and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/docs/migration.md.


 Reporting 3/3 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    The project uses GitHub Issues as its public issue tracker for individual bug reports, feature requests, and questions. The README directs users to GitHub Issues for bugs, feature requests, and questions, and package metadata lists the GitHub Issues URL as the bug-reporting location.

    https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/issues


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST give credit to the reporter(s) of all vulnerability reports resolved in the last 12 months, except for the reporter(s) who request anonymity. If there have been no vulnerabilities resolved in the last 12 months, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [vulnerability_report_credit]

    N/A. There have been no vulnerabilities resolved in the last 12 months, so there are no vulnerability reporters to credit. The project documents that reporters will be credited in release notes if they wish when a vulnerability is fixed. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/SECURITY.md and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented process for responding to vulnerability reports. (URL required) [vulnerability_response_process]
    This is strongly related to vulnerability_report_process, which requires that there be a documented way to report vulnerabilities. It also related to vulnerability_report_response, which requires response to vulnerability reports within a certain time frame.

    The project documents its process for responding to vulnerability reports in SECURITY.md. It tells reporters to use GitHub private vulnerability reporting, explains what information to include, says reports will be acknowledged and investigated, says reporters will be kept informed of progress, and says a new release and GitHub Security Advisory will be published where appropriate. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/SECURITY.md.


 Quality 19/19 ●

  • Coding standards


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST identify the specific coding style guides for the primary languages it uses, and require that contributions generally comply with it. (URL required) [coding_standards]
    In most cases this is done by referring to some existing style guide(s), possibly listing differences. These style guides can include ways to improve readability and ways to reduce the likelihood of defects (including vulnerabilities). Many programming languages have one or more widely-used style guides. Examples of style guides include Google's style guides and SEI CERT Coding Standards.

    The project identifies coding standards for its primary JavaScript/Node.js codebase in the contributing guide. It requires formatting with Prettier, linting with ESLint flat config, small composable functions, clear names, and comments only where intent is non-obvious. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md#coding-style.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST automatically enforce its selected coding style(s) if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can do so in the selected language(s). [coding_standards_enforced]
    This MAY be implemented using static analysis tool(s) and/or by forcing the code through code reformatters. In many cases the tool configuration is included in the project's repository (since different projects may choose different configurations). Projects MAY allow style exceptions (and typically will); where exceptions occur, they MUST be rare and documented in the code at their locations, so that these exceptions can be reviewed and so that tools can automatically handle them in the future. Examples of such tools include ESLint (JavaScript), Rubocop (Ruby), and devtools check (R).

    The project automatically enforces its selected coding standards with FLOSS tools. Formatting is checked with Prettier via npm run format:check, and linting is checked with ESLint via npm run lint. CI runs both checks automatically on pushes and pull requests. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/package.json and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml.


  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    Build systems for native binaries MUST honor the relevant compiler and linker (environment) variables passed in to them (e.g., CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS, and LDFLAGS) and pass them to compiler and linker invocations. A build system MAY extend them with additional flags; it MUST NOT simply replace provided values with its own. If no native binaries are being generated, select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_standard_variables]
    It should be easy to enable special build features like Address Sanitizer (ASAN), or to comply with distribution hardening best practices (e.g., by easily turning on compiler flags to do so).

    N/A. The project does not build native binaries and does not have a native compiler/linker build system, so compiler and linker environment variables such as CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS, and LDFLAGS are not applicable. commitment-issues is a pure ESM JavaScript package with no build step. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md#project-layout.


    Enough for a badge!

    The build and installation system SHOULD preserve debugging information if they are requested in the relevant flags (e.g., "install -s" is not used). If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_preserve_debug]
    E.G., setting CFLAGS (C) or CXXFLAGS (C++) should create the relevant debugging information if those languages are used, and they should not be stripped during installation. Debugging information is needed for support and analysis, and also useful for measuring the presence of hardening features in the compiled binaries.

    N/A. The project has no native build or installation system that strips or preserves debugging information. commitment-issues is a typical JavaScript/Node.js package using pure ESM source files directly, with no build step, no native binaries, and no compiled debug symbols. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md#project-layout.


    Enough for a badge!

    The build system for the software produced by the project MUST NOT recursively build subdirectories if there are cross-dependencies in the subdirectories. If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_non_recursive]
    The project build system's internal dependency information needs to be accurate, otherwise, changes to the project may not build correctly. Incorrect builds can lead to defects (including vulnerabilities). A common mistake in large build systems is to use a "recursive build" or "recursive make", that is, a hierarchy of subdirectories containing source files, where each subdirectory is independently built. Unless each subdirectory is fully independent, this is a mistake, because the dependency information is incorrect.

    N/A. The project has no build system that recursively builds subdirectories and no native build output. commitment-issues is a pure ESM JavaScript package with no build step or runtime transpilation. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md#project-layout.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to repeat the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_repeatable]
    GCC and clang users may find the -frandom-seed option useful; in some cases, this can be resolved by forcing some sort order. More suggestions can be found at the reproducible build site.

    N/A. No building occurs for normal use because the project is a scripting-language package where source files are used directly instead of being compiled. commitment-issues is a pure ESM JavaScript package with no build step or runtime transpilation. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md#project-layout.


  • Installation system


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way to easily install and uninstall the software produced by the project using a commonly-used convention. [installation_common]
    Examples include using a package manager (at the system or language level), "make install/uninstall" (supporting DESTDIR), a container in a standard format, or a virtual machine image in a standard format. The installation and uninstallation process (e.g., its packaging) MAY be implemented by a third party as long as it is FLOSS.

    The project provides a common installation and removal path using npm. Users install it with npm install -D commitment-issues eslint prettier, initialize it with npx commitment-issues init, and can remove it with npm remove commitment-issues plus the documented manual cleanup steps. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues#quickstart and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/docs/faq.md#how-do-i-remove-it.


    Enough for a badge!

    The installation system for end-users MUST honor standard conventions for selecting the location where built artifacts are written to at installation time. For example, if it installs files on a POSIX system it MUST honor the DESTDIR environment variable. If there is no installation system or no standard convention, select "not applicable" (N/A). [installation_standard_variables]

    N/A. The project uses npm as its installation system and does not install built artifacts using a custom native installer or POSIX-style install process. There is no project-specific installation location variable such as DESTDIR to honor. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues#quickstart and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md#project-layout.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way for potential developers to quickly install all the project results and support environment necessary to make changes, including the tests and test environment. This MUST be performed with a commonly-used convention. [installation_development_quick]
    This MAY be implemented using a generated container and/or installation script(s). External dependencies would typically be installed by invoking system and/or language package manager(s), per external_dependencies.

    The project provides a quick, common development setup using git and npm. Potential developers can fork and clone the repository, run npm install, then verify the development/test environment with npm test, npm run lint, and npm run format:check. The contributing guide also documents how to run the full test suite and individual test files. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md#getting-started.


  • Externally-maintained components


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST list external dependencies in a computer-processable way. (URL required) [external_dependencies]
    Typically this is done using the conventions of package manager and/or build system. Note that this helps implement installation_development_quick.

    The project lists external dependencies in computer-processable npm metadata. package.json declares runtime dependencies, development dependencies, peer dependencies, and the supported Node engine, while package-lock.json records resolved dependency versions, integrity hashes, licenses, and transitive dependency metadata. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/package.json and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/package-lock.json.


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST monitor or periodically check their external dependencies (including convenience copies) to detect known vulnerabilities, and fix exploitable vulnerabilities or verify them as unexploitable. [dependency_monitoring]
    This can be done using an origin analyzer / dependency checking tool / software composition analysis tool such as OWASP's Dependency-Check, Sonatype's Nexus Auditor, Synopsys' Black Duck Software Composition Analysis, and Bundler-audit (for Ruby). Some package managers include mechanisms to do this. It is acceptable if the components' vulnerability cannot be exploited, but this analysis is difficult and it is sometimes easier to simply update or fix the part.

    The project makes reused externally maintained components easy to identify and update through standard npm metadata and Dependabot. Dependencies are listed in package.json and locked in package-lock.json, and Dependabot is configured to open update pull requests for both npm packages and GitHub Actions. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/package.json, https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/package-lock.json, and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/dependabot.yml.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST either:
    1. make it easy to identify and update reused externally-maintained components; or
    2. use the standard components provided by the system or programming language.
    Then, if a vulnerability is found in a reused component, it will be easy to update that component. [updateable_reused_components]
    A typical way to meet this criterion is to use system and programming language package management systems. Many FLOSS programs are distributed with "convenience libraries" that are local copies of standard libraries (possibly forked). By itself, that's fine. However, if the program *must* use these local (forked) copies, then updating the "standard" libraries as a security update will leave these additional copies still vulnerable. This is especially an issue for cloud-based systems; if the cloud provider updates their "standard" libraries but the program won't use them, then the updates don't actually help. See, e.g., "Chromium: Why it isn't in Fedora yet as a proper package" by Tom Callaway.

    The project makes reused externally maintained components easy to identify and update through standard npm metadata and Dependabot. Dependencies are listed in package.json and locked in package-lock.json, and Dependabot is configured to open update pull requests for both npm packages and GitHub Actions. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/package.json, https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/package-lock.json, and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/dependabot.yml.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD avoid using deprecated or obsolete functions and APIs where FLOSS alternatives are available in the set of technology it uses (its "technology stack") and to a supermajority of the users the project supports (so that users have ready access to the alternative). [interfaces_current]

    The project avoids deprecated or obsolete APIs where practical by targeting current Node.js runtime behavior, using pure ESM source files directly, and replacing older husky/lint-staged-based hook wiring with native .git/hooks wiring in version 3.x. The migration guide documents the move away from older hook-manager wiring and the supported current approach. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/docs/migration.md and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md#project-layout.


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    An automated test suite MUST be applied on each check-in to a shared repository for at least one branch. This test suite MUST produce a report on test success or failure. [automated_integration_testing]
    This requirement can be viewed as a subset of test_continuous_integration, but focused on just testing, without requiring continuous integration.

    The project applies an automated test suite on each check-in to the shared repository through GitHub Actions. The CI workflow runs on pushes to main and pull requests, and it reports success or failure for linting, formatting, automated tests, package lifecycle smoke tests, coverage, and package-manager smoke tests. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST add regression tests to an automated test suite for at least 50% of the bugs fixed within the last six months. [regression_tests_added50]

    The project has evidence that regression tests are added for recent bug fixes. Recent repo-wide fixes included hook health reporting, init/lint-staged migration behavior, pre-push path handling, and blocking pre-push diff-failure behavior, with related init, doctor, prepush, path, and scenario-coverage tests added or updated. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/docs/scenario-coverage.md and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage80]
    Many FLOSS tools are available to measure test coverage, including gcov/lcov, Blanket.js, Istanbul, JCov, and covr (R). Note that meeting this criterion is not a guarantee that the test suite is thorough, instead, failing to meet this criterion is a strong indicator of a poor test suite.

    The project has FLOSS automated test suites that provide more than 80% coverage. The README reports current coverage at 93.93%, and the test suite is run with Node.js's built-in FLOSS node:test runner. Coverage is measured with npm run test:coverage, which uses Node's built-in coverage support. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues#readme and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/package.json.


  • New functionality testing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a formal written policy that as major new functionality is added, tests for the new functionality MUST be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy_mandated]

    The project documents a test policy, but the current wording is not strong enough for this criterion because it says behavior changes should include automated tests rather than requiring that major new functionality MUST include tests. Current partial policy is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md#contribution-requirements.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include, in its documented instructions for change proposals, the policy that tests are to be added for major new functionality. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    The project documents the policy for adding tests in the contribution/change proposal instructions. The contributing guide says behavior changes should include automated tests, bug fixes should include regression tests when practical, and PRs should pass npm test, linting, and formatting checks. The pull request template also asks contributors to confirm that tests were added or updated where appropriate. This is documented here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md#contribution-requirements and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md.


  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    The project is strict with warnings where practical by using ESLint as a required quality gate, configuring its recommended JavaScript baseline, and setting project rules such as no-unused-vars, eqeqeq, no-var, and prefer-const to error. The lint command is npm run lint, and CI runs linting automatically on pushes and pull requests, so lint findings must be fixed before changes pass CI. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/eslint.config.js, https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/package.json, and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml.


 Security 10/13 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST implement secure design principles (from "know_secure_design"), where applicable. If the project is not producing software, select "not applicable" (N/A). [implement_secure_design]
    For example, the project results should have fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default). They should also have complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable). Note that in some cases principles will conflict, in which case a choice must be made (e.g., many mechanisms can make things more complex, contravening "economy of mechanism" / keep it simple).

    The project implements secure design principles where applicable. The security review documents the project security boundary and relevant risks for a local Git-hook CLI, including command/argument injection, path traversal, unsafe working-tree mutation, dependency/release-chain risk, and private vulnerability handling. The hardening document shows implemented mitigations, including safer process spawning with argument vectors instead of shell interpolation, defensive working-tree guards, path normalization tests, CodeQL, OpenSSF Scorecard, Dependabot, pinned GitHub Actions, npm trusted publishing, and SLSA provenance. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/docs/security-review-2026-07.md and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/docs/security-hardening.md.


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    N/A. The software produced by this project does not implement or depend on cryptographic algorithms or cipher modes as runtime security mechanisms, so it does not depend on cryptographic algorithms with known serious weaknesses such as SHA-1 or CBC mode. commitment-issues runs locally in the user's Git workflow and does not expose a network service or transmit repository content. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/docs/security-review-2026-07.md and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues#privacy.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD support multiple cryptographic algorithms, so users can quickly switch if one is broken. Common symmetric key algorithms include AES, Twofish, and Serpent. Common cryptographic hash algorithm alternatives include SHA-2 (including SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 AND SHA-512) and SHA-3. [crypto_algorithm_agility]

    N/A. The software produced by this project does not implement cryptographic algorithms or provide cryptographic security mechanisms, so cryptographic algorithm agility is not applicable. commitment-issues runs locally in the user's Git workflow, does not expose a network service, and does not transmit repository content. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/docs/security-review-2026-07.md and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues#privacy.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST support storing authentication credentials (such as passwords and dynamic tokens) and private cryptographic keys in files that are separate from other information (such as configuration files, databases, and logs), and permit users to update and replace them without code recompilation. If the project never processes authentication credentials and private cryptographic keys, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_credential_agility]

    N/A. The project never processes authentication credentials or private cryptographic keys as part of its runtime behavior, so credential/key storage agility is not applicable. commitment-issues is local Git-hook tooling and does not provide authentication, store passwords, manage private keys, expose a network service, or transmit repository content. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/docs/security-review-2026-07.md and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues#privacy.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 SHOULD be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    N/A. commitment-issues does not support network communications. It runs locally inside the user's Git workflow, reads local Git state and project files, and shells out to local tools such as ESLint, Prettier, and the configured test runner. It does not expose a network service or transmit repository content.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    N/A. commitment-issues does not use TLS because it does not perform network communications. It runs locally inside the user's Git workflow, reads local Git state and local files, and shells out to local tools such as ESLint, Prettier, and the configured test runner. It does not expose a network service or transmit repository content.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform TLS certificate verification by default when using TLS, including on subresources. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_certificate_verification]
    Note that incorrect TLS certificate verification is a common mistake. For more information, see "The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser Software" by Martin Georgiev et al. and "Do you trust this application?" by Michael Catanzaro.

    N/A. The software produced by this project does not use TLS, expose a network service, or transmit repository content, so TLS certificate verification is not applicable. commitment-issues runs locally in the user's Git workflow and shells out to local tools. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/docs/security-review-2026-07.md and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues#privacy.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform certificate verification before sending HTTP headers with private information (such as secure cookies). If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_verification_private]

    N/A. The software produced by this project does not use TLS and does not send HTTP headers with private information such as secure cookies. commitment-issues runs locally in the user's Git workflow, does not expose a network service, and does not transmit repository content. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/docs/security-review-2026-07.md and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues#privacy.


  • Secure release


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST cryptographically sign releases of the project results intended for widespread use, and there MUST be a documented process explaining to users how they can obtain the public signing keys and verify the signature(s). The private key for these signature(s) MUST NOT be on site(s) used to directly distribute the software to the public. If releases are not intended for widespread use, select "not applicable" (N/A). [signed_releases]
    The project results include both source code and any generated deliverables where applicable (e.g., executables, packages, and containers). Generated deliverables MAY be signed separately from source code. These MAY be implemented as signed git tags (using cryptographic digital signatures). Projects MAY provide generated results separately from tools like git, but in those cases, the separate results MUST be separately signed.

    The project has a release workflow that publishes through npm trusted publishing and generates SLSA provenance, but I do not see a documented user-facing process explaining how users can obtain public signing keys and verify release signatures. Keep this Unmet until release-signing verification instructions are documented. Current partial release-security evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/workflows/publish.yml.


    Barely enough for a badge.

    It is SUGGESTED that in the version control system, each important version tag (a tag that is part of a major release, minor release, or fixes publicly noted vulnerabilities) be cryptographically signed and verifiable as described in signed_releases. [version_tags_signed]

    The project uses version tags for releases, but I do not see evidence that important version tags are cryptographically signed and verifiable. Keep this Unmet until release tags are signed and the verification process is documented. Current release-tag workflow evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/workflows/publish.yml.


  • Other security issues


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project results MUST check all inputs from potentially untrusted sources to ensure they are valid (an *allowlist*), and reject invalid inputs, if there are any restrictions on the data at all. [input_validation]
    Note that comparing input against a list of "bad formats" (aka a *denylist*) is normally not enough, because attackers can often work around a denylist. In particular, numbers are converted into internal formats and then checked if they are between their minimum and maximum (inclusive), and text strings are checked to ensure that they are valid text patterns (e.g., valid UTF-8, length, syntax, etc.). Some data may need to be "anything at all" (e.g., a file uploader), but these would typically be rare.

    No (currently in progress).

    commitment-issues uses an allowlist for recognized configuration keys and warns about unknown configuration options, helping prevent configuration typos from silently changing behavior. However, it does not yet fully validate and reject all invalid configuration values from untrusted inputs (such as malformed values in package.json).

    To fully satisfy this requirement, the project will implement strict validation for configuration values (for example, ensuring booleans are booleans, tone is one of the supported values, arrays contain only valid element types, and numeric values are within valid ranges), rejecting or ignoring invalid inputs with clear diagnostic messages.


    Enough for a badge!

    Hardening mechanisms SHOULD be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. [hardening]
    Hardening mechanisms may include HTTP headers like Content Security Policy (CSP), compiler flags to mitigate attacks (such as -fstack-protector), or compiler flags to eliminate undefined behavior. For our purposes least privilege is not considered a hardening mechanism (least privilege is important, but separate).

    The project uses documented hardening mechanisms to reduce the chance that software defects become security vulnerabilities. These include safer process spawning with argument vectors instead of shell interpolation for file paths, defensive working-tree guards that refuse risky staged/unstaged mutations, cross-platform path normalization tests, CodeQL static analysis, OpenSSF Scorecard, Dependabot, pinned GitHub Actions, npm trusted publishing, and SLSA provenance for releases.

    https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/docs/security-hardening.md


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST provide an assurance case that justifies why its security requirements are met. The assurance case MUST include: a description of the threat model, clear identification of trust boundaries, an argument that secure design principles have been applied, and an argument that common implementation security weaknesses have been countered. (URL required) [assurance_case]
    An assurance case is "a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a specified set of critical claims regarding a system’s properties are adequately justified for a given application in a given environment" ("Software Assurance Using Structured Assurance Case Models", Thomas Rhodes et al, NIST Interagency Report 7608). Trust boundaries are boundaries where data or execution changes its level of trust, e.g., a server's boundaries in a typical web application. It's common to list secure design principles (such as Saltzer and Schroeer) and common implementation security weaknesses (such as the OWASP top 10 or CWE/SANS top 25), and show how each are countered. The BadgeApp assurance case may be a useful example. This is related to documentation_security, documentation_architecture, and implement_secure_design.

    Not yet.

    This requirement is not currently satisfied.

    To meet this requirement, the project should publish an assurance case (for example, docs/security/assurance-case.md) that includes:

    • A description of the project's threat model, including expected attackers, assets, and assumptions.
    • Clear identification of trust boundaries (such as user repositories, Git hooks, local configuration, the operating system, external tools, and CI environments).
    • An explanation of how secure design principles are applied (least privilege, fail-safe defaults, defense in depth, secure defaults, and minimizing trust).
    • An explanation of how common implementation security weaknesses are mitigated (input validation, command execution safety, path handling, temporary files, dependency management, error handling, and testing).

    Once published, the URL to this document can be provided as evidence for this requirement.


 Analysis 2/2 ●

  • Static code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one static analysis tool with rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    The project's static analysis includes CodeQL, a security-focused static analysis tool for JavaScript/TypeScript that is intended to find common vulnerability patterns. The project also uses ESLint's recommended JavaScript baseline and project-specific error rules to catch common code mistakes. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/eslint.config.js.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) MUST be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    N/A. The project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language such as C or C++. commitment-issues is a JavaScript/Node.js package using pure ESM .mjs source files, so memory-safety dynamic-analysis requirements for memory-unsafe languages do not apply. Evidence is here: https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md#project-layout and https://github.com/RoryGlenn/commitment-issues/blob/main/package.json.



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Project badge entry owned by: RoryGlenn.
Entry created on 2026-07-08 02:38:47 UTC, last updated on 2026-07-09 21:04:40 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-07-09 17:43:22 UTC.